African Press Agency
14 June 2008
Chadian rebels say their arrival in the capital N’djamena is "imminent" as they are nearer following a "farther march inside the national territory," the spokesperson of the rebels Doctor Ali Gadaya told APA, adding that the units crossed on Friday the towns of Goz Beida and Am Timan, at 600km south and south-east of the capital.
The same source said the rebels entered Adde and Am Djirema at the Chad - Sudan border.
On Thursday, the military aircraft had tried to stop their progress by shelling their positions, APA learned from military sources.
"We shot down two MI-24 helicopters. The first fell in Tombrouk. The second landed on the Arkou Mountain, at the north-eastern entry of Abeche," Ali Gadaya said.
The Chadian authorities said these were indoctrination statements. They spoke of an emergency landing of a helicopter on the mountains surrounding Abeche due to "engine problems during a test flight."
In a release published Wednesday, the government acknowledged the incursion of the rebels into Adde and Am Djirema, but said it had taken "all the necessary steps."
On 2 June, the French general commanding the European forces deployed in Chad (EUFOR) Jean-Philippe Ganascia had said that the rebels who had attacked the capital, in February, to overthrow President Idriss Deby Itno "were not able" to launch a new raid on N’djamena.
Contrary to the February attack when their units had suffered much shelling by the army helicopters, the rebel troops of General Nouri seem to have new anti-aircraft batteries; military sources told APA under anonymity.
No sign of panic was notice on Friday in N’djamena, but the inhabitants, who were very much affected by the 2 and 3 February battles were keenly following the situation, APA noted.
In Abeche, about 900km north-east of the capital, the United Nations staff as well as the humanitarian agents were gathered at given places around the airport for their evacuation to the capital, UN sources revealed.
Inhabitants of the city, located at less than 200km from the incursion zone, live in fear of an attack, they told APA Friday by telephone.
14 June, 2008
Chadian rebels capture Goz-Beida garrison.
African Press Agency
14 June 2008
The Chadian rebels attacked and captured the Goz Beida fortress on Saturday afternoon, military and rebel sources told APA.
After claiming to be beyond this city on Friday, the rebels have expressed their aim to reach the Chadian capital at about 750 km from this troubled area.
According to reliable sources, mainly humanitarian, a strong rebel column is heading towards N’Djamena while a second one spotted by the European forces at 150 km from Abéché in the Abdi district, is also moving to this key city in eastern Chad which is regarded as the second strategic lock alongside Goz Beida.
A third column went through the Am-Dam district on Friday and is getting near the Mangalmé city at about 600 km in the north-east of N’Djamena, corroborating sources disclosed to APA.
Meanwhile, the Parliament has condemned this rebel incursion in a statement sent to APA on Saturday, accusing Khartoum of failing to respect the accords signed during the March OIC summit in Dakar.
14 June 2008
The Chadian rebels attacked and captured the Goz Beida fortress on Saturday afternoon, military and rebel sources told APA.
After claiming to be beyond this city on Friday, the rebels have expressed their aim to reach the Chadian capital at about 750 km from this troubled area.
According to reliable sources, mainly humanitarian, a strong rebel column is heading towards N’Djamena while a second one spotted by the European forces at 150 km from Abéché in the Abdi district, is also moving to this key city in eastern Chad which is regarded as the second strategic lock alongside Goz Beida.
A third column went through the Am-Dam district on Friday and is getting near the Mangalmé city at about 600 km in the north-east of N’Djamena, corroborating sources disclosed to APA.
Meanwhile, the Parliament has condemned this rebel incursion in a statement sent to APA on Saturday, accusing Khartoum of failing to respect the accords signed during the March OIC summit in Dakar.
French army backs Djibouti against Eritrea.
Afrol News
13 June 2008
As the UN Security Council, the Arab League and the African Union urge Eritrea to stop its aggression against neighbouring Djibouti, French officers stationed in Djibouti revealed France is providing direct military support to the country. France is going to step up its military presence in Djibouti with immediate effect.
Speaking to the government-controlled press agency 'Agence Djiboutienne d'Information' (ADI), French officer Colonel Ducret said troops from France are "providing assistance in logistics, medical but also support in terms of intelligence service to the Djiboutian army."
This information has been confirmed by Paris Ministry of Defence spokesmen, talking to the French press. These sources add, that while French troops have not been involved in the fighting with Eritreans, they have provided aerial surveillance of the border, informing Djibouti's army about Eritrean troop movements. Other assistance had mainly focused on medical aid.
Further, the Ministry of Defence had decided to increase French military presence in Djibouti while the conflict with Eritrea goes on. There exist plans to establish mobile French military bases close to the Eritrean border, which would assure against an Eritrean advance into the small Horn of Africa country, unnamed French Ministry sources revealed to the Paris press.
France already has a large military base in Djibouti, which it considers a major ally. The Paris government was among the first countries to condemn the Eritrean aggression against Djibouti. The French Foreign Ministry called "on both parties, particularly Eritrea, to commit to a cease-fire and resume dialogue."
Yesterday, only the US State Department's condemnation of Eritrea was clearer. A State Department spokesperson referred to the border conflict as a "military aggression" committed by Eritrea. Also the US has a large military basis in Djibouti, but the US Army has yet to state whether it is assisting its host nation in this conflict. US-Eritrean relations, on the other hand, are cool, with Washington accusing Eritrea of arming Somali Islamists and groups close to al Qaeda.
During the day, global condemnation of Eritrea has become even wider. The Arab League today urged Eritrea to withdraw its forces from border areas near Djibouti "immediately" and to respect Djibouti's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Eritrea however has rejected a fact finding mission from the League, which was to find ways to ease tension.
Even the UN Security Council today condemned "Eritrea's military action against Djibouti," clearly putting the blame on the Asmara government. It urged "both parties, in particular Eritrea, to show maximum restraint and withdraw forces to the status-quo ante." The UN body further urged Eritrea to stop resisting international efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and peace "in a manner consistent with international law."
In addition to the Arab League's effort to approach Eritrea, also an African Union (AU) is currently trying to reach out to both countries. However, also the AU has so far been met with a cold shoulder by the Asmara government.
Eritrean authorities, increasingly out of touch with the international community following years of diplomatic isolation, totally deny what they are accused of. The Asmara Foreign Ministry has issued a press release calling the massive condemnation of its military aggression against Djibouti "baseless and mendacious statements."
Meanwhile, in Djibouti, authorities are encouraged by the massive international support. President Ismail Omar Guelleh told the state agency 'ADI' that "If Eritrea wants war, it will get it." He made it clear that he considers his country to be at war with Eritrea.
13 June 2008
As the UN Security Council, the Arab League and the African Union urge Eritrea to stop its aggression against neighbouring Djibouti, French officers stationed in Djibouti revealed France is providing direct military support to the country. France is going to step up its military presence in Djibouti with immediate effect.
Speaking to the government-controlled press agency 'Agence Djiboutienne d'Information' (ADI), French officer Colonel Ducret said troops from France are "providing assistance in logistics, medical but also support in terms of intelligence service to the Djiboutian army."
This information has been confirmed by Paris Ministry of Defence spokesmen, talking to the French press. These sources add, that while French troops have not been involved in the fighting with Eritreans, they have provided aerial surveillance of the border, informing Djibouti's army about Eritrean troop movements. Other assistance had mainly focused on medical aid.
Further, the Ministry of Defence had decided to increase French military presence in Djibouti while the conflict with Eritrea goes on. There exist plans to establish mobile French military bases close to the Eritrean border, which would assure against an Eritrean advance into the small Horn of Africa country, unnamed French Ministry sources revealed to the Paris press.
France already has a large military base in Djibouti, which it considers a major ally. The Paris government was among the first countries to condemn the Eritrean aggression against Djibouti. The French Foreign Ministry called "on both parties, particularly Eritrea, to commit to a cease-fire and resume dialogue."
Yesterday, only the US State Department's condemnation of Eritrea was clearer. A State Department spokesperson referred to the border conflict as a "military aggression" committed by Eritrea. Also the US has a large military basis in Djibouti, but the US Army has yet to state whether it is assisting its host nation in this conflict. US-Eritrean relations, on the other hand, are cool, with Washington accusing Eritrea of arming Somali Islamists and groups close to al Qaeda.
During the day, global condemnation of Eritrea has become even wider. The Arab League today urged Eritrea to withdraw its forces from border areas near Djibouti "immediately" and to respect Djibouti's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Eritrea however has rejected a fact finding mission from the League, which was to find ways to ease tension.
Even the UN Security Council today condemned "Eritrea's military action against Djibouti," clearly putting the blame on the Asmara government. It urged "both parties, in particular Eritrea, to show maximum restraint and withdraw forces to the status-quo ante." The UN body further urged Eritrea to stop resisting international efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and peace "in a manner consistent with international law."
In addition to the Arab League's effort to approach Eritrea, also an African Union (AU) is currently trying to reach out to both countries. However, also the AU has so far been met with a cold shoulder by the Asmara government.
Eritrean authorities, increasingly out of touch with the international community following years of diplomatic isolation, totally deny what they are accused of. The Asmara Foreign Ministry has issued a press release calling the massive condemnation of its military aggression against Djibouti "baseless and mendacious statements."
Meanwhile, in Djibouti, authorities are encouraged by the massive international support. President Ismail Omar Guelleh told the state agency 'ADI' that "If Eritrea wants war, it will get it." He made it clear that he considers his country to be at war with Eritrea.
ERITREA-DJIBOUTI (2): ALSO FRENCH SOLDIERS ON BORDER.
MISNA
13 June 2008
A French military unit was deployed alongside the Djibouti troops on the border with Eritrea, where the armies of the two Horn of Africa nations engaged in violent clashes over the past days. The news was reported by the official Djibouti news agency, (ADI, ‘Agence djiboutienne d’information’) citing military officials, specifying that “French soldiers are currently in Moulouhlé (around 15km from the border) in support of the Djiboutian army”, without however providing details on the number of troops. ADI adds that the French forces have “provided logistic and health support since the start of the hostilities”, under defence accords signed between the nations in 1977. No confirmation has arrived so far from French or international sources.
France in Djibouti has its most important military base of the African continent. On visiting the wounded soldiers at a French military hospital a few hours ago, Djibouti’s President told reporters that his nation is “absolutely” at war with Eritrea, as calls for dialogue between the nations continue to pour in from around the world, including Egypt and the Arab League. In an appeal launched last night at the conclusion of an emergency meeting on the tension between the Horn of Africa nations, Arab League Deputy Secretary General Ahmed Ben Helli called on Eritrea to immediately withdraw troops from the border, specifying that contacts are already underway with Asmara. The Eritrean government apparently accepted a visit of a special commission to investigate the border clashes.
13 June 2008
A French military unit was deployed alongside the Djibouti troops on the border with Eritrea, where the armies of the two Horn of Africa nations engaged in violent clashes over the past days. The news was reported by the official Djibouti news agency, (ADI, ‘Agence djiboutienne d’information’) citing military officials, specifying that “French soldiers are currently in Moulouhlé (around 15km from the border) in support of the Djiboutian army”, without however providing details on the number of troops. ADI adds that the French forces have “provided logistic and health support since the start of the hostilities”, under defence accords signed between the nations in 1977. No confirmation has arrived so far from French or international sources.
France in Djibouti has its most important military base of the African continent. On visiting the wounded soldiers at a French military hospital a few hours ago, Djibouti’s President told reporters that his nation is “absolutely” at war with Eritrea, as calls for dialogue between the nations continue to pour in from around the world, including Egypt and the Arab League. In an appeal launched last night at the conclusion of an emergency meeting on the tension between the Horn of Africa nations, Arab League Deputy Secretary General Ahmed Ben Helli called on Eritrea to immediately withdraw troops from the border, specifying that contacts are already underway with Asmara. The Eritrean government apparently accepted a visit of a special commission to investigate the border clashes.
EAST: CONFUSED REPORTS ON ARMY-REBEL CLASHES.
MISNA
13 June 2008
The toll remains unknown of fighting of the past 48 hours between rebels of the Union for Democratic Change (UDC) – part of a vast National Alliance (AN) of armed formations active for years in a bid to overthrow President Idriss Deby – and the Chadian army. According to the local press, close to the rebellion, the fighting was particularly intense, though the most serious consequences were apparently caused by bombings conducted yesterday morning by three army helicopters. The local press also confirms that at least one of the helicopters was shot down, though based on an official version it made an emergency landing at the Abeché airport (main city in east), and that the nearby area of Dar Sila is since yesterday entirely under the control of the rebellion. While the rebel movements once again accused French soldiers of intervening in support of the Chadian army, the government of N’Djamena attributed “the aggression” to “mercenaries hired by Khartoum”. Chad and Sudan have for at least two years accused each other of supporting their respective internal rebellions, despite many international mediation attempts.
13 June 2008
The toll remains unknown of fighting of the past 48 hours between rebels of the Union for Democratic Change (UDC) – part of a vast National Alliance (AN) of armed formations active for years in a bid to overthrow President Idriss Deby – and the Chadian army. According to the local press, close to the rebellion, the fighting was particularly intense, though the most serious consequences were apparently caused by bombings conducted yesterday morning by three army helicopters. The local press also confirms that at least one of the helicopters was shot down, though based on an official version it made an emergency landing at the Abeché airport (main city in east), and that the nearby area of Dar Sila is since yesterday entirely under the control of the rebellion. While the rebel movements once again accused French soldiers of intervening in support of the Chadian army, the government of N’Djamena attributed “the aggression” to “mercenaries hired by Khartoum”. Chad and Sudan have for at least two years accused each other of supporting their respective internal rebellions, despite many international mediation attempts.
THREE COLOMBIANS ARRESTED IN ALLEGED PLOT AGAINST PRESIDENT.
MISNA
13 June 2008
Four people, including three Colombians, were arrested in Ecuador in connection to an alleged plot to kill Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa.
“We are still at preliminary investigations and don’t know the particular details. We only know that there were foreigners with contracts to attack the president, connected to some people in Ecuador”, said the Attorney General Washington Pérez.
Ecuador’s Security Minister Gustavo Larrea told Bogota-based radio Caracol that “police intelligence allowed us to uncover the group plotting to assassinate the President. We do not know yet to whom they are linked”. In an interview with the ‘Ecuavisa’ TV, President Correa confirmed that “police has been on their path for some time”, however minimising the case: “There is a high possibility that they’re simply con men, since the men asked for money in exchange for information. We will continue to investigate, but we are not alarmed”. A few days ago, Luciano Marín, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, a member of the secretariat of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), had spoken of an alleged plot to assassinate Correa in a statement sent to the ‘Agencia bolivariana de prensa’ (ABP). Márquez accused Colombian President Alvaro Uribe of wanting to kill Correa and his Venezuelan counterpart Hugo Chavez.
13 June 2008
Four people, including three Colombians, were arrested in Ecuador in connection to an alleged plot to kill Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa.
“We are still at preliminary investigations and don’t know the particular details. We only know that there were foreigners with contracts to attack the president, connected to some people in Ecuador”, said the Attorney General Washington Pérez.
Ecuador’s Security Minister Gustavo Larrea told Bogota-based radio Caracol that “police intelligence allowed us to uncover the group plotting to assassinate the President. We do not know yet to whom they are linked”. In an interview with the ‘Ecuavisa’ TV, President Correa confirmed that “police has been on their path for some time”, however minimising the case: “There is a high possibility that they’re simply con men, since the men asked for money in exchange for information. We will continue to investigate, but we are not alarmed”. A few days ago, Luciano Marín, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, a member of the secretariat of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), had spoken of an alleged plot to assassinate Correa in a statement sent to the ‘Agencia bolivariana de prensa’ (ABP). Márquez accused Colombian President Alvaro Uribe of wanting to kill Correa and his Venezuelan counterpart Hugo Chavez.
13 June, 2008
Equatorial Guinea to try Simon Mann on Tuesday.
Mail & Guardian
13 June 2008
Bernardino Ndze Biyoa
British mercenary Simon Mann, an Eton-educated former special forces officer, will go on trial in Equatorial Guinea on Tuesday for leading a failed 2004 coup, the state's public prosecutor said on Friday.
Jose Olo Obono said that Mann, who was arrested in 2004 in Zimbabwe with 70 mercenaries en route to the oil-rich West African nation, will face three main charges: crimes against the head of state, crimes against the government and crimes against the peace and independence of the state.
"There are evident facts in this case, so what can he say?" Olo Obono said.
"The maximum sentence would be the death penalty ... but I don't think in this case we will seek the death penalty."
Mann, held in Malabo's notorious Black Beach prison, said in a television interview broadcast in Britain in March that he plotted to oust the West African state's President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who has ruled the former Spanish colony since 1979.
Mann, heir to a brewing fortune who attended Britain's exclusive Eton School, was extradited from Zimbabwe in February after serving a four-year sentence for buying weapons without a licence. Prosecutors said the arms were to be used in the coup.
The arrest of Mann, who once served in Britain's elite Special Air Service regiment, had ended the career of one of the last prominent "dogs of war" still active on the African continent. One of Africa's most notorious foreign mercenaries, Frenchman Bob Denard, died in October.
After his army service, Mann (55) later helped found two security firms that became bywords for mercenary activity across Africa in the 1990s -- Executive Outcomes and Sandline International.
Mann had appealed against his extradition by arguing he would not receive a fair trial and could be tortured in Equatorial Guinea, which has faced sharp international criticism for human rights abuses.
The High Court in Zimbabwe, which has an oil-supply deal with Equatorial Guinea, dismissed his argument.
Equatorial Guinea authorities have said Mann has testified that Mark Thatcher, the son of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, knew all about the scheme to topple the government of sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest oil producer.
Mark Thatcher has denied any involvement in the plan. He was arrested in 2004 by South African police at his Cape Town home on suspicion of bankrolling the coup plot, but he eventually agreed a plea-bargain deal with South African authorities.
Olo Obono said journalists would be allowed to cover the Mann trial but cameras would not be permitted in the courtroom.
Eleven other men, including several foreigners, are already serving sentences of between 13 and 34 years in Equatorial Guinea in connection with the alleged plot. -- Reuters
13 June 2008
Bernardino Ndze Biyoa
British mercenary Simon Mann, an Eton-educated former special forces officer, will go on trial in Equatorial Guinea on Tuesday for leading a failed 2004 coup, the state's public prosecutor said on Friday.
Jose Olo Obono said that Mann, who was arrested in 2004 in Zimbabwe with 70 mercenaries en route to the oil-rich West African nation, will face three main charges: crimes against the head of state, crimes against the government and crimes against the peace and independence of the state.
"There are evident facts in this case, so what can he say?" Olo Obono said.
"The maximum sentence would be the death penalty ... but I don't think in this case we will seek the death penalty."
Mann, held in Malabo's notorious Black Beach prison, said in a television interview broadcast in Britain in March that he plotted to oust the West African state's President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who has ruled the former Spanish colony since 1979.
Mann, heir to a brewing fortune who attended Britain's exclusive Eton School, was extradited from Zimbabwe in February after serving a four-year sentence for buying weapons without a licence. Prosecutors said the arms were to be used in the coup.
The arrest of Mann, who once served in Britain's elite Special Air Service regiment, had ended the career of one of the last prominent "dogs of war" still active on the African continent. One of Africa's most notorious foreign mercenaries, Frenchman Bob Denard, died in October.
After his army service, Mann (55) later helped found two security firms that became bywords for mercenary activity across Africa in the 1990s -- Executive Outcomes and Sandline International.
Mann had appealed against his extradition by arguing he would not receive a fair trial and could be tortured in Equatorial Guinea, which has faced sharp international criticism for human rights abuses.
The High Court in Zimbabwe, which has an oil-supply deal with Equatorial Guinea, dismissed his argument.
Equatorial Guinea authorities have said Mann has testified that Mark Thatcher, the son of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, knew all about the scheme to topple the government of sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest oil producer.
Mark Thatcher has denied any involvement in the plan. He was arrested in 2004 by South African police at his Cape Town home on suspicion of bankrolling the coup plot, but he eventually agreed a plea-bargain deal with South African authorities.
Olo Obono said journalists would be allowed to cover the Mann trial but cameras would not be permitted in the courtroom.
Eleven other men, including several foreigners, are already serving sentences of between 13 and 34 years in Equatorial Guinea in connection with the alleged plot. -- Reuters
Senator Under Probe for Massacre.
