256 News
27 March 2010
Fugitive Rwandan General, Kayumba Nyamwasa, has been replaced by William Nkurunziza. Nkurunziza takes over the Indian mission which Nyamwasa abandoned last month and fled for his life claiming the government of President Kagame (pictured) wanted to bump him off.
He is now hiding in South Africa where fled through Uganda early this month.
Nkurunziza himself has been out of circulation for over four years after falling out with the Rwanda regime. He had lost his job as Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) boss. A statement from the Rwanda cabinet confirmed the changes.
27 March, 2010
Baganda Start Anti-Museveni Radio in the US.
256 News
27 March 2010
Baganda based in the US have started a satellite radio to make up for the closure of CBS FM in September last year. Baganda Radio, as it is called, will start broadcasting in Uganda this evening. Baganda radioalso available on http://www.bagandaradio.com will be broadcasting its program “Wooli Nywera” live in Luganda to Eastern, Central and Southern Africa starting today (Saturday, March 27, 2010) at 8:00pm East African time.
The frequency is 15410KHz on the 19 meter band.
For the rest of the world, the show will be broadcast live on the internet at http://www.facebook.com/l/7cc71;www.ababaka.com.
The founders of the radio are reportedly fundraising from among loyal Baganda to support the radio.
The radio is expected to be more anti-NRM and anti-President Museveni than any other radio in Uganda has ever been. Their target panelists include opposition party leaders, Col. Kiiza Besigye (FDC) and Olara Otunnu (UPC).
The radio will have talk shows on Saturdays and Sundays.
27 March 2010
Baganda based in the US have started a satellite radio to make up for the closure of CBS FM in September last year. Baganda Radio, as it is called, will start broadcasting in Uganda this evening. Baganda radioalso available on http://www.bagandaradio.com will be broadcasting its program “Wooli Nywera” live in Luganda to Eastern, Central and Southern Africa starting today (Saturday, March 27, 2010) at 8:00pm East African time.
The frequency is 15410KHz on the 19 meter band.
For the rest of the world, the show will be broadcast live on the internet at http://www.facebook.com/l/7cc71;www.ababaka.com.
The founders of the radio are reportedly fundraising from among loyal Baganda to support the radio.
The radio is expected to be more anti-NRM and anti-President Museveni than any other radio in Uganda has ever been. Their target panelists include opposition party leaders, Col. Kiiza Besigye (FDC) and Olara Otunnu (UPC).
The radio will have talk shows on Saturdays and Sundays.
Ghosts of a genocide-the RPA's slaughter of thousands at Kibeho went unpunished.
By Bryan Patterson
Sunday Herald Sun
March 28, 2010
Editor's Note: The book "Pure Massacre" can be purchased through Big Sky Publishing at: http://www.bigskypublishing.com.au/bookview.php?iid=36&vt=B. This book makes an excellent companion book to "Combat Medic" by Terry Pickard, also available through Big Sky Publishing (http://www.bigskypublishing.com.au/bookview.php?iid=2&vt=B).
On April 22, 1995 - almost 15 years ago - a group of Australian soldiers watched in horror as more than 4000 unarmed men, women and children were slaughtered by machetes, guns and grenades in front of their eyes by Rwandan government soldiers.
Our soldiers could do nothing to stop the madness. A decade and a half later, many still have regular nightmares about that.
Embedded in their memories are the faces of the victims, arms stretched out and pleading for help that couldn't be given. And they can still see the sneering laughing faces of the Rwandan killers, their hands covered in blood as they slaughtered the women and children and babies.
Our soldiers were sent to Rwanda as part of a UN peacekeeping team. But restricted by the UN rules of engagement governing the deployment, they could only watch helplessly as the orgy of killing unfolded and try to help the wounded under the gaze of trigger-happy killers.
Nothing could have prepared any soldier for that.
"Many of the vets have a lot of guilt about what happened because they were not able to do the best they could do to save lives. They could not do anything to defend those who couldn't defend themselves."
Jake Blake, who was a corporal on the Rwanda mission, said O'Hallaron's book had lifted the lid on "a dirty little secret".
"This is the first time the story has been told in detail by people who were on the ground. The first time the story has been told by those who can't forget."
A year before the Kibeho massacre, the landlocked country bordered by Uganda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania had been involved in a bloody civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. An estimated 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 genocide.
After the victory by the army of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army, led by General Paul Kagame, many ethnic Hutu fled from the army-controlled areas to internally displaced persons camps taken over by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and a number of aid organisations.
French Major-General Guy Tousignant, the former UN force commander of United Nations forces, recalled arriving in Rwanda's capital city Kigali on August 15, 1995. Bodies lay in the street and packs of dogs, fattened from the corpses, ruled the city. There was no drinking water or electricity.
"The devil had swept through the country and killed Rwanda's spirit and soul," said Maj-Gen Tousignant.
"All that seemed to remain was the stench of genocide and children abandoned by war pathetically wandering the streets, traumatised by the death and destruction they had witnessed."
By early 1995, the displaced persons' camp at Kibeho was the biggest in Rwanda, sprawling for 9sq km and containing 80,000 to 100,000 people.
The 32 Australian soldiers and medical officers arrived there as part of the UN peacekeeping force on April 18, 1995.
There were daily killings by the Rwandan government soldiers, but the slaughter exploded out of control soon after 10am on April 22. The Australians had a grandstand view of the nightmare from the Zambian compound.
The RPA soldiers murdered women and children right up to the UN wire. Bodies were everywhere. For the Diggers behind the wire, the next few hours were agonising.
For the refugees, there was nowhere to run.
As the Australians collected the wounded from among the piles of dead, the crisis began to escalate as panic-stricken Hutus overran the Zambian compound, driven forward by machete-and rifle wielding militia.
Hundreds were killed in the crush and the Australians were forced to repel at bayonet point the terrified victims they were supposed to be protecting, pushing them back into the RPA killing zone.
The RPA went wild and cut loose with another hail of fire on the panicking crowd.
Despite the madness, according to Kevin O'Halloran, the Australians proved their mettle, venturing out from the Zambian compound time and time again to collect the wounded before the RPA could finish them off.
At the same time they were trying to impress upon the RPA that the world was watching.
Lance Corporal Andrew Miller would later describe how the RPA made sport out of killing even babies.
"At one stage, a whole crowd of people were running down the hill and the RPA were firing after them and the whole hillside was littered with different coloured clothing as they lay dead on the ground. The RPA just stood on the top of the hill and picked off people as they ran away."
Corporal Jake Blake recalled this week: "It all went mad. At the time everything was semi-real".
One memory still haunts him.
"All of a sudden we had displaced persons outside our perimeter. We would grab them and take them back over the wire.
"One bloke came through and we dragged him back, five minutes later he was back in again so we put him back over the wire. He came in again, offering me a wad of money, desperate for help, but it was not in our mandate. So we put him back over the wire.
"He came back again and this time in broken English he offered me a little girl. Not to save her. He wanted me to take the girl in payment to save him.
"My 2IC and I grabbed the bloke and dragged him over the wire to the shoulder of the hill. There was a road just below us and rightly or wrongly it was my call. We dropped him over the edge down to the road as we had had a gutful by that stage and the business with the little girl. It was the straw that broke the camel's back.
"He got up and looked back at us. About half a dozen RPA soldiers appeared, grabbed the bloke and dragged him off down the road. All the time he never broke eye contact with me. They moved off in the darkness and we lost sight of him.
"We turned to walk away and a single shot barked out. We looked back at the road to see the same RPA soldiers walking back past us laughing and waving to us."
He said it was a decision that has haunted him ever since.
"Maybe I could have done something to save the bloke. I don't know. You think of these things all the time. It doesn't get any easier."
O'Halloran also carries an image that won't disappear. It is of a mother with a child strapped to her back, a little girl and a little boy at her feet. All dead.
After the madness stopped, one Australian medic with a hand-held counter counted bodies he passed. He reached more than 4000 clicks about halfway through the killing field before RPA soldiers threatened to kill him if he did not stop.
For two days, the Australians brought out those still alive and helped to fill mass graves with corpses.
Some estimate that up to 8000 could have been killed at the camp. The Rwandan Government's estimate of the number killed was about 300.
Most Australian soldiers there during the rampage later agreed that they would have died at the hands of the RPA soldiers had they tried to stop the killings. The RPA heavily outnumbered and outgunned the Australians.
O'Halloran said the Australians who saw the Kibeho savagery were brave, steadfast and courageous.
"They were determined to save as many lives as they could with the limited mandate and inadequate equipment. They achieved this while under fire.
"Members of the RPA tried to goad them into taking offensive action. But the Australian officers remained cool, calm and collected under difficult conditions.
"One of the greatest achievements was the incalculable number of lives saved by the sheer presence of the Australian soldiers. I truly believe our service should be remembered as as a success against the odds."
He said the Australian military tradition was "long, glorious and, for the most part, honourable".
"However our encounter at Kibeho and the murder of so many in front of us seemed anything but honourable for the men and women who served there," he said. "Our hands were tied."
Four Australians were awarded the Medal for Gallantry for their distinguished service at Kibeho, the first gallantry medals awarded to Australians since the Vietnam War.
When the story of Kibeho first broke, the world was appalled. The UN announced an investigation, but the results were indecisive.
Kevin O'Halloran said it took him 10 years to finish his book on the events at Kibeho.
"I thought there was no book on the market that told the story from the soldiers' point of view. I wanted to give those veterans a voice."
O'Halloran said he hoped the world had learned a lesson from Kibeho. Such a thing would probably not happen again.
Jake Blake is not sure.
"I don't think they learned anything," he said.
"Yes, it could happen again."
Sunday Herald Sun
March 28, 2010
Editor's Note: The book "Pure Massacre" can be purchased through Big Sky Publishing at: http://www.bigskypublishing.com.au/bookview.php?iid=36&vt=B. This book makes an excellent companion book to "Combat Medic" by Terry Pickard, also available through Big Sky Publishing (http://www.bigskypublishing.com.au/bookview.php?iid=2&vt=B).
On April 22, 1995 - almost 15 years ago - a group of Australian soldiers watched in horror as more than 4000 unarmed men, women and children were slaughtered by machetes, guns and grenades in front of their eyes by Rwandan government soldiers.
