Times Online
17 December 2009
By Rhys Blakely
A key terror suspect who allegedly helped to plan last year’s attacks in Mumbai and plotted to strike Europe was an American secret agent who went rogue, Indian officials believe.
David Headley, 49, who was born in Washington to a Pakistan diplomat father and an American mother, was arrested in Chicago in October. He is accused of reconnoitring targets in India and Europe for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Pakistan-based terror group behind the Mumbai attacks and of having links to al-Qaeda. He has denied the charges.
He came to the attention of the US security services in 1997 when he was arrested in New York for heroin smuggling. He earned a reduced sentence by working for the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) infiltrating Pakistan-linked narcotics gangs.
Indian investigators, who have been denied access to Mr Headley, suspect that he remained on the payroll of the US security services — possibly working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) — but switched his allegiance to LeT.
Mr. Headley, who changed his name from Daood Gilani, was in Mumbai until two weeks before the attacks on the city, which claimed 166 lives last November. It is alleged that he spent months checking targets in India’s commercial capital, using his Western looks and anglicised name to move in elite social circles, hobnob with Bollywood actors and even to pass himself off as Jewish.
Despite being firmly on the radar of the US intelligence agencies, he was allowed to return to India as recently as March. Indian officials are furious that their American counterparts did not share details of that visit at the time. The Indian media has raised the possibility that Mr Headley was being protected by his American handlers — a theory that experts say is credible.
“The feeling in India is that the US has not been transparent,” said B. Raman, a former counter-terrorism chief in the Indian foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing.
“That Headley was an agent for the DEA is known. Whether he was being used by the CIA as well is a matter of speculation, but it is almost certain that the CIA was aware of him and his movements across the subcontinent.”
According to Mr Raman, it is probable that Mr Headley, who was arrested when the US authorities learned that he was about to fly to Pakistan, was listed on the main database of the US National Counterterrorism Centre, a facility used by the CIA and several other American agencies to track terror suspects.
Indian officials suspect that US agencies declined to share intelligence to avoid compromising other secret operations and to to be able to deny any link with Mr Headley.
Analysts believe that the US may also have been anxious to avoid sharing information that could further raise tensions between India and Pakistan, nuclear-armed neighbours who have fought three wars.
According to documents put before a court in Chicago, Mr Headley had links with the Pakistan Army and, through it, with al-Qaeda.
As well as helping to co-ordinate the Mumbai atrocity, Mr Headley is accused of planning attacks on Mumbai’s Bollywood film industry, the Shiv Sena, a Hindu extremist group also based in Mumbai, a major Hindu temple, and a Danish newspaper that had published cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.
The US authorities allege that he was close to Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a former Pakistani schoolmate and businessman who is also being charged with planning to attack the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten. Mr Rana is accused of having known about the attack on Mumbai in advance.
The CIA denied that Headley had worked for the organisation.
“Any suggestion that Headley was working for the CIA is complete and utter nonsense. It’s flat-out false,” Paul Gimigliano, from the CIA’s Office of Public Affairs, said.
The Indian Home Secretary, Gopal Krishna Pillai, has said that his Government would seek the extradition of Mr Headley — a request that has so far been stonewalled by US officials.
19 December, 2009
Heritage Farms Out 50% Stake in Ugandan Blocks for $1.35 Billion.
Heritage Oil plc
Press Release
12/18/2009
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=84385
Heritage has entered into a sale and purchase agreement with Eni International B.V. for the sale of its 50% interest in Blocks 1 and 3A in Uganda. The consideration comprises cash of US $1.35 billion and a further contingent, deferred consideration of either US $150 million in cash or an interest in a mutually agreed producing oil field independently valued at a similar amount.
Completion of the SPA is subject to the receipt and satisfaction of certain approvals and conditions, including the approval of the Company's shareholders at a meeting to be held before the end of January 2010, the receipt of any necessary consents from the Ugandan Government and HOGL not receiving a valid pre-emption notice from Tullow Uganda Limited ("Tullow").
Highlights
Cash consideration on closing the transaction of US $1.35 billion
Contingent, deferred consideration of either US $150 million in cash or an interest in a producing oil field, to be mutually agreed and independently valued at a similar amount
The Proposed Transaction has been unanimously recommended by the Board of Heritage, subject to various conditions, including approval from the Ugandan authorities, Tullow not exercising a right of pre-emption and approval of a majority of Heritage shareholders and the exchangeable shareholders of Heritage Oil Corporation who vote at a general meeting to be held before the end of January 2010
Class 1 shareholder circular, which will include a Mineral Expert's Report on the Company's material assets, is expected to be published shortly
Proposed Transaction is expected to complete in the first quarter of 2010
Following completion, Heritage will consider returning a portion of the disposal proceeds to shareholders in the form of a special dividend, which could be in the range of 75 pence to 100 pence per share
Heritage will also be seeking authority to buy back shares should the directors determine such a buyback to be in the best interests of the Company
Heritage will retain an interest in the Albert Basin through its interests in Blocks 1 and 2 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are currently awaiting presidential decree
Summary of the Proposed Transaction
Eni International B.V., a wholly owned affiliate of Eni, will acquire Heritage's entire interest in, and operatorship of, Blocks 1 and 3A in Uganda for consideration of up to US $1.5 billion, of which US $1.35 billion will be paid in cash on completion. Eni has agreed to pay a contingent, deferred consideration of either US $150 million in cash or to transfer to Heritage an interest in a producing oil field independently valued at a similar amount. Should Eni decide that it wishes to satisfy the deferred consideration in the form of an interest in an oil producing asset, the Company will have 90 days to consider whether it wishes to accept the asset, and will have sole discretion to decline in favour of the cash alternative. Any such transfer of an interest in a producing oil field would be subject to the provisions of the Listing Rules and may require, inter alia, shareholder approval at a meeting that would be called at a future date once the asset, if any, had been identified.
Payment of the full amount of the deferred consideration is conditional on the relevant authorities within the Ugandan Government granting Eni, within a period of two years from the date of completion, certain tax incentives in relation to upstream, midstream and downstream activities on the disposed assets. The amount of the deferred consideration will depend upon the scale of the tax incentives negotiated.
The gross book value attributable to the assets being sold to Eni as at 30 June 2009, net of liabilities, was approximately US $145 million. No revenue or profits were generated from Heritage's Ugandan assets in the financial year ended 2008 and substantially all expenses have been capitalised. The Proposed Transaction is expected to complete in the first quarter of 2010.
A shareholder circular, which will include a Mineral Expert's Report, describing the Proposed Transaction is expected to be published shortly. Completion of the Proposed Transaction is subject to the approval of a majority of the Company's shareholders (and the exchangeable shareholders of Heritage Oil Corporation) voting at a general meeting to be held before the end of January 2010.
Under the terms of the SPA, should the Company receive an unsolicited written acquisition proposal from a bona fide offeror which the Board considers would be superior to the Proposed Transaction from a financial point of view for the shareholders of Heritage, it has been agreed that for a period of five business days the Company shall not enter into any agreement with the bona fide offeror. During this period Eni will have the right to match or exceed the terms of the superior offer.
Heritage has agreed to pay Eni a break fee of 1 percent of the market capitalisation of the Company in the event that Heritage accepts a competing superior offer from a third party and in certain other limited circumstances. A break fee is not payable to Eni if Tullow pre-empts the Proposed Transaction.
Background to and reasons for the Disposal
A primary aim of management is to realise value at an appropriate stage of an asset's life-cycle and re-invest the proceeds to build significant shareholder value from a diversified portfolio of oil and gas assets. The Board of Directors, having been advised by J.P. Morgan Cazenove Limited, Financial Adviser and Corporate Broker to Heritage, believes that the Proposed Transaction is in the best interests of the Company and represents an excellent opportunity to realise value from assets that are entering the development stage.
Approvals and Consents
Completion of the Proposed Transaction is subject to, among other things: (i) the approval of a majority of the Company's shareholders and the exchangeable shareholders of Heritage Oil Corporation voting at a general meeting which will be held before the end of January 2010; (ii) approval from the Ugandan Governmental authorities, and (iii) Tullow not exercising its right to pre-empt the Proposed Transaction on identical terms. Accordingly, there can be no assurances that the Proposed Transaction will complete or that it will complete on the terms outlined in the SPA or herein.
The Government of Uganda has been consulted on the Proposed Transaction and has indicated its support for Eni's proposed entrance into the oil industry in Uganda.
Use of Proceeds
Heritage will continue to have operations in seven countries and will use some of the disposal proceeds to fund the exploration, appraisal and development of these areas, in particular in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ("Kurdistan"), which remains a core area of focus. Heritage has a producing asset in Russia and exploration projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kurdistan, Mali, Malta, Pakistan and Tanzania. The Company plans to embark on drilling programmes in certain of these territories next year, with a number of high-impact exploration wells which could continue to generate significant value for shareholders.
Furthermore, the proceeds will provide Heritage with the financial flexibility to participate in opportunities to generate further value for shareholders, including the acquisition of exploration licences and producing assets.
The Company is also considering returning a portion of the disposal proceeds to shareholders through a special dividend on completion of the transaction, which could be in the range of 75 pence to 100 pence per share. In the event that the dividend is paid, Heritage would expect to still have a cash position of over US$1 billion. Heritage will also be seeking authority to buy back shares should the directors determine such a buyback to be in the best interests of the Company.
Information Regarding Blocks 1 and 3A in Uganda
The Kingfisher Field was discovered in 2007 and six wells have been drilled in Blocks 1 and 3A which have discovered approximately 300 million barrels net to the Company. Heritage has spent approximately US$150 million on its oil and gas interests in Uganda, since being awarded its first licence in 1997.
Tullow right of pre-emption
In the context of the Proposed Transaction, the Board believes that there is a provision in the joint operating agreement with Tullow that would give rise to a right of pre-emption in favour of Tullow. HOGL will notify Tullow of the Proposed Transaction and upon receipt of such a notice, Tullow has the right to acquire the disposed assets on the same terms and conditions as agreed with Eni in the SPA without reservation. Tullow is required to notify the Company of any such intention within thirty days of the delivery notice of the SPA to Tullow which, if notice is delivered today as intended, would expire on 17 January 2010.
As such, in the circular to be sent to shareholders, in connection with the Proposed Transaction, shareholders will be asked to consider and vote on both the proposed disposal to Eni and the potential alternative transaction, should Tullow exercise its right of pre-emption.
Tony Buckingham, Chief Executive Officer, commented, "We are delighted to enter into this binding agreement with Eni, whom we believe are well positioned to further our work in Uganda and realise production at the earliest possible opportunity. We believe the transaction will create significant shareholder value at a critical juncture in the Ugandan asset's life cycle.
"The disposal proceeds give Heritage great flexibility enabling the Company to focus on its existing exploration and development programmes, participate in value generating acquisition opportunities as and when they arise, as well as giving us the ability to pay a special dividend to shareholders."
Press Release
12/18/2009
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=84385
Heritage has entered into a sale and purchase agreement with Eni International B.V. for the sale of its 50% interest in Blocks 1 and 3A in Uganda. The consideration comprises cash of US $1.35 billion and a further contingent, deferred consideration of either US $150 million in cash or an interest in a mutually agreed producing oil field independently valued at a similar amount.
Completion of the SPA is subject to the receipt and satisfaction of certain approvals and conditions, including the approval of the Company's shareholders at a meeting to be held before the end of January 2010, the receipt of any necessary consents from the Ugandan Government and HOGL not receiving a valid pre-emption notice from Tullow Uganda Limited ("Tullow").
Highlights
Cash consideration on closing the transaction of US $1.35 billion
Contingent, deferred consideration of either US $150 million in cash or an interest in a producing oil field, to be mutually agreed and independently valued at a similar amount
The Proposed Transaction has been unanimously recommended by the Board of Heritage, subject to various conditions, including approval from the Ugandan authorities, Tullow not exercising a right of pre-emption and approval of a majority of Heritage shareholders and the exchangeable shareholders of Heritage Oil Corporation who vote at a general meeting to be held before the end of January 2010
Class 1 shareholder circular, which will include a Mineral Expert's Report on the Company's material assets, is expected to be published shortly
Proposed Transaction is expected to complete in the first quarter of 2010
Following completion, Heritage will consider returning a portion of the disposal proceeds to shareholders in the form of a special dividend, which could be in the range of 75 pence to 100 pence per share
Heritage will also be seeking authority to buy back shares should the directors determine such a buyback to be in the best interests of the Company
Heritage will retain an interest in the Albert Basin through its interests in Blocks 1 and 2 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are currently awaiting presidential decree
Summary of the Proposed Transaction
Eni International B.V., a wholly owned affiliate of Eni, will acquire Heritage's entire interest in, and operatorship of, Blocks 1 and 3A in Uganda for consideration of up to US $1.5 billion, of which US $1.35 billion will be paid in cash on completion. Eni has agreed to pay a contingent, deferred consideration of either US $150 million in cash or to transfer to Heritage an interest in a producing oil field independently valued at a similar amount. Should Eni decide that it wishes to satisfy the deferred consideration in the form of an interest in an oil producing asset, the Company will have 90 days to consider whether it wishes to accept the asset, and will have sole discretion to decline in favour of the cash alternative. Any such transfer of an interest in a producing oil field would be subject to the provisions of the Listing Rules and may require, inter alia, shareholder approval at a meeting that would be called at a future date once the asset, if any, had been identified.
Payment of the full amount of the deferred consideration is conditional on the relevant authorities within the Ugandan Government granting Eni, within a period of two years from the date of completion, certain tax incentives in relation to upstream, midstream and downstream activities on the disposed assets. The amount of the deferred consideration will depend upon the scale of the tax incentives negotiated.
The gross book value attributable to the assets being sold to Eni as at 30 June 2009, net of liabilities, was approximately US $145 million. No revenue or profits were generated from Heritage's Ugandan assets in the financial year ended 2008 and substantially all expenses have been capitalised. The Proposed Transaction is expected to complete in the first quarter of 2010.