The News
13 June 2008
By Benjamin B. Sworh
Margibi County Senator Roland Kaine was Thursday invited by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the massacre of more than 13 persons in Bassa Town, Margibi County.
Senator Kaine was called to assist the police with investigation over circumstances surrounding the incident.
The Director of Price Analysis at the Ministry of Commerce, Charles Bennie had accused Senator Kaine of masterminding the killings of men who had gone to work on his father's farm.
Speaking at the police headquarters on Capitol Hill, Senator Kaine denied that he masterminded the killings.
Senator Kaine said he would cooperate with police to facilitate the investigation.
The Margibi County Senator was accompanied to the Police headquarters by four of his Senate colleagues Gloria Scott, Abel Massalay, Frederick Cherue and James Momo.
Kaine said he was concerned about the number of persons who lost their lives.
Earlier, Senate President Pro-tempore Isaac Nyenabo disclosed that the Justice Ministry wrote plenary requesting it to allow Senator Kaine to assist with the investigation into the massacre of the men.
Nyenabo described the act as disastrous, barbaric and called on the Justice Ministry to investigate the matter and bring the perpetrators to justice.
A survivor of the massacre, Moko Gibson, said he and his colleagues were attacked last Saturday by men using AK-47 raffles and machetes.
13 June 2008
By Benjamin B. Sworh
Margibi County Senator Roland Kaine was Thursday invited by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the massacre of more than 13 persons in Bassa Town, Margibi County.
Senator Kaine was called to assist the police with investigation over circumstances surrounding the incident.
The Director of Price Analysis at the Ministry of Commerce, Charles Bennie had accused Senator Kaine of masterminding the killings of men who had gone to work on his father's farm.
Speaking at the police headquarters on Capitol Hill, Senator Kaine denied that he masterminded the killings.
Senator Kaine said he would cooperate with police to facilitate the investigation.
The Margibi County Senator was accompanied to the Police headquarters by four of his Senate colleagues Gloria Scott, Abel Massalay, Frederick Cherue and James Momo.
Kaine said he was concerned about the number of persons who lost their lives.
Earlier, Senate President Pro-tempore Isaac Nyenabo disclosed that the Justice Ministry wrote plenary requesting it to allow Senator Kaine to assist with the investigation into the massacre of the men.
Nyenabo described the act as disastrous, barbaric and called on the Justice Ministry to investigate the matter and bring the perpetrators to justice.
A survivor of the massacre, Moko Gibson, said he and his colleagues were attacked last Saturday by men using AK-47 raffles and machetes.
DRC Refuses Transparency.
Le Phare
13 June 2008
By J-R. Bompolonga
Les fonds affectés à l’Initiative pour la Transparence dans la gestion des Industries extractives (Itie) en 2007 et 2008 n’ont pas été débloqués. Livrée à la presse au cours de l’atelier organisé par la coalition « Publiez ce que vous payez », au centre culturel Boboto du 6 au 7 juin 2008, cette information a été confirmée hier au Phare par Jean- Pierre Muteba, membre de la Société civile et président du Conseil consultatif de l’Itie.
Chiffres à l’appui, il a indiqué que 100.000 dollars sur 1.000.000 inscrits au budget 2007 ont été livrés à l’Itie en janvier 2008. Cependant, aucun souci n’a encore été libéré en faveur de l’Itie sur les 756.000 dollars lui alloués pour l’exercice budgétaire de cette année.
Face à cette situation, l’Itie/Rd Congo n’est pas en mesure de remplir sa mission, celle d’assurer la mise en œuvre des principes et des critères de l’Initiative en Rd Congo. Les 100.000 dollars libérés au mois de janvier ont permis d’honorer les arriérés de loyer et des dettes contractées par l’Itie.
Bloquée par le gouvernement, cette structure ne peut pas réaliser son but qui est d’assurer la transparence des paiements et des revenus générés par des industries extractives, de rendre cette information accessible à la société civile et au grand public, et de favoriser le bon usage de cette richesse afin qu’elle soit un moteur de croissance économique, contribue au développement durable et à la réduction de la pauvreté.
Ces fonds lui auraient pourtant permis d’exercer ses activités qui consistent à collecter les statistiques sur la production, la commercialisation et les paiements faits à l’Etat par les industries extractives ; à faire auditer les comptes des industries extractives et de l’Etat puis rapprocher les données ; à divulguer et diffuser les paiements et les recettes ; à rendre public tous les contrats importants du secteur extractif.
Rappelons que depuis mai 2005, le gouvernement de la Rd Congo a levé l’option de mettre en œuvre l’Itie en vue de promouvoir une meilleure gouvernance des ressources naturelles pour qu’elles deviennent un levier de lutte contre la pauvreté. Dans le décret portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du comité de l’Itie/Rd Congo, trois structures ont été mises sur pied. Il s’agit du Comité de pilotage, présidé par le ministère du Plan, du Conseil consultatif, présidé par la Société civile, et du Secrétariat exécutif.
L’Itie a été créé pour encourager tout pays qui regorge des ressources naturelles importantes à accroître la transparence de la gestion des recettes tirées de l’exploitation minière, pétrolière, gazière et forestière.
13 June 2008
By J-R. Bompolonga
Les fonds affectés à l’Initiative pour la Transparence dans la gestion des Industries extractives (Itie) en 2007 et 2008 n’ont pas été débloqués. Livrée à la presse au cours de l’atelier organisé par la coalition « Publiez ce que vous payez », au centre culturel Boboto du 6 au 7 juin 2008, cette information a été confirmée hier au Phare par Jean- Pierre Muteba, membre de la Société civile et président du Conseil consultatif de l’Itie.
Chiffres à l’appui, il a indiqué que 100.000 dollars sur 1.000.000 inscrits au budget 2007 ont été livrés à l’Itie en janvier 2008. Cependant, aucun souci n’a encore été libéré en faveur de l’Itie sur les 756.000 dollars lui alloués pour l’exercice budgétaire de cette année.
Face à cette situation, l’Itie/Rd Congo n’est pas en mesure de remplir sa mission, celle d’assurer la mise en œuvre des principes et des critères de l’Initiative en Rd Congo. Les 100.000 dollars libérés au mois de janvier ont permis d’honorer les arriérés de loyer et des dettes contractées par l’Itie.
Bloquée par le gouvernement, cette structure ne peut pas réaliser son but qui est d’assurer la transparence des paiements et des revenus générés par des industries extractives, de rendre cette information accessible à la société civile et au grand public, et de favoriser le bon usage de cette richesse afin qu’elle soit un moteur de croissance économique, contribue au développement durable et à la réduction de la pauvreté.
Ces fonds lui auraient pourtant permis d’exercer ses activités qui consistent à collecter les statistiques sur la production, la commercialisation et les paiements faits à l’Etat par les industries extractives ; à faire auditer les comptes des industries extractives et de l’Etat puis rapprocher les données ; à divulguer et diffuser les paiements et les recettes ; à rendre public tous les contrats importants du secteur extractif.
Rappelons que depuis mai 2005, le gouvernement de la Rd Congo a levé l’option de mettre en œuvre l’Itie en vue de promouvoir une meilleure gouvernance des ressources naturelles pour qu’elles deviennent un levier de lutte contre la pauvreté. Dans le décret portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du comité de l’Itie/Rd Congo, trois structures ont été mises sur pied. Il s’agit du Comité de pilotage, présidé par le ministère du Plan, du Conseil consultatif, présidé par la Société civile, et du Secrétariat exécutif.
L’Itie a été créé pour encourager tout pays qui regorge des ressources naturelles importantes à accroître la transparence de la gestion des recettes tirées de l’exploitation minière, pétrolière, gazière et forestière.
ICTR Can Retract a Trial, Says Top Prosecutor.
Hirondelle News Agency
12 June 2008
Editor's Note: This is a proverbial double-edged sword for the prosecution. Transferring the case to the ICTR would acknowledge that Rwandan authorities did not conduct the investigations properly and thus the Office of the Prosecutor will further damage the reputation of the Rwandan justice system, further reducing their chances of obtaining the transfer of remaining cases and convicted individuals back to Rwanda. Therefore, this may just be rhetoric designed to make the OTP appear unbiased in light of the revelations of Carla del Ponte, Michael Hourigan, Florence Hartmann, and others demonstrating years of judical tampering at the ICTR designed to protect the RPF/A from prosecution.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has legal powers to retract the trial of four soldiers arrested in Rwanda on Wednesday if it was deemed that the case was not conducted in a transparent manner, Prosecutor, Hassan Jallow, has warned.
The Rwandan military arrested the soldiers, including a Brigadier General, for alleged killings of 13 clergymen and are expected to appear in court soon. The alleged killings took place on 5 June at Kabgayi, central Rwanda.
"If it [trial] is badly conducted, we have the competence to bring the case to the Tribunal," he told reporters on Thursday.
He added that Rwanda shared concurrent jurisdiction with the tribunal, but the Tribunal has the primacy, Justice Jallow stated, adding that the trial would be closely monitored by the Office of Prosecutor (OTP) under William Egbe, a Senior Trial Attorney who is head of the ICTR's Special Investigative Unit (SIU).
"The Rwandan government asked to be given an opportunity to prosecute the case," Justice Jallow disclosed, adding that he agreed with the hope that it would be conducted in a manner which would bring reconciliation in Rwanda.
Asked why should the trial be allowed in Rwanda when already two ICTR Chambers have rejected transfers of two genocide accused for trials in Kigali on grounds that they may not get a fair trial, the Prosecutor responded: " The rejection [of transfers] was out of judicial cases whereas was not the case with the arrested Rwandan soldiers."
The soldiers' arrests follow last week's disclosure by the Prosecutor before the UN Security Council that some soldiers of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) had committed atrocities.
Justice Jallow's predecessor, Swiss Carla Del Ponte, was the first to disclose over the RPF investigations during her tenure as the ICTR prosecutor between 1999 and 2003. The Rwandan government in the past has been furious over the investigations and even reached a boiling point by refusing to co-operate with the UN tribunal and once even denied entry visa to Carla Del Ponte.
12 June 2008
Editor's Note: This is a proverbial double-edged sword for the prosecution. Transferring the case to the ICTR would acknowledge that Rwandan authorities did not conduct the investigations properly and thus the Office of the Prosecutor will further damage the reputation of the Rwandan justice system, further reducing their chances of obtaining the transfer of remaining cases and convicted individuals back to Rwanda. Therefore, this may just be rhetoric designed to make the OTP appear unbiased in light of the revelations of Carla del Ponte, Michael Hourigan, Florence Hartmann, and others demonstrating years of judical tampering at the ICTR designed to protect the RPF/A from prosecution.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has legal powers to retract the trial of four soldiers arrested in Rwanda on Wednesday if it was deemed that the case was not conducted in a transparent manner, Prosecutor, Hassan Jallow, has warned.
The Rwandan military arrested the soldiers, including a Brigadier General, for alleged killings of 13 clergymen and are expected to appear in court soon. The alleged killings took place on 5 June at Kabgayi, central Rwanda.
"If it [trial] is badly conducted, we have the competence to bring the case to the Tribunal," he told reporters on Thursday.
He added that Rwanda shared concurrent jurisdiction with the tribunal, but the Tribunal has the primacy, Justice Jallow stated, adding that the trial would be closely monitored by the Office of Prosecutor (OTP) under William Egbe, a Senior Trial Attorney who is head of the ICTR's Special Investigative Unit (SIU).
"The Rwandan government asked to be given an opportunity to prosecute the case," Justice Jallow disclosed, adding that he agreed with the hope that it would be conducted in a manner which would bring reconciliation in Rwanda.
Asked why should the trial be allowed in Rwanda when already two ICTR Chambers have rejected transfers of two genocide accused for trials in Kigali on grounds that they may not get a fair trial, the Prosecutor responded: " The rejection [of transfers] was out of judicial cases whereas was not the case with the arrested Rwandan soldiers."
The soldiers' arrests follow last week's disclosure by the Prosecutor before the UN Security Council that some soldiers of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) had committed atrocities.
Justice Jallow's predecessor, Swiss Carla Del Ponte, was the first to disclose over the RPF investigations during her tenure as the ICTR prosecutor between 1999 and 2003. The Rwandan government in the past has been furious over the investigations and even reached a boiling point by refusing to co-operate with the UN tribunal and once even denied entry visa to Carla Del Ponte.
A List of Clergymembers Killed in Rwanda 1994-1998.
Jerome Karabayinga in Kabgayi , Rwanda and
Clarisse Mwambali in Washington, D.C., USA.
Kigali , June 10, 1999: Rwandans celebrated Pentecost on May 24, 1999 . The
Roman Catholic Church of Rwanda reminded the followers to remember all catholic
priests and bishops slaughtered in Rwanda , especially since 1994. The mass
recollection included also unmentioned religious/laity such as the Belgian
nun Griet Bosmans who was slaughtered, along with 17 high school girls at
Muramba.
"Father in heaven, fifty days have celebrated the fullness of the mystery
of your revealed love. See your people gather in prayer, open to receive the
Spirit's flame. May it come to rest in our hearts and disperse the divisions
of word and tongue. With one voice and one song may we praise your name in
joy and thanksgiving. Grant this through Christ our Lord. Amen."
"A priest in the plateaus of the Diocese of Kabgayi starts his sermon by this
prayer. The priest went on to describe how the leadership of the Catholic
Church, once the undisputed dominant of the Rwandan spiritual life, is being
slowly but steadily decimated."
"Before we conclude, let us remember that at this very moment His Eminence
Augustin Misago, Bishop of Gikongoro is imprisoned in filthy conditions by
our leaders; that His Eminence Thaddee Ntihinyurwa, Bishop of Cyangugu and
many, many, many more religious and laity are persecuted by our political
leaders.
However, let us not be discouraged; let us not despair. The Pentecost must
give us hope. In deed, that day, 2000 years ago, when the mystery of love
was being revealed to the Church of Christ , the forces of evil were trying
to decimate the people of God. What did this evil endeavor produce at the
end? Martyrs, like Stephan and others, but also people like Saul, who later
became Paul, the most prominent apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ."
The following is an extended list of priests and bishops killed
in Rwanda from 1994-1998.
BISHOP AND FOREIGNERS:
His Eminence Vincent Nsengiyumva, Archbishop of Kigali, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Joseph Ruzindana, Bishop of Byumba, killed by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Innocent Gasabwoya, Vicar-General of Kabgayi, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Thaddee Nsengiyumva, Bishop of Kabgayi, killed by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Phocas Nikwigize, Bishop of Ruhengeri, killed by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) on November 30, 1996 in Goma, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
His Eminence Jean-Marie Rwabirinda, Vicar-General of Kabgayi, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Andre Sibomana, Acting Bishop of Kabgayi, killed
by the DMI in Kabgayi on March 9, 1998.
Chaplain Antoine Hategekimana, killed in Bukavu in November 1996, by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army, along with His Eminence Christopher
Munzihirwa-Mwene- Ngabo, Archbishop of Bukavu, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Chaplain Fidel Gahonzire, Chaplain of the Kabgayi Hospital,
killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
Father Guy Pinard, a Canadian, killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army in
February 1997, while conducting a Mass.
His Eminence Boniface Kagabo, acting bishop of Ruhengeri, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army on May 26, 1998.
Father Vjeco Curic, a Friar priest from Croatia, mysteriously killed with his
passenger (by the DMI) in front of the Holy Family Church of Kigali on January 31, 1998.
The following extendible list gives the distribution of slaughtered priests
by Diocese:
DIOCESE of BUTARE
1. Father Filmin Butera, Head of the parish of Higiro, killed in Butare on
May 31, 1994
2. Father Justine Furaha, Head of the Parish of Save, killed
in Butare on May 31, 1994
3. Father Alex Kayumba, Parish of Cyahinda, killed in the Parish of
Kiruhura in July 1994.
4. Father Charles Nshogoza, Head of the Parish of Cyahinda,
killed in Cyahinda.
5. Father Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Parish of Nyanza, killed in Nyanza in April
1994.
6. Father Francis Ngomirakiza, Head of the Parish of Karama,
Killed in Ndago, on July 5, 1994
7. Father Callixte Nkeshumpatse, Parish of Gakoma, killed in Bugesera.
8. Father Second Ntibaziga, Director of the Nursing School of Gakoma,
killed
in Gakoma on May 7, 1994
9. Father Innocent Nyangezi, Parish of Nyanza, killed in Nyanza in April
1994.
10. Father Tharcisse Rubingiza, Professor of Theology at the School of
Theology of Nyakibanda, killed in the Parish of Gisagara on April 26,
1994.
11. Father Jean Bosco Yirirwahandi, Head of the Parish of Nyanza, killed in
Nyanza, in April 1994.
These were killed in hospitals during April 7, 1994- December 1994:
12. Father Bonifasi Musoni,
13. Father John Ntiyamira,
14. Father Vitari Rutayisire,
15. Father Narcisse Semuriro.
This one has disappeared, probably killed in April-May 1994.
16. Father Felicien Muvara of Butare.
DIOCESE OF BYUMBA
1. Father Alex Havugimana, killed in Byumba in April 1994.
2. Father Joseph Hitimana, killed in Byumba April 1994.
3. Father Augustin Mashyenderi killed in the Parish of Nyinawimana in April
1994.
4. Father Gaspard Mudashimwa, Professor at the Rwesero Seminary,
killed in Rwesero on May 21, 1994
5. Father Ladislas Muhayemungu, killed in April 1994.
6. Father Celestin Muhayimana, killed in Nyinawimana in April 1994.
7. Father Fidel Mulinda killed in April 1994.
8. Father Faustine Murindwa killed in April 1994.
9. Father Christian Nkiliyehe killed in April 1994.
10. Father Athanase Nkundabanyanga, Bursar of the Diocese of Byumba, killed
in Byumba in April 1994
11. Father Thaddee Ciza, a Burundese refugee, d1sappeared in April 1994!
DIOCESE OF CYANGUGU
1. Father Joseph Boneza, Head of the Parish of Mibirizi, killed in
Cyangugu on May 19, 1994
2. Father Innocent Gashugi, killed in the hospital on May 17, 1994
DIOCESE OF GIKONGORO
1. Father Stratton Gakwaya, Bursar of the Diocese of Gikongoro, killed in
Kigali on April 7, 1994
2. Father Boniface Kanyoni, Parish of Kibeho, killed in Kigali on April 7,
1994.
3. Father Canisius Murinzi, Parish of Mbuga,
killed in Gikongoro on May 13, 1994
4. Father Aloys Musoni, Parish of Cyanika, killed in Gikongoro on May 13,
1994.
5. Father Pierre Ngoga, Head of the Parish of Kibeho, killed in Butare on
May 31, 1994
6. Father Jean Marie Vianney Niyirema, Head of the Parish of Kaduha, killed
in Kigali on April 7, 1994
7. Father Joseph Niyomugabo, Head of the Parish of Cyanika,
killed in Cyanika on April 24, 1994
8. Father Irenee Nyamwasa, Head of the Parish of Mbuga, killed in
Gikongoro on May 13, 1994
9. Father Alfred Nzabakurana, School Super Intendant of Gikongoro, killed
in Kigali on May 7, 1994
10. Father Jean Marie Rwanyabuto, Head of the Parish of Muganza, killed in
Gisagara on May 26, 1994
11. Father Jean Marie Sebera, Head of the Parish of Simbi, killed in Ndago
on July 5, 1994
12. Father Callixte Uwitonze, Parish of Gikongoro, killed in Nyanza in
April 1994.
DIOCESE OF KABGAYI
1. Father Tharcisse Gakuba, Parish of Muyunzwe, killed in
Bukomero, on May 24, 1994
2. Father Alfred Kayibanda, Parish of Kabgayi, killed in
Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
5. Father Alphonse Mbuguje, killed in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
7. Father Callixte Musonera, Head of the Parish of Kayenzi,
killed in Bukomero on May 24, 1994
8. Father Sylvester Ndabaretse (a Burundese refugee), Bursar of
the Diocese, killed in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
9. Father Celestin Niwenshuti, Parish of Byimana, killed in
i Bukomero on May 24, 1994
12. Father Bernard Ntamugabumwe, School Super intendant of Gitarama,
killed in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
13. Father Emmanuel, Parish of Gitarama, killed i Nyakabanda on July 7,
1994.