Our soldiers could do nothing to stop the madness. A decade and a half later, many still have regular nightmares about that.
Embedded in their memories are the faces of the victims, arms stretched out and pleading for help that couldn't be given. And they can still see the sneering laughing faces of the Rwandan killers, their hands covered in blood as they slaughtered the women and children and babies.
Our soldiers were sent to Rwanda as part of a UN peacekeeping team. But restricted by the UN rules of engagement governing the deployment, they could only watch helplessly as the orgy of killing unfolded and try to help the wounded under the gaze of trigger-happy killers.
Nothing could have prepared any soldier for that.
"Many of the vets have a lot of guilt about what happened because they were not able to do the best they could do to save lives. They could not do anything to defend those who couldn't defend themselves."
Jake Blake, who was a corporal on the Rwanda mission, said O'Hallaron's book had lifted the lid on "a dirty little secret".
"This is the first time the story has been told in detail by people who were on the ground. The first time the story has been told by those who can't forget."
A year before the Kibeho massacre, the landlocked country bordered by Uganda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania had been involved in a bloody civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. An estimated 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 genocide.
After the victory by the army of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army, led by General Paul Kagame, many ethnic Hutu fled from the army-controlled areas to internally displaced persons camps taken over by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and a number of aid organisations.
French Major-General Guy Tousignant, the former UN force commander of United Nations forces, recalled arriving in Rwanda's capital city Kigali on August 15, 1995. Bodies lay in the street and packs of dogs, fattened from the corpses, ruled the city. There was no drinking water or electricity.
"The devil had swept through the country and killed Rwanda's spirit and soul," said Maj-Gen Tousignant.
"All that seemed to remain was the stench of genocide and children abandoned by war pathetically wandering the streets, traumatised by the death and destruction they had witnessed."
By early 1995, the displaced persons' camp at Kibeho was the biggest in Rwanda, sprawling for 9sq km and containing 80,000 to 100,000 people.
The 32 Australian soldiers and medical officers arrived there as part of the UN peacekeeping force on April 18, 1995.
There were daily killings by the Rwandan government soldiers, but the slaughter exploded out of control soon after 10am on April 22. The Australians had a grandstand view of the nightmare from the Zambian compound.
The RPA soldiers murdered women and children right up to the UN wire. Bodies were everywhere. For the Diggers behind the wire, the next few hours were agonising.
For the refugees, there was nowhere to run.
As the Australians collected the wounded from among the piles of dead, the crisis began to escalate as panic-stricken Hutus overran the Zambian compound, driven forward by machete-and rifle wielding militia.
Hundreds were killed in the crush and the Australians were forced to repel at bayonet point the terrified victims they were supposed to be protecting, pushing them back into the RPA killing zone.
The RPA went wild and cut loose with another hail of fire on the panicking crowd.
Despite the madness, according to Kevin O'Halloran, the Australians proved their mettle, venturing out from the Zambian compound time and time again to collect the wounded before the RPA could finish them off.
At the same time they were trying to impress upon the RPA that the world was watching.
Lance Corporal Andrew Miller would later describe how the RPA made sport out of killing even babies.
"At one stage, a whole crowd of people were running down the hill and the RPA were firing after them and the whole hillside was littered with different coloured clothing as they lay dead on the ground. The RPA just stood on the top of the hill and picked off people as they ran away."
Corporal Jake Blake recalled this week: "It all went mad. At the time everything was semi-real".
One memory still haunts him.
"All of a sudden we had displaced persons outside our perimeter. We would grab them and take them back over the wire.
"One bloke came through and we dragged him back, five minutes later he was back in again so we put him back over the wire. He came in again, offering me a wad of money, desperate for help, but it was not in our mandate. So we put him back over the wire.
"He came back again and this time in broken English he offered me a little girl. Not to save her. He wanted me to take the girl in payment to save him.
"My 2IC and I grabbed the bloke and dragged him over the wire to the shoulder of the hill. There was a road just below us and rightly or wrongly it was my call. We dropped him over the edge down to the road as we had had a gutful by that stage and the business with the little girl. It was the straw that broke the camel's back.
"He got up and looked back at us. About half a dozen RPA soldiers appeared, grabbed the bloke and dragged him off down the road. All the time he never broke eye contact with me. They moved off in the darkness and we lost sight of him.
"We turned to walk away and a single shot barked out. We looked back at the road to see the same RPA soldiers walking back past us laughing and waving to us."
He said it was a decision that has haunted him ever since.
"Maybe I could have done something to save the bloke. I don't know. You think of these things all the time. It doesn't get any easier."
O'Halloran also carries an image that won't disappear. It is of a mother with a child strapped to her back, a little girl and a little boy at her feet. All dead.
After the madness stopped, one Australian medic with a hand-held counter counted bodies he passed. He reached more than 4000 clicks about halfway through the killing field before RPA soldiers threatened to kill him if he did not stop.
For two days, the Australians brought out those still alive and helped to fill mass graves with corpses.
Some estimate that up to 8000 could have been killed at the camp. The Rwandan Government's estimate of the number killed was about 300.
Most Australian soldiers there during the rampage later agreed that they would have died at the hands of the RPA soldiers had they tried to stop the killings. The RPA heavily outnumbered and outgunned the Australians.
O'Halloran said the Australians who saw the Kibeho savagery were brave, steadfast and courageous.
"They were determined to save as many lives as they could with the limited mandate and inadequate equipment. They achieved this while under fire.
"Members of the RPA tried to goad them into taking offensive action. But the Australian officers remained cool, calm and collected under difficult conditions.
"One of the greatest achievements was the incalculable number of lives saved by the sheer presence of the Australian soldiers. I truly believe our service should be remembered as as a success against the odds."
He said the Australian military tradition was "long, glorious and, for the most part, honourable".
"However our encounter at Kibeho and the murder of so many in front of us seemed anything but honourable for the men and women who served there," he said. "Our hands were tied."
Four Australians were awarded the Medal for Gallantry for their distinguished service at Kibeho, the first gallantry medals awarded to Australians since the Vietnam War.
When the story of Kibeho first broke, the world was appalled. The UN announced an investigation, but the results were indecisive.
Kevin O'Halloran said it took him 10 years to finish his book on the events at Kibeho.
"I thought there was no book on the market that told the story from the soldiers' point of view. I wanted to give those veterans a voice."
O'Halloran said he hoped the world had learned a lesson from Kibeho. Such a thing would probably not happen again.
Jake Blake is not sure.
"I don't think they learned anything," he said.
"Yes, it could happen again."
Iraq's new parliament seat distribution.
AP
26 March 2010
A look at the distribution of seats in Iraq's parliament from each province, after full vote returns from the March 7 parliamentary elections. In the 325-seat parliament, there are 310 general seats, 8 seats for Christians and other minorities and 7 compensatory seats.
_Anbar province (14 seats)
Ayad Allawi's Iraqiya ....................11 seats
Iraqi (Sunni) Accordance ..................2 seats
Iraqi Unity Alliance, Sunni party..........1 seat
_Babil province (16 seats)
Iraqi National Alliance, INA ..............5 seats
Iraqiya....................................3 seats
Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law.............8 seats
_Baghdad province (68 seats + 2 seats, Christian, Sabean)
Iraqiya....................................24 seats
State of Law...............................26 seats
INA........................................17 seats
Iraqi Accordance ...........................1 seat
_Basra province (24 seats)
State of Law ...............................14 seats
Iraqiya......................................3 seats
Iraqi National Alliance......................7 seats
_Dahuk province (10 seats + 1 Christian seat)
Kurdish Alliance ............................9 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Party......................1 seat
_Dhi Qar province (18 seats)
Iraqiya.......................................1 seat
State of Law..................................8 seats
INA...........................................9 seats
_Diyala province (13 seats)
Iraqiya.......................................8 seats
State of Law .................................1 seat
INA ..........................................3 seats
Kurdish Alliance..............................1 seat
_Irbil province (14 seats + 1 Christian seat)
Kurdish Alliance.............................10 seats
Goran.........................................2 seats
Kurdish Islamic...............................1 seat
Kurdistan Islamic Party.......................1 seat
_Karbala (10 seats)
Iraqiya.......................................1 seat
State of Law..................................6 seats
INA...........................................3 seats
_Muthanna province (7 seats)
State of Law...................................4 seats
INA............................................3 seats
_Maysan province (10 seats)
State of Law...................................4 seats
INA............................................6 seats
_Najaf province (12 seats)
State of Law...................................7 seats
INA ...........................................5 seats
_Ninevah province (31 seats + 3 seats for Christian, Yazidi and Shabak minorities)
Iraqiya.........................................20 seats
INA..............................................1 seat
Iraqi Accordance.................................1 seat
Kurdish Alliance.................................8 seats
Iraq Unity Alliance..............................1 seat
_Qadisiyah (11 seats)
Iraqiya.........................................2 seats
State of Law....................................4 seats
INA.............................................5 seats
_Salahuddin province (12 seats)
Iraqiya ........................................8 seats
Iraqi Accordance ...............................2 seats
Iraq Unity Alliance.............................2 seats
_Sulaimaniyah (17 seats)
Kurdish Alliance................................8 seats
Goran ..........................................6 seats
Kurdish Islamic.................................2 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Party.........................1 seat
_Tamim province (12 seats + 1 Christian)
Iraqiya ........................................6 seats
Kurdish Alliance................................6 seats
_Wasit province (11 seats)
Iraqiya ........................................2 seats
State of Law....................................5 seats
INA.............................................4 seats
Compensatory (7 seats):
INA.............................................2 seats
Iraqiya ........................................2 seats
State of Law....................................2 seats
Kurdish Alliance................................1 seat
____________
TOTALS:
Iraqiya ........................................91 seats
State of Law....................................89 seats
INA ............................................70 seats
Kurdish Alliance................................43 seats
Goran............................................8 seats
Iraqi Accordance ................................6 seats
Iraqi Unity Alilance.............................4 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Party .........................3 seats
Kurdish Islamic..................................3 seats
26 March 2010
A look at the distribution of seats in Iraq's parliament from each province, after full vote returns from the March 7 parliamentary elections. In the 325-seat parliament, there are 310 general seats, 8 seats for Christians and other minorities and 7 compensatory seats.