A shareholder circular, which will include a Mineral Expert's Report, describing the Proposed Transaction is expected to be published shortly. Completion of the Proposed Transaction is subject to the approval of a majority of the Company's shareholders (and the exchangeable shareholders of Heritage Oil Corporation) voting at a general meeting to be held before the end of January 2010.
Under the terms of the SPA, should the Company receive an unsolicited written acquisition proposal from a bona fide offeror which the Board considers would be superior to the Proposed Transaction from a financial point of view for the shareholders of Heritage, it has been agreed that for a period of five business days the Company shall not enter into any agreement with the bona fide offeror. During this period Eni will have the right to match or exceed the terms of the superior offer.
Heritage has agreed to pay Eni a break fee of 1 percent of the market capitalisation of the Company in the event that Heritage accepts a competing superior offer from a third party and in certain other limited circumstances. A break fee is not payable to Eni if Tullow pre-empts the Proposed Transaction.
Background to and reasons for the Disposal
A primary aim of management is to realise value at an appropriate stage of an asset's life-cycle and re-invest the proceeds to build significant shareholder value from a diversified portfolio of oil and gas assets. The Board of Directors, having been advised by J.P. Morgan Cazenove Limited, Financial Adviser and Corporate Broker to Heritage, believes that the Proposed Transaction is in the best interests of the Company and represents an excellent opportunity to realise value from assets that are entering the development stage.
Approvals and Consents
Completion of the Proposed Transaction is subject to, among other things: (i) the approval of a majority of the Company's shareholders and the exchangeable shareholders of Heritage Oil Corporation voting at a general meeting which will be held before the end of January 2010; (ii) approval from the Ugandan Governmental authorities, and (iii) Tullow not exercising its right to pre-empt the Proposed Transaction on identical terms. Accordingly, there can be no assurances that the Proposed Transaction will complete or that it will complete on the terms outlined in the SPA or herein.
The Government of Uganda has been consulted on the Proposed Transaction and has indicated its support for Eni's proposed entrance into the oil industry in Uganda.
Use of Proceeds
Heritage will continue to have operations in seven countries and will use some of the disposal proceeds to fund the exploration, appraisal and development of these areas, in particular in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ("Kurdistan"), which remains a core area of focus. Heritage has a producing asset in Russia and exploration projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kurdistan, Mali, Malta, Pakistan and Tanzania. The Company plans to embark on drilling programmes in certain of these territories next year, with a number of high-impact exploration wells which could continue to generate significant value for shareholders.
Furthermore, the proceeds will provide Heritage with the financial flexibility to participate in opportunities to generate further value for shareholders, including the acquisition of exploration licences and producing assets.
The Company is also considering returning a portion of the disposal proceeds to shareholders through a special dividend on completion of the transaction, which could be in the range of 75 pence to 100 pence per share. In the event that the dividend is paid, Heritage would expect to still have a cash position of over US$1 billion. Heritage will also be seeking authority to buy back shares should the directors determine such a buyback to be in the best interests of the Company.
Information Regarding Blocks 1 and 3A in Uganda
The Kingfisher Field was discovered in 2007 and six wells have been drilled in Blocks 1 and 3A which have discovered approximately 300 million barrels net to the Company. Heritage has spent approximately US$150 million on its oil and gas interests in Uganda, since being awarded its first licence in 1997.
Tullow right of pre-emption
In the context of the Proposed Transaction, the Board believes that there is a provision in the joint operating agreement with Tullow that would give rise to a right of pre-emption in favour of Tullow. HOGL will notify Tullow of the Proposed Transaction and upon receipt of such a notice, Tullow has the right to acquire the disposed assets on the same terms and conditions as agreed with Eni in the SPA without reservation. Tullow is required to notify the Company of any such intention within thirty days of the delivery notice of the SPA to Tullow which, if notice is delivered today as intended, would expire on 17 January 2010.
As such, in the circular to be sent to shareholders, in connection with the Proposed Transaction, shareholders will be asked to consider and vote on both the proposed disposal to Eni and the potential alternative transaction, should Tullow exercise its right of pre-emption.
Tony Buckingham, Chief Executive Officer, commented, "We are delighted to enter into this binding agreement with Eni, whom we believe are well positioned to further our work in Uganda and realise production at the earliest possible opportunity. We believe the transaction will create significant shareholder value at a critical juncture in the Ugandan asset's life cycle.
"The disposal proceeds give Heritage great flexibility enabling the Company to focus on its existing exploration and development programmes, participate in value generating acquisition opportunities as and when they arise, as well as giving us the ability to pay a special dividend to shareholders."
Nominees for Afghanistan's new Cabinet.
AP News
Dec 19, 2009
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's nominees for his new Cabinet, presented Saturday:
Incumbents:
_ Defense, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak
_ Interior, Hanif Atmar
_ Finance, Omar Zakhilwal
_ Public Health, Dr. Mohammad Amin Fatemi
_ Agriculture, Muhammad Asif Rahimi
_ Justice, Mohammad Sarwar Danish
_ Education, Ghulam Farooq Wardak
_ Women's Affairs, Husn Bano Ghazanfar
_ Communications, Amirzai Sangeen
_ Counternarcotics, Gen. Khodaidad, who uses one name
_ Water and Power, Ismail Khan
Acting:
Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta will remain in the post for the time being. Pres. Karzai has said he will make a new nomination after an international conference on Afghanistan to be held in London in late January.
New nominees:
_ Higher Education, Hobidullah Hobid
_ Economy, Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi
_ Information and Cultural Affairs, Sayed Makhdum Rahin
_ Mines, Wahidullah Shahrani
_ Hajj and Mosque, Enayatullah Balugh
_ Refugees, Enayatullah Nazari
_ Transportation, Mohammad Ullah Patash
_ Commerce, Gulam Mohammad Aylaqi
_ Public Welfare, Mirza Husain Abdullahi
_ Work and Social Affairs, Ismail Manshi
_ Border and Tribal Affairs, Hamid Gilani
_ Development and Rural Affairs, Wais Ahmad Darmek
New ministry:
Karzai is asking for parliament to create a Ministry for Martyr and Disabled Affairs.
Dec 19, 2009
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's nominees for his new Cabinet, presented Saturday:
Incumbents:
_ Defense, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak
_ Interior, Hanif Atmar
_ Finance, Omar Zakhilwal
_ Public Health, Dr. Mohammad Amin Fatemi
_ Agriculture, Muhammad Asif Rahimi
_ Justice, Mohammad Sarwar Danish
_ Education, Ghulam Farooq Wardak
_ Women's Affairs, Husn Bano Ghazanfar
_ Communications, Amirzai Sangeen
_ Counternarcotics, Gen. Khodaidad, who uses one name
_ Water and Power, Ismail Khan
Acting:
Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta will remain in the post for the time being. Pres. Karzai has said he will make a new nomination after an international conference on Afghanistan to be held in London in late January.
New nominees:
_ Higher Education, Hobidullah Hobid
_ Economy, Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi
_ Information and Cultural Affairs, Sayed Makhdum Rahin
_ Mines, Wahidullah Shahrani
_ Hajj and Mosque, Enayatullah Balugh
_ Refugees, Enayatullah Nazari
_ Transportation, Mohammad Ullah Patash
_ Commerce, Gulam Mohammad Aylaqi
_ Public Welfare, Mirza Husain Abdullahi
_ Work and Social Affairs, Ismail Manshi
_ Border and Tribal Affairs, Hamid Gilani
_ Development and Rural Affairs, Wais Ahmad Darmek
New ministry:
Karzai is asking for parliament to create a Ministry for Martyr and Disabled Affairs.
18 December, 2009
CIA working with Palestinian security agents who torture Hamas members.
The Guardian
By Ian Cobain
17 December 2009
Palestinian security agents who have been detaining and allegedly torturing supporters of the Islamist organisation Hamas in the West Bank have been working closely with the CIA, the Guardian has learned.
Less than a year after Barack Obama signed an executive order that prohibited torture and provided for the lawful interrogation of detainees in US custody, evidence is emerging the CIA is co-operating with security agents whose continuing use of torture has been widely documented by human rights groups.
The relationship between the CIA and the two Palestinian agencies involved – Preventive Security Organisation (PSO) and General Intelligence Service (GI) – is said by some western diplomats and other officials in the region to be so close that the American agency appears to be supervising the Palestinians' work.
One senior western official said: "The [Central Intelligence] Agency consider them as their property, those two Palestinian services." A diplomatic source added that US influence over the agencies was so great they could be considered "an advanced arm of the war on terror".
While the CIA and the Palestinian Authority (PA) deny the US agency controls its Palestinian counterparts, neither denies that they interact closely in the West Bank. Details of that co-operation are emerging as some human rights organisations are beginning to question whether US intelligence agencies may be turning a blind eye to abusive interrogations conducted by other countries' intelligence agencies with whom they are working. According to the Palestinian watchdog al-Haq, human rights in the West Bank and Gaza have "gravely deteriorated due to the spreading violations committed by Palestinian actors" this year.
Most of those held without trial and allegedly tortured in the West Bank have been supporters of Hamas, which won the Palestinian elections in 2006 but is denounced as a terrorist organisation by the PA – which in turn is dominated by the rival Fatah political faction – and by the US and EU. In the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has been in control for more than two years, there have been reports of its forces detaining and torturing Fatah sympathisers in the same way.
Among the human rights organisations that have documented or complained about the mistreatment of detainees held by the PA in the West Bank are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, al-Haq and the Israeli watchdog B'Tselem. Even the PA's human rights commission has expressed "deep concern" over the mistreatment of detainees.
The most common complaint is that detainees are severely beaten and subjected to a torture known as shabeh, during which they are shackled and forced to assume painful positions for long periods. There have also been reports of sleep deprivation, and of large numbers of detainees being crammed into small cells to prevent rest. Instead of being brought before civilian courts, almost all the detainees enter a system of military justice under which they need not be brought before a court for six months.
According to PA officials, between 400 and 500 Hamas sympathisers are held by the PSO and GI.
Some of the mistreatment has been so severe that at least three detainees have died in custody this year. The most recent was Haitham Amr, a 33-year-old nurse and Hamas supporter from Hebron who died four days after he was detained by GI officials last June. Extensive bruising around his kidneys suggested he had been beaten to death. Among those who died in GI custody last year was Majid al-Barghuti, 42, an imam at a village near Ramallah.
While there is no evidence that the CIA has been commissioning such mistreatment, human rights activists say it would end promptly if US pressure was brought to bear on the Palestinian authorities.
Shawan Jabarin, general director of al-Haq, said: "The Americans could stop it any time. All they would have to do is go to [prime minister] Salam Fayyad and tell him they were making it an issue.. Then they could deal with the specifics: they could tell him that detainees needed to be brought promptly before the courts."
A diplomat in the region said "at the very least" US intelligence officers were aware of the torture and not doing enough to stop it. He added: "There are a number of questions for the US administration: what is their objective, what are their rules of engagement? Do they train the GI and PSO according to the manual which was established by the previous administration, including water-boarding? Are they in control, or are they just witnessing?"
Sa'id Abu-Ali, the PA's interior minister, accepted detainees had been tortured and some had died, but said such abuses had not been official policy and steps were being taken to prevent them. He said such abuses "happen in every country in the world". Abu-Ali sought initially to deny the CIA was "deeply involved" with the two Palestinian intelligence agencies responsible for the torture of Hamas sympathisers, but then conceded that links did exist. "There is a connection, but there is no supervision by the Americans," he said. "It is solely a Palestinian affair. But the Americans help us."
The CIA does not deny working with the PSO and GI in the West Bank, although it will not say what use it has made of intelligence extracted during the interrogation of Hamas supporters. But it denies turning what one official described as "a Nelson's eye to abuse".
The CIA's spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, denied it played a supervisory role over the PSO or GI. "The notion that this agency somehow runs other intelligence services … is simply wrong," he said. "The CIA … only supports, and is interested in, lawful methods that produce sound intelligence."
Concern about detainee abuse is growing in the West Bank despite an effort by the international community to create Palestinian institutions that will guarantee greater security as a first step towards creating a Palestinian state. More than half of the PA's $2.8bn (£1.66bn) budget came from international donors last year; more than a quarter was swallowed up by the ministry of the interior and national security. Human Rights Watch and al-Haq have said that in raising the security capacity of the PA, donor countries have a responsibility to ensure it observes international human rights standards.
At the heart of the international effort is the creation of the Palestinian national security force, a 7,500-strong gendarmerie trained by US, British, Canadian and Turkish army officers under the command of a US general, Keith Dayton. Many Palestinians blame Dayton for the mistreatment of Hamas sympathisers, although the general's remit does not extend to either of the intelligence agencies responsible.
Some in Dayton's team are said to have been warned by senior CIA officers that they should not attempt to interfere in the work of the PSO or GI. Privately, some of them are said to fear that the mistreatment of detainees, and the anger this is arousing among the population, may undermine their mission. One source said: "I know that Dayton and his crew are very concerned about what is happening in those detention centres because they know it can jeopardise their work."
By Ian Cobain
17 December 2009
Palestinian security agents who have been detaining and allegedly torturing supporters of the Islamist organisation Hamas in the West Bank have been working closely with the CIA, the Guardian has learned.
Less than a year after Barack Obama signed an executive order that prohibited torture and provided for the lawful interrogation of detainees in US custody, evidence is emerging the CIA is co-operating with security agents whose continuing use of torture has been widely documented by human rights groups.
The relationship between the CIA and the two Palestinian agencies involved – Preventive Security Organisation (PSO) and General Intelligence Service (GI) – is said by some western diplomats and other officials in the region to be so close that the American agency appears to be supervising the Palestinians' work.
One senior western official said: "The [Central Intelligence] Agency consider them as their property, those two Palestinian services." A diplomatic source added that US influence over the agencies was so great they could be considered "an advanced arm of the war on terror".
While the CIA and the Palestinian Authority (PA) deny the US agency controls its Palestinian counterparts, neither denies that they interact closely in the West Bank. Details of that co-operation are emerging as some human rights organisations are beginning to question whether US intelligence agencies may be turning a blind eye to abusive interrogations conducted by other countries' intelligence agencies with whom they are working. According to the Palestinian watchdog al-Haq, human rights in the West Bank and Gaza have "gravely deteriorated due to the spreading violations committed by Palestinian actors" this year.