14. Father Francois Twagirmana, Parish of Kinazi, killed in
Masango in July 1994 Nyakanga.
16. Father Michel Gigi, Head of the Parish of Cyeza, killed in the
the hospital on July 7, 1994
17. Father Vianney Rusingizandekwe has disappeared.
DIOCESE OF KIBUNGO
1. Father Joseph Gatare, Director of the College of Mukarange ,
killed in Mukarange on April 12, 1994
2. Father Elisee Mpongano, Head of the Parish of Bare,
killed in Kibungo on April 15, 1994
3. Father Jean Bosco Munyawera, Head of the Parish of Mukarane
killed in Mukarange on April 12, 1994
4. Father Evode Mwanangu, Parish of Rukoma,
killed in Rukoma on April 8, 1994
5. Father Michel Nsengiyumva, Head of the Parish of Rukoma,
killed in Kibungo on April 18, 1994
6. Father Justin Ruterandongozi, Parish of Rukoma, killed in
Rukoma on April 7, 1994
ARCHDIOCESE OF KIGALI
1. Father Ananie Rugasira, Bursar of Ndera killed in Ndera
On April 9, 1994
2. Father Alexandre Ngeze killed in the Hospital of Rilima .
The following priests have disappeared:
3. Father Joseph Harelimana,
4. Father Felix Kabayiza,
5. Father Canisius Ndekezi.
DIOCESE OF NYUNDO
1. Father Mathias Gahinda, Head of the Parish of Mubuga,
killed in Kibuye in April 1994.
2. Father Edouard Gakwandi, Parish of Nyundo, killed in Nyundo
on April 9, 1994
3. Father Silas Gasake, Head of the Parish of Kibingo, killed in Nyundo on April 9, 1994 .
4. Father Albert Gashema, Parish of Mubuga, killed in April 1994.
5. Father Louis Gasore, Head of the Parish of Muhororo,
killed in Muhororo in April 1994.
6. Father Thaddee Gatore, Head of the Parish of Kivumu, killed in
Kivumu on April 13, 1994
7. Father Antoine Habiyambere, Parish of Rambura, killed in
Rambura on April 7, 1994
8. Father Sipiridio Kageyo, Head of the Parish of Rambura,
killed in rambura on April 7, 1994
9. Father Callixte Kalisa, School Super Intendant of Gisenyi,
Killed in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
10. Father Clement Kanyabusozo, Head of the Parish of
Mushubati, Killed in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
11. Father Fedinand Karekezi, Parish of Mushubati, killed
in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
12. Father Robert Matajyabo, Parish of Mushubati, killed
in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
13. Father Denis Mutabazi, Parish of Kibingo, killed in
Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
14. Father Silver Mutiganda, Paris! h of Mur unda, killed in
Murunda on April 8, 1994
15. Father Herman Mwambali, Retired living in Nyundo, killed
in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
16. Father Antoine Niyitegeka, Parish of Rambura, killed in
Rambura on April 7, 1994
17. Father Augustin Nkezabera, Head of the Parish of Muramba,
killed in Muramba on April 7,1994
18. Father Venuste Nsengiyumva, Parish of Kivumu, killed in
in Kivumu on April 7, 1994
19. Father Augustin Ntagara, Head of the Parish of Gisenyi,
killed in Gisenyi on April 7, 1994
20. Father Vedaste Nyiribakwe, Professor at the School of
Theology of Kabgayi, killed in Kabgayi on April 24, 1994
21. Father Adrien Nzanana, Head of the Parish of Kibingo,
killed in Nyundo on April 7, 1994
22. Father Aloys Nzaramba, Chancellor of Nyundo, killed in
Nyundo on April 9, 1994
23. Father Innocent Ruberizesa, Head of the Parish of Birambo,
killed in Birambo in April 1994.
24. Father Theophile Rutagengwa, Parish of Muramba, killed in
Kibuye in April 1994.
25. Father Francois Rwigenza, Parish of Muhororo, killed in
Muhororo in April 1994.
26. Father Deogratias Rwivanga, Parish of Kibuye, killed in April 1994.
27. Father Narcisse Sebasare, Parish of Birambo, killed in
Birambo in April 1994.
28. Father Joseph Sekabaraga, Head of the Parish of Biruyi,
killed in Biruyi on April 13,1994.
29. Father Boniface Senyenzi, Parish of Kibuye, killed in
Kibuye in April 1994.
30. Father Deogratias Twagirayezu, Teacher at the Seminary of Nyundo,
killed in Nyundo on April 7, 1994
31. Father Alfred Niyitegeka disappeared in April 1994.
Diocese of Ruhengeri
1. Father Geronimo Sembagare, Director of the College of Janja, killed in
Goma on July 16, 1994.
Clarisse Mwambali in Washington, D.C., USA.
Kigali , June 10, 1999: Rwandans celebrated Pentecost on May 24, 1999 . The
Roman Catholic Church of Rwanda reminded the followers to remember all catholic
priests and bishops slaughtered in Rwanda , especially since 1994. The mass
recollection included also unmentioned religious/laity such as the Belgian
nun Griet Bosmans who was slaughtered, along with 17 high school girls at
Muramba.
"Father in heaven, fifty days have celebrated the fullness of the mystery
of your revealed love. See your people gather in prayer, open to receive the
Spirit's flame. May it come to rest in our hearts and disperse the divisions
of word and tongue. With one voice and one song may we praise your name in
joy and thanksgiving. Grant this through Christ our Lord. Amen."
"A priest in the plateaus of the Diocese of Kabgayi starts his sermon by this
prayer. The priest went on to describe how the leadership of the Catholic
Church, once the undisputed dominant of the Rwandan spiritual life, is being
slowly but steadily decimated."
"Before we conclude, let us remember that at this very moment His Eminence
Augustin Misago, Bishop of Gikongoro is imprisoned in filthy conditions by
our leaders; that His Eminence Thaddee Ntihinyurwa, Bishop of Cyangugu and
many, many, many more religious and laity are persecuted by our political
leaders.
However, let us not be discouraged; let us not despair. The Pentecost must
give us hope. In deed, that day, 2000 years ago, when the mystery of love
was being revealed to the Church of Christ , the forces of evil were trying
to decimate the people of God. What did this evil endeavor produce at the
end? Martyrs, like Stephan and others, but also people like Saul, who later
became Paul, the most prominent apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ."
The following is an extended list of priests and bishops killed
in Rwanda from 1994-1998.
BISHOP AND FOREIGNERS:
His Eminence Vincent Nsengiyumva, Archbishop of Kigali, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Joseph Ruzindana, Bishop of Byumba, killed by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Innocent Gasabwoya, Vicar-General of Kabgayi, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Thaddee Nsengiyumva, Bishop of Kabgayi, killed by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Phocas Nikwigize, Bishop of Ruhengeri, killed by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) on November 30, 1996 in Goma, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
His Eminence Jean-Marie Rwabirinda, Vicar-General of Kabgayi, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) , in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
His Eminence Andre Sibomana, Acting Bishop of Kabgayi, killed
by the DMI in Kabgayi on March 9, 1998.
Chaplain Antoine Hategekimana, killed in Bukavu in November 1996, by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army, along with His Eminence Christopher
Munzihirwa-Mwene- Ngabo, Archbishop of Bukavu, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Chaplain Fidel Gahonzire, Chaplain of the Kabgayi Hospital,
killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994.
Father Guy Pinard, a Canadian, killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army in
February 1997, while conducting a Mass.
His Eminence Boniface Kagabo, acting bishop of Ruhengeri, killed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Army on May 26, 1998.
Father Vjeco Curic, a Friar priest from Croatia, mysteriously killed with his
passenger (by the DMI) in front of the Holy Family Church of Kigali on January 31, 1998.
The following extendible list gives the distribution of slaughtered priests
by Diocese:
DIOCESE of BUTARE
1. Father Filmin Butera, Head of the parish of Higiro, killed in Butare on
May 31, 1994
2. Father Justine Furaha, Head of the Parish of Save, killed
in Butare on May 31, 1994
3. Father Alex Kayumba, Parish of Cyahinda, killed in the Parish of
Kiruhura in July 1994.
4. Father Charles Nshogoza, Head of the Parish of Cyahinda,
killed in Cyahinda.
5. Father Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Parish of Nyanza, killed in Nyanza in April
1994.
6. Father Francis Ngomirakiza, Head of the Parish of Karama,
Killed in Ndago, on July 5, 1994
7. Father Callixte Nkeshumpatse, Parish of Gakoma, killed in Bugesera.
8. Father Second Ntibaziga, Director of the Nursing School of Gakoma,
killed
in Gakoma on May 7, 1994
9. Father Innocent Nyangezi, Parish of Nyanza, killed in Nyanza in April
1994.
10. Father Tharcisse Rubingiza, Professor of Theology at the School of
Theology of Nyakibanda, killed in the Parish of Gisagara on April 26,
1994.
11. Father Jean Bosco Yirirwahandi, Head of the Parish of Nyanza, killed in
Nyanza, in April 1994.
These were killed in hospitals during April 7, 1994- December 1994:
12. Father Bonifasi Musoni,
13. Father John Ntiyamira,
14. Father Vitari Rutayisire,
15. Father Narcisse Semuriro.
This one has disappeared, probably killed in April-May 1994.
16. Father Felicien Muvara of Butare.
DIOCESE OF BYUMBA
1. Father Alex Havugimana, killed in Byumba in April 1994.
2. Father Joseph Hitimana, killed in Byumba April 1994.
3. Father Augustin Mashyenderi killed in the Parish of Nyinawimana in April
1994.
4. Father Gaspard Mudashimwa, Professor at the Rwesero Seminary,
killed in Rwesero on May 21, 1994
5. Father Ladislas Muhayemungu, killed in April 1994.
6. Father Celestin Muhayimana, killed in Nyinawimana in April 1994.
7. Father Fidel Mulinda killed in April 1994.
8. Father Faustine Murindwa killed in April 1994.
9. Father Christian Nkiliyehe killed in April 1994.
10. Father Athanase Nkundabanyanga, Bursar of the Diocese of Byumba, killed
in Byumba in April 1994
11. Father Thaddee Ciza, a Burundese refugee, d1sappeared in April 1994!
DIOCESE OF CYANGUGU
1. Father Joseph Boneza, Head of the Parish of Mibirizi, killed in
Cyangugu on May 19, 1994
2. Father Innocent Gashugi, killed in the hospital on May 17, 1994
DIOCESE OF GIKONGORO
1. Father Stratton Gakwaya, Bursar of the Diocese of Gikongoro, killed in
Kigali on April 7, 1994
2. Father Boniface Kanyoni, Parish of Kibeho, killed in Kigali on April 7,
1994.
3. Father Canisius Murinzi, Parish of Mbuga,
killed in Gikongoro on May 13, 1994
4. Father Aloys Musoni, Parish of Cyanika, killed in Gikongoro on May 13,
1994.
5. Father Pierre Ngoga, Head of the Parish of Kibeho, killed in Butare on
May 31, 1994
6. Father Jean Marie Vianney Niyirema, Head of the Parish of Kaduha, killed
in Kigali on April 7, 1994
7. Father Joseph Niyomugabo, Head of the Parish of Cyanika,
killed in Cyanika on April 24, 1994
8. Father Irenee Nyamwasa, Head of the Parish of Mbuga, killed in
Gikongoro on May 13, 1994
9. Father Alfred Nzabakurana, School Super Intendant of Gikongoro, killed
in Kigali on May 7, 1994
10. Father Jean Marie Rwanyabuto, Head of the Parish of Muganza, killed in
Gisagara on May 26, 1994
11. Father Jean Marie Sebera, Head of the Parish of Simbi, killed in Ndago
on July 5, 1994
12. Father Callixte Uwitonze, Parish of Gikongoro, killed in Nyanza in
April 1994.
DIOCESE OF KABGAYI
1. Father Tharcisse Gakuba, Parish of Muyunzwe, killed in
Bukomero, on May 24, 1994
2. Father Alfred Kayibanda, Parish of Kabgayi, killed in
Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
5. Father Alphonse Mbuguje, killed in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
7. Father Callixte Musonera, Head of the Parish of Kayenzi,
killed in Bukomero on May 24, 1994
8. Father Sylvester Ndabaretse (a Burundese refugee), Bursar of
the Diocese, killed in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
9. Father Celestin Niwenshuti, Parish of Byimana, killed in
i Bukomero on May 24, 1994
12. Father Bernard Ntamugabumwe, School Super intendant of Gitarama,
killed in Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
13. Father Emmanuel, Parish of Gitarama, killed i Nyakabanda on July 7,
1994.
14. Father Francois Twagirmana, Parish of Kinazi, killed in
Masango in July 1994 Nyakanga.
16. Father Michel Gigi, Head of the Parish of Cyeza, killed in the
the hospital on July 7, 1994
17. Father Vianney Rusingizandekwe has disappeared.
DIOCESE OF KIBUNGO
1. Father Joseph Gatare, Director of the College of Mukarange ,
killed in Mukarange on April 12, 1994
2. Father Elisee Mpongano, Head of the Parish of Bare,
killed in Kibungo on April 15, 1994
3. Father Jean Bosco Munyawera, Head of the Parish of Mukarane
killed in Mukarange on April 12, 1994
4. Father Evode Mwanangu, Parish of Rukoma,
killed in Rukoma on April 8, 1994
5. Father Michel Nsengiyumva, Head of the Parish of Rukoma,
killed in Kibungo on April 18, 1994
6. Father Justin Ruterandongozi, Parish of Rukoma, killed in
Rukoma on April 7, 1994
ARCHDIOCESE OF KIGALI
1. Father Ananie Rugasira, Bursar of Ndera killed in Ndera
On April 9, 1994
2. Father Alexandre Ngeze killed in the Hospital of Rilima .
The following priests have disappeared:
3. Father Joseph Harelimana,
4. Father Felix Kabayiza,
5. Father Canisius Ndekezi.
DIOCESE OF NYUNDO
1. Father Mathias Gahinda, Head of the Parish of Mubuga,
killed in Kibuye in April 1994.
2. Father Edouard Gakwandi, Parish of Nyundo, killed in Nyundo
on April 9, 1994
3. Father Silas Gasake, Head of the Parish of Kibingo, killed in Nyundo on April 9, 1994 .
4. Father Albert Gashema, Parish of Mubuga, killed in April 1994.
5. Father Louis Gasore, Head of the Parish of Muhororo,
killed in Muhororo in April 1994.
6. Father Thaddee Gatore, Head of the Parish of Kivumu, killed in
Kivumu on April 13, 1994
7. Father Antoine Habiyambere, Parish of Rambura, killed in
Rambura on April 7, 1994
8. Father Sipiridio Kageyo, Head of the Parish of Rambura,
killed in rambura on April 7, 1994
9. Father Callixte Kalisa, School Super Intendant of Gisenyi,
Killed in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
10. Father Clement Kanyabusozo, Head of the Parish of
Mushubati, Killed in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
11. Father Fedinand Karekezi, Parish of Mushubati, killed
in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
12. Father Robert Matajyabo, Parish of Mushubati, killed
in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
13. Father Denis Mutabazi, Parish of Kibingo, killed in
Gakurazo on June 5, 1994
14. Father Silver Mutiganda, Paris! h of Mur unda, killed in
Murunda on April 8, 1994
15. Father Herman Mwambali, Retired living in Nyundo, killed
in Nyundo on April 9, 1994
16. Father Antoine Niyitegeka, Parish of Rambura, killed in
Rambura on April 7, 1994
17. Father Augustin Nkezabera, Head of the Parish of Muramba,
killed in Muramba on April 7,1994
18. Father Venuste Nsengiyumva, Parish of Kivumu, killed in
in Kivumu on April 7, 1994
19. Father Augustin Ntagara, Head of the Parish of Gisenyi,
killed in Gisenyi on April 7, 1994
20. Father Vedaste Nyiribakwe, Professor at the School of
Theology of Kabgayi, killed in Kabgayi on April 24, 1994
21. Father Adrien Nzanana, Head of the Parish of Kibingo,
killed in Nyundo on April 7, 1994
22. Father Aloys Nzaramba, Chancellor of Nyundo, killed in
Nyundo on April 9, 1994
23. Father Innocent Ruberizesa, Head of the Parish of Birambo,
killed in Birambo in April 1994.
24. Father Theophile Rutagengwa, Parish of Muramba, killed in
Kibuye in April 1994.
25. Father Francois Rwigenza, Parish of Muhororo, killed in
Muhororo in April 1994.
26. Father Deogratias Rwivanga, Parish of Kibuye, killed in April 1994.
27. Father Narcisse Sebasare, Parish of Birambo, killed in
Birambo in April 1994.
28. Father Joseph Sekabaraga, Head of the Parish of Biruyi,
killed in Biruyi on April 13,1994.
29. Father Boniface Senyenzi, Parish of Kibuye, killed in
Kibuye in April 1994.
30. Father Deogratias Twagirayezu, Teacher at the Seminary of Nyundo,
killed in Nyundo on April 7, 1994
31. Father Alfred Niyitegeka disappeared in April 1994.
Diocese of Ruhengeri
1. Father Geronimo Sembagare, Director of the College of Janja, killed in
Goma on July 16, 1994.
12 June, 2008
Chad rebels say on offensive, seek French mediation, not Intervention.
Reuters
12 June 2008
By Finbarr O'Reilly
Rebel forces in Chad said on Thursday they shot down a government helicopter in a fresh offensive from the east aimed at overthrowing President Idriss Deby.
But they offered to call off the advance if France and the European Union, which have supported Deby's rule over the landlocked oil producer, pressed him into holding all-inclusive peace talks with rebel groups and civilian opponents.
There was no immediate reaction from the Chadian government nor any clear independent confirmation of the rebels' statement that their columns had pushed westwards "deep inside" the eastern Dar Sila region of Chad.
However, Irish troops stationed in east Chad as part of an EU protection force (EUFOR) for U.N.-run refugee camps said they had received reports of combat at Modeina near the Sudan border between rebel ground forces and Chadian government aircraft.
A spokesman for the Irish troops said two Chadian helicopters were hit by ground fire from rebel anti-aircraft guns cannon one crash-landed, while the other landed safely.
Abderaman Koulamallah of the rebel National Alliance told Reuters four rebel columns had moved westwards, hoping to topple Deby after a February attack on the capital N'Djamena failed to.
"We plan to carry the war to the interior of the country," said Koulamallah, whose Democratic Union for Change (UDC) group belongs to the insurgent alliance.
He said he was speaking by telephone from France, but that he was in contact with rebel military commanders in Chad.
Koulamallah said the rebels were prepared to call off their offensive if France and the European Union forced Deby to agree to round table talks on Chad's political situation and future.
"If France and the European Union get involved to guarantee an accord, we are ready not to go to war," he said.
The rebels, who Chad's government says are backed by Sudan, have fought a guerrilla war for more than two years to try to overthrow Deby. They denounce him as dictatorial and corrupt.
Koulamallah said the rebels wanted French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who pledged strong support for Deby after the February rebel assault on the capital, to host a peace conference.
In Thursday's clash in the Dar Sila region, the rebel forces used anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to fire back at two government helicopters that attacked them from the air. One helicopter was shot down, Koulamallah said.
TWO HELICOPTERS "HIT"
Commandant Stephen Morgan, spokesman for the Irish 97th Infantry Battalion based at Goz-Beida in eastern Chad, said the reported clash took place 70 km (40 miles) northeast of the Irish base, so they had no details of casualties.
But he added: "I can confirm that a Chadian helicopter has been taken down just outside Abeche near the airfield in what appears to be a controlled crash-landing due to damage sustained from ground fire from 23-millimetre anti-aircraft weapons".
"There were two aircraft that sustained damage but the second one managed to land," he said.
Fighting killed several hundred people in February when rebel forces raced across the country and attacked N'Djamena.
The rebels withdrew after the government and military of former colonial power France came out strongly in support of Deby, who himself seized power in an eastern revolt in 1990.
A fresh Chadian rebel offensive against Deby had been widely expected since Sudanese Darfuri insurgents attacked the Sudanese capital Khartoum in May. Both countries accuse each other of supporting rebel groups hostile to each others' governments.