_Anbar province (14 seats)
Ayad Allawi's Iraqiya ....................11 seats
Iraqi (Sunni) Accordance ..................2 seats
Iraqi Unity Alliance, Sunni party..........1 seat
_Babil province (16 seats)
Iraqi National Alliance, INA ..............5 seats
Iraqiya....................................3 seats
Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law.............8 seats
_Baghdad province (68 seats + 2 seats, Christian, Sabean)
Iraqiya....................................24 seats
State of Law...............................26 seats
INA........................................17 seats
Iraqi Accordance ...........................1 seat
_Basra province (24 seats)
State of Law ...............................14 seats
Iraqiya......................................3 seats
Iraqi National Alliance......................7 seats
_Dahuk province (10 seats + 1 Christian seat)
Kurdish Alliance ............................9 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Party......................1 seat
_Dhi Qar province (18 seats)
Iraqiya.......................................1 seat
State of Law..................................8 seats
INA...........................................9 seats
_Diyala province (13 seats)
Iraqiya.......................................8 seats
State of Law .................................1 seat
INA ..........................................3 seats
Kurdish Alliance..............................1 seat
_Irbil province (14 seats + 1 Christian seat)
Kurdish Alliance.............................10 seats
Goran.........................................2 seats
Kurdish Islamic...............................1 seat
Kurdistan Islamic Party.......................1 seat
_Karbala (10 seats)
Iraqiya.......................................1 seat
State of Law..................................6 seats
INA...........................................3 seats
_Muthanna province (7 seats)
State of Law...................................4 seats
INA............................................3 seats
_Maysan province (10 seats)
State of Law...................................4 seats
INA............................................6 seats
_Najaf province (12 seats)
State of Law...................................7 seats
INA ...........................................5 seats
_Ninevah province (31 seats + 3 seats for Christian, Yazidi and Shabak minorities)
Iraqiya.........................................20 seats
INA..............................................1 seat
Iraqi Accordance.................................1 seat
Kurdish Alliance.................................8 seats
Iraq Unity Alliance..............................1 seat
_Qadisiyah (11 seats)
Iraqiya.........................................2 seats
State of Law....................................4 seats
INA.............................................5 seats
_Salahuddin province (12 seats)
Iraqiya ........................................8 seats
Iraqi Accordance ...............................2 seats
Iraq Unity Alliance.............................2 seats
_Sulaimaniyah (17 seats)
Kurdish Alliance................................8 seats
Goran ..........................................6 seats
Kurdish Islamic.................................2 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Party.........................1 seat
_Tamim province (12 seats + 1 Christian)
Iraqiya ........................................6 seats
Kurdish Alliance................................6 seats
_Wasit province (11 seats)
Iraqiya ........................................2 seats
State of Law....................................5 seats
INA.............................................4 seats
Compensatory (7 seats):
INA.............................................2 seats
Iraqiya ........................................2 seats
State of Law....................................2 seats
Kurdish Alliance................................1 seat
____________
TOTALS:
Iraqiya ........................................91 seats
State of Law....................................89 seats
INA ............................................70 seats
Kurdish Alliance................................43 seats
Goran............................................8 seats
Iraqi Accordance ................................6 seats
Iraqi Unity Alilance.............................4 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Party .........................3 seats
Kurdish Islamic..................................3 seats
Spanish Judge Seeking Arrest Of Gen. Nyamwasa on International Warrant.
Rwanda News Agency
26 March 2010
He fled Rwanda for safety but it looks likes fugitive Lt. Gen. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa was heading for more trouble. A Spanish judge who indicted him along with 40others has written to the South African government to arrest him, RNA reports.
Judge Fernando Andreu on Thursday last week (March 11) wrote to Interpol informing them of the presence of the ex-army chief in South Africa, who is also, wanted in Rwanda on state terrorism charges.
Spanish daily El Pais reported that in the letter, Judge Fernando writes that Gen. Kayumba “ordered and supervised” the killing of Spanish missionary Joaquim Vallmajó in 1994 and members of medical charity Médecins du Monde including Flors Sirera, Manuel Madrazo and Luis Valtueña – all allegedly killed in 1997.
The Spanish nationals were allegedly killed in Northern Rwanda and eastern DR Congo. At the time, Kayumba, a Colonel, was heading the Northern Province – also battling the ex-Rwandan army which was attacking from DRC.
The contested indictment was adopted in February 2008 targeting Gen. Nyamwasa and 39 top officers. President Kagame is subject to the indictment but cannot be arrested owing to presidential immunity.
Judge Andreu claims that Gen. Nyamwasa “kidnapped and assassinated” missionary Joaquim Vallmajó. The Spanish missionary was supposedly killed on April 26, 1994. Indicative of how in control Gen. Nyamwasa was of his forces, he allegedly demanded for a report on the assassination.
Basing his indictment on testimony from former guerrillas, Judge Andreu says missionary Vallmajó was killed with machetes to avoid the “wastage of bullets”, and later incinerated.
Gen. Nyamwasa, according to Judge Andreu, “decided, ordered and supervised” the murder of three Spanish humanitarian workers in January 1997 in Ruhengeri – now part of the Northern Province.
The judge also alleges that Gen. Nyamwasa planned and executed the massacres of Rwandan refugees between 1992 and 1996. This essentially means the crimes go back even before the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) took over Rwanda.
Gen. Nyamwasa was until recently Rwanda’s envoy to India. He fled the country after supposedly being interrogated about links to a series of grenade blasts which have rocked the country. He has however dismissed this version of events, saying instead that he was summoned by senior RPF party and government officials.
Meanwhile, Kigali has asked South Africa to arrest the renegade officer. Government is said to be currently “negotiating” with South African authorities to arrest and extradite Gen. Nyamwasa.
“Although we do not have an extradition treaty with South Africa, they have agreed to cooperate with us to arrest him,” said Maj Gen. Frank Mugambage, Rwanda’s envoy in Uganda – where Gen. Kayumba passed.
“In fact we have also alerted Interpol to arrest him whenever he is sighted and we hope very soon we shall catch up with him.”
Mr Mugambage told Daily Monitor that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has declared that by next year, all Rwandan refugees in Uganda and other countries will be returned home saying Rwanda is now safe.
Mr William Nkurunziza was appointed Ambassador of Rwanda in India in lieu of General Kayumba Nyamwasa.
26 March 2010
He fled Rwanda for safety but it looks likes fugitive Lt. Gen. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa was heading for more trouble. A Spanish judge who indicted him along with 40others has written to the South African government to arrest him, RNA reports.
Judge Fernando Andreu on Thursday last week (March 11) wrote to Interpol informing them of the presence of the ex-army chief in South Africa, who is also, wanted in Rwanda on state terrorism charges.
Spanish daily El Pais reported that in the letter, Judge Fernando writes that Gen. Kayumba “ordered and supervised” the killing of Spanish missionary Joaquim Vallmajó in 1994 and members of medical charity Médecins du Monde including Flors Sirera, Manuel Madrazo and Luis Valtueña – all allegedly killed in 1997.
The Spanish nationals were allegedly killed in Northern Rwanda and eastern DR Congo. At the time, Kayumba, a Colonel, was heading the Northern Province – also battling the ex-Rwandan army which was attacking from DRC.
The contested indictment was adopted in February 2008 targeting Gen. Nyamwasa and 39 top officers. President Kagame is subject to the indictment but cannot be arrested owing to presidential immunity.
Judge Andreu claims that Gen. Nyamwasa “kidnapped and assassinated” missionary Joaquim Vallmajó. The Spanish missionary was supposedly killed on April 26, 1994. Indicative of how in control Gen. Nyamwasa was of his forces, he allegedly demanded for a report on the assassination.
Basing his indictment on testimony from former guerrillas, Judge Andreu says missionary Vallmajó was killed with machetes to avoid the “wastage of bullets”, and later incinerated.
Gen. Nyamwasa, according to Judge Andreu, “decided, ordered and supervised” the murder of three Spanish humanitarian workers in January 1997 in Ruhengeri – now part of the Northern Province.
The judge also alleges that Gen. Nyamwasa planned and executed the massacres of Rwandan refugees between 1992 and 1996. This essentially means the crimes go back even before the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) took over Rwanda.
Gen. Nyamwasa was until recently Rwanda’s envoy to India. He fled the country after supposedly being interrogated about links to a series of grenade blasts which have rocked the country. He has however dismissed this version of events, saying instead that he was summoned by senior RPF party and government officials.
Meanwhile, Kigali has asked South Africa to arrest the renegade officer. Government is said to be currently “negotiating” with South African authorities to arrest and extradite Gen. Nyamwasa.
“Although we do not have an extradition treaty with South Africa, they have agreed to cooperate with us to arrest him,” said Maj Gen. Frank Mugambage, Rwanda’s envoy in Uganda – where Gen. Kayumba passed.
“In fact we have also alerted Interpol to arrest him whenever he is sighted and we hope very soon we shall catch up with him.”
Mr Mugambage told Daily Monitor that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has declared that by next year, all Rwandan refugees in Uganda and other countries will be returned home saying Rwanda is now safe.
Mr William Nkurunziza was appointed Ambassador of Rwanda in India in lieu of General Kayumba Nyamwasa.
26 March, 2010
Rwanda court says not competent to hear Nkunda case.
AFP
26 March 2010
Editor's Note: The Rwandan government will drag this out as long as possible to keep Nkunda in Rwanda and prevent him from talking.
Rwanda's supreme court ruled Friday it is not competent to hear a plea seeking the release of Laurent Nkunda.
"The court ruled it is not competent and sent the case back to a military tribunal," Aime Bokanga, one of Nkunda's lawyers told AFP.
The court's argument is based on the military status of General James Kabarebe, Rwanda's chief of defence staff, designated as the person responsible for Nkunda's detention.
Neither Gen. Kabarebe nor Nkunda was present in court Friday.
"For us it's a disappointment. The supreme court could have taken cognisance of this case," Bokanga said.
"It didn't take into account the human aspects of the case. Our client has been held without trial for more than a year. But we hope that the military courts will rule on the case since it has been sent back to them by the highest court in the land."