Most of those held without trial and allegedly tortured in the West Bank have been supporters of Hamas, which won the Palestinian elections in 2006 but is denounced as a terrorist organisation by the PA – which in turn is dominated by the rival Fatah political faction – and by the US and EU. In the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has been in control for more than two years, there have been reports of its forces detaining and torturing Fatah sympathisers in the same way.
Among the human rights organisations that have documented or complained about the mistreatment of detainees held by the PA in the West Bank are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, al-Haq and the Israeli watchdog B'Tselem. Even the PA's human rights commission has expressed "deep concern" over the mistreatment of detainees.
The most common complaint is that detainees are severely beaten and subjected to a torture known as shabeh, during which they are shackled and forced to assume painful positions for long periods. There have also been reports of sleep deprivation, and of large numbers of detainees being crammed into small cells to prevent rest. Instead of being brought before civilian courts, almost all the detainees enter a system of military justice under which they need not be brought before a court for six months.
According to PA officials, between 400 and 500 Hamas sympathisers are held by the PSO and GI.
Some of the mistreatment has been so severe that at least three detainees have died in custody this year. The most recent was Haitham Amr, a 33-year-old nurse and Hamas supporter from Hebron who died four days after he was detained by GI officials last June. Extensive bruising around his kidneys suggested he had been beaten to death. Among those who died in GI custody last year was Majid al-Barghuti, 42, an imam at a village near Ramallah.
While there is no evidence that the CIA has been commissioning such mistreatment, human rights activists say it would end promptly if US pressure was brought to bear on the Palestinian authorities.
Shawan Jabarin, general director of al-Haq, said: "The Americans could stop it any time. All they would have to do is go to [prime minister] Salam Fayyad and tell him they were making it an issue.. Then they could deal with the specifics: they could tell him that detainees needed to be brought promptly before the courts."
A diplomat in the region said "at the very least" US intelligence officers were aware of the torture and not doing enough to stop it. He added: "There are a number of questions for the US administration: what is their objective, what are their rules of engagement? Do they train the GI and PSO according to the manual which was established by the previous administration, including water-boarding? Are they in control, or are they just witnessing?"
Sa'id Abu-Ali, the PA's interior minister, accepted detainees had been tortured and some had died, but said such abuses had not been official policy and steps were being taken to prevent them. He said such abuses "happen in every country in the world". Abu-Ali sought initially to deny the CIA was "deeply involved" with the two Palestinian intelligence agencies responsible for the torture of Hamas sympathisers, but then conceded that links did exist. "There is a connection, but there is no supervision by the Americans," he said. "It is solely a Palestinian affair. But the Americans help us."
The CIA does not deny working with the PSO and GI in the West Bank, although it will not say what use it has made of intelligence extracted during the interrogation of Hamas supporters. But it denies turning what one official described as "a Nelson's eye to abuse".
The CIA's spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, denied it played a supervisory role over the PSO or GI. "The notion that this agency somehow runs other intelligence services … is simply wrong," he said. "The CIA … only supports, and is interested in, lawful methods that produce sound intelligence."
Concern about detainee abuse is growing in the West Bank despite an effort by the international community to create Palestinian institutions that will guarantee greater security as a first step towards creating a Palestinian state. More than half of the PA's $2.8bn (£1.66bn) budget came from international donors last year; more than a quarter was swallowed up by the ministry of the interior and national security. Human Rights Watch and al-Haq have said that in raising the security capacity of the PA, donor countries have a responsibility to ensure it observes international human rights standards.
At the heart of the international effort is the creation of the Palestinian national security force, a 7,500-strong gendarmerie trained by US, British, Canadian and Turkish army officers under the command of a US general, Keith Dayton. Many Palestinians blame Dayton for the mistreatment of Hamas sympathisers, although the general's remit does not extend to either of the intelligence agencies responsible.
Some in Dayton's team are said to have been warned by senior CIA officers that they should not attempt to interfere in the work of the PSO or GI. Privately, some of them are said to fear that the mistreatment of detainees, and the anger this is arousing among the population, may undermine their mission. One source said: "I know that Dayton and his crew are very concerned about what is happening in those detention centres because they know it can jeopardise their work."
17 December, 2009
ICTR mandate extended to 2012.
Afrol News
17 December 2009
The UN Security Council has extended the Rwanda genocide tribunal mandate to 2012. The tribunal was set up to deal with the worst atrocities committed during 1994.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is given until the end of 2012 to conclude all appeals procedures and trial judges are expected to finish their work by 30 June 2010.
Eleven currently accused of genocide are still at large out of the 81 people indicted for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994.
The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, holds two recently arrested indictees who are awaiting trial, and has 26 prosecutions in progress with 49 cases completed, including nine that are pending appeal and eight acquittals.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
It may also deal with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations of international law committed in the territory of neighbouring states during the same period.
17 December 2009
The UN Security Council has extended the Rwanda genocide tribunal mandate to 2012. The tribunal was set up to deal with the worst atrocities committed during 1994.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is given until the end of 2012 to conclude all appeals procedures and trial judges are expected to finish their work by 30 June 2010.
Eleven currently accused of genocide are still at large out of the 81 people indicted for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994.
The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, holds two recently arrested indictees who are awaiting trial, and has 26 prosecutions in progress with 49 cases completed, including nine that are pending appeal and eight acquittals.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
It may also deal with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations of international law committed in the territory of neighbouring states during the same period.
Palestinian leaders to extend President Mahmoud Abbas's term indefinitely.
Washington Post
By Howard Schneider
Wednesday, December 16, 2009; A08
The Palestine Liberation Organization's ruling Central Council gathered here this week to extend the soon-to-expire term of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a session that promised to say as much about the drift and division in Palestinian politics as about the 74-year-old leader's standing.
Delegates to the roughly 120-member body, representing a collection of political parties, labor unions and other organizations, said that with little hope of elections soon, they will authorize Abbas to stay in office indefinitely. The Hamas movement's control of the Gaza Strip has forced the cancellation of an election set for January, when Abbas's term ends, and little progress has been made toward a reconciliation agreement that would allow the vote to be rescheduled.
Delegates said they also plan to endorse Abbas's policy of refusing to start new peace negotiations with Israel without a comprehensive freeze on the expansion of its settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem -- areas that the Palestinians expect to be part of their future state.
"The Israelis are supporting something we cannot accept, and Abbas cannot retreat," said Nabil Amr, a council member and former Palestinian Authority ambassador to Egypt.
The Central Council meeting will resolve the immediate problem of continuing Palestinian governance -- at least in the West Bank, where the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority holds power. But Hamas, a militant Islamist group, is not part of the PLO, an umbrella organization formed in the 1960s that still serves as an important arbiter of Palestinian interests.
Abbas has said he will not run for reelection, but in an opening address Tuesday he gave no indication that he plans to resign or leave the stage anytime soon. To the contrary, he spelled out again what he feels is needed for negotiations to resume: a halt to Israeli settlement construction and a recognition by Israel that the territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war forms the basis for talks about setting a final border.
"When Israel stops settlement activity for a specific period, and when it recognizes the borders we are calling for, there would be nothing to prevent us from going to negotiations," Abbas said.
There was little new substance in Abbas's remarks, and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has said he worries that the Palestinian leader has made the refusal of new negotiations a "strategic choice."
"There is a real concern now that saying no is a deliberate strategy," said Netanyahu spokesman Mark Regev. "They have become rejectionists out of a desire to not be forced to make concessions."
The Israelis have said they are ready to start negotiations without preconditions.
Abbas, who negotiated with previous Israeli governments as settlement construction continued, hardened his stance after the Obama administration pushed for a settlement freeze but was rebuffed by Netanyahu, who would agree only to a partial moratorium.
PLO delegates said the experience of the past few months -- the hopes raised by Barack Obama's election and the frustration over the lack of subsequent progress -- has left them groping for a new strategy.
"Negotiate? What for? For the sake of negotiations?" asked Adnan Garib, one of a handful of Central Council members allowed by Israel to travel to Ramallah from Gaza for the meeting. "We have to have a clear frame of reference" before restarting talks.
By Howard Schneider
Wednesday, December 16, 2009; A08
The Palestine Liberation Organization's ruling Central Council gathered here this week to extend the soon-to-expire term of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a session that promised to say as much about the drift and division in Palestinian politics as about the 74-year-old leader's standing.
Delegates to the roughly 120-member body, representing a collection of political parties, labor unions and other organizations, said that with little hope of elections soon, they will authorize Abbas to stay in office indefinitely. The Hamas movement's control of the Gaza Strip has forced the cancellation of an election set for January, when Abbas's term ends, and little progress has been made toward a reconciliation agreement that would allow the vote to be rescheduled.
Delegates said they also plan to endorse Abbas's policy of refusing to start new peace negotiations with Israel without a comprehensive freeze on the expansion of its settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem -- areas that the Palestinians expect to be part of their future state.
"The Israelis are supporting something we cannot accept, and Abbas cannot retreat," said Nabil Amr, a council member and former Palestinian Authority ambassador to Egypt.
The Central Council meeting will resolve the immediate problem of continuing Palestinian governance -- at least in the West Bank, where the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority holds power. But Hamas, a militant Islamist group, is not part of the PLO, an umbrella organization formed in the 1960s that still serves as an important arbiter of Palestinian interests.
Abbas has said he will not run for reelection, but in an opening address Tuesday he gave no indication that he plans to resign or leave the stage anytime soon. To the contrary, he spelled out again what he feels is needed for negotiations to resume: a halt to Israeli settlement construction and a recognition by Israel that the territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war forms the basis for talks about setting a final border.
"When Israel stops settlement activity for a specific period, and when it recognizes the borders we are calling for, there would be nothing to prevent us from going to negotiations," Abbas said.
There was little new substance in Abbas's remarks, and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has said he worries that the Palestinian leader has made the refusal of new negotiations a "strategic choice."
"There is a real concern now that saying no is a deliberate strategy," said Netanyahu spokesman Mark Regev. "They have become rejectionists out of a desire to not be forced to make concessions."
The Israelis have said they are ready to start negotiations without preconditions.
Abbas, who negotiated with previous Israeli governments as settlement construction continued, hardened his stance after the Obama administration pushed for a settlement freeze but was rebuffed by Netanyahu, who would agree only to a partial moratorium.
PLO delegates said the experience of the past few months -- the hopes raised by Barack Obama's election and the frustration over the lack of subsequent progress -- has left them groping for a new strategy.
"Negotiate? What for? For the sake of negotiations?" asked Adnan Garib, one of a handful of Central Council members allowed by Israel to travel to Ramallah from Gaza for the meeting. "We have to have a clear frame of reference" before restarting talks.
Gulf petro-powers to launch currency in latest threat to dollar hegemony.
Daily Telegraph
17 December 2009
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
“The Gulf monetary union pact has come into effect,” said Kuwait’s finance minister, Mustafa al-Shamali, speaking at a Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) summit in Kuwait.
The move will give the hyper-rich club of oil exporters a petro-currency of their own, greatly increasing their influence in the global exchange and capital markets and potentially displacing the US dollar as the pricing currency for oil contracts. Between them they amount to regional superpower with a GDP of $1.2 trillion (£739bn), some 40pc of the world’s proven oil reserves, and financial clout equal to that of China.
The Emirates are staying out for now – irked that the bank will be located in Riyadh at the insistence of Saudi King Abdullah rather than in Abu Dhabi. They are expected join later, along with Oman.
The Gulf states remain divided over the wisdom of anchoring their economies to the US dollar. The Gulf currency – dubbed “Gulfo” – is likely to track a global exchange basket and may ultimately float as a regional reserve currency in its own right. “The US dollar has failed. We need to delink,” said Nahed Taher, chief executive of Bahrain’s Gulf One Investment Bank.
The project is inspired by Europe’s monetary union, seen as a huge success in the Arab world. But there are concerns that the region is trying to run before it can walk.
Europe took 40 years to reach the point where it felt ready to launch a currency. It began with the creation of the Iron & Steel Community in the 1950s, moving by steps towards a single market enforced by powerful Commission and European Court. The EMU timetable was fixed at the Masstricht in 1991 but it took another 11 for euro notes and coins to reach the streets.
Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Kalifa, Bahrain’s foreign minister, told the FIKR Arab Thought summit in Kuwait that the project would not work unless the Gulf countries first break down basic barriers to trade and capital flows.
At the moment, trucks sit paralysed at border posts for days awaiting entry clearance. Labour mobility between states is almost zero.
“The single currency should come last. We need to coordinate our economic policies and build up common infrastructure as a first step,” he said.
Mohammed El-Enein, chair of the energy and industry committee in Egypt’s parliament, said Europe’s example could help the Arab world achieve its half-century dream of a unified currency, but the task requires discipline. “We need exactly the same institutions as the EU has created. We need a commission, a court, and a bank,” he said.
The last currency to trade in souks from Marakesh, to Baghdad and Mecca, was the Ottomon Piaster, known as the “kurush”. It suffered chronic inflation as the silver coinage was debased.
There is a logic to an Arab currency. The region speaks one language, has the unifying creed of “Umma Wahida” or One Nation from the Koran, and has not torn itself apart in savage wars – ever – in quite the way that Europe has in living memory.
Yet hurdles are formidable even for the tight-knit group of Gulf states. While the eurozone is a club of rough equals – with Germany, France, Italy, and Spain each holding two votes on the ECB council – the Gulf currency will be dominated by Saudi Arabia. The risk is that other countries will feel like satellites. Monetary policy will inevitably be set for Riyadh’s needs.
Hans Redeker, currency chief at BNP Paraibas, said the Gulf states may have romanticised Europe’s achievement and need to move with great care to avoid making the same errors.
“The Greek crisis has exposed the weak foundations on which the euro is built. The gap in competitiveness between core Europe and the periphery has grown wider and wider. The obvious mistake was to launch EMU without a central fiscal authority and political union, as the Bundesbank warned in the 1990s,” he said.