France has military aircraft and troops stationed in Chad under a defence cooperation treaty, under which Paris provides intelligence, logistical and medical help to Chad's government.
In their statement, the Chadian rebels urged France not to involve itself directly in the conflict but to act as mediator.
(Additional reporting by Pascal Fletcher in Dakar; Writing by Pascal Fletcher; editing by Alistair Thomson)
12 June 2008
By Finbarr O'Reilly
Rebel forces in Chad said on Thursday they shot down a government helicopter in a fresh offensive from the east aimed at overthrowing President Idriss Deby.
But they offered to call off the advance if France and the European Union, which have supported Deby's rule over the landlocked oil producer, pressed him into holding all-inclusive peace talks with rebel groups and civilian opponents.
There was no immediate reaction from the Chadian government nor any clear independent confirmation of the rebels' statement that their columns had pushed westwards "deep inside" the eastern Dar Sila region of Chad.
However, Irish troops stationed in east Chad as part of an EU protection force (EUFOR) for U.N.-run refugee camps said they had received reports of combat at Modeina near the Sudan border between rebel ground forces and Chadian government aircraft.
A spokesman for the Irish troops said two Chadian helicopters were hit by ground fire from rebel anti-aircraft guns cannon one crash-landed, while the other landed safely.
Abderaman Koulamallah of the rebel National Alliance told Reuters four rebel columns had moved westwards, hoping to topple Deby after a February attack on the capital N'Djamena failed to.
"We plan to carry the war to the interior of the country," said Koulamallah, whose Democratic Union for Change (UDC) group belongs to the insurgent alliance.
He said he was speaking by telephone from France, but that he was in contact with rebel military commanders in Chad.
Koulamallah said the rebels were prepared to call off their offensive if France and the European Union forced Deby to agree to round table talks on Chad's political situation and future.
"If France and the European Union get involved to guarantee an accord, we are ready not to go to war," he said.
The rebels, who Chad's government says are backed by Sudan, have fought a guerrilla war for more than two years to try to overthrow Deby. They denounce him as dictatorial and corrupt.
Koulamallah said the rebels wanted French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who pledged strong support for Deby after the February rebel assault on the capital, to host a peace conference.
In Thursday's clash in the Dar Sila region, the rebel forces used anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to fire back at two government helicopters that attacked them from the air. One helicopter was shot down, Koulamallah said.
TWO HELICOPTERS "HIT"
Commandant Stephen Morgan, spokesman for the Irish 97th Infantry Battalion based at Goz-Beida in eastern Chad, said the reported clash took place 70 km (40 miles) northeast of the Irish base, so they had no details of casualties.
But he added: "I can confirm that a Chadian helicopter has been taken down just outside Abeche near the airfield in what appears to be a controlled crash-landing due to damage sustained from ground fire from 23-millimetre anti-aircraft weapons".
"There were two aircraft that sustained damage but the second one managed to land," he said.
Fighting killed several hundred people in February when rebel forces raced across the country and attacked N'Djamena.
The rebels withdrew after the government and military of former colonial power France came out strongly in support of Deby, who himself seized power in an eastern revolt in 1990.
A fresh Chadian rebel offensive against Deby had been widely expected since Sudanese Darfuri insurgents attacked the Sudanese capital Khartoum in May. Both countries accuse each other of supporting rebel groups hostile to each others' governments.
France has military aircraft and troops stationed in Chad under a defence cooperation treaty, under which Paris provides intelligence, logistical and medical help to Chad's government.
In their statement, the Chadian rebels urged France not to involve itself directly in the conflict but to act as mediator.
(Additional reporting by Pascal Fletcher in Dakar; Writing by Pascal Fletcher; editing by Alistair Thomson)
West fails to condemn Ethiopia rights abuses -HRW
Reuters
12 June 2008
By Daniel Wallis
Western donors have failed to condemn war crimes by Ethiopian forces during a year-old campaign against separatist fighters in the country's eastern Ogaden region, Human Rights Watch said on Thursday.
"The Ethiopian army's answer to the rebels has been to viciously attack civilians in the Ogaden," said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director of the U.S.-based group.
"These widespread and systematic atrocities amount to crimes against humanity. Yet Ethiopia's major donors, Washington, London and Brussels, seem to be maintaining a conspiracy of silence around the crimes."
Ethiopian government officials in Addis Ababa routinely reject such allegations against their counter-insurgency operations in the rocky, arid region, which borders Somalia.
They also accuse the rebels of abusing locals.
But officials had no immediate comment on the new report.
Ethiopia, a key regional ally of the United States, launched its latest offensive after the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a Chinese-run oil field in the region in April 2007, killing more than 70 people.
Human Rights Watch said its 130-page report was based on interviews by its researchers with more than 100 victims and eyewitnesses of abuses by soldiers.
Ridwan Sahid told how an Ethiopian soldier pushed him into a ditch and tried to kill him by taking a metal rod used to clean his gun and ramming it down his throat.
When Ridwan fought him off by twisting his fingers, more troops rushed over and tried to strangle him with a rope. Ridwan passed out and woke up later under the cold body of a friend.
BEATINGS, TORTURE
One 31-year-old Ogaden shopkeeper told HRW he was arrested and beaten by troops who demanded he admit being an ONLF member.
"They tied both my legs and lifted me upside down to the ceiling with a rope, and kept beating me more, saying I had to confess," he was quoted as saying.
"For two months, we underwent this same ordeal, being taken from our rooms at night and being beaten and tortured."
The report also includes accounts of villages being burned by the military, which HRW said it had confirmed using satellite imagery. Witnesses said at least 150 civilians were executed.
HRW said the government was limiting all access to the region, that the violence was ongoing, and that staff believed their findings represented only a fraction of the actual abuses.
Gagnon said the army's tactics were fuelling a looming humanitarian crisis and threatening the survival of thousands of ethnic Somali nomads who cross the area with their livestock.
Western nations give Ethiopia more than $2 billion a year in aid, she said, but must speak out now to halt the bloodshed.
"The government's attacks on civilians, its trade blockade, and restrictions on aid amount to the illegal collective punishment of tens of thousands of people," Gagnon said.
"Unless humanitarian agencies get immediate access to independently assess the needs and monitor food distribution, more lives will be lost."
Also accused of abuses by its military in Somalia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has said in the past human rights groups are selectively and falsely attacking him after falling for propaganda by Ethiopia's enemies.
(Editing by Andrew Cawthorne and Matthew Tostevin)
12 June 2008
By Daniel Wallis
Western donors have failed to condemn war crimes by Ethiopian forces during a year-old campaign against separatist fighters in the country's eastern Ogaden region, Human Rights Watch said on Thursday.
"The Ethiopian army's answer to the rebels has been to viciously attack civilians in the Ogaden," said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director of the U.S.-based group.
"These widespread and systematic atrocities amount to crimes against humanity. Yet Ethiopia's major donors, Washington, London and Brussels, seem to be maintaining a conspiracy of silence around the crimes."
Ethiopian government officials in Addis Ababa routinely reject such allegations against their counter-insurgency operations in the rocky, arid region, which borders Somalia.
They also accuse the rebels of abusing locals.
But officials had no immediate comment on the new report.
Ethiopia, a key regional ally of the United States, launched its latest offensive after the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a Chinese-run oil field in the region in April 2007, killing more than 70 people.
Human Rights Watch said its 130-page report was based on interviews by its researchers with more than 100 victims and eyewitnesses of abuses by soldiers.
Ridwan Sahid told how an Ethiopian soldier pushed him into a ditch and tried to kill him by taking a metal rod used to clean his gun and ramming it down his throat.
When Ridwan fought him off by twisting his fingers, more troops rushed over and tried to strangle him with a rope. Ridwan passed out and woke up later under the cold body of a friend.
BEATINGS, TORTURE
One 31-year-old Ogaden shopkeeper told HRW he was arrested and beaten by troops who demanded he admit being an ONLF member.
"They tied both my legs and lifted me upside down to the ceiling with a rope, and kept beating me more, saying I had to confess," he was quoted as saying.
"For two months, we underwent this same ordeal, being taken from our rooms at night and being beaten and tortured."
The report also includes accounts of villages being burned by the military, which HRW said it had confirmed using satellite imagery. Witnesses said at least 150 civilians were executed.
HRW said the government was limiting all access to the region, that the violence was ongoing, and that staff believed their findings represented only a fraction of the actual abuses.
Gagnon said the army's tactics were fuelling a looming humanitarian crisis and threatening the survival of thousands of ethnic Somali nomads who cross the area with their livestock.
Western nations give Ethiopia more than $2 billion a year in aid, she said, but must speak out now to halt the bloodshed.
"The government's attacks on civilians, its trade blockade, and restrictions on aid amount to the illegal collective punishment of tens of thousands of people," Gagnon said.
"Unless humanitarian agencies get immediate access to independently assess the needs and monitor food distribution, more lives will be lost."
Also accused of abuses by its military in Somalia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has said in the past human rights groups are selectively and falsely attacking him after falling for propaganda by Ethiopia's enemies.
(Editing by Andrew Cawthorne and Matthew Tostevin)
Cameroonian Attorney Appointed Head of ICTR's Investigative Unit.
Hirondelle News Agency
11 June 2008
Cameroonian Senior Trial Attorney, William Egbe, has been appointed to head the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Special Investigative Unit (SIU), reports Hirondelle Agency.
An ICTR source said that Egbe was appointed about three months ago to the post, which was held by another Senior Trial Attorney, Charles Adeogun-Philips. Among the task of the Unit is to secure arrests of 13 fugitives, including Felician Kabuga, the alleged financial of the 1994 genocide.
The source said that Charles has been assigned another equally important trial of Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, a former Deputy Governor of Gisagara, Butare, southern Rwanda. The accused was extradited from France last week under a warrant from the ICTR.
Ntawukuriryayo appeared on Tuesday before duty judge Khalida Khan of Pakistan and pleaded not guilty to three counts of genocide.
Ntawukuriryayo twice battled against his transfer to ICTR, lastly being his appeal before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, which also rejected the application mid last month.
Since its establishment in November 1994, the tribunal has convicted 30 persons and acquitted five while 28 others are currently on trial. Eleven trials are on-going, four of which have closed and are awaiting judgments.
The arrival of Ntawukuriryayo brings the number of people still awaiting trial in Arusha to eight.
11 June 2008
Cameroonian Senior Trial Attorney, William Egbe, has been appointed to head the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Special Investigative Unit (SIU), reports Hirondelle Agency.
An ICTR source said that Egbe was appointed about three months ago to the post, which was held by another Senior Trial Attorney, Charles Adeogun-Philips. Among the task of the Unit is to secure arrests of 13 fugitives, including Felician Kabuga, the alleged financial of the 1994 genocide.
The source said that Charles has been assigned another equally important trial of Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, a former Deputy Governor of Gisagara, Butare, southern Rwanda. The accused was extradited from France last week under a warrant from the ICTR.
Ntawukuriryayo appeared on Tuesday before duty judge Khalida Khan of Pakistan and pleaded not guilty to three counts of genocide.
Ntawukuriryayo twice battled against his transfer to ICTR, lastly being his appeal before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, which also rejected the application mid last month.
Since its establishment in November 1994, the tribunal has convicted 30 persons and acquitted five while 28 others are currently on trial. Eleven trials are on-going, four of which have closed and are awaiting judgments.
The arrival of Ntawukuriryayo brings the number of people still awaiting trial in Arusha to eight.
Mission Impossible--Justice at the ICTR.
via CirqueMinime Paris
29 April 2005
By Tiphaine Dickson
Defense lawyers have gotten used to being unpopular when they defend those accused of very serious crimes. The job of the defense, in all judicial systems, consists in making sure, even in the most explosive situations, that the rights of the defendant are fully and definitely exercised. When the state deploys its machinery of repression against an individual, the defense lawyer is the only rampart that protects the accused from injustice, vengeance and tyranny.
Defense lawyers have also gotten used to being vilified for keeping company with those they represent, or, even worse, for being associated with the crimes of which their clients are accused. In the context of political trials, in many parts of the world, they risk their reputations, their professional futures, and certain among them risk their lives. Generally, however, defense lawyers enjoy courteous and collegial treatment before these tribunals. They are officers of the court, and they protect all citizens from the potential or actual juridical aberations of the state. In some systems their participation is essential to the search for truth, and they are rewarded with a certain respect as well as with a casual prestige.
Yet even the most seasoned and jaded lawyer is staggered by the icy welcome reserved for defense counsel at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. All too often, the work of the defense is seen as an obstacle to the grand mission which the ICTR has set itself: Bringing ‘reconciliation’ to Rwanda.
“Reconciliation”?
What could ‘reconciliation’ mean in the mind of a jurist? How can a tribunal bring it about? Rather than a juridical objective, isn’t ‘reconciliation’ a political goal? Wasn’t the establishment of the ICTR the result of political wheeling and dealing within the UN Security Council, all necessitated by some resounding political, diplomatic and military screw-ups?
Yet the ICTR congratulates itself for having successfully made important break-throughs in the struggle against the ‘culture of impunity.’ It most often expresses its achievements in numbers: How many detainees, how many convictions, the first woman charged with rape, the first chief of state to have pleaded guilty to the charge of genocide . . .
No one seems interested in asking if the Tribunal’s achievement of criminal justice can decently be gauged by the number of convictions it hands down. Others might wonder as to the political usefulness of the whole endeavor. In fact, fighting has exploded throughout the Great Lakes region of Africa, while in Rwanda, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and all freedoms, save for the freedom to plunder and pillage, have disappeared like the morning mist.
But congratulations certainly must be inorder, for the ICTR now boasts of having received, in an affair without precedent in the history of juris prudence, the Human Rights award of the Freidrich Ebert-Stiftung Foundation(1) for having significantly promoted national reconciliation in Rwanda.(2) And what should one make of this Foundation, subject of recent revelations by former CIA agent Phillip Agee that its founder, Freidrich Ebert-Stiftung, was well known to US Intelligence for his engaged anti-Communism after the Second World War, and has been well used by The Agency for decades as a go-between with the old Fascist guard in Europe? According to Agee, the Foundation played a key role in the defeat of the ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal in 1973. But today it bestows a prize for Human Rights on the ICTR, and the Tribunal’s representatives accept it without the slightest consideration that by so doing they might besmirch the appearance of impartiality essential to such a court, and applaud themselves for this ‘reconciliation’ to which they have contributed.
What kind of reconciliation are we talking about here when only one ethnic group is currently locked down, when the crimes of the victors are swept under the rug, against all protestations, and when the military junta currently in power in Kigali decides who the witnesses, the accused, and even who the Prosecutor will be?(3) What kind of reconciliation could blot out the attack of April 6, 1994, on the Rwandan presidential plane that killed two African presidents, the chief of staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, several political personalities and the entire French crew?
The beginnings of the ICTR were shakey and criticized everywhere, except, curiously, by the Hutu community in exile which, already in 1994, was expressing loud and clear its support for the establishment of a Tribunal to shed light on all the crimes committed in Rwanda since the invasion of that country on October 1, 1990. As for the Rwanda of Paul Kagame: it was dead set against UN Security Council Resolution 955, notably because it did not permit the ICTR to hand down the death penalty, and because the UN would not seat the court in Kigali.
Position of the Problem
The ICTR has always been the object of criticism that ranges from the complaisant to the outright racist. The Western media have tried to out do one another in their repetitious charges that the Chief Prosecutor is ‘corrupt’ and the the Tribunal’s procedures are ‘slow’ and ‘confused’.
The reader might consider such generalizations as endemique of the functioning of African institutions.(4) But that would be a grave error. The ICTR is not an African institution, it’s a UN institution. The prosecutor’s office was directed by a South African man, a Canadian woman, and a Swiss woman.(5) And American influence on the Tribunal is undeniable.(6)
This is not to say that the ICTR doesn’t deserve this reproach, far from it, but it does serve to refocus the analysis and pose some fundamental questions. Is this Tribunal really suited to bring about justice, or is it merely an institution forged in the furnace of political opportunism? And despite the fact that the directors of the Tribunal never cease repeating that it is not an example of victors’ justice, one can not help noting a certain incapability—institutional or deliberate—to proceed with an objective examination of all the aspects of the Rwandan conflict, and not just those that serve the interests of the victors and their powerful sponsors. So the institution vows that such massacres as afflicted and forever scarred Rwanda should never again be allowed to take place. But can such a wish be realized without first arriving at the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
One should straight-away pose and existential question: Was the ICTR created legally? The UN Charter does not give any authority to the Security Council to establish judicial bodies. The ICTY and the ICTR were established at the behest of Madeleine Albright, the same US representative who, in a grim sort of irony, pressured the Security Council to reduce the mission of the UN intervention force in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to a nearly symbolic presence, and this at the very height of the armed conflict and massacres.(7)
Even more ironically: the Security Council had the power (and the responsibility) to take action to restore the peace and security of Rwanda. It chose essentially not to do that. On the other hand, the Security Council has no power to establish a Tribunal, and yet that’s exactly what it did.(8) According to Resolution 955, the Tribunal must contribute to a ‘process of national reconciliation and the reestablishment and maintenance of the peace’. But by November 1994, it was just a little too late to be concerned with the reestablishment of peace: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had won the war and set up a military state over the whole of the Rwandan territory. The only thing left to do was to judge the losers.
And as far as the struggle against impunity is concerned, a little more irony arises: The US refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the Internation Criminal Court (Treaty of Rome). They seek to undermine the court’s authority by signing treaties of ‘mutual non-cooperation’ with other nations, the terms of which dictate that the signatories will never transfer one another's citizens to this permanent Tribunal. Such a treaty was signed by Rwanda, which has chosen to side against all those nations that have recognized the authority of the ICC.
An independent Tribunal?
Article 20 of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which are contained in the annex of Security Council Resolution 955 that the UN used to create the ICTR, set forth the rights of the accused. This Article was inspired by, and transcribed almost word for word from, Article 14 of the Internation Pact on Civil and Political Rights. Judge Laïty Kama (then President of the ICTR) recognized this lineage in his speech before the UN Generaly Assembly on 10 December 1996.(9)
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, is the principal international instrument for the protection of individual rights. It garauntees the exercise of those fundamental rights recognized by the community of nations.
It garauntees every individual the right to a trial before an independent tribunal:
“All are equal before the tribunals and courts of justice. Every individual
has the right to have his case heard equitably and publicly by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law”;
Article 20 of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, however it may have been ‘inspired’ by the principled terms of the Covenant, left out the explicit and fundamental garauntees of the right to a trial before an independent, impartial, competent tribunal established by law.
The ICTR is not constrained by garauntees of impartiality and independence as set out in international and regional instruments for the protection of the rights of the individual or in the constitutions or legal codes of many countries.(10) The Security Council deliberately omitted according the accused their most fundamental right: the right to a trial before and independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
An institution can not pretend to be judicial without being independent. Independence is at the very heart of the idea of Justice. An institution that is not independent, or that cannot garauntee or affirm its independence and its impartiality, is not capable of exercising a judiciary function. It can pretend to do this and it can drape itself with all the cosmetic trappings of justice, but any tribunal that cannot garauntee to those it judges that it is independent, is, at the very essence of its judicial function, hollow.
The ICTR and the search for truth
Whoever calls for reconciliation, necessarily, calls for truth as a precondition. Early on in the course of the trials in Arusha, the first President of the Tribunal, Laïty Kama, let it be very clearly understood that he considered the search for truth to have been assigned to him as a judge by the UN. Thus, in the Akayesu case, the first trial begun before the ICTR, the trial chamber became immersed in a number of questions that bore no connection with charges against Mr. Akayesu, the former burgermaster of the tiny commune of Taba. During the long testimony of Alison Des Forges, a leading American activist for Human Rights Watch,(11) recognized as an expert-witness by the Chamber,(12) what took place was actually the first ‘collective prosecution’ in the history of the Tribunal. In effect, what was called into question was ‘the actual intentions’ of President Habyarimana, the election of President Kayibanda, or that of Colonel Lizinde, the student quotas, the speech of Leon Mugesera, or that of Colonel Bagosora, the Akazu, the UNAMIR, the events at Bugesera, but little if anything about Akayesu or what he’d been charged with.