Nkunda's lawyers in December complained to the supreme court that their client's continued detention, first in Gisenyi, a town in northwestern Rwanda on the border with DR Congo, and then in Kigali, was "illegal".
26 March 2010
Editor's Note: The Rwandan government will drag this out as long as possible to keep Nkunda in Rwanda and prevent him from talking.
Rwanda's supreme court ruled Friday it is not competent to hear a plea seeking the release of Laurent Nkunda.
"The court ruled it is not competent and sent the case back to a military tribunal," Aime Bokanga, one of Nkunda's lawyers told AFP.
The court's argument is based on the military status of General James Kabarebe, Rwanda's chief of defence staff, designated as the person responsible for Nkunda's detention.
Neither Gen. Kabarebe nor Nkunda was present in court Friday.
"For us it's a disappointment. The supreme court could have taken cognisance of this case," Bokanga said.
"It didn't take into account the human aspects of the case. Our client has been held without trial for more than a year. But we hope that the military courts will rule on the case since it has been sent back to them by the highest court in the land."
Nkunda's lawyers in December complained to the supreme court that their client's continued detention, first in Gisenyi, a town in northwestern Rwanda on the border with DR Congo, and then in Kigali, was "illegal".
Rwanda, Ethiopia strengthen defence ties.
The New Times
26 March 2010
By Edmund Kagire
Rwanda and Ethiopia yesterday signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which will see the two countries strengthen their defence and military cooperation.
The MoU was signed by the Minister of Defence, Gen. Marcel Gatsinzi and his Ethiopian counterpart, Mr. Siraj Fegesa as well as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen. James Kabarebe and his Ethiopian counterpart, Gen. Samora Yunus.
The agreement will see the two countries strengthen defence and military cooperation in the area of training and education as well as sharing information on military operations and equipment.
Gen. Gatsinzi said that Rwanda and Ethiopia have shared a long history of cooperation in the areas of defence and that the new bilateral deal will cement the already existing ‘strong relationship’ the two nations have been sharing.
His Ethiopian counterpart said that his country is committed to maintain the long-lasting ‘sisterly’ relations the two countries have shared and that they will continue to work hand-in-hand to maintain high standards of stability and citizen protection.
“This shows you that we have had a long history of brotherhood and we believe this MoU will further enhance the mutual understanding between ourselves as well as the mutual benefits that will come out of the bilateral cooperation”.
In an interview with The New Times, Brig. Gen Jean Bosco Kazura, the head of Training and Operations in RDF, said that Ethiopia and Rwanda have a cordial military relationship.
He revealed that cooperation has mainly been in the area of education and training as well several peacekeeping initiatives in which Rwanda is involved.
26 March 2010
By Edmund Kagire
Rwanda and Ethiopia yesterday signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which will see the two countries strengthen their defence and military cooperation.
The MoU was signed by the Minister of Defence, Gen. Marcel Gatsinzi and his Ethiopian counterpart, Mr. Siraj Fegesa as well as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen. James Kabarebe and his Ethiopian counterpart, Gen. Samora Yunus.
The agreement will see the two countries strengthen defence and military cooperation in the area of training and education as well as sharing information on military operations and equipment.
Gen. Gatsinzi said that Rwanda and Ethiopia have shared a long history of cooperation in the areas of defence and that the new bilateral deal will cement the already existing ‘strong relationship’ the two nations have been sharing.
His Ethiopian counterpart said that his country is committed to maintain the long-lasting ‘sisterly’ relations the two countries have shared and that they will continue to work hand-in-hand to maintain high standards of stability and citizen protection.
“This shows you that we have had a long history of brotherhood and we believe this MoU will further enhance the mutual understanding between ourselves as well as the mutual benefits that will come out of the bilateral cooperation”.
In an interview with The New Times, Brig. Gen Jean Bosco Kazura, the head of Training and Operations in RDF, said that Ethiopia and Rwanda have a cordial military relationship.
He revealed that cooperation has mainly been in the area of education and training as well several peacekeeping initiatives in which Rwanda is involved.
25 March, 2010
de Villepin creates new political party to challenge Sarkozy.
BBC News
25 March 2010
Dominique de Villepin, arch-rival of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, is launching a new party amid speculation that he will run for the presidency.
He did not give his party a name, or formally announce a presidential run.
But he said it would be "a free and independent movement" and criticised the "politics practised today".
The former prime minister was recently acquitted of plotting to smear Mr Sarkozy when the two men served in the government of President Jacques Chirac.
Mr de Villepin, known as an elegant diplomat, poet, and author of books on Napoleon, was once a favourite to succeed Mr Chirac as the centre-right UMP party's candidate for president.
But he developed an intense rivalry with Mr Sarkozy - then his interior minister - who went on to gain the nomination.
Shake-up
He said: "I have decided to create a political movement, a free and independent movement, open to everyone, which is above divisions and can unite all good intentions."
He said he was looking to shake up the political scene "over the next two years," describing himself as "uneasy with the politics practised today by the majority".
He criticised the distribution of wealth in France today, saying: "We cannot accept to live in a country where inequality and injustice reach such a level. We cannot delay our response."
The new party is to be officially launched on 19 June.
Some commentators said Mr de Villepin would pose a risk for Mr Sarkozy in the 2012 presidential election by threatening to split the right-wing vote.
But others questioned whether he had the support in parliament to mount a serious challenge.
25 March 2010
Dominique de Villepin, arch-rival of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, is launching a new party amid speculation that he will run for the presidency.
He did not give his party a name, or formally announce a presidential run.
But he said it would be "a free and independent movement" and criticised the "politics practised today".
The former prime minister was recently acquitted of plotting to smear Mr Sarkozy when the two men served in the government of President Jacques Chirac.
Mr de Villepin, known as an elegant diplomat, poet, and author of books on Napoleon, was once a favourite to succeed Mr Chirac as the centre-right UMP party's candidate for president.
But he developed an intense rivalry with Mr Sarkozy - then his interior minister - who went on to gain the nomination.
Shake-up
He said: "I have decided to create a political movement, a free and independent movement, open to everyone, which is above divisions and can unite all good intentions."
He said he was looking to shake up the political scene "over the next two years," describing himself as "uneasy with the politics practised today by the majority".
He criticised the distribution of wealth in France today, saying: "We cannot accept to live in a country where inequality and injustice reach such a level. We cannot delay our response."
The new party is to be officially launched on 19 June.
Some commentators said Mr de Villepin would pose a risk for Mr Sarkozy in the 2012 presidential election by threatening to split the right-wing vote.
But others questioned whether he had the support in parliament to mount a serious challenge.
Goldman Sachs chief included in Nigeria's new cabinet.
The Independent
25 March 2010
By Daniel Howden
Editor's Note: One of the reasons the foreign countries backed Pres. Jonathan was because he was a relatively inexperienced politician who was unprepared for his sudden meteoric rise to the presidency. As a result of his inexperience, his is more likely to listen to advisors on issues he is less familiar with and will be more malleable by outside pressure points. Foreign countries and private investors hope to use this to their advantage and make the country more capitalist friendly, along with reducing corruption and increasing government transparency to help protect their investments. This influence is evident in his choices for the new Nigerian cabinet and the removal of the vast majority of Pres. Yar'Adua's cabinet, known for its corruption. The intrastate violence will be the wild card in the equation, as it will create insecurity and uncertainty in the oil sector in some areas of the country.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nigeria's acting president included some surprises in his new cabinet one week after sacking the entire Government in Africa's leading oil producer. Goodluck Jonathan included a newcomer from Goldman Sachs and promoted the junior oil minister in what was seen as an attempt to return to a reform agenda after months of drift and paralysis in the crisis-stricken nation.
Only nine former ministers look set to be reappointed, among them Odein Ajumogobia, previously junior oil minister, who looks likely to be promoted after his former boss Rilwanu Lukman was omitted.
The acting president moved to assert his authority over the fractious Government, which has been paralysed since November, as President Umaru Yar'Adua has been suffering from a mysterious illness and has not been seen in public. Mr Jonathan has had to struggle for control with a cabal surrounding the first lady, Turai Yar'Adua, amid fears that a political crisis could worsen sectarian violence and undermine efforts to extend a ceasefire in the oil-producing Niger Delta.
Mr Jonathan produced a list of 33 names for the Senate to consider, and his only obvious concession to the powerful northern block around Mr Yar'Adua was the naming of his nephew Murtala. Further names are expected to be announced to bring the Government back up to its full complement of 42 ministers. No portfolios have been announced. Senate approval is expected before Easter.
"All of this will be very closely watched by investors," Razia Khan, head of Africa research at Standard Chartered, told Reuters. "Appointments will be key to determining whether the aim is to kickstart reforms ... or whether this is just politics returning to centre stage," she said.
The power struggle between supporters of Mr Yar'Adua, a Muslim northerner and Mr Jonathan, a Christian southerner, has dangerously mirrored north-south sectarian tensions in the country itself. Yesterday's list of names was a reminder of the complexities of balancing interest groups across 36 states and numerous ethnic groups in Africa's most populous country.
In addition to the sop to the Yar'Adua clan, was the inclusion of Sanusi Daggash, a minister of planning in the administration of former president Olusegun Obasanjo – another kingmaker in the background of the power games in the capital, Abuja.
Early interest among analysts focused on the choice of Olusegun Aganga, a London-based managing director at Goldman Sachs. His inclusion appeared to signal the acting president's intent to move ahead with critical banking reforms and bring in new-blood to what was seen as Yar'Adua's failing administration.
The nomination of Mr Agang – who heads up Goldman Sachs' hedge fund consulting services in London – comes as Nigeria is set to test its strength with foreign investors with a planned $500m debut global bond.
The extended power vacuum has seen renewed violence in the Niger Delta where last week car bombs set off by the region's leading militant group MEND signalled the end of a fragile ceasefire. It has also come as sectarian violence in the central city of Jos has claimed the lives of at least 400 people in two bouts of mass killings this year. The central Plateau State has become an explosive fault line in the deeply divided country with Christian and Muslim groups caught in a spiral of violence.
The first head of state from the Niger Delta, Mr Jonathan has attracted strong support from the US and Europe, which are both heavily reliant on Nigerian oil.