“The euro was created for political reasons after the fall of the Berlin Wall to lock Germany irrevocably into Europe. It was not done for economic reasons,” he said.
Ben Simpfendorfer, Asia economist for RBS and an expert on the Middle East, told the FIKR conference that the rise of China had paradoxically disrupted the case for pan-Arab economic integration.
There was a natural fit ten years ago between rich oil state and low-wage manufacturers in Egypt and Syria, but cheap exports from China have forced poorer Arab states to retreat behind barriers to shelter their industries. “The rationale for a single currency has become weaker,” he said.
The GCC also agreed to create a joint military strike force – akin to the EU’s rapid reaction force – to tackle threats such as the incursion of Yemeni Shiite rebels into Saudi territory earlier this year.
This is a major breakthrough after years of deadlock on defence cooperation.
The Sunni Gulf states are deeply concerned about the great power ambitions of Shiite Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons, to the point where the theme of a possible war between Iran and a Saudi-led constellation of states has crept into the media debate.
They nevertheless repeated on Tuesday that “any military action against Iran” by Western powers would be unacceptable.
17 December 2009
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
“The Gulf monetary union pact has come into effect,” said Kuwait’s finance minister, Mustafa al-Shamali, speaking at a Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) summit in Kuwait.
The move will give the hyper-rich club of oil exporters a petro-currency of their own, greatly increasing their influence in the global exchange and capital markets and potentially displacing the US dollar as the pricing currency for oil contracts. Between them they amount to regional superpower with a GDP of $1.2 trillion (£739bn), some 40pc of the world’s proven oil reserves, and financial clout equal to that of China.
The Emirates are staying out for now – irked that the bank will be located in Riyadh at the insistence of Saudi King Abdullah rather than in Abu Dhabi. They are expected join later, along with Oman.
The Gulf states remain divided over the wisdom of anchoring their economies to the US dollar. The Gulf currency – dubbed “Gulfo” – is likely to track a global exchange basket and may ultimately float as a regional reserve currency in its own right. “The US dollar has failed. We need to delink,” said Nahed Taher, chief executive of Bahrain’s Gulf One Investment Bank.
The project is inspired by Europe’s monetary union, seen as a huge success in the Arab world. But there are concerns that the region is trying to run before it can walk.
Europe took 40 years to reach the point where it felt ready to launch a currency. It began with the creation of the Iron & Steel Community in the 1950s, moving by steps towards a single market enforced by powerful Commission and European Court. The EMU timetable was fixed at the Masstricht in 1991 but it took another 11 for euro notes and coins to reach the streets.
Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Kalifa, Bahrain’s foreign minister, told the FIKR Arab Thought summit in Kuwait that the project would not work unless the Gulf countries first break down basic barriers to trade and capital flows.
At the moment, trucks sit paralysed at border posts for days awaiting entry clearance. Labour mobility between states is almost zero.
“The single currency should come last. We need to coordinate our economic policies and build up common infrastructure as a first step,” he said.
Mohammed El-Enein, chair of the energy and industry committee in Egypt’s parliament, said Europe’s example could help the Arab world achieve its half-century dream of a unified currency, but the task requires discipline. “We need exactly the same institutions as the EU has created. We need a commission, a court, and a bank,” he said.
The last currency to trade in souks from Marakesh, to Baghdad and Mecca, was the Ottomon Piaster, known as the “kurush”. It suffered chronic inflation as the silver coinage was debased.
There is a logic to an Arab currency. The region speaks one language, has the unifying creed of “Umma Wahida” or One Nation from the Koran, and has not torn itself apart in savage wars – ever – in quite the way that Europe has in living memory.
Yet hurdles are formidable even for the tight-knit group of Gulf states. While the eurozone is a club of rough equals – with Germany, France, Italy, and Spain each holding two votes on the ECB council – the Gulf currency will be dominated by Saudi Arabia. The risk is that other countries will feel like satellites. Monetary policy will inevitably be set for Riyadh’s needs.
Hans Redeker, currency chief at BNP Paraibas, said the Gulf states may have romanticised Europe’s achievement and need to move with great care to avoid making the same errors.
“The Greek crisis has exposed the weak foundations on which the euro is built. The gap in competitiveness between core Europe and the periphery has grown wider and wider. The obvious mistake was to launch EMU without a central fiscal authority and political union, as the Bundesbank warned in the 1990s,” he said.
“The euro was created for political reasons after the fall of the Berlin Wall to lock Germany irrevocably into Europe. It was not done for economic reasons,” he said.
Ben Simpfendorfer, Asia economist for RBS and an expert on the Middle East, told the FIKR conference that the rise of China had paradoxically disrupted the case for pan-Arab economic integration.
There was a natural fit ten years ago between rich oil state and low-wage manufacturers in Egypt and Syria, but cheap exports from China have forced poorer Arab states to retreat behind barriers to shelter their industries. “The rationale for a single currency has become weaker,” he said.
The GCC also agreed to create a joint military strike force – akin to the EU’s rapid reaction force – to tackle threats such as the incursion of Yemeni Shiite rebels into Saudi territory earlier this year.
This is a major breakthrough after years of deadlock on defence cooperation.
The Sunni Gulf states are deeply concerned about the great power ambitions of Shiite Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons, to the point where the theme of a possible war between Iran and a Saudi-led constellation of states has crept into the media debate.
They nevertheless repeated on Tuesday that “any military action against Iran” by Western powers would be unacceptable.
Pres. Obama moves ahead with AFRICOM.
Pambazuka News
10 December 2009
By Daniel Volman
In his 11 July 2009 speech in Accra, Ghana, US President Barack Obama declared, 'America has a responsibility to advance this vision, not just with words, but with support that strengthens African capacity. When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems – they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response. That is why we stand ready to partner through diplomacy, technical assistance, and logistical support, and will stand behind efforts to hold war criminals accountable. Our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa and the world.'
And yet all the available evidence demonstrates that he is determined to continue the expansion of US military activity on the continent initiated by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s and dramatically escalated by President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009. While many expected the Obama administration to adopt a security policy toward Africa that would be far less militaristic and unilateral than that pursued by his predecessor, the facts show that he is in fact essentially following the same policy that has guided US military involvement in Africa for more than a decade.
The clearest indication of President Obama’s intentions for AFRICOM (United States African Command) and for America’s military involvement in Africa is provided by the budget requests for the 2010 financial year submitted by the Departments of State and Defense to Congress in May 2009. The State Department budget request – which includes funding for all US arms sales, military training, and other security assistance programmes – proposes major increases in funding for US arms sales to a number of African countries through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme. The budget proposes to increase FMF funding for sub-Saharan African counties more than 300 per cent, from just over US$8.2 million to more than US$25.5 million, with additional increases in funding for Maghrebi countries. Major recipients slated for increases include Chad (US$500,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$2.5 million), Djibouti (US$2.5 million), Ethiopia (US$3 million), Kenya (US$1 million), Liberia (US$9 million), Morocco (US$9 million), Nigeria (US$1.4 million), South Africa (US$800,000) and the Africa Regional Program (US$2.8 million).
The same trend is evident in the Obama administration's request for funding for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. The budget request for the IMET programme proposes to increase funding for African countries by nearly 17 per cent, from just under US$14 million to more than US$16 million, with additional increases for Maghrebi countries. Major recipients slated for increases include Algeria (US$950,000), Chad (US$400,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$500,000), Djibouti (US$350,000), Ethiopia (US$775,000), Equatorial Guinea (US$40,000), Ghana (US$850,000), Liberia (US$525,000), Libya (US$250,000), Mali (US$350,000), Morocco (US$1.9 million), Niger (US$250,000), Nigeria (US$1.1 million), Rwanda (US$500,000), Senegal (US$1.1 million), South Africa (US$900,000) and Uganda (US$550,000).
The Obama administration also proposes major new funding for security assistance provided through the Peacekeeping Operations programme. The 2010 financial year budget proposes to increase funding for the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership – from US$15 million in the 2009 financial year to US$20 million in 2010 – and for the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative from US$5 million in the 2009 financial year to US$10 million in the 2010 financial year.
It also includes US$42 million to continue operations in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPAs) in southern Sudan, US$10 million to help create a professional 2,000-member armed force in Liberia, US$21 million to continue operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo to reform the military (including the creation of rapid reaction force for the eastern Congo and the rehabilitation of the military base at Kisangani), and US$3.6 million for the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security Program, which will be used to support monitoring teams, advisory assistance, training, infrastructure enhancements, and equipment in the Great Lakes region, the Mano River region, the Horn of Africa, Chad and the Central African Republic.
And it includes US$67 million to support the African Union mission in Somalia, along with a request for US$96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The request for the GPOI includes funding for the African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance Program (ACOTA) – which provides training and equipment to a number of African military forces to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities – and the Obama administration has requested US$96.8 million for ACOTA activities in the 2010 financial year.
Furthermore, the Obama administration’s budget request for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) programmes contains US$24 million for Sudan to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords in southern Sudan and to assist programmes to stabilise Darfur by providing technical assistance and training for southern Sudan’s criminal justice sector and law enforcement institutions as well as contributing to UN civilian police and formed police units in southern Sudan and Darfur. It also includes funds for police reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); for training, infrastructure, and equipment for police units in Liberia; to operate the American-run International Law Academy in Gaborone, Botswana; and to create a Regional Security Training Center for West, Central and North Africa.
And the Obama administration is also asking for funding to be provided through the INCLE programs for the first time to provide security assistance to countries participating in the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria. Major recipients slated for increases include Algeria (US$970,000), Cape Verde (US$2 million), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$1.7 million), Ethiopia (US$500,000), Gambia (US$450,00), Ghana (US$500,000), Guinea-Bissau (US$3 million), Liberia (US$8 million), Morocco (US$2 million), Nigeria (US$2 million), Sierre Leone (US$250,000), Sudan (US$24 million), Uganda (US$385,000), and the Africa Regional Program (US$4.5 million).
The Obama administration also proposes to increase funding for counterterrorism programmes. These include the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program – which provides training to countries throughout the world – the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification, Secure Comparison, and Evaluation System Program – which supports identification and watch listing systems to 18 countries (including Kenya) – the Counterterrorism Financing Program, which helps partner countries throughout the world stop the flow of money to terrorists – and the Counterterrorism Engagement Program, which is intended to strengthen ties with key political leaders throughout the world and 'build political will at senior levels in partner nations for shared counterterrorism challenges'. The Obama administration’s budget request requests increased funding for Kenya (from US$5 million in the 2009 financial year to US$8 million in the 2010 financial year), for South Africa (a new programme for US$1 million), and the Africa Regional programme (from almost US$15 million in the 2009 financial year to more than US$20 million in the 2010 financial year).
The Obama administration proposed 2010 budget for the Department of Defense requests US$278 million in operation and maintenance funds to cover the cost of AFRICOM operations and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership operations at the AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. The administration is also requesting US$263 million to provide additional manpower, airlift and communications support to AFRICOM. In addition, the administration is requesting US$60 million to fund CJTF-HOA operations in the 2010 financial year and US$249 million to pay for the operation of the 500-acre base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and for facilities modifications, along with US$41.8 for major base improvement construction projects.
The administration has requested some US$400 million for Global Train and Equip (Section 1206) programmes, some US$200 million for Security and Stabilization Assistance (Section 1207) programmes, and some US$1 million for the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund. This money will be used primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan to pay for emergency training and equipment, the services of personnel from the State Department and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi and Afghani armed forces, but it will be available for the use of AFRICOM as well.
The administration’s budget request also contains US$1.9 billion to buy three littoral combat ships and another US$373 million to buy two joint high speed vessels, ships that will play a crucial role in US Navy operations off the coast of Africa. In addition, the administration has requested US$10.5 million to pay for naval deployments in west and central Africa in the 2010 financial year and another US$10 million for naval operations in east Africa.
When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Nigeria during her tour of Africa in August 2009, she met with Ojo Maduekwe, the foreign minister, and Godwin Abbe, the new minister of defence. In her remarks after the meeting, she was asked what the US government intended to do to help the Nigerian government establish stability and security in the Niger Delta. 'Well, the defence minister was present at the second larger meeting that the foreign minister convened,' she said, 'and he had some very specific suggestions as to how the United States could assist the Nigerian government in their efforts, which we think are very promising, to try to bring peace and stability to the Niger Delta. We will be following up on those. There is nothing that has been decided. But we have a very good working relationship between our two militaries. So I will be talking with my counterpart, the secretary of defense, and we will, through our joint efforts, through our bi-national commission mechanism, determine what Nigeria would want from us for help, because we know this is an internal matter, we know this is up to the Nigerian people and their government to resolve, and then look to see how we would offer that assistance.' Thus, in addition to the security assistance programmes in the budget request for the 2010 financial year, the Obama administration is now considering providing even more military support to the Nigerian government for use in the Niger Delta if the current amnesty programme collapses, as many analysts expect, and the government resumes military operations against insurgent forces in this vital oil-producing region (which produces 10 per cent of America’s total oil imports).
Another indication of the Obama administration’s intentions are provided by its decision to expand US military involvement in Somalia as well as its decision to continue the Bush administration’s policy of unilateral military attacks against alleged al-Qaeda operatives in that country. In June 2009, a senior State Department official (presumed to have been Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson) revealed that the Obama administration had initiated a programme of indirect military support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (the internationally recognised government of the country, although it only exercises control over a small part of the capital, Mogadishu) and a few other towns in the southern part of the country).
According to the official, the US government was providing funding to the TFG to finance weapons purchases and had also asked the governments of Uganda and Burundi, which have deployed troops to Mogadishu under an African Union mandate to protect the TFG, to transfer weaponry from their own stockpiles to the armed forces of the TFG in exchange for promises that the US government would reimburse them. In addition, the US government made its base in Djibouti available to other governments for them to provide military training to the armed forces of the TFG.