Thus it appears that the ICTR agreed de facto and out of a need to understand the context, which, it would seem, is certainly the right of any investigator, to install an examining magistrate on the bench. It should be noted, however, that with the testimony of Des Forges in the Akayesu case, the judges explored only those elements favorable to the Prosecution. Unlike any other known examining magistrate, who would look equally into both sides of the case, the ICTR openly sided with the Prosecutor in his search for elements that would support his dominant argument.
The ICTR and the crime of aggression commited against Rwanda in 1990
We have seen how the Tribunal showed itself to be rather informal in the Akayesu case. The testimony of Alison Des Forges was considered precedential in its function as research into the truth, yet her testimony largely exceeded the bounds of the charges against the accused. This kind of investigation would not have been acceptable in a court of common law, where the rules as to the admissibility of evidence strictly limit the debate and do not permit the introduction of facts that are not pertinent to the charges or might be prejudicial to the accused.
The procedural suppleness of the ICTR was tested when the matter of the 1990 invasion of Rwanda from Uganda was examined.
First problem: the Tribunal’s jurisdiction did not extend to the time period of the Rwandan invasion by the RPF in October 1990. Formally, the Tribunal is competent to judge crimes under its jurisdiction committed between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.(13) The judicial result of this political choice is to grant immunity from prosecution to Uganda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
The invasion of Rwanda is the pivotal event of that nation’s recent history. All consequent events quite obviously flow directly from it. This invasion is typical of the crime of aggression, described by the Nuremberg Tribunal as ‘the supreme war crime'.(14) But the ICTR has used its jurisprudence to fog-out the reality of this aggression, preferring, in its very first decision in the Akayesu case, to conclude that Rwanda was the object of a simple ‘attack’:
The 1st of October 1990, an attack was launched from Uganda by
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), whose predecessor, the Rwandan
Alliance for National Unity (‘RANU’) was created in 1979
by Tutsi exiles in Uganda.(15)
This passage illustrates very well that the reconciliatory function of the Tribunal, as it concerns this fact fundamental to the understanding of the Rwandan tragedy, is conspicuous in its absense. It was not a matter of a mere ‘attack’ but of an invasion, which is the only decent way to describe it. Also, the fact that this ‘attack’ was said to have come ‘out of Uganda’ is misleading. Elements of the Ugandan Army, led by a Ugandan Army general, with tanks, guns and ammunition from this same Ugandan military committed an aggression against Rwanda. Paul Kagame, who at the time was a high-ranking Ugandan Army officer, and a citizen of that country, and was director of military intelligence for the Ugandan Army, was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, when the invasion took place.
Why hide this reality? Because it will shed light on other aspects of the debate. Because the invasion of Rwanda, and then the shooting down of the presidents’ plane on 6 April 1994, invalidates the thesis so carefully prepared by Des Forges and others, that a genocide was planned by President Habyarimana, those close to him, certain members of his party, the MRND, the Rwandan Armed Forces, and by a sinister but indistinct media.
Biased Expertise: and if this was true?
Finally, the Federal Court of Canada rendered an important decision in the Mugesera case.(16) Unlike the ICTR, the Federal Court of Appeals recognized that Rwanda was the object of an armed aggression(17), and taking this reality into full account concluded that the words spoken by Dr Leon Mugesera in a political speech in 1992 did not constitute an incitation to commit murder or other crimes against humanity. This very speech was described by Madame Des Forges, in her testimony before the ICTR as well as in the Mugesera case in Canada, as being one of the elements that prepared the massacres of 1994.(18) However, Des Forges was severely criticized by the Canadian Court, which said it was astonished by her lack of rigor and by the troublesome gaps in her methodological observations, as much in her testimony as in the report of the International Commison of Inquiry (1993) of which she was one of the authors. The hearsay, the unverified facts, the truncated speech, sources which could not be named: these elements made the Canadian Judges brush aside such evidence as had been considered the gold standard by many so-called experts on Rwanda: that Leon Mugesera was close to President Habyarimana, that he was a member of the death squads, that his speech immediately provoked the killings.
This remarkable opinion by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals, written with special regard to the dire manipulation of Dr Mugesera's speech, must make one wonder at the real value of these experts, certain of whom have been deposed in Arusha—notably Alison Des Forges—and who have written, sometimes a little quickly, sometimes quite badly, the history of Rwanda:
“(. . .) some of these conclusions, often erroneous, often hasty and
speculative, often dubious and fundamentally superficial, were repeated and
reiterated so many times without discernment or any other form of validation
as to engender a belief in a non-existant reality.(19)
While some of the defense lawyers at the ICTR happily consider this statement as it might apply to their clients, rarely would they permit themselves to believe, for more than an instant, that this institution that stands in judgment over the vanquished, the ICTR, is capable of what the highminded might consider a political and judicial blasphemy.(20)
Invisible assault
It is agreed by one and all, regardless of their slant on or interpretation of the events, that the spark that set off the explosion in Rwanda in 1994 was the shooting down of the plane that killed Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, the Rwandan Army chief of staff, several personalities close to the presidents and the entire French crew.
Nearly ten years after the catastrophic attack of 6 April 1994, no criminal or civil charges have been brought, nor have any diplomatic sanctions been imposed. As if the airplane simply crashed, and thereafter the killings began. As crude as this statement may seem, it is exactly the thesis adopted by the Prosecutor at the ICTR in the charges brought against Georges Rutuganda, my client:
“The 6th of April 1994, an airplane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana
of Rwanda, and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at the Kigali airport
killing all aboard. Following the deaths of the two presidents, the generalized political
and ethnic killings began in Kigali and then spread to other parts of Rwanda.”
The ICTR Prosecutor’s terminology did not demonstrate any great willingness of see into the heart of the matter: the plane ‘crashed’. Two presidents of two countries so torn by wars and coups d’état that they were quite likely once again to return to bloody war were ‘dead’— simple as that.
It is not inexact to state that the plane crashed. But it is hugely improbable that a judicial institution spawned by the UN Security Council should neglect to mention that before the plane crashed, it was blown out of the sky by two SAM-16 missiles.
The ICTR has all the judicial power and technology necessary to initiate and carry out a thorough investigation of this terrorist act that begat such nightmarish consequences. Yet its causes seem to be of astonishingly little interest to this organ of the UNSC, which was also responsible for the UNAMIR force in Kigali at the time of the attack.
The importance of this attack has not, at any rate, gotten past the defense. Already by the 7th of February 1997, this writer had pleaded, in Chamber I of the ICTR, that the Prosecution devulge all evidence obtained by its investigative services at the time of the attack on the presidential plane, or, in the case that no such investigation had yet taken place, that the Prosecution proceed immediately to initiate such an investigation. The response of the Associate Prosecutor was stupefying: “Our responsibility is not to investigate the crash of the plane; this is not our job. I am, therefore, in the most categoric fashion, going to set that question aside. And I can say emphatically that we have not carried out such an investigation, nor have we received any reports on such an investigation. Secondly, it is not our role, it is not our mission to carry out an investigation on the crash of an airplane carrying some presidents or vice-presidents. The question is not relevant to our authority.(21)
That was in February 1997. On the 1st of March 2000, the Canadian daily, National Post, revealed that investigations into the attack had been carried out by the Prosecution from 1996(22)—before the Prosecutor had denied it, categorically on his oath of office, during the trial of Georges Rutaganda—and that his investigations had been fruitful: two witnesses from Kagame’s elite unit, ‘The Network’, had been located and had confirmed that the attack was the work of the RPF, in collaboration with a foreign country.
Two documents had been obtained by a journalist from The Post: ‘The Hourrigan Report’, as well as an unsigned letter detailing the testimony of members of ‘The Network’. The first report, marked ‘Confidential’, was directed to the attention of the Office of Internal Investigations of the United Nations by a former investigator for the Prosecutor’s Office(23), and related the frustrations of its author, in particular the fact that he was forbidden to continue his investigation into the attack, despite his having made significant progress and that Prosecutor Arbour seemed thrilled by the new developments. But she brought the whole thing to a brutal halt. The investigation was closed just as it was approaching the truth about the causes of this attack.
Investigation suddenly stopped. And this despite new witnesses, inside witnesses, who would knock the pins out from under the whole thesis that had been in play until then, or at least that idea put forward by certain people to explain the attack: that the attack was commited by ‘Extremist Hutus’ inorder to liquidate Habyarimana as he returned from peace negotiations in Dar es Salaam, because he seemed ready to put in place the institutions set forth in the Arusha Accords, was too weak with regard to the Tutsis, and inorder to begin the genocide which had been programmed for some time.
And what if the abandoned investigation had revealed that the RPF had brought down the presidential plane? What would have been the political consequences? In the case of the Prosecution v Rutaganda, Filip Reyntjens, called by the prosecution as an expert-witness, conceded during his cross examination that:
“The Arusha Accords gave a great deal to the RPF. They could have
gained a lot more if they had carried on the war to its end, which was what
they finally did in fact, but they certainly could not have done this without
first having a good pretext.
Now, I am not at all suggesting that the RPF was looking for this pretext,
because this pretext could have been the shooting down of the presidential
plane and we do not know today who carried out this attack.”(24)
(emphasis added)
We do know today, in fact, that at the time professor Reyntjens gave this testimony, the Prosecutor held evidence that established the RPF’s responsibility for this attack. But in light of Reyntjens’ observation, some gargantuan problems arose.
In the first place, the identities of the perpetrators of this attack, unlike what the Associate Prosecutor contented in February 1997, is of great importance. And even more significant is that the Prosecution’s fundamental thesis regarding the events in Rwanda925)—that President Habyarimana, the MRND, the general staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces and other ‘Extremists Hutus’, did not negotiate for peace in good faith, because they did not want to share power with the RPF—collapses like a house of cards. And in place of this thesis, today, irrevocably implanted in hearts and minds, is a doubt: the RPF could have shot down the plane to create a pretext for continuing armed hostilities, and to take advantage of the predictable chaos that would follow on the shock of this assassination to take over the country militarily. And the UNAMIR were not actually there to ‘maintain the peace’—as fragile as it already was—for, from the moment of that attack, the peace just evaporated.
The killings, the massacres began. With consequences we all know of, and which continue their macabre unfolding into Congo. Five million, six million human lives taken since the invasion of Rwanda in 1990? Where is the Tribunal for the Congolese victims, for the Hutus slaughtered in the refugee camps in the ex-Zaire?
What would be the judicial consequences drawn from the fact the Prosecution’s investigators had discovered: that the presidential plane was brought down by the RPF?
Professor Reyntjens led us down a new path of considerations essential to understanding, not only the Rwandan catastrophe, but also the real reasons why a good faith investigation of this tragedy could be so badly botched:
“But there would also have been a judicial interest. Those who
shot down the plane knew very well what the consequences of this attack
would be, and in this case they would bear a legal responsibility—
and I’m not saying political, now, but legal—for the genocide.
Because they would have—knowing full well what the consequences
would be—they would have ignited the genocide.”(26)
Despite this evidence presented at his trial, the judgement condemning Georges Rutaganda made note only of a ‘plane crash’. The attack is invisible, its victims are demonised, and the fact of the attack serves merely as a point in time from which to mark the beginning of the genocide.
The defense lawyers are still waiting to get all the evidence from the Prosecutor’s investigation into this murderous assault, nearly seven years after the first formal request was filed. They will undoubtedly have to wait for the results of the investigation conducted by the French anti-terrorist judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière.
Fragile Edifice
The ad hoc Tribunals are very fragile constructs whose excessive politicization (as much in their conception as in their subsequent instrumentalization) has made them institutions of varying moral geometry. Some have criticized them for not arresting and condemning enough of the guilty, and for spending much too much money on the prodigious defense of those already ‘presumed guilty’. A few others, like me, are scandalized by the insupportable violations of fundamental rights commited by this pretentious adjudication in the name of a SINGLE international justice. It is even more unbearable to note that this injustice is being committed by a creation of the Security Council—the gendarme of the UN, that represents only a tiny, though all-powerful, minority of its member states. This injustice committed in the name of the gravity of the crimes, which one presumes, and what a presumption this is, will be seen better and better, is only the sad result of defamatory campaigns led by special interests which would never be given the right to argue before a real court issued from a real democratic institution. The repetition, ad nauseam, of the ‘aimable et convenable’(27) (‘kind and decent’) story of the ‘genocide of the Tutsis’—is this an exclusive franchise?—discredits and subverts any notion of justice. The fact that the whole truth is obscured does not honor the innocent victims of the massacres: men, women , children, and old folks, be they Tutsi, Hutu, Twa or Congolese. They all had the right to live in a country at peace. And their memory is profaned when Justice refuses to lift the viel on the causes of a war that ended up executing them, without due process of law.
Mission Impossible?
How then can one mount a defense in such a context ? Must one engage in an institutional direction, accept that the institution exists, and that those who find themselves imprisoned by it have the right, like everyone else, to be defended ? All the more so when the lawyer has convinced herself that her client is totally and objectively innocent, a conviction that many of her colleagues hold with regard to their own clients. The accused has the right to tell his side of the story, to fight against the half-truths and outright lies that are used against him. To turn the Tribunal into a political platform, as was done by Dreyfus, Mandela and Barghouti.
On the other hand, it must be asked to what extent the Defense contributes to legitimizing an institution so politicized as to be the antithesis of a judicial body. The ICTR can not function without the cooperation of the Kagame government, and it is an inevitable juridical consequence to point out that this Tribunal lacks the capacity to be independent. Yet, independence is at the very heart of the concept of justice. Without garauntees of independence, an institution that judges human beings charged with the worst crimes imaginable can not pretend to be a court of justice. Its function, its judgements, will be fatally influenced by the source of its lack of independence, whether institutional, political or by coercive forces coming from outside interests.
The Defense is sometimes practiced, as the saying goes, without regard to borders. But we must make very sure that it is not practiced without regard to conscience. And with a total understanding of the case.
Tiphaine Dickson
© 2003
(1) The Foundation was established in West Germany after WWII and was especially appreciated by the CIA for its fervent anti-Communism. In effect, the Foundation Freidrich Ebert-Stiftung was used by the CIA as a go-between for decades and was notably effective in the reversal of the ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal. See ex-CIA agent Philip Agee’s “Terrorism and Civil Society”:
The Instruments of US Policy in Cuba", http://www.counterpunch.org/agee08092003.html:
"From early on the CIA channeled money through these foundations for non-government organizations and groups in Germany. Then in the 1960's the foundations began supporting fraternal political parties and other organizations abroad, and they channeled CIA money for these purposes as well. By the 1980's the two foundations had programs going in some 60 countries and were spending about $150 million per year. And what was most interesting, they operated in near-total secrecy.
One operation of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung shows how effective they could be. In 1974, when the fifty-year-old fascist regime was overthrown in Portugal, a NATO member, communists and left-wing military officers took charge of the government. At that time the Portuguese social democrats, known as the Socialist Party, could hardly have numbered enough for a poker game, and they all lived in Paris and had no following in Portugal. Thanks to at least $10 million from the Ebert Stiftung plus funds from the CIA, the social democrats came back to Portugal, built a party overnight, saw it mushroom, and within a few years the Socialist Party became the governing party of Portugal. The left was relegated to the sidelines in disarray."
(2) "Le TPIR recevra le 20 mai un prix de la Frederick Ebert Siftung" (sic), Fondation Hirondelle, le 16 mai 2003.
(3) Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor for both ad hoc UN Tribunals since 1999, was forced to resign her post at the ICTR at the insistant pressuring of the Rwandan government, and because of support for her removal from the American and British governments. "Carla Del Ponte craint que Kigali n'exploite sa mise a l'écart du TPIR", Agence France-Presse, 9 août 2003.
(4) This Western sensibility is strongly influenced by the colonialist discourse present in popular literature and imagery. Voir l'excellente analyse de See the excellent analysis of Robin Philpot in his Ça ne s'est pas passé comme ça à Kigali, Montréal, Les Intouchables, 2003.
(5) From 1994 to 1996, the prosecution was directed by South African Richard Goldstone. He was replaced by Canadian Louise Arbour, whose mandate was terminated in the autumn of 1999. The Swiss Carla Del Ponte took over the position until her recent forced departure. A Gambian, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, now occupies the post of Prosecutor at the ICTR, though the job was split up at the demand of Kigali and Washington, see above.
(6) The Deputy Prosecutor who tried the first cases at the ICTR is today the US Ambassador for War Crimes. This is a US State Dept. post: Office of War Crimes Issues, http://www.state.gov/s/wci/
Dernièrement, le gouvernement rwandais annulait une rencontre prévue avec des responsables du Tribunal en raison de l'indisponibilité de l'ambassadeur Recently, the Rwandan government canceled a planned meeting of Tribunal officials because of the unavailability of ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper: "La rencontre TPIR-Rwanda, prévue à Arusha, n'a pas eu lieu", Fondation Hirondelle, 10 décembre 2002.
(7) Madame Albright acknowledges today that she regrets the US opposition, and her own, to an intervention force for Rwanda. "Albright Admits US Errors on Genocide", Kevin Kelly, The East African (Nairobi) 22 septembre 2003.
(8) It is interesting to note that the current Secretray General of the UN, Koffi Annan, was the UN’s director of Peacekeeping Operations in 1994.
(9) “. . . Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, was the inspiration for Article 20 of the Statutes”, ibid.
(10) Canada: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Liberties, article 11(d); US: 5th Amendement of the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution; France: Constitution, Title VIII; Switzerland: LFOJ, art.21; UK: Act of Settlement. See also the Lusaka Statement on Government Under the Law (Commonwealth, 1992): “We express our joint belief in the central place enjoyed by an independent, impartial and informed judiciary in realisation of just, honest, open and accountable government”, in Fragile Bastion-Judicial Independence in the Nineties and Beyond, Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sydney, 1997. And many nations are signatory to international and regional instruments which include garauntees of independence and impartiality.
(11) The American NGO which took part in The International Commission Investigating Violations of Individual Rights in Rwanda since the beginning of the war in 1990, Final Report, FIDH, Paris, March 1993. Its report, which came out in March 1993, had some important repercussions: see infra. Human Rights Watch and La Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) directed a project on the events of 1994, Aucun témoin ne doit survivre (No witness to tell the story), Paris, Éditions Karthala,1999.
(12) Unlike many national jurisdictions, the ICTR did not examin Mme Des Forges before recognizeing her expertise. It was enough that the Prosecutor affirmed that she was an expert. Procureur v Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, transcripts of 11 février 1997.
(13) Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 1.
(14) "To initiate a war of aggression is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." Justice Birkett, from Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, l'affaire Goering et al.
(15) Procureur c. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, Jugement, 2 Septembre, 1998, par. 93.
(16) Mugesera c. Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration, 2003 CAF 325, available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/cf/2003/2003caf325.html
(17) Ibid., par. 240
(18) In the cases of Akayesu, Nahimana et al, et Bagosora et al.
(19) Mugesera, supra, para. 256.
(20) At this writing, the Canadian Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration had not appealed the decision, but were it to do so, the arguments would be heard before the Supreme Court of Canada, the court of last resort, on which sits the Honorable Louise Arbour, who was the Prosecutor at the ICTR at the time that Alison Des Forges testified on the subject of Dr Mugesera. Des Forges brought up Leon Mugesera at the behest of the Prosecutor, even though, in the case in question—Akayesu—the Mugesera speech was of no pertinence to the debate.
(21) Procureur c. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, transcriptions du 7 février 1997, pp. 44-5.
(22)"Explosive Leak on Rwanda Genocide", Steven Edwards, National Post, 1er mars 2000, page 1.
(23) Michael Hourrigan, Austraian lawyer, employed by the Prosecution of the ICTR in the first years of operation of the Tribunal. See "Hourrigan contre l’ONU", Thierry Cruvillier, Diplomatie judiciaire, 9 mai 2000, http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/Tpir/Parquet29.htm
(24) Procureur c. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, transcriptions du 24 novembre 1997, pages 19-20.
(25) This is identical to Mme Des Forges’ thesis.
(26) Procureur c. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, Transcriptions du 24 novembre 1997, pp. 113-114.
(27) Robin Philpot, Ça ne s'est pas passé comme ça à Kigali, op. cit., borrowing a phrase from Gustave Flaubert.
29 April 2005
By Tiphaine Dickson
Defense lawyers have gotten used to being unpopular when they defend those accused of very serious crimes. The job of the defense, in all judicial systems, consists in making sure, even in the most explosive situations, that the rights of the defendant are fully and definitely exercised. When the state deploys its machinery of repression against an individual, the defense lawyer is the only rampart that protects the accused from injustice, vengeance and tyranny.