With Russia and China stepping up their involvement in Nigeria's massive oil and gas reserves, there is cautious support for the former vice president and Washington has put behind-the-scenes pressure on key figures in the country's political elite to allow Mr Jonathan to govern for the next year ahead of polls, expected in 2011.
However, the ruling PDP Party has called on the acting president not to run in future elections, and he faces strong opposition from the majority of powerful state governors should he be tempted to try.
25 March 2010
By Daniel Howden
Editor's Note: One of the reasons the foreign countries backed Pres. Jonathan was because he was a relatively inexperienced politician who was unprepared for his sudden meteoric rise to the presidency. As a result of his inexperience, his is more likely to listen to advisors on issues he is less familiar with and will be more malleable by outside pressure points. Foreign countries and private investors hope to use this to their advantage and make the country more capitalist friendly, along with reducing corruption and increasing government transparency to help protect their investments. This influence is evident in his choices for the new Nigerian cabinet and the removal of the vast majority of Pres. Yar'Adua's cabinet, known for its corruption. The intrastate violence will be the wild card in the equation, as it will create insecurity and uncertainty in the oil sector in some areas of the country.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nigeria's acting president included some surprises in his new cabinet one week after sacking the entire Government in Africa's leading oil producer. Goodluck Jonathan included a newcomer from Goldman Sachs and promoted the junior oil minister in what was seen as an attempt to return to a reform agenda after months of drift and paralysis in the crisis-stricken nation.
Only nine former ministers look set to be reappointed, among them Odein Ajumogobia, previously junior oil minister, who looks likely to be promoted after his former boss Rilwanu Lukman was omitted.
The acting president moved to assert his authority over the fractious Government, which has been paralysed since November, as President Umaru Yar'Adua has been suffering from a mysterious illness and has not been seen in public. Mr Jonathan has had to struggle for control with a cabal surrounding the first lady, Turai Yar'Adua, amid fears that a political crisis could worsen sectarian violence and undermine efforts to extend a ceasefire in the oil-producing Niger Delta.
Mr Jonathan produced a list of 33 names for the Senate to consider, and his only obvious concession to the powerful northern block around Mr Yar'Adua was the naming of his nephew Murtala. Further names are expected to be announced to bring the Government back up to its full complement of 42 ministers. No portfolios have been announced. Senate approval is expected before Easter.
"All of this will be very closely watched by investors," Razia Khan, head of Africa research at Standard Chartered, told Reuters. "Appointments will be key to determining whether the aim is to kickstart reforms ... or whether this is just politics returning to centre stage," she said.
The power struggle between supporters of Mr Yar'Adua, a Muslim northerner and Mr Jonathan, a Christian southerner, has dangerously mirrored north-south sectarian tensions in the country itself. Yesterday's list of names was a reminder of the complexities of balancing interest groups across 36 states and numerous ethnic groups in Africa's most populous country.
In addition to the sop to the Yar'Adua clan, was the inclusion of Sanusi Daggash, a minister of planning in the administration of former president Olusegun Obasanjo – another kingmaker in the background of the power games in the capital, Abuja.
Early interest among analysts focused on the choice of Olusegun Aganga, a London-based managing director at Goldman Sachs. His inclusion appeared to signal the acting president's intent to move ahead with critical banking reforms and bring in new-blood to what was seen as Yar'Adua's failing administration.
The nomination of Mr Agang – who heads up Goldman Sachs' hedge fund consulting services in London – comes as Nigeria is set to test its strength with foreign investors with a planned $500m debut global bond.
The extended power vacuum has seen renewed violence in the Niger Delta where last week car bombs set off by the region's leading militant group MEND signalled the end of a fragile ceasefire. It has also come as sectarian violence in the central city of Jos has claimed the lives of at least 400 people in two bouts of mass killings this year. The central Plateau State has become an explosive fault line in the deeply divided country with Christian and Muslim groups caught in a spiral of violence.
The first head of state from the Niger Delta, Mr Jonathan has attracted strong support from the US and Europe, which are both heavily reliant on Nigerian oil.
With Russia and China stepping up their involvement in Nigeria's massive oil and gas reserves, there is cautious support for the former vice president and Washington has put behind-the-scenes pressure on key figures in the country's political elite to allow Mr Jonathan to govern for the next year ahead of polls, expected in 2011.
However, the ruling PDP Party has called on the acting president not to run in future elections, and he faces strong opposition from the majority of powerful state governors should he be tempted to try.
Secretary Michael Chertoff Joins BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors.
BAE Systems
Press Release
25 March 2010
The Honorable Michael Chertoff has joined the BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors. As a member of the Board, Secretary Chertoff will provide oversight and strategic counsel, further ensuring that BAE Systems, Inc. is well positioned to meet current and future customer requirements in the defense and security markets.
"We are delighted to have Secretary Chertoff join our Board," said General Tony Zinni (USMC ret.), Chairman of the BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors. "Secretary Chertoff is uniquely well positioned to support the Company as it continues to grow in the global security market. His years of experience in the security domain will be of tremendous value to our businesses as we help our government and private sector customers develop cyber security solutions, combat terrorism and organized crime, and strengthen border and transportation security."
"I am honored to be joining General Zinni and the other outstanding members of the Board in supporting BAE Systems, Inc.'s strategic efforts to address 21st century security challenges," Secretary Chertoff said.
Michael Chertoff served as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security from 2005 to 2009, where he led efforts to advance our cyber security and to block would-be terrorists from crossing U.S. borders, working closely with global allies. Previously, Secretary Chertoff served as a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third District.
Secretary Chertoff is a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School. From 1979-1980, he served as a clerk to Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, Jr.
Secretary Chertoff joins a distinguished group of outside directors of BAE Systems, Inc. They are:
-- General Anthony C. Zinni (USMC, ret.) Chairman of the Board Former Commander of U.S. Central Command
-- Chairman Lee H. Hamilton Former Member of Congress, Chairman of the House Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, and Co-Chair of the 9/11 Commission
-- Richard J. Kerr Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-- Lt. General Kenneth A. Minihan (USAF, ret.) Former Director National Security Agency
-- Admiral Robert Natter (USN, ret.) Former Commander of Fleet Forces & Atlantic Command
-- General J.H. Binford Peay, III (USA, ret.) Former Vice Chief of Staff U.S. Army and Commander of U.S. Central Command
-- Dr. William Schneider, Jr. Former Undersecretary of State for Security, Science & Technology
The company's Inside Directors are:
-- Ian King, Chief Executive, BAE Systems plc
-- George Rose, Group Finance Director, BAE Systems plc
The company's Officers/Directors are:
-- Linda Hudson, President and CEO, BAE Systems, Inc.
-- Sheila Cheston, Executive Vice President, BAE Systems, Inc.
-- Robert J. Fitch, Senior Vice President Government Relations, BAE Systems, Inc.
Press Release
25 March 2010
The Honorable Michael Chertoff has joined the BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors. As a member of the Board, Secretary Chertoff will provide oversight and strategic counsel, further ensuring that BAE Systems, Inc. is well positioned to meet current and future customer requirements in the defense and security markets.
"We are delighted to have Secretary Chertoff join our Board," said General Tony Zinni (USMC ret.), Chairman of the BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors. "Secretary Chertoff is uniquely well positioned to support the Company as it continues to grow in the global security market. His years of experience in the security domain will be of tremendous value to our businesses as we help our government and private sector customers develop cyber security solutions, combat terrorism and organized crime, and strengthen border and transportation security."
"I am honored to be joining General Zinni and the other outstanding members of the Board in supporting BAE Systems, Inc.'s strategic efforts to address 21st century security challenges," Secretary Chertoff said.
Michael Chertoff served as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security from 2005 to 2009, where he led efforts to advance our cyber security and to block would-be terrorists from crossing U.S. borders, working closely with global allies. Previously, Secretary Chertoff served as a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third District.
Secretary Chertoff is a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School. From 1979-1980, he served as a clerk to Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, Jr.
Secretary Chertoff joins a distinguished group of outside directors of BAE Systems, Inc. They are:
-- General Anthony C. Zinni (USMC, ret.) Chairman of the Board Former Commander of U.S. Central Command
-- Chairman Lee H. Hamilton Former Member of Congress, Chairman of the House Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, and Co-Chair of the 9/11 Commission
-- Richard J. Kerr Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-- Lt. General Kenneth A. Minihan (USAF, ret.) Former Director National Security Agency
-- Admiral Robert Natter (USN, ret.) Former Commander of Fleet Forces & Atlantic Command
-- General J.H. Binford Peay, III (USA, ret.) Former Vice Chief of Staff U.S. Army and Commander of U.S. Central Command
-- Dr. William Schneider, Jr. Former Undersecretary of State for Security, Science & Technology
The company's Inside Directors are:
-- Ian King, Chief Executive, BAE Systems plc
-- George Rose, Group Finance Director, BAE Systems plc
The company's Officers/Directors are:
-- Linda Hudson, President and CEO, BAE Systems, Inc.
-- Sheila Cheston, Executive Vice President, BAE Systems, Inc.
-- Robert J. Fitch, Senior Vice President Government Relations, BAE Systems, Inc.
NATO provides airlift support to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
NATO Allied Command Operations News
18 March 2010
In response to the African Union request for strategic airlift support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the USA has conducted airlift missions under the NATO banner in support of the Ugandan troop rotations.
The airlift, which commenced on 5 Mar 2010 and was completed on 16 Mar 2010, was undertaken by USA contracted DynCorps International, transporting 1700 Ugandan troops from Uganda into Mogadishu and re-deploying 850 Ugandan troops out of Mogadishu.
NATO began providing support to the African Union in May 2005. The NATO approach in Africa is based on the recognition of the African Union's desire to provide African solutions to African problems. As such, all assistance is based on specific requests from the African Union.
Part of this policy is the NATO standing agreement to provide Strategic sealift and airlift support for African Union Troop Contributing Countries willing to deploy to Somalia, recently extended by NATO until 31 January 2011. Besides NATO's significant airlift contributions to the AU mission in SUDAN (AMIS), before this last airlift request, the first and only support to AMISOM was given in June 2008 to transport a battalion of Burundian peacekeepers to Mogadishu.