During her visit to Kenya in August 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US government would 'continue to provide equipment and training to the TFG', stating 'very early in the administration, I made the decision, which the president supported, to accelerate and provide aid to the TFG'. She went on to declare that al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgent group fighting to overthrow the TFG, was 'a terrorist group with links to al-Qaeda and other foreign military networks' and that they 'see Somalia as a future haven for global terrorism'. 'There is no doubt', Secretary Clinton stated 'that al-Shabaab wants to obtain control over Somalia to use it as a base from which to influence and even infiltrate surrounding countries and launch attacks against countries far and near.' Thus, 'if al-Shabaab were to obtain a haven in Somalia, which would then attract al-Qaeda and other terrorist actors, it would be a threat to the United States.'
The US government arranged for the delivery of an initial supply of approximately 40 tonnes of small arms and ammunition worth approximately US$10 million to the TFG between May and August of 2009 from the stockpiles of the African Union peacekeeping force, along with between US$1 million and US$2 million in cash to the TFG to finance its own arms purchase, and the delivery of another 40 tonnes of small arms and ammunition over the following months. A number of other governments – including Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and France – are also reported to have sent military personnel to the US base in Djibouti to provide military training to TFG troops.
According to a report by the Associated Press, American officials 'say the US military is not conducting the training and will not put any forces in Somalia'. Other countries were conducting the training, the Associated Press reported, because 'the [Obama] administration is making a concerted effort to avoid putting any American footprint in Somalia, which would risk alienating allies and add to charges by Islamic extremists of a Western takeover.' However, it has since become clear that most of the arms and training has been transferred to al-Shabaab, either by Islamic militants who had infiltrated the TFG military forces or as a result of the sale of the weapons and ammunition on the black market.
Then, in August, US Special Forces troops attacked and killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, an alleged al-Qaeda operative who was accused of being involved in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 as well as other al-Qaeda operations in east Africa. The US Special Forces troops carried out the attack from onboard several helicopters that had been launched from a US Navy warship off the Somali coast, using machine guns and automatic assault rifles to strafe a convoy of four-wheel drive vehicles carrying Nabhan and his retinue. Following the initial assault, the helicopters landed so that their troops could seize Nabhan’s body for positive identification. It is likely that the Obama administration will conduct further military operations in Somalia since, in the words of Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, the deputy commander of AFRICOM, 'the threat posed by al-Shabaab is something that we pay very, very close attention to.'
And in October 2009, the Obama administration announced a major new security assistance package for Mali that was delivered on 20 October 2009. The package – valued at US$4.5 to US$5 million (2.3 billion CFA) and which includes 37 Land Cruiser pickup trucks, communication equipment, replacement parts, clothing and other individual equipment – is intended to enhance Mali's ability to transport and communicate with internal security (counter-insurgency) units throughout the country and control its borders. The security assistance package is officially known as the 'Counter Terrorism Train and Equip' (CTTE) programme. Although ostensibly intended to help Mali deal with potential threats from AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), it is more likely to be used against Tuareg insurgent forces.
In addition, between April and June of 2009, 300 US Special Forces personnel were deployed to Mali to train Malian military forces at three local bases and, according to Lt Col Louis Sombora, deputy commander of Mali's 33rd Parachute Regiment (which was the recipient of the new US military aid package), more than 95 per cent of his soldiers have received US military training. And in early November 2009, US Air Force Brigadier General Michael W. Callan, vice commander of the US Air Force Africa (the Air Force contingent based in Europe and dedicated to AFRICOM), visited Mali along with other US military personnel in order to inspect local military forces (including the 33rd Parachute Regiment) and tour local military facilities. According to Lt Col Marshall Mantiply, defense attaché at the US Embassy in Bamako, 'we are working with the Mali ministry of defence on a ten-year plan' to enhance the country's military capabilities.
The aid package to Mali is just the latest instance of America’s growing military involvement in the Sahel region. In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Africa hearing on 'Counter-terrorism in the Sahel' on 17 November 2009, Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson identified Mali – along with Algeria and Mauritania – as one of the 'key countries' in the region for the US counterterrorism strategy. 'We believe that our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of improving the security environment in the country will have future benefits if they are sustained', he stated.
It is clear, therefore, that President Barack Obama has decided to follow the path marked out for AFRICOM by the Clinton and Bush administrations, based on the use of military force to ensure that America can satisfy its continuing addiction to oil and to deal with the threat posed by al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups, rather than to chart a new path passed on a partnership with the people of Africa and other countries that have a stake on the continent (including China) to promote sustainable economic development, democracy and human rights in Africa and a global energy order based on the use of clean, safe and renewable resources.
This is the consequence of two factors. To begin with, President Obama genuinely believes in the strategy of the global 'War on Terror' and thinks that Africa must be a central battlefield in America’s military campaign against al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups. Many analysts believe that terrorism does not constitute a significant threat to America’s national security interests and that it would be far more effective to treat terrorism as a crime and to reduce the threat of terrorism by employing traditional law enforcement techniques. But, as demonstrated by the president’s decision to escalate US military operations in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali, the Obama administration is determined to use military force instead, despite the fact that – as US military analysts argue – this only helps to strengthen terrorist groups and jeopardises other US security interests.
And with regard to America’s growing dependence on African oil supplies, President Obama understands the danger of relying upon the importation of a vital resource from unstable countries ruled by repressive, undemocratic regimes and the necessity of reducing America’s reliance on the use of oil and other non-renewable sources of energy. But, for understandable reasons, he has concluded that there is simply very little that he can do to achieve this goal during the limited time that he will be in office. He knows that it will take at least several decades to make the radical changes that will be necessary to develop alternative sources of energy, particularly to fuel cars and other means of transportation (if this is even technically feasible). And he knows that – in the meantime – public support for his presidency and for his party depends on the continued supply of reliable and relatively inexpensive supplies of gas and other petroleum-based energy to the American people, more than any other single factor. In the event of a substantial disruption in the supply of oil from Nigeria or any other major African supplier, he realises that he will be under irresistible political pressure to employ the only instrument that he has at his disposal – US military forces – to try to keep Africa’s oil flowing.
Professional military officers also know that the repressive, undemocratic regimes upon which the United States relies to maintain oil production are likely to fail and that they are almost certain to find themselves sent into combat in Africa – whether they like it or not – if this leads to a major disruption of oil exports, and are already working on plans for direct military intervention in Africa. Thus, in May 2008, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Special Operations Command, and the Joint Forces Command conducted a war game scenario for Nigeria during war game exercise that it conducts each year at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
The scenario – set in the hypothetical year 2013 – was designed to test the ability of the United States to respond to a crisis in Nigeria in which the Nigerian government fragments and rival factions within the Nigerian military begin fighting for control of the Niger Delta, creating so much violence and chaos that it would be impossible to continue oil production. The participants concluded that there was little the United States could do to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that, in the end, they would probably be ordered to send up to 20,000 American troops into the Niger Delta in what the participants clearly recognised would be a futile attempt to get the oil flowing again. The fact that the participants in the Nigerian war games decided to go public with this information suggests that they believe that this scenario is likely to become a reality in the near future and that their only hope of avoiding this is to tell the public in the hope that this will prevent the order from being issued.
But the professional military officers who would actually have to lead their troops into Africa are not the only people who understand that America’s reliance on the military to solve the energy dilemma and the threat of terrorism is a dangerous mistake. Members of the US Congress are also increasingly sceptical about this strategy and are beginning to give AFRICOM the critical scrutiny it deserves. Moreover, a number of concerned organisations and individuals in the United States and in Africa came together in August 2006 to create the Resist AFRICOM campaign in order to educate the American people about AFRICOM and to mobilise public and congressional opposition to the new command. The Resist AFRICOM campaign will continue to press the Obama administration to abandon its plan for AFRICOM and to pursue a policy toward Africa based on a genuine partnership with the people of Africa, international cooperation, democracy, human rights and sustainable economic development.
BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS
* Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington DC, and a member of the board of directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on US military policy in Africa and African security issues and has been conducting research and writing on these issues for more than 30 years.
10 December 2009
By Daniel Volman
In his 11 July 2009 speech in Accra, Ghana, US President Barack Obama declared, 'America has a responsibility to advance this vision, not just with words, but with support that strengthens African capacity. When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems – they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response. That is why we stand ready to partner through diplomacy, technical assistance, and logistical support, and will stand behind efforts to hold war criminals accountable. Our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa and the world.'
And yet all the available evidence demonstrates that he is determined to continue the expansion of US military activity on the continent initiated by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s and dramatically escalated by President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009. While many expected the Obama administration to adopt a security policy toward Africa that would be far less militaristic and unilateral than that pursued by his predecessor, the facts show that he is in fact essentially following the same policy that has guided US military involvement in Africa for more than a decade.
The clearest indication of President Obama’s intentions for AFRICOM (United States African Command) and for America’s military involvement in Africa is provided by the budget requests for the 2010 financial year submitted by the Departments of State and Defense to Congress in May 2009. The State Department budget request – which includes funding for all US arms sales, military training, and other security assistance programmes – proposes major increases in funding for US arms sales to a number of African countries through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme. The budget proposes to increase FMF funding for sub-Saharan African counties more than 300 per cent, from just over US$8.2 million to more than US$25.5 million, with additional increases in funding for Maghrebi countries. Major recipients slated for increases include Chad (US$500,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$2.5 million), Djibouti (US$2.5 million), Ethiopia (US$3 million), Kenya (US$1 million), Liberia (US$9 million), Morocco (US$9 million), Nigeria (US$1.4 million), South Africa (US$800,000) and the Africa Regional Program (US$2.8 million).
The same trend is evident in the Obama administration's request for funding for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. The budget request for the IMET programme proposes to increase funding for African countries by nearly 17 per cent, from just under US$14 million to more than US$16 million, with additional increases for Maghrebi countries. Major recipients slated for increases include Algeria (US$950,000), Chad (US$400,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$500,000), Djibouti (US$350,000), Ethiopia (US$775,000), Equatorial Guinea (US$40,000), Ghana (US$850,000), Liberia (US$525,000), Libya (US$250,000), Mali (US$350,000), Morocco (US$1.9 million), Niger (US$250,000), Nigeria (US$1.1 million), Rwanda (US$500,000), Senegal (US$1.1 million), South Africa (US$900,000) and Uganda (US$550,000).
The Obama administration also proposes major new funding for security assistance provided through the Peacekeeping Operations programme. The 2010 financial year budget proposes to increase funding for the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership – from US$15 million in the 2009 financial year to US$20 million in 2010 – and for the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative from US$5 million in the 2009 financial year to US$10 million in the 2010 financial year.
It also includes US$42 million to continue operations in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPAs) in southern Sudan, US$10 million to help create a professional 2,000-member armed force in Liberia, US$21 million to continue operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo to reform the military (including the creation of rapid reaction force for the eastern Congo and the rehabilitation of the military base at Kisangani), and US$3.6 million for the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security Program, which will be used to support monitoring teams, advisory assistance, training, infrastructure enhancements, and equipment in the Great Lakes region, the Mano River region, the Horn of Africa, Chad and the Central African Republic.
And it includes US$67 million to support the African Union mission in Somalia, along with a request for US$96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The request for the GPOI includes funding for the African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance Program (ACOTA) – which provides training and equipment to a number of African military forces to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities – and the Obama administration has requested US$96.8 million for ACOTA activities in the 2010 financial year.
Furthermore, the Obama administration’s budget request for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) programmes contains US$24 million for Sudan to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords in southern Sudan and to assist programmes to stabilise Darfur by providing technical assistance and training for southern Sudan’s criminal justice sector and law enforcement institutions as well as contributing to UN civilian police and formed police units in southern Sudan and Darfur. It also includes funds for police reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); for training, infrastructure, and equipment for police units in Liberia; to operate the American-run International Law Academy in Gaborone, Botswana; and to create a Regional Security Training Center for West, Central and North Africa.
And the Obama administration is also asking for funding to be provided through the INCLE programs for the first time to provide security assistance to countries participating in the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria. Major recipients slated for increases include Algeria (US$970,000), Cape Verde (US$2 million), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$1.7 million), Ethiopia (US$500,000), Gambia (US$450,00), Ghana (US$500,000), Guinea-Bissau (US$3 million), Liberia (US$8 million), Morocco (US$2 million), Nigeria (US$2 million), Sierre Leone (US$250,000), Sudan (US$24 million), Uganda (US$385,000), and the Africa Regional Program (US$4.5 million).
The Obama administration also proposes to increase funding for counterterrorism programmes. These include the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program – which provides training to countries throughout the world – the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification, Secure Comparison, and Evaluation System Program – which supports identification and watch listing systems to 18 countries (including Kenya) – the Counterterrorism Financing Program, which helps partner countries throughout the world stop the flow of money to terrorists – and the Counterterrorism Engagement Program, which is intended to strengthen ties with key political leaders throughout the world and 'build political will at senior levels in partner nations for shared counterterrorism challenges'. The Obama administration’s budget request requests increased funding for Kenya (from US$5 million in the 2009 financial year to US$8 million in the 2010 financial year), for South Africa (a new programme for US$1 million), and the Africa Regional programme (from almost US$15 million in the 2009 financial year to more than US$20 million in the 2010 financial year).
The Obama administration proposed 2010 budget for the Department of Defense requests US$278 million in operation and maintenance funds to cover the cost of AFRICOM operations and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership operations at the AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. The administration is also requesting US$263 million to provide additional manpower, airlift and communications support to AFRICOM. In addition, the administration is requesting US$60 million to fund CJTF-HOA operations in the 2010 financial year and US$249 million to pay for the operation of the 500-acre base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and for facilities modifications, along with US$41.8 for major base improvement construction projects.
The administration has requested some US$400 million for Global Train and Equip (Section 1206) programmes, some US$200 million for Security and Stabilization Assistance (Section 1207) programmes, and some US$1 million for the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund. This money will be used primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan to pay for emergency training and equipment, the services of personnel from the State Department and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi and Afghani armed forces, but it will be available for the use of AFRICOM as well.
The administration’s budget request also contains US$1.9 billion to buy three littoral combat ships and another US$373 million to buy two joint high speed vessels, ships that will play a crucial role in US Navy operations off the coast of Africa. In addition, the administration has requested US$10.5 million to pay for naval deployments in west and central Africa in the 2010 financial year and another US$10 million for naval operations in east Africa.