Defense lawyers have also gotten used to being vilified for keeping company with those they represent, or, even worse, for being associated with the crimes of which their clients are accused. In the context of political trials, in many parts of the world, they risk their reputations, their professional futures, and certain among them risk their lives. Generally, however, defense lawyers enjoy courteous and collegial treatment before these tribunals. They are officers of the court, and they protect all citizens from the potential or actual juridical aberations of the state. In some systems their participation is essential to the search for truth, and they are rewarded with a certain respect as well as with a casual prestige.
Yet even the most seasoned and jaded lawyer is staggered by the icy welcome reserved for defense counsel at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. All too often, the work of the defense is seen as an obstacle to the grand mission which the ICTR has set itself: Bringing ‘reconciliation’ to Rwanda.
“Reconciliation”?
What could ‘reconciliation’ mean in the mind of a jurist? How can a tribunal bring it about? Rather than a juridical objective, isn’t ‘reconciliation’ a political goal? Wasn’t the establishment of the ICTR the result of political wheeling and dealing within the UN Security Council, all necessitated by some resounding political, diplomatic and military screw-ups?
Yet the ICTR congratulates itself for having successfully made important break-throughs in the struggle against the ‘culture of impunity.’ It most often expresses its achievements in numbers: How many detainees, how many convictions, the first woman charged with rape, the first chief of state to have pleaded guilty to the charge of genocide . . .
No one seems interested in asking if the Tribunal’s achievement of criminal justice can decently be gauged by the number of convictions it hands down. Others might wonder as to the political usefulness of the whole endeavor. In fact, fighting has exploded throughout the Great Lakes region of Africa, while in Rwanda, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and all freedoms, save for the freedom to plunder and pillage, have disappeared like the morning mist.
But congratulations certainly must be inorder, for the ICTR now boasts of having received, in an affair without precedent in the history of juris prudence, the Human Rights award of the Freidrich Ebert-Stiftung Foundation(1) for having significantly promoted national reconciliation in Rwanda.(2) And what should one make of this Foundation, subject of recent revelations by former CIA agent Phillip Agee that its founder, Freidrich Ebert-Stiftung, was well known to US Intelligence for his engaged anti-Communism after the Second World War, and has been well used by The Agency for decades as a go-between with the old Fascist guard in Europe? According to Agee, the Foundation played a key role in the defeat of the ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal in 1973. But today it bestows a prize for Human Rights on the ICTR, and the Tribunal’s representatives accept it without the slightest consideration that by so doing they might besmirch the appearance of impartiality essential to such a court, and applaud themselves for this ‘reconciliation’ to which they have contributed.
What kind of reconciliation are we talking about here when only one ethnic group is currently locked down, when the crimes of the victors are swept under the rug, against all protestations, and when the military junta currently in power in Kigali decides who the witnesses, the accused, and even who the Prosecutor will be?(3) What kind of reconciliation could blot out the attack of April 6, 1994, on the Rwandan presidential plane that killed two African presidents, the chief of staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, several political personalities and the entire French crew?
The beginnings of the ICTR were shakey and criticized everywhere, except, curiously, by the Hutu community in exile which, already in 1994, was expressing loud and clear its support for the establishment of a Tribunal to shed light on all the crimes committed in Rwanda since the invasion of that country on October 1, 1990. As for the Rwanda of Paul Kagame: it was dead set against UN Security Council Resolution 955, notably because it did not permit the ICTR to hand down the death penalty, and because the UN would not seat the court in Kigali.
Position of the Problem
The ICTR has always been the object of criticism that ranges from the complaisant to the outright racist. The Western media have tried to out do one another in their repetitious charges that the Chief Prosecutor is ‘corrupt’ and the the Tribunal’s procedures are ‘slow’ and ‘confused’.
The reader might consider such generalizations as endemique of the functioning of African institutions.(4) But that would be a grave error. The ICTR is not an African institution, it’s a UN institution. The prosecutor’s office was directed by a South African man, a Canadian woman, and a Swiss woman.(5) And American influence on the Tribunal is undeniable.(6)
This is not to say that the ICTR doesn’t deserve this reproach, far from it, but it does serve to refocus the analysis and pose some fundamental questions. Is this Tribunal really suited to bring about justice, or is it merely an institution forged in the furnace of political opportunism? And despite the fact that the directors of the Tribunal never cease repeating that it is not an example of victors’ justice, one can not help noting a certain incapability—institutional or deliberate—to proceed with an objective examination of all the aspects of the Rwandan conflict, and not just those that serve the interests of the victors and their powerful sponsors. So the institution vows that such massacres as afflicted and forever scarred Rwanda should never again be allowed to take place. But can such a wish be realized without first arriving at the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
One should straight-away pose and existential question: Was the ICTR created legally? The UN Charter does not give any authority to the Security Council to establish judicial bodies. The ICTY and the ICTR were established at the behest of Madeleine Albright, the same US representative who, in a grim sort of irony, pressured the Security Council to reduce the mission of the UN intervention force in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to a nearly symbolic presence, and this at the very height of the armed conflict and massacres.(7)
Even more ironically: the Security Council had the power (and the responsibility) to take action to restore the peace and security of Rwanda. It chose essentially not to do that. On the other hand, the Security Council has no power to establish a Tribunal, and yet that’s exactly what it did.(8) According to Resolution 955, the Tribunal must contribute to a ‘process of national reconciliation and the reestablishment and maintenance of the peace’. But by November 1994, it was just a little too late to be concerned with the reestablishment of peace: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had won the war and set up a military state over the whole of the Rwandan territory. The only thing left to do was to judge the losers.
And as far as the struggle against impunity is concerned, a little more irony arises: The US refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the Internation Criminal Court (Treaty of Rome). They seek to undermine the court’s authority by signing treaties of ‘mutual non-cooperation’ with other nations, the terms of which dictate that the signatories will never transfer one another's citizens to this permanent Tribunal. Such a treaty was signed by Rwanda, which has chosen to side against all those nations that have recognized the authority of the ICC.
An independent Tribunal?
Article 20 of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which are contained in the annex of Security Council Resolution 955 that the UN used to create the ICTR, set forth the rights of the accused. This Article was inspired by, and transcribed almost word for word from, Article 14 of the Internation Pact on Civil and Political Rights. Judge Laïty Kama (then President of the ICTR) recognized this lineage in his speech before the UN Generaly Assembly on 10 December 1996.(9)
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, is the principal international instrument for the protection of individual rights. It garauntees the exercise of those fundamental rights recognized by the community of nations.
It garauntees every individual the right to a trial before an independent tribunal:
“All are equal before the tribunals and courts of justice. Every individual
has the right to have his case heard equitably and publicly by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law”;
Article 20 of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, however it may have been ‘inspired’ by the principled terms of the Covenant, left out the explicit and fundamental garauntees of the right to a trial before an independent, impartial, competent tribunal established by law.
The ICTR is not constrained by garauntees of impartiality and independence as set out in international and regional instruments for the protection of the rights of the individual or in the constitutions or legal codes of many countries.(10) The Security Council deliberately omitted according the accused their most fundamental right: the right to a trial before and independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
An institution can not pretend to be judicial without being independent. Independence is at the very heart of the idea of Justice. An institution that is not independent, or that cannot garauntee or affirm its independence and its impartiality, is not capable of exercising a judiciary function. It can pretend to do this and it can drape itself with all the cosmetic trappings of justice, but any tribunal that cannot garauntee to those it judges that it is independent, is, at the very essence of its judicial function, hollow.
The ICTR and the search for truth
Whoever calls for reconciliation, necessarily, calls for truth as a precondition. Early on in the course of the trials in Arusha, the first President of the Tribunal, Laïty Kama, let it be very clearly understood that he considered the search for truth to have been assigned to him as a judge by the UN. Thus, in the Akayesu case, the first trial begun before the ICTR, the trial chamber became immersed in a number of questions that bore no connection with charges against Mr. Akayesu, the former burgermaster of the tiny commune of Taba. During the long testimony of Alison Des Forges, a leading American activist for Human Rights Watch,(11) recognized as an expert-witness by the Chamber,(12) what took place was actually the first ‘collective prosecution’ in the history of the Tribunal. In effect, what was called into question was ‘the actual intentions’ of President Habyarimana, the election of President Kayibanda, or that of Colonel Lizinde, the student quotas, the speech of Leon Mugesera, or that of Colonel Bagosora, the Akazu, the UNAMIR, the events at Bugesera, but little if anything about Akayesu or what he’d been charged with.
Thus it appears that the ICTR agreed de facto and out of a need to understand the context, which, it would seem, is certainly the right of any investigator, to install an examining magistrate on the bench. It should be noted, however, that with the testimony of Des Forges in the Akayesu case, the judges explored only those elements favorable to the Prosecution. Unlike any other known examining magistrate, who would look equally into both sides of the case, the ICTR openly sided with the Prosecutor in his search for elements that would support his dominant argument.
The ICTR and the crime of aggression commited against Rwanda in 1990
We have seen how the Tribunal showed itself to be rather informal in the Akayesu case. The testimony of Alison Des Forges was considered precedential in its function as research into the truth, yet her testimony largely exceeded the bounds of the charges against the accused. This kind of investigation would not have been acceptable in a court of common law, where the rules as to the admissibility of evidence strictly limit the debate and do not permit the introduction of facts that are not pertinent to the charges or might be prejudicial to the accused.
The procedural suppleness of the ICTR was tested when the matter of the 1990 invasion of Rwanda from Uganda was examined.
First problem: the Tribunal’s jurisdiction did not extend to the time period of the Rwandan invasion by the RPF in October 1990. Formally, the Tribunal is competent to judge crimes under its jurisdiction committed between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.(13) The judicial result of this political choice is to grant immunity from prosecution to Uganda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
The invasion of Rwanda is the pivotal event of that nation’s recent history. All consequent events quite obviously flow directly from it. This invasion is typical of the crime of aggression, described by the Nuremberg Tribunal as ‘the supreme war crime'.(14) But the ICTR has used its jurisprudence to fog-out the reality of this aggression, preferring, in its very first decision in the Akayesu case, to conclude that Rwanda was the object of a simple ‘attack’:
The 1st of October 1990, an attack was launched from Uganda by
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), whose predecessor, the Rwandan
Alliance for National Unity (‘RANU’) was created in 1979
by Tutsi exiles in Uganda.(15)
This passage illustrates very well that the reconciliatory function of the Tribunal, as it concerns this fact fundamental to the understanding of the Rwandan tragedy, is conspicuous in its absense. It was not a matter of a mere ‘attack’ but of an invasion, which is the only decent way to describe it. Also, the fact that this ‘attack’ was said to have come ‘out of Uganda’ is misleading. Elements of the Ugandan Army, led by a Ugandan Army general, with tanks, guns and ammunition from this same Ugandan military committed an aggression against Rwanda. Paul Kagame, who at the time was a high-ranking Ugandan Army officer, and a citizen of that country, and was director of military intelligence for the Ugandan Army, was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, when the invasion took place.
Why hide this reality? Because it will shed light on other aspects of the debate. Because the invasion of Rwanda, and then the shooting down of the presidents’ plane on 6 April 1994, invalidates the thesis so carefully prepared by Des Forges and others, that a genocide was planned by President Habyarimana, those close to him, certain members of his party, the MRND, the Rwandan Armed Forces, and by a sinister but indistinct media.
Biased Expertise: and if this was true?
Finally, the Federal Court of Canada rendered an important decision in the Mugesera case.(16) Unlike the ICTR, the Federal Court of Appeals recognized that Rwanda was the object of an armed aggression(17), and taking this reality into full account concluded that the words spoken by Dr Leon Mugesera in a political speech in 1992 did not constitute an incitation to commit murder or other crimes against humanity. This very speech was described by Madame Des Forges, in her testimony before the ICTR as well as in the Mugesera case in Canada, as being one of the elements that prepared the massacres of 1994.(18) However, Des Forges was severely criticized by the Canadian Court, which said it was astonished by her lack of rigor and by the troublesome gaps in her methodological observations, as much in her testimony as in the report of the International Commison of Inquiry (1993) of which she was one of the authors. The hearsay, the unverified facts, the truncated speech, sources which could not be named: these elements made the Canadian Judges brush aside such evidence as had been considered the gold standard by many so-called experts on Rwanda: that Leon Mugesera was close to President Habyarimana, that he was a member of the death squads, that his speech immediately provoked the killings.
This remarkable opinion by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals, written with special regard to the dire manipulation of Dr Mugesera's speech, must make one wonder at the real value of these experts, certain of whom have been deposed in Arusha—notably Alison Des Forges—and who have written, sometimes a little quickly, sometimes quite badly, the history of Rwanda:
“(. . .) some of these conclusions, often erroneous, often hasty and
speculative, often dubious and fundamentally superficial, were repeated and
reiterated so many times without discernment or any other form of validation
as to engender a belief in a non-existant reality.(19)
While some of the defense lawyers at the ICTR happily consider this statement as it might apply to their clients, rarely would they permit themselves to believe, for more than an instant, that this institution that stands in judgment over the vanquished, the ICTR, is capable of what the highminded might consider a political and judicial blasphemy.(20)
Invisible assault
It is agreed by one and all, regardless of their slant on or interpretation of the events, that the spark that set off the explosion in Rwanda in 1994 was the shooting down of the plane that killed Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, the Rwandan Army chief of staff, several personalities close to the presidents and the entire French crew.
Nearly ten years after the catastrophic attack of 6 April 1994, no criminal or civil charges have been brought, nor have any diplomatic sanctions been imposed. As if the airplane simply crashed, and thereafter the killings began. As crude as this statement may seem, it is exactly the thesis adopted by the Prosecutor at the ICTR in the charges brought against Georges Rutuganda, my client:
“The 6th of April 1994, an airplane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana
of Rwanda, and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at the Kigali airport
killing all aboard. Following the deaths of the two presidents, the generalized political
and ethnic killings began in Kigali and then spread to other parts of Rwanda.”
The ICTR Prosecutor’s terminology did not demonstrate any great willingness of see into the heart of the matter: the plane ‘crashed’. Two presidents of two countries so torn by wars and coups d’état that they were quite likely once again to return to bloody war were ‘dead’— simple as that.
It is not inexact to state that the plane crashed. But it is hugely improbable that a judicial institution spawned by the UN Security Council should neglect to mention that before the plane crashed, it was blown out of the sky by two SAM-16 missiles.
The ICTR has all the judicial power and technology necessary to initiate and carry out a thorough investigation of this terrorist act that begat such nightmarish consequences. Yet its causes seem to be of astonishingly little interest to this organ of the UNSC, which was also responsible for the UNAMIR force in Kigali at the time of the attack.
The importance of this attack has not, at any rate, gotten past the defense. Already by the 7th of February 1997, this writer had pleaded, in Chamber I of the ICTR, that the Prosecution devulge all evidence obtained by its investigative services at the time of the attack on the presidential plane, or, in the case that no such investigation had yet taken place, that the Prosecution proceed immediately to initiate such an investigation. The response of the Associate Prosecutor was stupefying: “Our responsibility is not to investigate the crash of the plane; this is not our job. I am, therefore, in the most categoric fashion, going to set that question aside. And I can say emphatically that we have not carried out such an investigation, nor have we received any reports on such an investigation. Secondly, it is not our role, it is not our mission to carry out an investigation on the crash of an airplane carrying some presidents or vice-presidents. The question is not relevant to our authority.(21)
That was in February 1997. On the 1st of March 2000, the Canadian daily, National Post, revealed that investigations into the attack had been carried out by the Prosecution from 1996(22)—before the Prosecutor had denied it, categorically on his oath of office, during the trial of Georges Rutaganda—and that his investigations had been fruitful: two witnesses from Kagame’s elite unit, ‘The Network’, had been located and had confirmed that the attack was the work of the RPF, in collaboration with a foreign country.
Two documents had been obtained by a journalist from The Post: ‘The Hourrigan Report’, as well as an unsigned letter detailing the testimony of members of ‘The Network’. The first report, marked ‘Confidential’, was directed to the attention of the Office of Internal Investigations of the United Nations by a former investigator for the Prosecutor’s Office(23), and related the frustrations of its author, in particular the fact that he was forbidden to continue his investigation into the attack, despite his having made significant progress and that Prosecutor Arbour seemed thrilled by the new developments. But she brought the whole thing to a brutal halt. The investigation was closed just as it was approaching the truth about the causes of this attack.
Investigation suddenly stopped. And this despite new witnesses, inside witnesses, who would knock the pins out from under the whole thesis that had been in play until then, or at least that idea put forward by certain people to explain the attack: that the attack was commited by ‘Extremist Hutus’ inorder to liquidate Habyarimana as he returned from peace negotiations in Dar es Salaam, because he seemed ready to put in place the institutions set forth in the Arusha Accords, was too weak with regard to the Tutsis, and inorder to begin the genocide which had been programmed for some time.
And what if the abandoned investigation had revealed that the RPF had brought down the presidential plane? What would have been the political consequences? In the case of the Prosecution v Rutaganda, Filip Reyntjens, called by the prosecution as an expert-witness, conceded during his cross examination that:
“The Arusha Accords gave a great deal to the RPF. They could have
gained a lot more if they had carried on the war to its end, which was what
they finally did in fact, but they certainly could not have done this without
first having a good pretext.
Now, I am not at all suggesting that the RPF was looking for this pretext,
because this pretext could have been the shooting down of the presidential
plane and we do not know today who carried out this attack.”(24)
(emphasis added)
We do know today, in fact, that at the time professor Reyntjens gave this testimony, the Prosecutor held evidence that established the RPF’s responsibility for this attack. But in light of Reyntjens’ observation, some gargantuan problems arose.
In the first place, the identities of the perpetrators of this attack, unlike what the Associate Prosecutor contented in February 1997, is of great importance. And even more significant is that the Prosecution’s fundamental thesis regarding the events in Rwanda925)—that President Habyarimana, the MRND, the general staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces and other ‘Extremists Hutus’, did not negotiate for peace in good faith, because they did not want to share power with the RPF—collapses like a house of cards. And in place of this thesis, today, irrevocably implanted in hearts and minds, is a doubt: the RPF could have shot down the plane to create a pretext for continuing armed hostilities, and to take advantage of the predictable chaos that would follow on the shock of this assassination to take over the country militarily. And the UNAMIR were not actually there to ‘maintain the peace’—as fragile as it already was—for, from the moment of that attack, the peace just evaporated.
The killings, the massacres began. With consequences we all know of, and which continue their macabre unfolding into Congo. Five million, six million human lives taken since the invasion of Rwanda in 1990? Where is the Tribunal for the Congolese victims, for the Hutus slaughtered in the refugee camps in the ex-Zaire?
What would be the judicial consequences drawn from the fact the Prosecution’s investigators had discovered: that the presidential plane was brought down by the RPF?
Professor Reyntjens led us down a new path of considerations essential to understanding, not only the Rwandan catastrophe, but also the real reasons why a good faith investigation of this tragedy could be so badly botched:
“But there would also have been a judicial interest. Those who
shot down the plane knew very well what the consequences of this attack
would be, and in this case they would bear a legal responsibility—
and I’m not saying political, now, but legal—for the genocide.
Because they would have—knowing full well what the consequences
would be—they would have ignited the genocide.”(26)
Despite this evidence presented at his trial, the judgement condemning Georges Rutaganda made note only of a ‘plane crash’. The attack is invisible, its victims are demonised, and the fact of the attack serves merely as a point in time from which to mark the beginning of the genocide.
The defense lawyers are still waiting to get all the evidence from the Prosecutor’s investigation into this murderous assault, nearly seven years after the first formal request was filed. They will undoubtedly have to wait for the results of the investigation conducted by the French anti-terrorist judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière.