SHAPE delegated the authority to Joint Command Lisbon to have the operational lead for NATO engagements with the African Union and they provide the majority of the personnel to support the mission.
18 March 2010
In response to the African Union request for strategic airlift support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the USA has conducted airlift missions under the NATO banner in support of the Ugandan troop rotations.
The airlift, which commenced on 5 Mar 2010 and was completed on 16 Mar 2010, was undertaken by USA contracted DynCorps International, transporting 1700 Ugandan troops from Uganda into Mogadishu and re-deploying 850 Ugandan troops out of Mogadishu.
NATO began providing support to the African Union in May 2005. The NATO approach in Africa is based on the recognition of the African Union's desire to provide African solutions to African problems. As such, all assistance is based on specific requests from the African Union.
Part of this policy is the NATO standing agreement to provide Strategic sealift and airlift support for African Union Troop Contributing Countries willing to deploy to Somalia, recently extended by NATO until 31 January 2011. Besides NATO's significant airlift contributions to the AU mission in SUDAN (AMIS), before this last airlift request, the first and only support to AMISOM was given in June 2008 to transport a battalion of Burundian peacekeepers to Mogadishu.
SHAPE delegated the authority to Joint Command Lisbon to have the operational lead for NATO engagements with the African Union and they provide the majority of the personnel to support the mission.
U.S. to Help Train Nigerian Police.
Daily Champion
By Malachy Uzendu
25 March 2010
United States (US) yesterday disclosed its intention to help train officers of the Nigerian Police on how to combat terrorism and other violent crimes.
The Ambassador of United States of America to Nigeria Ms. Robin Sander, disclosed this when she led five members of the U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom on a courtesy visit to the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Mr. Ogbonna Onovo.
Speaking on the occasion, she expressed the desire of her government to assist the Nigerian Police Force in the training of its personnel in community policing and combat training to contain civil disturbances experienced in certain parts of the country in recent times.
Sanders told the IGP that the US government was "ready to provide equipment/logistics as a way of supporting the Force in combating crime in Nigeria" .
Though she did not give details and the form the assistance would look like, she however said that her home governemnt was unhappy with the level of sensless killings in parts of the country, particularly the north, where she said Nigeria witnessed more violent crimes.
Expressing serious worry with the development, Sanders said she would personally do all within her capacity to bring in other forms of assitance to the police, stressing that effective policing remains one of the core ingredients of democracy.
In his response, Onovo expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for finding time to visit him in spite of her tight schedules.
Onovo, told the US envoy of the willingness of the Police and the country as a whole to collaborate with the US government in any area of training which is aimed at building the capacity of the officers and men of the Nigerian Police with a view to advancing proactive policing.
He said that with the deep interest shown by US in the areas of crime prevention and control, it will equally help to protect investments by US citizens in the country.
The London Metropolitan Police was the first to offer assistance to the Nigerian Police and had also trained some of its personnel in community Policing, though the policy seem not to be working in the country due to corruption in the force.
By Malachy Uzendu
25 March 2010
United States (US) yesterday disclosed its intention to help train officers of the Nigerian Police on how to combat terrorism and other violent crimes.
The Ambassador of United States of America to Nigeria Ms. Robin Sander, disclosed this when she led five members of the U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom on a courtesy visit to the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Mr. Ogbonna Onovo.
Speaking on the occasion, she expressed the desire of her government to assist the Nigerian Police Force in the training of its personnel in community policing and combat training to contain civil disturbances experienced in certain parts of the country in recent times.
Sanders told the IGP that the US government was "ready to provide equipment/logistics as a way of supporting the Force in combating crime in Nigeria" .
Though she did not give details and the form the assistance would look like, she however said that her home governemnt was unhappy with the level of sensless killings in parts of the country, particularly the north, where she said Nigeria witnessed more violent crimes.
Expressing serious worry with the development, Sanders said she would personally do all within her capacity to bring in other forms of assitance to the police, stressing that effective policing remains one of the core ingredients of democracy.
In his response, Onovo expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for finding time to visit him in spite of her tight schedules.
Onovo, told the US envoy of the willingness of the Police and the country as a whole to collaborate with the US government in any area of training which is aimed at building the capacity of the officers and men of the Nigerian Police with a view to advancing proactive policing.
He said that with the deep interest shown by US in the areas of crime prevention and control, it will equally help to protect investments by US citizens in the country.
The London Metropolitan Police was the first to offer assistance to the Nigerian Police and had also trained some of its personnel in community Policing, though the policy seem not to be working in the country due to corruption in the force.
Update from Rwanda - PS-Imberakuri Claim Dissapearances, Arbitrary Detentions, and Oppression.
World News Journal
25 March 2010
Editor's Note: The following update was sent to the World News Journal this morning from one of its Rwandan sources. The political situation inside Rwanda is rapidly deteriorating and is quite likely to degenerate further as the elections approach and beyond. Private investors would be wise to stay away from this country.
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The Social Party-IMBERAKURI, the only registred opposition party in Rwanda, continues to undergo all sort of intimidation and harassment. At the moment, party faces a peak period where Rwandese authorities(local authorities, police and army) have mobilized and issued death threats to party representatives and members. Many members have dissapeared, others have fled their homes and we cannot forget those who were dismissed from their jobs arbitarily and those who are currently in jail.
Names
Place of Residence:
District
Sector
Locality
1. P.S. Members Kidnapped by Police
Ngendahayo Celestin
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Shyirambere Dominique
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Issa
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Donatien
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Vedaste
gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
2. Members Disappeared
Nshimiyimana JMV
Rutsiro
Ruhango
Nyakarera
Sindayiheba P. Celestin
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
Sibomana Alphonse
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
Mpakaniye Denys
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
Bumviyiki Joseph
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
3. Members in Jail
Bazimaziki Donat
Karongi
Mubuga
Ndahimana Joseph
Karongi
Mubuga
Nshimiyimana Emmanuel
Karongi
Mubuga
Niragire Claude
Karongi
Mubuga
Hategekimana Faustin
Karongi
Mubuga
Nsabimana Innocent
Nyarugenge
Nyakabanda
4. Members dismissed from their Jobs
Nshimiyimana J.M.V
Rutsiro
Nyakarema
Mutarambirwa Teobald
Nyarugenge
Gitaga
Ndayisabye Venat
Nyamagabe
Munezero Olivier
Ruhango
25 March 2010
Editor's Note: The following update was sent to the World News Journal this morning from one of its Rwandan sources. The political situation inside Rwanda is rapidly deteriorating and is quite likely to degenerate further as the elections approach and beyond. Private investors would be wise to stay away from this country.
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The Social Party-IMBERAKURI, the only registred opposition party in Rwanda, continues to undergo all sort of intimidation and harassment. At the moment, party faces a peak period where Rwandese authorities(local authorities, police and army) have mobilized and issued death threats to party representatives and members. Many members have dissapeared, others have fled their homes and we cannot forget those who were dismissed from their jobs arbitarily and those who are currently in jail.
Names
Place of Residence:
District
Sector
Locality
1. P.S. Members Kidnapped by Police
Ngendahayo Celestin
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Shyirambere Dominique
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Issa
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Donatien
Gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
Vedaste
gasabo
Kimihurura
Rugando
2. Members Disappeared
Nshimiyimana JMV
Rutsiro
Ruhango
Nyakarera
Sindayiheba P. Celestin
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
Sibomana Alphonse
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
Mpakaniye Denys
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
Bumviyiki Joseph
Karongi
Mubuga
Ryaruhanga
3. Members in Jail
Bazimaziki Donat
Karongi
Mubuga
Ndahimana Joseph
Karongi
Mubuga
Nshimiyimana Emmanuel
Karongi
Mubuga
Niragire Claude
Karongi
Mubuga
Hategekimana Faustin
Karongi
Mubuga
Nsabimana Innocent
Nyarugenge
Nyakabanda
4. Members dismissed from their Jobs
Nshimiyimana J.M.V
Rutsiro
Nyakarema
Mutarambirwa Teobald
Nyarugenge
Gitaga
Ndayisabye Venat
Nyamagabe
Munezero Olivier
Ruhango
Uganda People's Congress (UPC) Cabinet List.
UGANDAN PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (UPC) NATIONAL LEADERSHIP TEAM
24TH MARCH 2010
PARTY PRESIDENT: OLARA A. OTUNNU
VICE PRESIDENT:
SECRETARY GENERAL: MR. JOSEPH BOSSA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL: MR. EMMANUEL O. OFUMBI
SPOKESPERSON:
DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON: MR. MOSES NUWAGABA
PARTY CHAIRMAN: MAJ. EDWARD RURANGARANGA
PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN: REV. FR. JACINTO OGWAL
REGIONAL VICE-CHAIRPERSONS
WESTNILE: HON. DR. MOSES TAKO APILIGA
NORTHERN: MR. JULIUS OCEN
EASTERN: MS. REBECCA EREEMYE
CENTRAL: MR. HENRY MAYEGA
MIDWESTERN: MR. MATIYA KISEMBO
SOUTH WESTERN: MR. NDIWA NDIKORA
REGIONAL MOBILIZATION COORDINATORS
WEST NILE:
NORTHERN: MR. PAUL OGWAL OLULE
EASTERN: MR. MICHAEL O. OSINDE
CENTRAL:
MID WESTERN: MR. JOHN MARY KATO
SOUTH WESTERN: MR. GIDEON TWINOMUGISHA
NATIONAL PARTY TREASURER: MR. PETER MUKIDI WALUBIRI
ASSISTANT NATIONAL TREASURER: MS. WINIFRED ADIO
LEADER OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY: DR. APOLLO EKIBO
NATIONAL WORKERS LEADER:
NATIONAL WOMEN LEADER: MRS. RUTH MASIKA
DEPUTY NATIONAL WOMEN LEADER:
WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
COORDINATOR: MRS. MARGARET ATENG OTIM
(MEMBERSHIP TO BE CONFIRMED….)
NATIONAL YOUTH LEADER: MS. CECILIA ANYAKOIT
DEPUTY NATIONAL YOUTH LEADER: MR. EMMANUEL RUKUNDO
YOUTH LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
COORDINATOR: MR. ROBERT KANUSU
(MEMBERSHIP TO BE CONFIRMED….)