When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Nigeria during her tour of Africa in August 2009, she met with Ojo Maduekwe, the foreign minister, and Godwin Abbe, the new minister of defence. In her remarks after the meeting, she was asked what the US government intended to do to help the Nigerian government establish stability and security in the Niger Delta. 'Well, the defence minister was present at the second larger meeting that the foreign minister convened,' she said, 'and he had some very specific suggestions as to how the United States could assist the Nigerian government in their efforts, which we think are very promising, to try to bring peace and stability to the Niger Delta. We will be following up on those. There is nothing that has been decided. But we have a very good working relationship between our two militaries. So I will be talking with my counterpart, the secretary of defense, and we will, through our joint efforts, through our bi-national commission mechanism, determine what Nigeria would want from us for help, because we know this is an internal matter, we know this is up to the Nigerian people and their government to resolve, and then look to see how we would offer that assistance.' Thus, in addition to the security assistance programmes in the budget request for the 2010 financial year, the Obama administration is now considering providing even more military support to the Nigerian government for use in the Niger Delta if the current amnesty programme collapses, as many analysts expect, and the government resumes military operations against insurgent forces in this vital oil-producing region (which produces 10 per cent of America’s total oil imports).
Another indication of the Obama administration’s intentions are provided by its decision to expand US military involvement in Somalia as well as its decision to continue the Bush administration’s policy of unilateral military attacks against alleged al-Qaeda operatives in that country. In June 2009, a senior State Department official (presumed to have been Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson) revealed that the Obama administration had initiated a programme of indirect military support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (the internationally recognised government of the country, although it only exercises control over a small part of the capital, Mogadishu) and a few other towns in the southern part of the country).
According to the official, the US government was providing funding to the TFG to finance weapons purchases and had also asked the governments of Uganda and Burundi, which have deployed troops to Mogadishu under an African Union mandate to protect the TFG, to transfer weaponry from their own stockpiles to the armed forces of the TFG in exchange for promises that the US government would reimburse them. In addition, the US government made its base in Djibouti available to other governments for them to provide military training to the armed forces of the TFG.
During her visit to Kenya in August 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US government would 'continue to provide equipment and training to the TFG', stating 'very early in the administration, I made the decision, which the president supported, to accelerate and provide aid to the TFG'. She went on to declare that al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgent group fighting to overthrow the TFG, was 'a terrorist group with links to al-Qaeda and other foreign military networks' and that they 'see Somalia as a future haven for global terrorism'. 'There is no doubt', Secretary Clinton stated 'that al-Shabaab wants to obtain control over Somalia to use it as a base from which to influence and even infiltrate surrounding countries and launch attacks against countries far and near.' Thus, 'if al-Shabaab were to obtain a haven in Somalia, which would then attract al-Qaeda and other terrorist actors, it would be a threat to the United States.'
The US government arranged for the delivery of an initial supply of approximately 40 tonnes of small arms and ammunition worth approximately US$10 million to the TFG between May and August of 2009 from the stockpiles of the African Union peacekeeping force, along with between US$1 million and US$2 million in cash to the TFG to finance its own arms purchase, and the delivery of another 40 tonnes of small arms and ammunition over the following months. A number of other governments – including Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and France – are also reported to have sent military personnel to the US base in Djibouti to provide military training to TFG troops.
According to a report by the Associated Press, American officials 'say the US military is not conducting the training and will not put any forces in Somalia'. Other countries were conducting the training, the Associated Press reported, because 'the [Obama] administration is making a concerted effort to avoid putting any American footprint in Somalia, which would risk alienating allies and add to charges by Islamic extremists of a Western takeover.' However, it has since become clear that most of the arms and training has been transferred to al-Shabaab, either by Islamic militants who had infiltrated the TFG military forces or as a result of the sale of the weapons and ammunition on the black market.
Then, in August, US Special Forces troops attacked and killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, an alleged al-Qaeda operative who was accused of being involved in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 as well as other al-Qaeda operations in east Africa. The US Special Forces troops carried out the attack from onboard several helicopters that had been launched from a US Navy warship off the Somali coast, using machine guns and automatic assault rifles to strafe a convoy of four-wheel drive vehicles carrying Nabhan and his retinue. Following the initial assault, the helicopters landed so that their troops could seize Nabhan’s body for positive identification. It is likely that the Obama administration will conduct further military operations in Somalia since, in the words of Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, the deputy commander of AFRICOM, 'the threat posed by al-Shabaab is something that we pay very, very close attention to.'
And in October 2009, the Obama administration announced a major new security assistance package for Mali that was delivered on 20 October 2009. The package – valued at US$4.5 to US$5 million (2.3 billion CFA) and which includes 37 Land Cruiser pickup trucks, communication equipment, replacement parts, clothing and other individual equipment – is intended to enhance Mali's ability to transport and communicate with internal security (counter-insurgency) units throughout the country and control its borders. The security assistance package is officially known as the 'Counter Terrorism Train and Equip' (CTTE) programme. Although ostensibly intended to help Mali deal with potential threats from AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), it is more likely to be used against Tuareg insurgent forces.
In addition, between April and June of 2009, 300 US Special Forces personnel were deployed to Mali to train Malian military forces at three local bases and, according to Lt Col Louis Sombora, deputy commander of Mali's 33rd Parachute Regiment (which was the recipient of the new US military aid package), more than 95 per cent of his soldiers have received US military training. And in early November 2009, US Air Force Brigadier General Michael W. Callan, vice commander of the US Air Force Africa (the Air Force contingent based in Europe and dedicated to AFRICOM), visited Mali along with other US military personnel in order to inspect local military forces (including the 33rd Parachute Regiment) and tour local military facilities. According to Lt Col Marshall Mantiply, defense attaché at the US Embassy in Bamako, 'we are working with the Mali ministry of defence on a ten-year plan' to enhance the country's military capabilities.
The aid package to Mali is just the latest instance of America’s growing military involvement in the Sahel region. In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Africa hearing on 'Counter-terrorism in the Sahel' on 17 November 2009, Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson identified Mali – along with Algeria and Mauritania – as one of the 'key countries' in the region for the US counterterrorism strategy. 'We believe that our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of improving the security environment in the country will have future benefits if they are sustained', he stated.
It is clear, therefore, that President Barack Obama has decided to follow the path marked out for AFRICOM by the Clinton and Bush administrations, based on the use of military force to ensure that America can satisfy its continuing addiction to oil and to deal with the threat posed by al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups, rather than to chart a new path passed on a partnership with the people of Africa and other countries that have a stake on the continent (including China) to promote sustainable economic development, democracy and human rights in Africa and a global energy order based on the use of clean, safe and renewable resources.
This is the consequence of two factors. To begin with, President Obama genuinely believes in the strategy of the global 'War on Terror' and thinks that Africa must be a central battlefield in America’s military campaign against al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups. Many analysts believe that terrorism does not constitute a significant threat to America’s national security interests and that it would be far more effective to treat terrorism as a crime and to reduce the threat of terrorism by employing traditional law enforcement techniques. But, as demonstrated by the president’s decision to escalate US military operations in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali, the Obama administration is determined to use military force instead, despite the fact that – as US military analysts argue – this only helps to strengthen terrorist groups and jeopardises other US security interests.
And with regard to America’s growing dependence on African oil supplies, President Obama understands the danger of relying upon the importation of a vital resource from unstable countries ruled by repressive, undemocratic regimes and the necessity of reducing America’s reliance on the use of oil and other non-renewable sources of energy. But, for understandable reasons, he has concluded that there is simply very little that he can do to achieve this goal during the limited time that he will be in office. He knows that it will take at least several decades to make the radical changes that will be necessary to develop alternative sources of energy, particularly to fuel cars and other means of transportation (if this is even technically feasible). And he knows that – in the meantime – public support for his presidency and for his party depends on the continued supply of reliable and relatively inexpensive supplies of gas and other petroleum-based energy to the American people, more than any other single factor. In the event of a substantial disruption in the supply of oil from Nigeria or any other major African supplier, he realises that he will be under irresistible political pressure to employ the only instrument that he has at his disposal – US military forces – to try to keep Africa’s oil flowing.
Professional military officers also know that the repressive, undemocratic regimes upon which the United States relies to maintain oil production are likely to fail and that they are almost certain to find themselves sent into combat in Africa – whether they like it or not – if this leads to a major disruption of oil exports, and are already working on plans for direct military intervention in Africa. Thus, in May 2008, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Special Operations Command, and the Joint Forces Command conducted a war game scenario for Nigeria during war game exercise that it conducts each year at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
The scenario – set in the hypothetical year 2013 – was designed to test the ability of the United States to respond to a crisis in Nigeria in which the Nigerian government fragments and rival factions within the Nigerian military begin fighting for control of the Niger Delta, creating so much violence and chaos that it would be impossible to continue oil production. The participants concluded that there was little the United States could do to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that, in the end, they would probably be ordered to send up to 20,000 American troops into the Niger Delta in what the participants clearly recognised would be a futile attempt to get the oil flowing again. The fact that the participants in the Nigerian war games decided to go public with this information suggests that they believe that this scenario is likely to become a reality in the near future and that their only hope of avoiding this is to tell the public in the hope that this will prevent the order from being issued.
But the professional military officers who would actually have to lead their troops into Africa are not the only people who understand that America’s reliance on the military to solve the energy dilemma and the threat of terrorism is a dangerous mistake. Members of the US Congress are also increasingly sceptical about this strategy and are beginning to give AFRICOM the critical scrutiny it deserves. Moreover, a number of concerned organisations and individuals in the United States and in Africa came together in August 2006 to create the Resist AFRICOM campaign in order to educate the American people about AFRICOM and to mobilise public and congressional opposition to the new command. The Resist AFRICOM campaign will continue to press the Obama administration to abandon its plan for AFRICOM and to pursue a policy toward Africa based on a genuine partnership with the people of Africa, international cooperation, democracy, human rights and sustainable economic development.
BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS
* Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington DC, and a member of the board of directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. He is a specialist on US military policy in Africa and African security issues and has been conducting research and writing on these issues for more than 30 years.
AFRICOM could add Marine Air Ground Task Force.
By John Vandiver and Warren Peace
Stars and Stripes
European edition
December 16, 2009
A 1,000-strong Marine combat task force capable of rapidly deploying to hot spots could soon be at the disposal of the new U.S. Africa Command, which up to now has stressed training partnerships and security cooperation to wary African governments suspicious of U.S. military intentions on the continent.
AFRICOM and Marine officials confirmed that adding a Marine Air Ground Task Force is now under review, but they emphasized that no decision has been made on whether to incorporate such a fighting force into the command.
But analysts predict that any plan to dedicate combat troops to AFRICOM, coming just a few months after U.S. Special Forces staged a daring daylight raid deep inside southern Somalia to take out a much-wanted al-Qaida operative, will only increase the anxieties of African leaders who are concerned about entering into military cooperation agreements with the U.S.
“At the moment, I would steer clear of that one until their bona fides get established, and that is not now,” said Richard Cornwell, a South Africa-based senior research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies. “Africa doesn’t want to get turned into a new operational zone.”
Other experts suggest that a public relations crisis could be averted if AFRICOM is effective at explaining its intentions to leery Africans.
“Africans were beginning to take AFRICOM at its word — that it didn’t have committed troops in the same way a normal command does,” said Dan Lawner, an analyst at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which is based in Washington, D.C. “It’s extremely, extremely crucial that this be framed within the current rhetoric that they’re putting forth about having a much more specific, defined mission — a military mission in support of larger U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa.”
For their part, AFRICOM officials say the discussions taking place do not involve plans for increasing the U.S. military presence in Africa, but rather center on better executing existing training missions focused on training partnerships to help African militaries provide for their own security.
The proposal would not involve basing any Marines in Africa, officials said; instead, a Marine Air Ground Task Force would likely be placed somewhere in Europe.
“[T]he option being discussed would be a way to more efficiently provide personnel for existing activities and missions,” said AFRICOM spokesman Vince Crawley. “Any potential location in Europe would take place only with the approval of the host nation.”
A task force of Marines focused on Africa would carry certain advantages for the command, which relies on a revolving door of temporary troops to conduct its many training missions on the continent.
For some time, the Marine Corps has seen a need for an expeditionary force capable of supporting U.S. Africa Command initiatives, according to the Stuttgart-based U.S. Marine Corps Africa.
“The Marine Corps commandant’s long-range vision of European-based forces for missions supporting Africa Command on the continent is clearly one option,” Crawley said, adding that the early discussions have not yet been accepted by the Defense Department, State Department, the Europeans or African governments.
But the Marine Corps Web site mentions very little about training when talking about the capabilities of a Marine Air Ground Task Force, or MAGTF.
“MAGTF’s are readily available, self-sustaining, combined arms warfighting organizations,” the Marines’ Web site explains, noting among other things that such task forces are equipped to move forces into crisis areas without revealing their exact destination or intentions and project combat power at night and under adverse weather.
While the Marine task force plan continues to be reviewed, some small steps have already been taken within AFRICOM to give the command a more stable supply of personnel.
In late October, a 19-Marine security cooperation team arrived in Stuttgart. It represents the first operational forces dedicated exclusively to AFRICOM. Because much of AFRICOM’s work on the continent involves small numbers of troops deploying for limited amounts of time, the security cooperation team is expected to reduce Marine Forces Africa headquarters’ reliance special requests for Marines, which number about 80 per year.
Members of the team have already deployed in support of training missions in Uganda and Mali.
“Every year, we have more requests from African nations,” said Col. James Bright, operations officer of Marine Forces Africa.
Stars and Stripes
European edition
December 16, 2009
A 1,000-strong Marine combat task force capable of rapidly deploying to hot spots could soon be at the disposal of the new U.S. Africa Command, which up to now has stressed training partnerships and security cooperation to wary African governments suspicious of U.S. military intentions on the continent.
AFRICOM and Marine officials confirmed that adding a Marine Air Ground Task Force is now under review, but they emphasized that no decision has been made on whether to incorporate such a fighting force into the command.