Fragile Edifice
The ad hoc Tribunals are very fragile constructs whose excessive politicization (as much in their conception as in their subsequent instrumentalization) has made them institutions of varying moral geometry. Some have criticized them for not arresting and condemning enough of the guilty, and for spending much too much money on the prodigious defense of those already ‘presumed guilty’. A few others, like me, are scandalized by the insupportable violations of fundamental rights commited by this pretentious adjudication in the name of a SINGLE international justice. It is even more unbearable to note that this injustice is being committed by a creation of the Security Council—the gendarme of the UN, that represents only a tiny, though all-powerful, minority of its member states. This injustice committed in the name of the gravity of the crimes, which one presumes, and what a presumption this is, will be seen better and better, is only the sad result of defamatory campaigns led by special interests which would never be given the right to argue before a real court issued from a real democratic institution. The repetition, ad nauseam, of the ‘aimable et convenable’(27) (‘kind and decent’) story of the ‘genocide of the Tutsis’—is this an exclusive franchise?—discredits and subverts any notion of justice. The fact that the whole truth is obscured does not honor the innocent victims of the massacres: men, women , children, and old folks, be they Tutsi, Hutu, Twa or Congolese. They all had the right to live in a country at peace. And their memory is profaned when Justice refuses to lift the viel on the causes of a war that ended up executing them, without due process of law.
Mission Impossible?
How then can one mount a defense in such a context ? Must one engage in an institutional direction, accept that the institution exists, and that those who find themselves imprisoned by it have the right, like everyone else, to be defended ? All the more so when the lawyer has convinced herself that her client is totally and objectively innocent, a conviction that many of her colleagues hold with regard to their own clients. The accused has the right to tell his side of the story, to fight against the half-truths and outright lies that are used against him. To turn the Tribunal into a political platform, as was done by Dreyfus, Mandela and Barghouti.
On the other hand, it must be asked to what extent the Defense contributes to legitimizing an institution so politicized as to be the antithesis of a judicial body. The ICTR can not function without the cooperation of the Kagame government, and it is an inevitable juridical consequence to point out that this Tribunal lacks the capacity to be independent. Yet, independence is at the very heart of the concept of justice. Without garauntees of independence, an institution that judges human beings charged with the worst crimes imaginable can not pretend to be a court of justice. Its function, its judgements, will be fatally influenced by the source of its lack of independence, whether institutional, political or by coercive forces coming from outside interests.
The Defense is sometimes practiced, as the saying goes, without regard to borders. But we must make very sure that it is not practiced without regard to conscience. And with a total understanding of the case.
Tiphaine Dickson
© 2003
(1) The Foundation was established in West Germany after WWII and was especially appreciated by the CIA for its fervent anti-Communism. In effect, the Foundation Freidrich Ebert-Stiftung was used by the CIA as a go-between for decades and was notably effective in the reversal of the ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal. See ex-CIA agent Philip Agee’s “Terrorism and Civil Society”:
The Instruments of US Policy in Cuba", http://www.counterpunch.org/agee08092003.html:
"From early on the CIA channeled money through these foundations for non-government organizations and groups in Germany. Then in the 1960's the foundations began supporting fraternal political parties and other organizations abroad, and they channeled CIA money for these purposes as well. By the 1980's the two foundations had programs going in some 60 countries and were spending about $150 million per year. And what was most interesting, they operated in near-total secrecy.
One operation of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung shows how effective they could be. In 1974, when the fifty-year-old fascist regime was overthrown in Portugal, a NATO member, communists and left-wing military officers took charge of the government. At that time the Portuguese social democrats, known as the Socialist Party, could hardly have numbered enough for a poker game, and they all lived in Paris and had no following in Portugal. Thanks to at least $10 million from the Ebert Stiftung plus funds from the CIA, the social democrats came back to Portugal, built a party overnight, saw it mushroom, and within a few years the Socialist Party became the governing party of Portugal. The left was relegated to the sidelines in disarray."
(2) "Le TPIR recevra le 20 mai un prix de la Frederick Ebert Siftung" (sic), Fondation Hirondelle, le 16 mai 2003.
(3) Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor for both ad hoc UN Tribunals since 1999, was forced to resign her post at the ICTR at the insistant pressuring of the Rwandan government, and because of support for her removal from the American and British governments. "Carla Del Ponte craint que Kigali n'exploite sa mise a l'écart du TPIR", Agence France-Presse, 9 août 2003.
(4) This Western sensibility is strongly influenced by the colonialist discourse present in popular literature and imagery. Voir l'excellente analyse de See the excellent analysis of Robin Philpot in his Ça ne s'est pas passé comme ça à Kigali, Montréal, Les Intouchables, 2003.
(5) From 1994 to 1996, the prosecution was directed by South African Richard Goldstone. He was replaced by Canadian Louise Arbour, whose mandate was terminated in the autumn of 1999. The Swiss Carla Del Ponte took over the position until her recent forced departure. A Gambian, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, now occupies the post of Prosecutor at the ICTR, though the job was split up at the demand of Kigali and Washington, see above.
(6) The Deputy Prosecutor who tried the first cases at the ICTR is today the US Ambassador for War Crimes. This is a US State Dept. post: Office of War Crimes Issues, http://www.state.gov/s/wci/
Dernièrement, le gouvernement rwandais annulait une rencontre prévue avec des responsables du Tribunal en raison de l'indisponibilité de l'ambassadeur Recently, the Rwandan government canceled a planned meeting of Tribunal officials because of the unavailability of ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper: "La rencontre TPIR-Rwanda, prévue à Arusha, n'a pas eu lieu", Fondation Hirondelle, 10 décembre 2002.
(7) Madame Albright acknowledges today that she regrets the US opposition, and her own, to an intervention force for Rwanda. "Albright Admits US Errors on Genocide", Kevin Kelly, The East African (Nairobi) 22 septembre 2003.
(8) It is interesting to note that the current Secretray General of the UN, Koffi Annan, was the UN’s director of Peacekeeping Operations in 1994.
(9) “. . . Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, was the inspiration for Article 20 of the Statutes”, ibid.
(10) Canada: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Liberties, article 11(d); US: 5th Amendement of the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution; France: Constitution, Title VIII; Switzerland: LFOJ, art.21; UK: Act of Settlement. See also the Lusaka Statement on Government Under the Law (Commonwealth, 1992): “We express our joint belief in the central place enjoyed by an independent, impartial and informed judiciary in realisation of just, honest, open and accountable government”, in Fragile Bastion-Judicial Independence in the Nineties and Beyond, Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sydney, 1997. And many nations are signatory to international and regional instruments which include garauntees of independence and impartiality.
(11) The American NGO which took part in The International Commission Investigating Violations of Individual Rights in Rwanda since the beginning of the war in 1990, Final Report, FIDH, Paris, March 1993. Its report, which came out in March 1993, had some important repercussions: see infra. Human Rights Watch and La Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) directed a project on the events of 1994, Aucun témoin ne doit survivre (No witness to tell the story), Paris, Éditions Karthala,1999.
(12) Unlike many national jurisdictions, the ICTR did not examin Mme Des Forges before recognizeing her expertise. It was enough that the Prosecutor affirmed that she was an expert. Procureur v Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, transcripts of 11 février 1997.
(13) Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 1.
(14) "To initiate a war of aggression is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." Justice Birkett, from Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, l'affaire Goering et al.
(15) Procureur c. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, Jugement, 2 Septembre, 1998, par. 93.
(16) Mugesera c. Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration, 2003 CAF 325, available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/cf/2003/2003caf325.html
(17) Ibid., par. 240
(18) In the cases of Akayesu, Nahimana et al, et Bagosora et al.
(19) Mugesera, supra, para. 256.
(20) At this writing, the Canadian Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration had not appealed the decision, but were it to do so, the arguments would be heard before the Supreme Court of Canada, the court of last resort, on which sits the Honorable Louise Arbour, who was the Prosecutor at the ICTR at the time that Alison Des Forges testified on the subject of Dr Mugesera. Des Forges brought up Leon Mugesera at the behest of the Prosecutor, even though, in the case in question—Akayesu—the Mugesera speech was of no pertinence to the debate.
(21) Procureur c. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, transcriptions du 7 février 1997, pp. 44-5.
(22)"Explosive Leak on Rwanda Genocide", Steven Edwards, National Post, 1er mars 2000, page 1.
(23) Michael Hourrigan, Austraian lawyer, employed by the Prosecution of the ICTR in the first years of operation of the Tribunal. See "Hourrigan contre l’ONU", Thierry Cruvillier, Diplomatie judiciaire, 9 mai 2000, http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/Tpir/Parquet29.htm
(24) Procureur c. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, transcriptions du 24 novembre 1997, pages 19-20.
(25) This is identical to Mme Des Forges’ thesis.
(26) Procureur c. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, Transcriptions du 24 novembre 1997, pp. 113-114.
(27) Robin Philpot, Ça ne s'est pas passé comme ça à Kigali, op. cit., borrowing a phrase from Gustave Flaubert.
Affaire Mugesera: aveuglement volontaire, acharnement immoral.
via CirqueMinime Paris
7 December 2004
by Tiphaine Dickson
L'an passé, la Cour d’appel fédérale du Canada mettait apparamment fin à la longue saga judiciaire de Léon Mugesera, son épouse, et de ses cinq enfants, dans une rigoureuse décision qui renversait l'ordre de déporter toute une famille au Rwanda, cette quasi-dictature résolument militaire du Général Paul Kagame, dont les bruits de botte se font aujourd'hui de nouveau entendre au Congo voisin. Immigration Canada, poussé par divers lobbies, a porté l'affaire en appel, et la Cour suprême entendra les parties, ainsi que les intervenants agressifs en faveur de la déportation du Dr. Mugesera, ce mercredi le 8 décembre.
La Cour d’appel fédérale avait pourtant, (et surtout) au terme d'un exercice dont l'admirable impartialité et la méthodologie rigoureuse font honneur au système judiciaire canadien, invalidé le récit élevé au rang de quasi vérité institutionnelle voulant que Mugesera soit un criminel contre l'Humanité parmi nous, et qu'il fallait à tout prix l'accuser, le chasser, ou pire. Mugesera, nous a-t-on inlassablement répété, avait prononcé un discours incitant au génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda, on l'a même "vu" à la télévision. Radio-Canada avait en effet diffusé des images d'un discours de Mugesera (qui portait, en réalité, sur la transition vers la démocratie à l'occidentale et d'éventuelles élections) avec, en sous-titres, le texte d'un discours haineux. La réalité est que ces sous-titres ne correspondaient pas au discours que nous "voyions"; pire encore, les sous-titres, ce qui faisait qu'on avait "vu" Mugesera inciter à la haine, n'étaient pas la traduction fidèle du "fameux" discours, mais bien une version partiale, tronquée, et inexacte, discréditée devant la justice.
La Cour d’appel fédérale a conclu, après un examen attentif du gargantuesque dossier, que l'affaire Mugesera se résumait à ceci: "…des conclusions tantôt erronées, tantôt hâtives et spéculatives, tantôt douteuses au fondement superficiel maintes fois reprises et réitérées par d'autres sans discernement et sans autre forme de validation ont engendré une croyance en une réalité inexistante".
Certains persistent, avec un acharnement stupéfiant, à y croire encore. Il est vrai qu'il est fastidieux de lire une décision judiciaire de 137 pages, surtout si on croit déjà tout savoir, et surtout si on est convaincu d'avoir observé de visu le "flagrant délit". On ne peut, par exemple, oublier avoir vu, de nos propres yeux, cet homme émacié du camp d'Omarska, en Bosnie-herzégovine, derrière un barbelé, une image qui a illico fait du lieu un camp de concentration. Et nous avons tout de suite "su", parce que nous l'avions observé, qui étaient les coupables, et qui étaient les victimes. Mais qui, par contre, s'est intéressé à apprendre qu'en fait, (et un tribunal de Londres l'a reconnu par la suite) la journaliste britannique Penny Marshall a croqué cette image emblématique alors qu'elle était elle-même derrière un barbelé qui entourait un groupe électrogène, et que l'homme, malade depuis des années, s'est approché avec d'autres curieux, et qu'elle a filmé cet entretien en laissant croire aux spectateurs que des gens, qui n'étaient nullement prisonniers dans un camp de concentration (il s'agissait en fait d'un camp de réfugiés), l'étaient? Le journaliste australien Richard Carleton, quant à lui, a justifié le fait d'avoir falsifié un reportage sur l'ex-Yougoslavie, prétendant que de toute manière, même si son récit était inventé, il s'agissait tout de même d'un reflet fidèle de la réalité. Et s'agissant de Monsieur Mugesera, une nouvelle invention vient tout juste de s'ajouter au lot: Antoine Robitaille (Revue de la Presse canadienne, Le Devoir, le 20 novembre 2004) a récemment écrit que M. Mugesera avait prononcé son discours à la Radio Mille-Collines (RTLM), alors que M. Mugesera avait quitté le Rwanda, pour ne plus jamais y retourner, avant que cette radio ne soit établie, fin 1993!
Cette arrogante désinvolture, insoutenable lorsque la vie et la liberté d'êtres humains sont en jeu, colore l'affaire Mugesera depuis ses débuts. D'enviables carrières académiques et de droits de l'Homme (le paradoxe est douloureux) ont été bâties sur la persécution de cet homme, mais l'édifice est bien fragile. Des experts de renom, "spécialistes du Rwanda" ont été sévèrement critiqués par le Tribunal canadien, qui s'est dit étonné par leur manque de rigueur, et par les inquiétantes lacunes méthodologiques observées, tant dans leurs témoignages que dans le rapport de la Commission Internationale d'Enquête (1993) qui avait parti le bal des allégations contre Léon Mugesera. Le ouï-dire, les faits non vérifiés, les discours tronqués, les sources dont on ne peut divulguer le nom: tant d'éléments qui ont poussé les juges canadiens à balayer du revers de la main un récit qui pourtant fait école dans une littérature dite experte sur le Rwanda: que Léon Mugesera était un proche du Président Habyarimana, qu'il était membre des escadrons de la mort, que son discours avait immédiatement provoqué des tueries. Tout le monde y croit pourtant! Assez pour qu'Immigration Canada porte l'affaire en appel, et même que les interventions agressives se multiplient devant la Cour suprême. Mais qu'on le veuille ou non, et quelle que soit la ferveur de notre croyance (ou notre besoin de croire) que Mugesera est un "génocidaire" et que la Canada est complice, il faut se rappeler de ce qu'est une erreur judiciaire, de ce qu'est une vengeance politique transformée en procès, et de ce qu'est la pire injustice: celle qui condamne un innocent avant son procès, et qui lui fait porter les stigmates des pires crimes connus de l'Humanité. C'est une tache qui se répand sur une société toute entière.
L'honorable juge Létourneau de la Cour d’appel fédérale offrait cette réflexion: "Je ne peux cacher mon étonnement face non seulement à cette facilité avec laquelle le texte du discours de M. Mugesera fut altéré à des fins partisanes par le Commission internationale d'enquête, mais surtout face à cette aisance et à cette assurance avec lesquelles les triturations de textes furent par la suite acceptées, avec les conséquences qu'on connaît."
"L'aisance", "l'assurance", et ajoutons, l'arrogance: celles-là mêmes qui nous ont offertes les armes de destruction massive en Irak. Avant de condamner Léon Mugesera ou d'espérer qu'il le sera, sachez que ses cinq enfants seront, avec leur parents, déportés vers un pays qui emprisonne les journalistes (et l'ancien Président du nouveau régime), force deux premiers ministres à choisir l'exil, et assassine un Ministre de l'Intérieur en plein jour à Nairobi. Sachez cela et imaginez ce que serait le sort du Dr. Mugesera. Et avant d'espérer dénoncer la "complicité" canadienne par la déportation de Mugesera (et non un blanc, canadien ou québécois, bien entendu), demandez-vous ce que vous savez vraiment de lui, du Rwanda, ou de l'horreur de 1994.
Tiphaine Dickson est avocate spécialisée en droit pénal international. Elle a agi comme conseil principal devant le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda lors d'un des premiers procès pour génocide menés par l'organisation des Nations unies.
7 December 2004
by Tiphaine Dickson
L'an passé, la Cour d’appel fédérale du Canada mettait apparamment fin à la longue saga judiciaire de Léon Mugesera, son épouse, et de ses cinq enfants, dans une rigoureuse décision qui renversait l'ordre de déporter toute une famille au Rwanda, cette quasi-dictature résolument militaire du Général Paul Kagame, dont les bruits de botte se font aujourd'hui de nouveau entendre au Congo voisin. Immigration Canada, poussé par divers lobbies, a porté l'affaire en appel, et la Cour suprême entendra les parties, ainsi que les intervenants agressifs en faveur de la déportation du Dr. Mugesera, ce mercredi le 8 décembre.
La Cour d’appel fédérale avait pourtant, (et surtout) au terme d'un exercice dont l'admirable impartialité et la méthodologie rigoureuse font honneur au système judiciaire canadien, invalidé le récit élevé au rang de quasi vérité institutionnelle voulant que Mugesera soit un criminel contre l'Humanité parmi nous, et qu'il fallait à tout prix l'accuser, le chasser, ou pire. Mugesera, nous a-t-on inlassablement répété, avait prononcé un discours incitant au génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda, on l'a même "vu" à la télévision. Radio-Canada avait en effet diffusé des images d'un discours de Mugesera (qui portait, en réalité, sur la transition vers la démocratie à l'occidentale et d'éventuelles élections) avec, en sous-titres, le texte d'un discours haineux. La réalité est que ces sous-titres ne correspondaient pas au discours que nous "voyions"; pire encore, les sous-titres, ce qui faisait qu'on avait "vu" Mugesera inciter à la haine, n'étaient pas la traduction fidèle du "fameux" discours, mais bien une version partiale, tronquée, et inexacte, discréditée devant la justice.
La Cour d’appel fédérale a conclu, après un examen attentif du gargantuesque dossier, que l'affaire Mugesera se résumait à ceci: "…des conclusions tantôt erronées, tantôt hâtives et spéculatives, tantôt douteuses au fondement superficiel maintes fois reprises et réitérées par d'autres sans discernement et sans autre forme de validation ont engendré une croyance en une réalité inexistante".
Certains persistent, avec un acharnement stupéfiant, à y croire encore. Il est vrai qu'il est fastidieux de lire une décision judiciaire de 137 pages, surtout si on croit déjà tout savoir, et surtout si on est convaincu d'avoir observé de visu le "flagrant délit". On ne peut, par exemple, oublier avoir vu, de nos propres yeux, cet homme émacié du camp d'Omarska, en Bosnie-herzégovine, derrière un barbelé, une image qui a illico fait du lieu un camp de concentration. Et nous avons tout de suite "su", parce que nous l'avions observé, qui étaient les coupables, et qui étaient les victimes. Mais qui, par contre, s'est intéressé à apprendre qu'en fait, (et un tribunal de Londres l'a reconnu par la suite) la journaliste britannique Penny Marshall a croqué cette image emblématique alors qu'elle était elle-même derrière un barbelé qui entourait un groupe électrogène, et que l'homme, malade depuis des années, s'est approché avec d'autres curieux, et qu'elle a filmé cet entretien en laissant croire aux spectateurs que des gens, qui n'étaient nullement prisonniers dans un camp de concentration (il s'agissait en fait d'un camp de réfugiés), l'étaient? Le journaliste australien Richard Carleton, quant à lui, a justifié le fait d'avoir falsifié un reportage sur l'ex-Yougoslavie, prétendant que de toute manière, même si son récit était inventé, il s'agissait tout de même d'un reflet fidèle de la réalité. Et s'agissant de Monsieur Mugesera, une nouvelle invention vient tout juste de s'ajouter au lot: Antoine Robitaille (Revue de la Presse canadienne, Le Devoir, le 20 novembre 2004) a récemment écrit que M. Mugesera avait prononcé son discours à la Radio Mille-Collines (RTLM), alors que M. Mugesera avait quitté le Rwanda, pour ne plus jamais y retourner, avant que cette radio ne soit établie, fin 1993!