THE UPC COUNCIL OF ELDERS
CHAIRMAN: JUSTICE GEORGE MASIKA
MR. SILVANO ESIAGI
MR. SAMWIRI MUGWISA
MRS. MARY TIBERONDWA
MR. ZABERIO BYABAGAMBE
MR. ANDREW NYOTE
MR. NASUR OGWANG
MAJ. EDWARD RURANGARANGA
MR. DICK NYAI
RT. REV. BISHOP CYPRIAN BAMWOZE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: HON. ROSS EUKU
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: MR. CHRIS OPOKA OKUMU
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: MR. PATRICK MWONDHA
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: HON. YONNASANI KANYOMOZI
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: MR. SOSPATER AKWENYU
PARTY SECRETARIAT
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY: MR. WAAGONDA
24TH MARCH 2010
PARTY PRESIDENT: OLARA A. OTUNNU
VICE PRESIDENT:
SECRETARY GENERAL: MR. JOSEPH BOSSA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL: MR. EMMANUEL O. OFUMBI
SPOKESPERSON:
DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON: MR. MOSES NUWAGABA
PARTY CHAIRMAN: MAJ. EDWARD RURANGARANGA
PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN: REV. FR. JACINTO OGWAL
REGIONAL VICE-CHAIRPERSONS
WESTNILE: HON. DR. MOSES TAKO APILIGA
NORTHERN: MR. JULIUS OCEN
EASTERN: MS. REBECCA EREEMYE
CENTRAL: MR. HENRY MAYEGA
MIDWESTERN: MR. MATIYA KISEMBO
SOUTH WESTERN: MR. NDIWA NDIKORA
REGIONAL MOBILIZATION COORDINATORS
WEST NILE:
NORTHERN: MR. PAUL OGWAL OLULE
EASTERN: MR. MICHAEL O. OSINDE
CENTRAL:
MID WESTERN: MR. JOHN MARY KATO
SOUTH WESTERN: MR. GIDEON TWINOMUGISHA
NATIONAL PARTY TREASURER: MR. PETER MUKIDI WALUBIRI
ASSISTANT NATIONAL TREASURER: MS. WINIFRED ADIO
LEADER OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY: DR. APOLLO EKIBO
NATIONAL WORKERS LEADER:
NATIONAL WOMEN LEADER: MRS. RUTH MASIKA
DEPUTY NATIONAL WOMEN LEADER:
WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
COORDINATOR: MRS. MARGARET ATENG OTIM
(MEMBERSHIP TO BE CONFIRMED….)
NATIONAL YOUTH LEADER: MS. CECILIA ANYAKOIT
DEPUTY NATIONAL YOUTH LEADER: MR. EMMANUEL RUKUNDO
YOUTH LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
COORDINATOR: MR. ROBERT KANUSU
(MEMBERSHIP TO BE CONFIRMED….)
THE UPC COUNCIL OF ELDERS
CHAIRMAN: JUSTICE GEORGE MASIKA
MR. SILVANO ESIAGI
MR. SAMWIRI MUGWISA
MRS. MARY TIBERONDWA
MR. ZABERIO BYABAGAMBE
MR. ANDREW NYOTE
MR. NASUR OGWANG
MAJ. EDWARD RURANGARANGA
MR. DICK NYAI
RT. REV. BISHOP CYPRIAN BAMWOZE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: HON. ROSS EUKU
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: MR. CHRIS OPOKA OKUMU
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: MR. PATRICK MWONDHA
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: HON. YONNASANI KANYOMOZI
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY: MR. SOSPATER AKWENYU
PARTY SECRETARIAT
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY: MR. WAAGONDA
24 March, 2010
Tullow Close to Agreeing Total, Cnooc Uganda Deal, WSJ Reports.
Bloomberg
19 March 2010
By John Duce
March 19 (Bloomberg) -- Tullow Oil Plc is close to agreeing the terms of a partnership with Cnooc Ltd. and Total SA to develop oil assets in Uganda, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing unnamed people familiar with the deal.
An agreement may be signed as early as today, the newspaper said. Any deal still needs government approval, the report said.
Tullow expects Cnooc and Total to each take a one-third share in its three oil blocks in the Lake Albert region if the Ugandan government approves the deal, Chief Operating Officer Paul McDade said on March 10.
Cnooc’s Beijing-based spokesman Jiang Yongzhi declined to comment on the report.
19 March 2010
By John Duce
March 19 (Bloomberg) -- Tullow Oil Plc is close to agreeing the terms of a partnership with Cnooc Ltd. and Total SA to develop oil assets in Uganda, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing unnamed people familiar with the deal.
An agreement may be signed as early as today, the newspaper said. Any deal still needs government approval, the report said.
Tullow expects Cnooc and Total to each take a one-third share in its three oil blocks in the Lake Albert region if the Ugandan government approves the deal, Chief Operating Officer Paul McDade said on March 10.
Cnooc’s Beijing-based spokesman Jiang Yongzhi declined to comment on the report.
Congo miners, buyers launch tin tracing scheme.
Reuters
19 March 2010
By Katrina Manson
KINSHASA (Reuters) - Firms that dig tin in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, merchants and ends users have launched a monitoring scheme to show armed groups are not profiting from mines, an industry body said on Friday.
The trade in tin ore and tantalum found in Congo's violent east helps finance rebel groups that have attacked civilians, according to a United Nations report last year.
Mining is one of the principal sources of income and jobs in eastern Congo, but bad publicity surrounding so-called "conflict minerals" prompted Belgian metals merchant Traxys and tin smelter Thaisarco to stop buying material from the area last year.
Miners, trading firms and end users, including consumer electronics makers such as Apple, IBM and Sony, want to be able to prove the material they use does not come from mines controlled by rebel groups.
The scheme "will begin to track minerals and provide verifiable provenance information from individual mine sites in eastern DRC; something that has not been possible up to now," tin industry federation ITRI said in a statement.
Lobby group Global Witness says "mafia-style extortion rackets" still cover some of the most lucrative tin and tantalum mining areas in the east, following a visit earlier this month.
"Any scheme that does not include on-the-ground investigation on a regular basis, looking at the routes the minerals take as well as the mines is meaningless," Annie Dunnebacke at Global Witness told Reuters by telephone.
It said companies in Congo and neighbouring Rwanda are still buying goods directly from militarised mines, and which trade through armed checkpoints.
"Information about who controls which mine site is common knowledge in the trading towns of eastern Congo," said Global Witness earlier this month. "Companies buying minerals from militarised areas have no excuse for claiming ignorance."
The U.N. and OECD are trying to find ways to ensure minerals mined in eastern Congo do not fund armed groups. Both are due to report around October.
"If we can find a way to collect information along the trading route we will, but spot checks are not practical," said Kay Nimmo, manager for regulatory affairs at ITRI.
"We're not going to go off into the jungle and ask the army what they are doing."
19 March 2010
By Katrina Manson
KINSHASA (Reuters) - Firms that dig tin in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, merchants and ends users have launched a monitoring scheme to show armed groups are not profiting from mines, an industry body said on Friday.
The trade in tin ore and tantalum found in Congo's violent east helps finance rebel groups that have attacked civilians, according to a United Nations report last year.
Mining is one of the principal sources of income and jobs in eastern Congo, but bad publicity surrounding so-called "conflict minerals" prompted Belgian metals merchant Traxys and tin smelter Thaisarco to stop buying material from the area last year.
Miners, trading firms and end users, including consumer electronics makers such as Apple, IBM and Sony, want to be able to prove the material they use does not come from mines controlled by rebel groups.
The scheme "will begin to track minerals and provide verifiable provenance information from individual mine sites in eastern DRC; something that has not been possible up to now," tin industry federation ITRI said in a statement.
Lobby group Global Witness says "mafia-style extortion rackets" still cover some of the most lucrative tin and tantalum mining areas in the east, following a visit earlier this month.
"Any scheme that does not include on-the-ground investigation on a regular basis, looking at the routes the minerals take as well as the mines is meaningless," Annie Dunnebacke at Global Witness told Reuters by telephone.
It said companies in Congo and neighbouring Rwanda are still buying goods directly from militarised mines, and which trade through armed checkpoints.
"Information about who controls which mine site is common knowledge in the trading towns of eastern Congo," said Global Witness earlier this month. "Companies buying minerals from militarised areas have no excuse for claiming ignorance."
The U.N. and OECD are trying to find ways to ensure minerals mined in eastern Congo do not fund armed groups. Both are due to report around October.
"If we can find a way to collect information along the trading route we will, but spot checks are not practical," said Kay Nimmo, manager for regulatory affairs at ITRI.
"We're not going to go off into the jungle and ask the army what they are doing."
US oil firm Anadarko signs exploration deal in Kenya.
Upsteam Online
8 February 2010
Anadarko Petroleum has reportedly signed an oil and gas exploration agreement for five offshore blocks in the Kenya's Lamu Basin. A report said that Anadarko and the government had signed a deal for blocks L5, L7, L11A, L11B and L12.
"Anadarko is set to start its work programme," the report quoted Hudson Andambi, senior superintending geologist at the Ministry of Energy, as saying.
While east Africa's biggest economy has yet to strike oil or gas, the government is confident and a recent oil discovery in Uganda raised hopes Kenya might yield similar reserves. Neighbouring Tanzania also has natural gas deposits, some of which are already being used to generate electricity and to power industries.
Among other countries where Anadarko is present on the continent are Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Algeria and Ghana.
8 February 2010
Anadarko Petroleum has reportedly signed an oil and gas exploration agreement for five offshore blocks in the Kenya's Lamu Basin. A report said that Anadarko and the government had signed a deal for blocks L5, L7, L11A, L11B and L12.
"Anadarko is set to start its work programme," the report quoted Hudson Andambi, senior superintending geologist at the Ministry of Energy, as saying.
While east Africa's biggest economy has yet to strike oil or gas, the government is confident and a recent oil discovery in Uganda raised hopes Kenya might yield similar reserves. Neighbouring Tanzania also has natural gas deposits, some of which are already being used to generate electricity and to power industries.