But analysts predict that any plan to dedicate combat troops to AFRICOM, coming just a few months after U.S. Special Forces staged a daring daylight raid deep inside southern Somalia to take out a much-wanted al-Qaida operative, will only increase the anxieties of African leaders who are concerned about entering into military cooperation agreements with the U.S.
“At the moment, I would steer clear of that one until their bona fides get established, and that is not now,” said Richard Cornwell, a South Africa-based senior research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies. “Africa doesn’t want to get turned into a new operational zone.”
Other experts suggest that a public relations crisis could be averted if AFRICOM is effective at explaining its intentions to leery Africans.
“Africans were beginning to take AFRICOM at its word — that it didn’t have committed troops in the same way a normal command does,” said Dan Lawner, an analyst at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which is based in Washington, D.C. “It’s extremely, extremely crucial that this be framed within the current rhetoric that they’re putting forth about having a much more specific, defined mission — a military mission in support of larger U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa.”
For their part, AFRICOM officials say the discussions taking place do not involve plans for increasing the U.S. military presence in Africa, but rather center on better executing existing training missions focused on training partnerships to help African militaries provide for their own security.
The proposal would not involve basing any Marines in Africa, officials said; instead, a Marine Air Ground Task Force would likely be placed somewhere in Europe.
“[T]he option being discussed would be a way to more efficiently provide personnel for existing activities and missions,” said AFRICOM spokesman Vince Crawley. “Any potential location in Europe would take place only with the approval of the host nation.”
A task force of Marines focused on Africa would carry certain advantages for the command, which relies on a revolving door of temporary troops to conduct its many training missions on the continent.
For some time, the Marine Corps has seen a need for an expeditionary force capable of supporting U.S. Africa Command initiatives, according to the Stuttgart-based U.S. Marine Corps Africa.
“The Marine Corps commandant’s long-range vision of European-based forces for missions supporting Africa Command on the continent is clearly one option,” Crawley said, adding that the early discussions have not yet been accepted by the Defense Department, State Department, the Europeans or African governments.
But the Marine Corps Web site mentions very little about training when talking about the capabilities of a Marine Air Ground Task Force, or MAGTF.
“MAGTF’s are readily available, self-sustaining, combined arms warfighting organizations,” the Marines’ Web site explains, noting among other things that such task forces are equipped to move forces into crisis areas without revealing their exact destination or intentions and project combat power at night and under adverse weather.
While the Marine task force plan continues to be reviewed, some small steps have already been taken within AFRICOM to give the command a more stable supply of personnel.
In late October, a 19-Marine security cooperation team arrived in Stuttgart. It represents the first operational forces dedicated exclusively to AFRICOM. Because much of AFRICOM’s work on the continent involves small numbers of troops deploying for limited amounts of time, the security cooperation team is expected to reduce Marine Forces Africa headquarters’ reliance special requests for Marines, which number about 80 per year.
Members of the team have already deployed in support of training missions in Uganda and Mali.
“Every year, we have more requests from African nations,” said Col. James Bright, operations officer of Marine Forces Africa.
16 December, 2009
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Starving for diamonds.
IRIN News
16 December 2009
While she was helping to run a vaccination campaign in July, health worker and midwife Victorine Yangakola became aware of a serious nutritional crisis in Boda and surrounding villages in the western region of Lobaye. “I was coming across children with reddish hair and swollen bellies,” Yankagola recalls. “It was clear to me that this was severe malnutrition.”
Alerted by the Ministry of Health, Médecins Sans Frontières established an emergency programme in Boda in August. MSF field coordinator Luis Tello said MSF’s original intention was to stay for three months, but the agency is now looking to maintain a presence in Boda at least until May 2010. Part of the problem is that the fields are being neglected in favour of hunting for diamonds.
“You couldn’t talk about Boda without talking about diamonds,” says sub-prefect Joseph Denam Gueknekini. “Even the municipal office I am sitting in now was funded by diamond money.”
But Gueknekini, a former head teacher in Boda, says over-dependence on diamonds has exacted a heavy price on local communities. “Before, when diamonds were good and there was a lot of money circulating, you would find a lot of young people abandoning school to go off to mine diamonds. As people say here: ‘The pick is lighter than the pen’. Young men think they can become millionaires through mining diamonds. It seems a much more attractive option than cultivating a manioc field.”
Farmers across Lobaye complain of falling manioc prices, a lack of basic tools, a shortage of credit and a lack of cooperative structures. Many farmers neglected their fields in favour of the chantiers, the mining areas.
Vulnerable children
Many of the children MSF is encountering, both in Boda and surrounding villages, are extremely vulnerable, showing clear signs of kwashiorkor. “The numbers are not decreasing as well as we expected,” Tello acknowledges. “To solve the problem completely will be difficult.”
MSF’s tactics for combating child malnutrition include using a basic milk formula for new arrivals at the clinic in Boda, then moving affected children on to nutritional, therapeutic food, before giving them local food. Tello says there should be a monitoring period of six to eight weeks as the child gradually recovers. MSF offers an outreach service, driving, where possible, into outlying villages, providing medical care on the ground and ferrying malnourished children to Boda.
“Mothers should be bringing their children into clinics for vaccinations and anti-worm treatments,” Yangakola argues. “Mothers should be getting basic information on how to look after their babies. Instead, you find them giving three-month old babies manioc and water, which does nothing to help their nutritional status.” But Yangakola warns that nutritional concerns are not confined to women. “Often you see mothers coming in for pre-natal consultations who weigh as little as 35kg. Because of local customs, many mothers give birth at home. They don’t get access to antibiotics, iron and the kind of good food you need after giving birth.”
Problem diets
Yangakola is strongly critical of dietary habits in Lobaye, arguing that the dependence on manioc has contributed significantly to the rise of kwashiorkor in the west. “They have got everything here, oranges, papayas, groundnuts, vegetables, maize, but it is always manioc, often cooked with just water, no oil and no salt,” a health worker complains.
“I have worked in the CAR since 1975 and the illiteracy and malnutrition rates are the worst I have seen in the country,” says Italian missionary Adelino Bruneli. “The food here has very little nutritional value.”
In the local market there is a brisk trade in manioc flour and coco, a green plant harvested in the nearby forest. “Coco and manioc make an easy meal,” says Christine Diango, a mother of seven. “It is not what mothers should be cooking, but meat, fish and vegetables are all very expensive here.” Much of the produce comes from Bangui, 145km east, with transport costs forcing up prices.
While health activists like Yangakola talk about the need for a grassroots information campaign on diet and nutrition, the fight against malnutrition in Boda takes place against a background of infrastructural breakdown and sharp economic decline. Medical facilities in Lobaye are thinly spread, with an under-equipped hospital in the provincial capital Mbaiki the main focal point of a faltering health service. The road network is poor, with many regions inaccessible during the rainy season. Tello of MSF argues that a punitive cost-recovery programme, with patients charged much more than they can afford for treatment and basic medication, creates a dangerous dependence on traditional healers.
Losing their sparkle
As elsewhere in the CAR, diamond mining in Lobaye, which began in the 1930s, is exclusively artisanal, with all production coming from alluvial products of sand, gravel and clay. But diamond revenues have been badly hit by the international drop in prices, sparked in part by the global financial crisis.
The industry involves a complicated network of regulated and informal actors, including the diggers, the site owners and the buying houses, or “bureaux d’achat”. The government closed most of these in 2008 as part of a heavily publicized campaign to clean up the sector, eliminating illegal practices and establishing better regulatory controls. One of CAR’s main diamond buyers, ADR, continues to operate in Boda, but other houses have closed. Much of the buying is done by local collectors, some of whom double up as site owners, or “chefs de chantier”, supervising the work of dozens of diggers, who are obliged to turn their stones over for sale to the owner rather than sell elsewhere.
At Banagbélé, a diamond site 14km from Boda, off the main road to Mbaiki, the men dig and sieve. There is a scratch village here, with huts for workers. Most have come from Boda or nearby villages and many will see their families just once a week. Augustin Teng, 39, says he can earn between 50,000 and 100,000 francs (US$100 and $200) in a good month, but others are on daily rates of only 1,000 or 1,500 francs ($1 or $2).
Teng says he supplements his income from the chantier by keeping up his fields of manioc, maize and groundnuts and says other miners should follow suit, particularly given the drop in diamond prices. “That is what we have here in Centrafrique: diamonds and the land,” says Teng. “But you won’t get much from either at the moment.”
16 December 2009
While she was helping to run a vaccination campaign in July, health worker and midwife Victorine Yangakola became aware of a serious nutritional crisis in Boda and surrounding villages in the western region of Lobaye. “I was coming across children with reddish hair and swollen bellies,” Yankagola recalls. “It was clear to me that this was severe malnutrition.”
Alerted by the Ministry of Health, Médecins Sans Frontières established an emergency programme in Boda in August. MSF field coordinator Luis Tello said MSF’s original intention was to stay for three months, but the agency is now looking to maintain a presence in Boda at least until May 2010. Part of the problem is that the fields are being neglected in favour of hunting for diamonds.
“You couldn’t talk about Boda without talking about diamonds,” says sub-prefect Joseph Denam Gueknekini. “Even the municipal office I am sitting in now was funded by diamond money.”
But Gueknekini, a former head teacher in Boda, says over-dependence on diamonds has exacted a heavy price on local communities. “Before, when diamonds were good and there was a lot of money circulating, you would find a lot of young people abandoning school to go off to mine diamonds. As people say here: ‘The pick is lighter than the pen’. Young men think they can become millionaires through mining diamonds. It seems a much more attractive option than cultivating a manioc field.”
Farmers across Lobaye complain of falling manioc prices, a lack of basic tools, a shortage of credit and a lack of cooperative structures. Many farmers neglected their fields in favour of the chantiers, the mining areas.
Vulnerable children
Many of the children MSF is encountering, both in Boda and surrounding villages, are extremely vulnerable, showing clear signs of kwashiorkor. “The numbers are not decreasing as well as we expected,” Tello acknowledges. “To solve the problem completely will be difficult.”
MSF’s tactics for combating child malnutrition include using a basic milk formula for new arrivals at the clinic in Boda, then moving affected children on to nutritional, therapeutic food, before giving them local food. Tello says there should be a monitoring period of six to eight weeks as the child gradually recovers. MSF offers an outreach service, driving, where possible, into outlying villages, providing medical care on the ground and ferrying malnourished children to Boda.
“Mothers should be bringing their children into clinics for vaccinations and anti-worm treatments,” Yangakola argues. “Mothers should be getting basic information on how to look after their babies. Instead, you find them giving three-month old babies manioc and water, which does nothing to help their nutritional status.” But Yangakola warns that nutritional concerns are not confined to women. “Often you see mothers coming in for pre-natal consultations who weigh as little as 35kg. Because of local customs, many mothers give birth at home. They don’t get access to antibiotics, iron and the kind of good food you need after giving birth.”
Problem diets
Yangakola is strongly critical of dietary habits in Lobaye, arguing that the dependence on manioc has contributed significantly to the rise of kwashiorkor in the west. “They have got everything here, oranges, papayas, groundnuts, vegetables, maize, but it is always manioc, often cooked with just water, no oil and no salt,” a health worker complains.
“I have worked in the CAR since 1975 and the illiteracy and malnutrition rates are the worst I have seen in the country,” says Italian missionary Adelino Bruneli. “The food here has very little nutritional value.”
In the local market there is a brisk trade in manioc flour and coco, a green plant harvested in the nearby forest. “Coco and manioc make an easy meal,” says Christine Diango, a mother of seven. “It is not what mothers should be cooking, but meat, fish and vegetables are all very expensive here.” Much of the produce comes from Bangui, 145km east, with transport costs forcing up prices.
While health activists like Yangakola talk about the need for a grassroots information campaign on diet and nutrition, the fight against malnutrition in Boda takes place against a background of infrastructural breakdown and sharp economic decline. Medical facilities in Lobaye are thinly spread, with an under-equipped hospital in the provincial capital Mbaiki the main focal point of a faltering health service. The road network is poor, with many regions inaccessible during the rainy season. Tello of MSF argues that a punitive cost-recovery programme, with patients charged much more than they can afford for treatment and basic medication, creates a dangerous dependence on traditional healers.
Losing their sparkle
As elsewhere in the CAR, diamond mining in Lobaye, which began in the 1930s, is exclusively artisanal, with all production coming from alluvial products of sand, gravel and clay. But diamond revenues have been badly hit by the international drop in prices, sparked in part by the global financial crisis.
The industry involves a complicated network of regulated and informal actors, including the diggers, the site owners and the buying houses, or “bureaux d’achat”. The government closed most of these in 2008 as part of a heavily publicized campaign to clean up the sector, eliminating illegal practices and establishing better regulatory controls. One of CAR’s main diamond buyers, ADR, continues to operate in Boda, but other houses have closed. Much of the buying is done by local collectors, some of whom double up as site owners, or “chefs de chantier”, supervising the work of dozens of diggers, who are obliged to turn their stones over for sale to the owner rather than sell elsewhere.
At Banagbélé, a diamond site 14km from Boda, off the main road to Mbaiki, the men dig and sieve. There is a scratch village here, with huts for workers. Most have come from Boda or nearby villages and many will see their families just once a week. Augustin Teng, 39, says he can earn between 50,000 and 100,000 francs (US$100 and $200) in a good month, but others are on daily rates of only 1,000 or 1,500 francs ($1 or $2).
Teng says he supplements his income from the chantier by keeping up his fields of manioc, maize and groundnuts and says other miners should follow suit, particularly given the drop in diamond prices. “That is what we have here in Centrafrique: diamonds and the land,” says Teng. “But you won’t get much from either at the moment.”
Rwandan Parliament to Vote on Criminalizing Homosexuality this Week.
IGLHRC
15 December 2009
On December 16, 2009, the lower house of the Rwandan Parliament will hold its final debate on a draft revision of the penal code that will, for the first time, make homosexuality a crime in Rwanda. A vote on this draft code will occur before the end of the week. The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) has learned that the proposed Article 217 of the draft Penal Code Act will criminalize "[a]ny person who practices, encourages or sensitizes people of the same sex, to sexual relation or any sexual practice." If the Chamber of Deputies approves, the draft code will go before the Rwandan Senate most likely in early 2010.