Cette arrogante désinvolture, insoutenable lorsque la vie et la liberté d'êtres humains sont en jeu, colore l'affaire Mugesera depuis ses débuts. D'enviables carrières académiques et de droits de l'Homme (le paradoxe est douloureux) ont été bâties sur la persécution de cet homme, mais l'édifice est bien fragile. Des experts de renom, "spécialistes du Rwanda" ont été sévèrement critiqués par le Tribunal canadien, qui s'est dit étonné par leur manque de rigueur, et par les inquiétantes lacunes méthodologiques observées, tant dans leurs témoignages que dans le rapport de la Commission Internationale d'Enquête (1993) qui avait parti le bal des allégations contre Léon Mugesera. Le ouï-dire, les faits non vérifiés, les discours tronqués, les sources dont on ne peut divulguer le nom: tant d'éléments qui ont poussé les juges canadiens à balayer du revers de la main un récit qui pourtant fait école dans une littérature dite experte sur le Rwanda: que Léon Mugesera était un proche du Président Habyarimana, qu'il était membre des escadrons de la mort, que son discours avait immédiatement provoqué des tueries. Tout le monde y croit pourtant! Assez pour qu'Immigration Canada porte l'affaire en appel, et même que les interventions agressives se multiplient devant la Cour suprême. Mais qu'on le veuille ou non, et quelle que soit la ferveur de notre croyance (ou notre besoin de croire) que Mugesera est un "génocidaire" et que la Canada est complice, il faut se rappeler de ce qu'est une erreur judiciaire, de ce qu'est une vengeance politique transformée en procès, et de ce qu'est la pire injustice: celle qui condamne un innocent avant son procès, et qui lui fait porter les stigmates des pires crimes connus de l'Humanité. C'est une tache qui se répand sur une société toute entière.
L'honorable juge Létourneau de la Cour d’appel fédérale offrait cette réflexion: "Je ne peux cacher mon étonnement face non seulement à cette facilité avec laquelle le texte du discours de M. Mugesera fut altéré à des fins partisanes par le Commission internationale d'enquête, mais surtout face à cette aisance et à cette assurance avec lesquelles les triturations de textes furent par la suite acceptées, avec les conséquences qu'on connaît."
"L'aisance", "l'assurance", et ajoutons, l'arrogance: celles-là mêmes qui nous ont offertes les armes de destruction massive en Irak. Avant de condamner Léon Mugesera ou d'espérer qu'il le sera, sachez que ses cinq enfants seront, avec leur parents, déportés vers un pays qui emprisonne les journalistes (et l'ancien Président du nouveau régime), force deux premiers ministres à choisir l'exil, et assassine un Ministre de l'Intérieur en plein jour à Nairobi. Sachez cela et imaginez ce que serait le sort du Dr. Mugesera. Et avant d'espérer dénoncer la "complicité" canadienne par la déportation de Mugesera (et non un blanc, canadien ou québécois, bien entendu), demandez-vous ce que vous savez vraiment de lui, du Rwanda, ou de l'horreur de 1994.
Tiphaine Dickson est avocate spécialisée en droit pénal international. Elle a agi comme conseil principal devant le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda lors d'un des premiers procès pour génocide menés par l'organisation des Nations unies.
Mugesera to Testify at ICTR.
Hirondelle News Agency
11 June 2008
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has issued a subpoena for a Rwandan linguist living in Canada, Leon Mugesera, accused by his country to have incited genocide.
Mugesera's testimony was requested by the defence of Joseph Nzirorera, former Secretary-General of the then ruling National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), who is on a joint trial with two other top party leaders-- president Mathieu Ngirumpatse and his vice-president, Edouard Karemera. All three have pleaded not guilty.
"The Chamber grants Nzirorera's motion that Mugesera be subpoenaed to testify...that testimony be made by video-link", according to a court ruling, whose copy was availed on Wednesday to Hirondelle. The chamber also ordered the Registry to undertake the necessary logistics for video-link testimony.
The defence intends with the testimony to refute allegations that MRND leaders conveniently closed their eyes on the inflammatory speech pronounced by Mugesera on 22 November 1992 in Kabaya ,northern Rwanda, and helped him flee the country so as to escape legal proceedings.
In Kinyarwanda language, the speaker allegedly recalled in front of a packed crowd of MRND party members, the remarks which he had made a few days earlier to an ethnic Tutsi: "That your motherland is Ethiopia and that we will ensure that you will be dispatched by the (river) Nyabarongo for you to arrive there quickly". Two years later, thousands of ethnic Tutsis were killed and hurled into the Nyabarongo River.
A first motion requesting to subpoena Mugesera was rejected on 19 February because the Chamber considered that Nzirorera's defence had not done enough to obtain a voluntary appearance. At the end of new futile effort, Nzirorera's lawyers filed a second motion on 3 March.
Subsequently, the judges had asked the Registry, the department in charge of the administration of the Tribunal, to contact the witness. The Registry's report indicated that Mugesera does not say if he would testify or not.
The Chamber decided to render a decision forcing him to appear. But, as his current immigration status does not enable him to return to Canada if he was to suddenly leave that country, the judges authorized the defence to resort to video conference.
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada decided in favour of Mugesera's extradition to Kigali, but the Canadian government had then declared that it would not hand him over because capital punishment was still part of the Rwandan criminal code.
However, the death sentence has been abolished since last year by Rwanda, partly to encourage countries to extradite genocide accused.
The MRND official's trial re-started in September 2005 after cancellation of the first proceedings.
11 June 2008
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has issued a subpoena for a Rwandan linguist living in Canada, Leon Mugesera, accused by his country to have incited genocide.
Mugesera's testimony was requested by the defence of Joseph Nzirorera, former Secretary-General of the then ruling National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), who is on a joint trial with two other top party leaders-- president Mathieu Ngirumpatse and his vice-president, Edouard Karemera. All three have pleaded not guilty.
"The Chamber grants Nzirorera's motion that Mugesera be subpoenaed to testify...that testimony be made by video-link", according to a court ruling, whose copy was availed on Wednesday to Hirondelle. The chamber also ordered the Registry to undertake the necessary logistics for video-link testimony.
The defence intends with the testimony to refute allegations that MRND leaders conveniently closed their eyes on the inflammatory speech pronounced by Mugesera on 22 November 1992 in Kabaya ,northern Rwanda, and helped him flee the country so as to escape legal proceedings.
In Kinyarwanda language, the speaker allegedly recalled in front of a packed crowd of MRND party members, the remarks which he had made a few days earlier to an ethnic Tutsi: "That your motherland is Ethiopia and that we will ensure that you will be dispatched by the (river) Nyabarongo for you to arrive there quickly". Two years later, thousands of ethnic Tutsis were killed and hurled into the Nyabarongo River.
A first motion requesting to subpoena Mugesera was rejected on 19 February because the Chamber considered that Nzirorera's defence had not done enough to obtain a voluntary appearance. At the end of new futile effort, Nzirorera's lawyers filed a second motion on 3 March.
Subsequently, the judges had asked the Registry, the department in charge of the administration of the Tribunal, to contact the witness. The Registry's report indicated that Mugesera does not say if he would testify or not.
The Chamber decided to render a decision forcing him to appear. But, as his current immigration status does not enable him to return to Canada if he was to suddenly leave that country, the judges authorized the defence to resort to video conference.
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada decided in favour of Mugesera's extradition to Kigali, but the Canadian government had then declared that it would not hand him over because capital punishment was still part of the Rwandan criminal code.
However, the death sentence has been abolished since last year by Rwanda, partly to encourage countries to extradite genocide accused.
The MRND official's trial re-started in September 2005 after cancellation of the first proceedings.
Gun Running Worsening.
IRIN
12 June 2008
Mali has become an established transit route for weapons heading from West Africa's increasingly peaceful coastal states to active conflicts in West and Central Africa, an ECOWAS expert has warned.
"There are two factors on the supply side - stabilisation in Cote d'Ivoire and in Guinea Conakry," said Jonathan Sandy, small arms programme manager with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Bamako, who says regional monitoring has shown a steady uptick in the number of guns entering Mali over the last five years.
"On the demand side, some of the weapons stay in Mali and are used for criminality. Others go to active conflicts in the north of Mali, in Niger, Chad and even as far away as Sudan," he said.
Violence between the Malian army and Touareg rebels in northern Mali has escalated in recent months, with 20 rebels reportedly killed this week in the heaviest fighting since a rebel assault in May killed 25 people.
The Malian national arms commission says the weapons it has seized range from sophisticated automatic weapons to ancient revolvers. The seized weapons were manufactured in countries including the United States, China, Egypt, Italy, the Czech Republic and Russia, according to the arms commission.
In the Timbuktu region of northern Mali, arms commission officials said they have collected over 1,300 illegal weapons over the last five years, but that at least 5,500 weapons are still in circulation in that region alone. 450,000 people live in the Timbuktu region.
ECOWAS has also registered a 100 percent increase in the number of arms being manufactured locally over the last five years. "It's a good source of employment, but our concern is that it is not regulated," Sandy said.
Ahmed Hamid Maiga, head of the arms commission in Timbuktu, said deepening poverty, a declining agricultural sector, and rampant population growth explains increasing domestic demand for weapons.
"People have got to eat and drink," he said. "People think if they get a gun they will get something to eat. There are many cases of fights between pastoralists and cultivators. Other people fight over access to water sources."
ECOWAS's Sandy said strengthening national arms commissions in Mali and around the region and improving information and awareness is the best way to stop the spread of weapons.
[ This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations ]
12 June 2008
Mali has become an established transit route for weapons heading from West Africa's increasingly peaceful coastal states to active conflicts in West and Central Africa, an ECOWAS expert has warned.
"There are two factors on the supply side - stabilisation in Cote d'Ivoire and in Guinea Conakry," said Jonathan Sandy, small arms programme manager with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Bamako, who says regional monitoring has shown a steady uptick in the number of guns entering Mali over the last five years.
"On the demand side, some of the weapons stay in Mali and are used for criminality. Others go to active conflicts in the north of Mali, in Niger, Chad and even as far away as Sudan," he said.
Violence between the Malian army and Touareg rebels in northern Mali has escalated in recent months, with 20 rebels reportedly killed this week in the heaviest fighting since a rebel assault in May killed 25 people.
The Malian national arms commission says the weapons it has seized range from sophisticated automatic weapons to ancient revolvers. The seized weapons were manufactured in countries including the United States, China, Egypt, Italy, the Czech Republic and Russia, according to the arms commission.
In the Timbuktu region of northern Mali, arms commission officials said they have collected over 1,300 illegal weapons over the last five years, but that at least 5,500 weapons are still in circulation in that region alone. 450,000 people live in the Timbuktu region.
ECOWAS has also registered a 100 percent increase in the number of arms being manufactured locally over the last five years. "It's a good source of employment, but our concern is that it is not regulated," Sandy said.
Ahmed Hamid Maiga, head of the arms commission in Timbuktu, said deepening poverty, a declining agricultural sector, and rampant population growth explains increasing domestic demand for weapons.
"People have got to eat and drink," he said. "People think if they get a gun they will get something to eat. There are many cases of fights between pastoralists and cultivators. Other people fight over access to water sources."
ECOWAS's Sandy said strengthening national arms commissions in Mali and around the region and improving information and awareness is the best way to stop the spread of weapons.
[ This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations ]
ONE IN THREE CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK.
MISNA
11 June 2008
Almost three million minors are working in Uganda said the minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Syda Bbumba, revealing the results of a strudy noting that one in three children (between the ages of five and 17 years) is ‘forced’ to work by parents or by poor economic conditions. “Child labor is a wide-spread phenomenon in Uganda where approximately 2.7 million out of 7.9 million girls and boys are working prematurely," said Minister Bbumba in view of the International Day Against Child Labor to be observed next June 21.
Minister Bbumba emphasized the role of extreme poverty deriving from the widespread diffusion of Hiv/AIDS that kills one or both parents. This forces children to become bread winners, fueling the problem of child labor. The minister noted that HIV/AIDS, which had killed about 1.8 million Ugandans and left almost one million children orphaned. The minister also explained that the 2.7 million child laborers that were noted do not include those children used for regular household work. Bbumba stressed that the government is making an effort to reduce the number of child laborers through universal primary education programs and poverty reduction mechanisms.
11 June 2008
Almost three million minors are working in Uganda said the minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Syda Bbumba, revealing the results of a strudy noting that one in three children (between the ages of five and 17 years) is ‘forced’ to work by parents or by poor economic conditions. “Child labor is a wide-spread phenomenon in Uganda where approximately 2.7 million out of 7.9 million girls and boys are working prematurely," said Minister Bbumba in view of the International Day Against Child Labor to be observed next June 21.
Minister Bbumba emphasized the role of extreme poverty deriving from the widespread diffusion of Hiv/AIDS that kills one or both parents. This forces children to become bread winners, fueling the problem of child labor. The minister noted that HIV/AIDS, which had killed about 1.8 million Ugandans and left almost one million children orphaned. The minister also explained that the 2.7 million child laborers that were noted do not include those children used for regular household work. Bbumba stressed that the government is making an effort to reduce the number of child laborers through universal primary education programs and poverty reduction mechanisms.
‘IRON FIST’ AGAINST TOUAREG REBELS.
MISNA
11 June 2008
The communications minister and government spokesman Mohamed Ben Omar has excluded any chance of of dialogue with the Movement of Nigerines for Justice (MNJ) rebels. Speaking from Senegal, where he is on a visit, he said that the government would “not shake a bloodied hand”, announcing increased military resources to opposed the largely Touareg rebel group, which has been brandished as “bandit and dealing in drugs”. The announcement suggests the government wants to ensure greater military protection to the uranium extraction areas in the northern part of the country suggested the MNJ, which took up arms against the government of president Mamadou Tandja, largely prompted by complaints that the revenue from the extraction of uranium has not helped to boost development in the Touareg areas, which have been subjected to environmental damage.
Ben Omar has also announced a change in the sale of uranium procedures, turning these into a ‘sovereignty’ though no more details were offered. The minister also accused Moussa Kaka, correspondent of RFI, jaile since last September 20, of being a ‘common spy’ of the MNJ. The MNJ has attacked military and multinational targets, while the heavy tension is affecting the people of the north, who remain more isolated.
11 June 2008
The communications minister and government spokesman Mohamed Ben Omar has excluded any chance of of dialogue with the Movement of Nigerines for Justice (MNJ) rebels. Speaking from Senegal, where he is on a visit, he said that the government would “not shake a bloodied hand”, announcing increased military resources to opposed the largely Touareg rebel group, which has been brandished as “bandit and dealing in drugs”. The announcement suggests the government wants to ensure greater military protection to the uranium extraction areas in the northern part of the country suggested the MNJ, which took up arms against the government of president Mamadou Tandja, largely prompted by complaints that the revenue from the extraction of uranium has not helped to boost development in the Touareg areas, which have been subjected to environmental damage.
Ben Omar has also announced a change in the sale of uranium procedures, turning these into a ‘sovereignty’ though no more details were offered. The minister also accused Moussa Kaka, correspondent of RFI, jaile since last September 20, of being a ‘common spy’ of the MNJ. The MNJ has attacked military and multinational targets, while the heavy tension is affecting the people of the north, who remain more isolated.
Uganda to build a $2 million embassy in Kigali.
African Press Agency
12 June 2008
Ugandan is to construct a $2 million mansion for its embassy in Kigali to strengthen the bilateral cooperation of the two historical allies, according to the Uganda ambassador Richard Kabonero.
Kabonero told APA on Wednesday that the relations between the two states were excellent, noting that getting a permanent home in Kigali is a sign of cementing the long relations among the two peoples.
He said the new embassy is to be constructed in Kigali\’s posh residential area of Kacyiru and the structural design is in advanced stages.
The armies of the two former historical allies fought each other three times in the eastern city Kisangani of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both countries had intervened in the Congo instability.
But leaders from both the military and government of the two countries have been trying to restore their historical ties. Some senior military officers including Rwanda President Paul Kagame fought along side Ugandan leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni to overthrow the dictatorship of Milton Obote in Uganda.
\"We are trying to put aside the Kisangani ghost and concentrate on building an independent and sustainable economy of our two nations,\" said Kabonero.
12 June 2008
Ugandan is to construct a $2 million mansion for its embassy in Kigali to strengthen the bilateral cooperation of the two historical allies, according to the Uganda ambassador Richard Kabonero.
Kabonero told APA on Wednesday that the relations between the two states were excellent, noting that getting a permanent home in Kigali is a sign of cementing the long relations among the two peoples.
He said the new embassy is to be constructed in Kigali\’s posh residential area of Kacyiru and the structural design is in advanced stages.
The armies of the two former historical allies fought each other three times in the eastern city Kisangani of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both countries had intervened in the Congo instability.
But leaders from both the military and government of the two countries have been trying to restore their historical ties. Some senior military officers including Rwanda President Paul Kagame fought along side Ugandan leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni to overthrow the dictatorship of Milton Obote in Uganda.
\"We are trying to put aside the Kisangani ghost and concentrate on building an independent and sustainable economy of our two nations,\" said Kabonero.
11 June, 2008
'Merchant of Death' defense says no extradition to U.S.
RIA Novosti
11 June 2008
lawyer for an alleged Russian arms dealer in custody in Thailand on suspicion of illegal arms trading and other crimes, said Wednesday his client is unlikely to be extradited to the United States.
Earlier Wednesday, AFP quoted U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey as saying he was "very optimistic" about Viktor Bout extradition chances to face terrorism charges in the U.S.
Bout's lawyer, Yan Dasgupta, said regarding Mukasey's statement: "I do not share the optimism of the respected U.S. attorney general. I think the process will go properly and will result in a refusal [to extradite Bout]. There are no prospects for extradition - the request and charges are insane. They were spun out of thin air."
He also said the defense considers the extradition request in legal terms is out of line with an international extradition agreement between the U.S. and Thailand.
Earlier a Thai court postponed until July 28 the first hearing of Viktor Bout's extradition case as Bout's Thai lawyer had developed "a heart problem."
Thailand received in early May a formal request from Washington to extradite Bout to the U.S., where he has been indicted on four charges: conspiracy to kill Americans, and U.S. officers or employees, conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to acquire and use an anti-aircraft missile.
Viktor Bout, 41, was arrested in March in Bangkok during a joint police operation led by agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
DEA prosecutors claim that Bout conspired with others to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a leftist group listed by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.
Bout is a former lieutenant in the Russian military who quit the armed forces in 1991. He then allegedly transformed himself into an international arms dealer, earning the nickname 'the Merchant of Death.' The Western media has consistently referred to him as a "former KGB officer."
If convicted, he could face life imprisonment or, at the very least, a long prison term.
Western law enforcement agencies consider him to be "the most prominent foreign businessman" involved in trafficking arms to UN-embargoed destinations.
UN reports say Bout set up a network of more than 50 cargo aircraft around the world to facilitate his arms shipments.
U.S. authorities took measures against Bout in 2005, freezing his bank accounts and submitting a list of 30 companies linked to Bout to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee.
11 June 2008
lawyer for an alleged Russian arms dealer in custody in Thailand on suspicion of illegal arms trading and other crimes, said Wednesday his client is unlikely to be extradited to the United States.
Earlier Wednesday, AFP quoted U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey as saying he was "very optimistic" about Viktor Bout extradition chances to face terrorism charges in the U.S.
Bout's lawyer, Yan Dasgupta, said regarding Mukasey's statement: "I do not share the optimism of the respected U.S. attorney general. I think the process will go properly and will result in a refusal [to extradite Bout]. There are no prospects for extradition - the request and charges are insane. They were spun out of thin air."
He also said the defense considers the extradition request in legal terms is out of line with an international extradition agreement between the U.S. and Thailand.
Earlier a Thai court postponed until July 28 the first hearing of Viktor Bout's extradition case as Bout's Thai lawyer had developed "a heart problem."
Thailand received in early May a formal request from Washington to extradite Bout to the U.S., where he has been indicted on four charges: conspiracy to kill Americans, and U.S. officers or employees, conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to acquire and use an anti-aircraft missile.
Viktor Bout, 41, was arrested in March in Bangkok during a joint police operation led by agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
DEA prosecutors claim that Bout conspired with others to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a leftist group listed by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.
Bout is a former lieutenant in the Russian military who quit the armed forces in 1991. He then allegedly transformed himself into an international arms dealer, earning the nickname 'the Merchant of Death.' The Western media has consistently referred to him as a "former KGB officer."
If convicted, he could face life imprisonment or, at the very least, a long prison term.
Western law enforcement agencies consider him to be "the most prominent foreign businessman" involved in trafficking arms to UN-embargoed destinations.
UN reports say Bout set up a network of more than 50 cargo aircraft around the world to facilitate his arms shipments.
U.S. authorities took measures against Bout in 2005, freezing his bank accounts and submitting a list of 30 companies linked to Bout to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee.
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