Article 217 violates Rwandans' basic human rights and is contradictory to the Rwandan Constitution as well as various regional and international conventions. IGLHRC, the Coalition of African Lesbians (CAL), and Rwanda's Horizon Community Association (HOCA) will shortly issue a call to action to demand that the Rwandan Parliament withdraw this article. We urge the international community to act against this proposed law and support the equality, dignity, and privacy of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Rwanda.
This draft provision targeting LGBT people closely follows the introduction of a similar measure in neighboring Uganda, where the nation's parliament is currently debating an Anti-Homosexuality Bill. The proposed Ugandan law would prohibit all LGBT activism and organizing, would further criminalize consensual same-sex conduct between adults, which is already illegal in Uganda, and in some cases apply the death penalty.
15 December 2009
On December 16, 2009, the lower house of the Rwandan Parliament will hold its final debate on a draft revision of the penal code that will, for the first time, make homosexuality a crime in Rwanda. A vote on this draft code will occur before the end of the week. The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) has learned that the proposed Article 217 of the draft Penal Code Act will criminalize "[a]ny person who practices, encourages or sensitizes people of the same sex, to sexual relation or any sexual practice." If the Chamber of Deputies approves, the draft code will go before the Rwandan Senate most likely in early 2010.
Article 217 violates Rwandans' basic human rights and is contradictory to the Rwandan Constitution as well as various regional and international conventions. IGLHRC, the Coalition of African Lesbians (CAL), and Rwanda's Horizon Community Association (HOCA) will shortly issue a call to action to demand that the Rwandan Parliament withdraw this article. We urge the international community to act against this proposed law and support the equality, dignity, and privacy of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Rwanda.
This draft provision targeting LGBT people closely follows the introduction of a similar measure in neighboring Uganda, where the nation's parliament is currently debating an Anti-Homosexuality Bill. The proposed Ugandan law would prohibit all LGBT activism and organizing, would further criminalize consensual same-sex conduct between adults, which is already illegal in Uganda, and in some cases apply the death penalty.
Gulf Arabs agree on joint military force.
Reuters
16 December 2009
Arab states in the world’s top oil-exporting region have agreed to create a joint force for quick intervention to address security threats, a senior Gulf official said on Tuesday. The force would intervene in situations similar to an incursion into Saudi Arabia by Yemeni rebels earlier this year, the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) Abdul-Rahman al-Attiya said. The US-allied six-nation bloc is located across the Gulf from Iran and includes the world’s top oil exporter Saudi Arabia. They share Washington’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear plans.
16 December 2009
Arab states in the world’s top oil-exporting region have agreed to create a joint force for quick intervention to address security threats, a senior Gulf official said on Tuesday. The force would intervene in situations similar to an incursion into Saudi Arabia by Yemeni rebels earlier this year, the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) Abdul-Rahman al-Attiya said. The US-allied six-nation bloc is located across the Gulf from Iran and includes the world’s top oil exporter Saudi Arabia. They share Washington’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear plans.
15 December, 2009
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration Visiting AFRICOM on Three-Nation Trip.
US Department of State
Press Release
15 December 2009
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration will travel to Khartoum and Juba, Sudan; Stuttgart, Germany; and Brussels, Belgium from December 12-19, 2009.
Special Envoy Gration will travel to Khartoum and Juba, Sudan, to meet with officials from the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on resolving disputes over fundamental issues of CPA implementation.
In Stuttgart, Special Envoy Gration will have discussions with senior AFRICOM officials, and in Brussels, Special Envoy Gration will meet with European Union and Troika representatives.
Press Release
15 December 2009
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration will travel to Khartoum and Juba, Sudan; Stuttgart, Germany; and Brussels, Belgium from December 12-19, 2009.
Special Envoy Gration will travel to Khartoum and Juba, Sudan, to meet with officials from the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on resolving disputes over fundamental issues of CPA implementation.
In Stuttgart, Special Envoy Gration will have discussions with senior AFRICOM officials, and in Brussels, Special Envoy Gration will meet with European Union and Troika representatives.
Seized Weapons linked to Victor Bout.
Sidney Morning Herald
15 December 2009
A plane loaded with North Korean weapons that was seized in Thailand has been linked to suspected Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, once dubbed the ''Merchant of Death.''
Thai authorities focused yesterday on inspecting the 35 tonnes of weapons seized from the cargo plane, as details of the alleged shady past of the Ilyushin Il-76 emerged. Its ultimate destination remained a mystery. (Editor's Note: It is most likely they know but do not want to release the name.)
According to the crew's Thai lawyer, the plane was registered to Air West, a cargo transport company in Georgia.
Hugh Griffiths, a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said the plane had also been registered under a company named Beibars, linked to the Serbian arms trafficker Tomislav Damnjanovic, and with three companies identified by the US Treasury as companies controlled by Mr Bout.
Mr Griffiths is monitoring air cargo companies involved in arms trafficking. ''They are like flocks of migrating birds, these aircraft. They change from one company to another because the previous company has either been closed down for safety reasons or been identified in a UN trafficking report,'' he said.
The arms dealers had changed the plane's country of registration to Georgia because the EU had banned all cargo carriers registered in Kazakhstan, where Beibars is registered.
Mr Griffiths said the past owners of the aircraft had been documented by the UN as trafficking arms to Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Chad. He said the plane had also been used to ship arms from the Balkans to Burundi in October.
The five-man crew - four from Kazakhstan and one from Belarus - were denied bail on Monday. They are being held at Klong Prem Central Prison in Bangkok, where Bout is detained. He was arrested in March 2008 and is fighting extradition to the US.
15 December 2009
A plane loaded with North Korean weapons that was seized in Thailand has been linked to suspected Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, once dubbed the ''Merchant of Death.''
Thai authorities focused yesterday on inspecting the 35 tonnes of weapons seized from the cargo plane, as details of the alleged shady past of the Ilyushin Il-76 emerged. Its ultimate destination remained a mystery. (Editor's Note: It is most likely they know but do not want to release the name.)
According to the crew's Thai lawyer, the plane was registered to Air West, a cargo transport company in Georgia.
Hugh Griffiths, a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said the plane had also been registered under a company named Beibars, linked to the Serbian arms trafficker Tomislav Damnjanovic, and with three companies identified by the US Treasury as companies controlled by Mr Bout.
Mr Griffiths is monitoring air cargo companies involved in arms trafficking. ''They are like flocks of migrating birds, these aircraft. They change from one company to another because the previous company has either been closed down for safety reasons or been identified in a UN trafficking report,'' he said.
The arms dealers had changed the plane's country of registration to Georgia because the EU had banned all cargo carriers registered in Kazakhstan, where Beibars is registered.
Mr Griffiths said the past owners of the aircraft had been documented by the UN as trafficking arms to Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Chad. He said the plane had also been used to ship arms from the Balkans to Burundi in October.
The five-man crew - four from Kazakhstan and one from Belarus - were denied bail on Monday. They are being held at Klong Prem Central Prison in Bangkok, where Bout is detained. He was arrested in March 2008 and is fighting extradition to the US.
Rwandan Government Using Controversial "Genocide Ideology" Law to Opress Political Opposition.
Reuters
15 December 2009
By Hereward Holland
Rwandan opposition presidential candidate Bernard Ntaganda denied that he was peddling genocide ideology and ethnic "divisionism" at a senate committee inquiry late on Monday.
Ntaganda, head of recently formed Social Party Imberakuri (PS-Imberakuri), said the accusations were baseless and may be politically motivated. The committee said the constitution obliged it to investigate all accusations against political parties.
Ntaganda was summoned to answer charges based on Rwanda's 2008 genocide ideology law, which officials say is necessary to prevent future violence.
Analysts say critics of the government, including journalists, civil society groups, political leaders, clergy and teachers, are frequently targeted by the law. One analyst said it was likely Ntaganda had been called in because he is the only registered presidential rival to President Paul Kagame.
"According to that law, it says you must provide proof, some speech, a written public letter, to write (something) in a newspaper," Ntaganda told Reuters. "They have no proof. I deny the charge."
"What they accuse me of is based on rumours. There are no facts, no evidence... this is a clear testimony that they have no proof about those accusations," Ntaganda said.
Parliamentary spokesman Augustin Habimana said the senate committee had received information from an undisclosed source that the party was ethnically divisive and Ntaganda was summoned to provide an explanation.
"It is not for the senate to provide evidence. They have some information... (and) the senate wants to know if it is true or not," Habimana told Reuters.
15 December 2009
By Hereward Holland
Rwandan opposition presidential candidate Bernard Ntaganda denied that he was peddling genocide ideology and ethnic "divisionism" at a senate committee inquiry late on Monday.
Ntaganda, head of recently formed Social Party Imberakuri (PS-Imberakuri), said the accusations were baseless and may be politically motivated. The committee said the constitution obliged it to investigate all accusations against political parties.
Ntaganda was summoned to answer charges based on Rwanda's 2008 genocide ideology law, which officials say is necessary to prevent future violence.
Analysts say critics of the government, including journalists, civil society groups, political leaders, clergy and teachers, are frequently targeted by the law. One analyst said it was likely Ntaganda had been called in because he is the only registered presidential rival to President Paul Kagame.
"According to that law, it says you must provide proof, some speech, a written public letter, to write (something) in a newspaper," Ntaganda told Reuters. "They have no proof. I deny the charge."
"What they accuse me of is based on rumours. There are no facts, no evidence... this is a clear testimony that they have no proof about those accusations," Ntaganda said.
Parliamentary spokesman Augustin Habimana said the senate committee had received information from an undisclosed source that the party was ethnically divisive and Ntaganda was summoned to provide an explanation.
"It is not for the senate to provide evidence. They have some information... (and) the senate wants to know if it is true or not," Habimana told Reuters.
Israel confirms U.K. arrest warrant against Livni.
By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent
14 December 2009
Senior officials in Israel confirmed reports on Monday that a British court issued an arrest warrant against opposition chairwoman Tzipi Livni for her role in orchestrating Israel's military offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip nearly a year ago.
The request for the warrant was submitted by a pro-Palestinian organization.
British sources reported late Monday that though a British court had issued an arrest warrant for Livni over war crimes allegedly committed in Gaza while she served as foreign minister, it annulled it upon discovering she was not in the U.K.
Livni served as foreign minister alongside Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak during the Israel Defense Forces offensive in Gaza. The three figures comprised the "troika" of top decision-makers who charted the course of the war.
Earlier Monday, Arab-language media reported that Livni canceled her participation in a Jewish function in London after a warrant for her arrest was issued over part in last winter's Israel's Gaza offensive.
Israel's ambassador to London, Ron Prosor, conferred with officials in the British Ministry of Justice who told him that they were unaware of any criminal complaint or arrest warrant against the former foreign minister.
Yet, further inquiries by Israeli officials revealed that a warrant had indeed been issued.
Al-Quds Al-Arabi claimed on Monday that Scotland Yard advised the organizers of the Jewish National Fund conference in northwest London that the former foreign minister had canceled her scheduled address to the assembly over threats of a possible lawsuit by pro-Palestinian groups.
The Al-Quds Al-Arabi report also said that a group of about 100 anti-Israel protesters rallied outside the Hendon Hall Hotel on Sunday, just as delegates arrived at the JNF meet.
Livni's office said in a statement following the report that her appearance at the London event was canceled two weeks ago due to a scheduling conflict.
Livni's office also said that the opposition leader was proud of all the decisions she made as foreign minister during the Gaza war, an operation which she said achieved its goal of bring security to Israel.
A United Kingdom court two months ago deferred until further notice an appeal by local pro-Palestinian groups to issue an arrest warrant against Barak, who was visiting the country at the time.
A similar appeal was issued in 2004 against Israel's then defense minister, Shaul Mofaz. At the time, Mofaz was granted immunity from international arrest and trial - a precedent set by the British court, which until then had given such protection only to foreign ministers or premiers.
14 December 2009
Senior officials in Israel confirmed reports on Monday that a British court issued an arrest warrant against opposition chairwoman Tzipi Livni for her role in orchestrating Israel's military offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip nearly a year ago.
The request for the warrant was submitted by a pro-Palestinian organization.
British sources reported late Monday that though a British court had issued an arrest warrant for Livni over war crimes allegedly committed in Gaza while she served as foreign minister, it annulled it upon discovering she was not in the U.K.
Livni served as foreign minister alongside Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak during the Israel Defense Forces offensive in Gaza. The three figures comprised the "troika" of top decision-makers who charted the course of the war.
Earlier Monday, Arab-language media reported that Livni canceled her participation in a Jewish function in London after a warrant for her arrest was issued over part in last winter's Israel's Gaza offensive.
Israel's ambassador to London, Ron Prosor, conferred with officials in the British Ministry of Justice who told him that they were unaware of any criminal complaint or arrest warrant against the former foreign minister.
Yet, further inquiries by Israeli officials revealed that a warrant had indeed been issued.
Al-Quds Al-Arabi claimed on Monday that Scotland Yard advised the organizers of the Jewish National Fund conference in northwest London that the former foreign minister had canceled her scheduled address to the assembly over threats of a possible lawsuit by pro-Palestinian groups.
The Al-Quds Al-Arabi report also said that a group of about 100 anti-Israel protesters rallied outside the Hendon Hall Hotel on Sunday, just as delegates arrived at the JNF meet.
Livni's office said in a statement following the report that her appearance at the London event was canceled two weeks ago due to a scheduling conflict.
Livni's office also said that the opposition leader was proud of all the decisions she made as foreign minister during the Gaza war, an operation which she said achieved its goal of bring security to Israel.
A United Kingdom court two months ago deferred until further notice an appeal by local pro-Palestinian groups to issue an arrest warrant against Barak, who was visiting the country at the time.
A similar appeal was issued in 2004 against Israel's then defense minister, Shaul Mofaz. At the time, Mofaz was granted immunity from international arrest and trial - a precedent set by the British court, which until then had given such protection only to foreign ministers or premiers.
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