Among other countries where Anadarko is present on the continent are Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Algeria and Ghana.
Indonesia to import 600,000 barrels of oil from Sudan.
Rigzone
8 February 2010
Indonesian state-owned oil company Pertamina said it had obtained a permit from the trade minister to import 600,000 barrels of "Nile Blend" crude from Sudan.
Oil production in Indonesia has decreased steadily during the last decade, owing to disappointing exploration efforts and declining production at Indonesia's large, mature oil fields. In 2008, Sudan exported the majority of its oil to China (214,000 bpd) followed by Japan (102,000 bpd) and Indonesia (43,000 bpd). Additional importers of Sudanese crude include India, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia.
Pertamina vice president director Omar S. Anwar told Indonesian House Commission VII, dealing with people's welfare, the trade minister had already issued a letter to allow the import of several kinds of fuel oils and crude including the Sudanese Nile Blend.
"We have received a permit from the trade minister," he said. Omer said the tender for the import of Nile Blend carried out by its subsidiary, Petral, in November 2009 fordelivery in January 2010 had been done according to correct procedures.
Sudanese state oil firm Sudapet, in a tender in January for February-loading Nile Blend, sold a 1 mm-barrel cargo to European trader Arcadia and a 600,000-barrel cargo to Glencore at a discount of between $ 1.10 and $ 1.20 a barrel to Minas Indonesia Crude Price (ICP). As many as 32 companies mostly international took part in the process of the Nile Blend procurement, he said.
"The result is four companies have given the best offer," he said.
The best bidders are BP, Trafigura, Sietco and Gold Manor. Of the four bidders, Gold Manor is the one that offers the lowest price, he said. He said Nile Blend is also used in China and Japan. Omar denied that the Nile Blend import had once been withheld in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan.
"There is no problem with imports. Unloading in Balikpapan was already carried out on January 16, 2010," he said.
8 February 2010
Indonesian state-owned oil company Pertamina said it had obtained a permit from the trade minister to import 600,000 barrels of "Nile Blend" crude from Sudan.
Oil production in Indonesia has decreased steadily during the last decade, owing to disappointing exploration efforts and declining production at Indonesia's large, mature oil fields. In 2008, Sudan exported the majority of its oil to China (214,000 bpd) followed by Japan (102,000 bpd) and Indonesia (43,000 bpd). Additional importers of Sudanese crude include India, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia.
Pertamina vice president director Omar S. Anwar told Indonesian House Commission VII, dealing with people's welfare, the trade minister had already issued a letter to allow the import of several kinds of fuel oils and crude including the Sudanese Nile Blend.
"We have received a permit from the trade minister," he said. Omer said the tender for the import of Nile Blend carried out by its subsidiary, Petral, in November 2009 fordelivery in January 2010 had been done according to correct procedures.
Sudanese state oil firm Sudapet, in a tender in January for February-loading Nile Blend, sold a 1 mm-barrel cargo to European trader Arcadia and a 600,000-barrel cargo to Glencore at a discount of between $ 1.10 and $ 1.20 a barrel to Minas Indonesia Crude Price (ICP). As many as 32 companies mostly international took part in the process of the Nile Blend procurement, he said.
"The result is four companies have given the best offer," he said.
The best bidders are BP, Trafigura, Sietco and Gold Manor. Of the four bidders, Gold Manor is the one that offers the lowest price, he said. He said Nile Blend is also used in China and Japan. Omar denied that the Nile Blend import had once been withheld in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan.
"There is no problem with imports. Unloading in Balikpapan was already carried out on January 16, 2010," he said.
MoU signed for Trans-Oriental Gas Pipeline.
Pipelines International
3 February 2010
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Trans-Oriental Gas Pipeline (TOGP) has been signed between Distinct Objective Sdn Bhd (DOSB), Asia Consortium Petroleum Engineering and Gas, Messrs Enmac Sekutu, China's Panyu Chu Kong Steel Pipe Co and Dongah Tec of Korea.
Under the agreement, approximately 4,000 km of subsea natural gas pipeline, extending from Malaysia to South Korea, will be constructed.
DOSB will build a 2,500 km section of pipeline running from offshore Pahang, Malaysia to North Vietnam. Meanwhile, Asia Consortium Engineering Petroleum and Gas will be responsible for the construction of the remaining 1,500 km pipeline section, linking China to the South Korean coast.
"We hope to finalise the financial requirements soon as discussions with investors from countries like South Korea, China, Indonesia and Japan are progressing well," said DOSB President and Chief Executive Officer Shaharuddin Abdul Manan.
The project is expected to take five years to complete, with commissioning planned for late 2015.
3 February 2010
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Trans-Oriental Gas Pipeline (TOGP) has been signed between Distinct Objective Sdn Bhd (DOSB), Asia Consortium Petroleum Engineering and Gas, Messrs Enmac Sekutu, China's Panyu Chu Kong Steel Pipe Co and Dongah Tec of Korea.
Under the agreement, approximately 4,000 km of subsea natural gas pipeline, extending from Malaysia to South Korea, will be constructed.
DOSB will build a 2,500 km section of pipeline running from offshore Pahang, Malaysia to North Vietnam. Meanwhile, Asia Consortium Engineering Petroleum and Gas will be responsible for the construction of the remaining 1,500 km pipeline section, linking China to the South Korean coast.
"We hope to finalise the financial requirements soon as discussions with investors from countries like South Korea, China, Indonesia and Japan are progressing well," said DOSB President and Chief Executive Officer Shaharuddin Abdul Manan.
The project is expected to take five years to complete, with commissioning planned for late 2015.
Témoignage de Charles Onana sur le cas Mushayidi (Testimony by Charles Onana on the case of Mushayidi).
Qui arrêtera le cartel du crime qui sévit aujourd’hui à Kigali ? Qui mettra un terme au calvaire sanglant des Tutsi, des Hutu et des Congolais ? Qui rendra justice aux Français, aux Espagnols et aux Canadiens tombés sous les missiles et les balles des tueurs qui ont pris, par la force, le pouvoir en 1994 au Rwanda ?
Pour l’instant, le silence règne. Peut-être aussi un certain malaise ! Face à l’escalade meurtrière du pouvoir rwandais, face aux fuites en cascade de militaires et de diplomates rwandais à l’étranger, face aux multiples persécutions d’opposants politiques, face aux arrestations arbitraires de citoyens rwandais dans leurs pays comme à l’étranger, les puissances occidentales qui soutiennent le régime de Kigali font profil bas. Pourtant, la vie de nombreux Rwandais est, à l’intérieur comme l’extérieur, plus que jamais menacée. Peu importe qu’ils soient Hutu ou Tutsi. Depuis l’époque des partis uniques, l’Afrique n’a pas connu une dictature aussi féroce et un pouvoir aussi cruel. Une situation intenable et forcément insupportable pour toutes les victimes de la tragédie de 1994 au Rwanda.
Mon ami et confrère Déo Mushayidi est une de ces victimes. Hier, il était membre du Front Patriotique rwandais (FPR). Aujourd’hui, il est victime du régime-FPR. Hier c’était des extrémistes hutu qui exécutaient les membres de sa famille, aujourd’hui ce sont les extrémistes tutsi au pouvoir qui s’apprêtent à l’assassiner. Devant la gravité de la situation, je ne pouvais pas rester les bras croisés. Si je réagis à travers ce texte, c’est pour soutenir mon ami kidnappé et envoyé au peloton d’exécution.
Voici deux semaines que Déo Mushayidi a été arrêté en Burundi avant d’être déporté à Kigali, la nouvelle capitale africaine du crime autorisé. Je n’ai pas voulu réagir dans la précipitation. Je voulais savoir ce qu’il avait fait et ce qu’on lui reprochait exactement. Après quelques jours d’attente, le régime du chef de l’Etat rwandais, Paul Kagame, a craché son venin en accusant Déo Mushayidi d’avoir porté ‘‘atteinte à la sûreté de l'Etat". Cette accusation lui a été signifiée lors de sa première comparution devant un juge à Kigali. Puis, l’accusation a enflé avec d’autres chefs d'inculpation : "trouble à l’ordre public, usage de faux, association avec un groupe terroriste, révisionnisme du génocide (contre les Tutsis) et divisionnisme". Une victime tutsi comme Déo Mushayidi ne pouvait attendre moins des porte-paroles autoproclamés des Tutsi. Ce sont ces imposteurs qui gouvernement désormais les collines du Rwanda.
Dans quelles circonstances Déo Mushayidi a-t-il été arrêté ? Qui a pris la décision de l’envoyer à Kigali ? En vertu de quelle convention internationale a-t-il été remis aux autorités rwandaises ou plus exactement à Paul Kagame ?
Le moins qu’on puisse dire est que rien n’est clair dans cette affaire. Mais, la décision très politique d’envoyer Déo Mushayidi au Rwanda est une incitation au meurtre d’opposants rwandais en exil. Cette initiative met particulièrement en danger tous les Tutsi qui refusent de se soumettre à l’autoritarisme sanglant de Paul Kagame.
Mon ami Mushayidi est en effet devenu un opposant au régime de Paul Kagame après avoir milité dans son parti au début des années 90 en Suisse. Jusqu’en 1994, avant la prise de pouvoir de Paul Kagame, il représentait le FPR à Genève. Dès son arrivée à Kigali, il fut parmi les premiers et rares Tutsi à comprendre ce qu’était réellement le nouveau régime de Paul Kagame.
C’est en 1999 à Washington que j’ai rencontré pour la première fois Déo Mushayidi. Prudent, mesuré et critique, Déo est un journaliste professionnel et un esprit ouvert. Il dirigeait un journal à Kigali et présidait l’association des journalistes rwandais.
Un soir, dans ma chambre d’hôtel à Washington, Déo Mushayidi me mit en garde contre l’image que les médias occidentaux donnaient de Paul Kagame et de son régime. Il le connaissait bien pour avoir travaillé avec lui et pour l’avoir vu agir. J’étais déjà en train d’enquêter sur le rôle de Paul Kagame dans l’attentat du 6 avril 1994 contre l’avion de l’ancien président rwandais, Juvenal Habyarimana. Attentat dans lequel le président burundais, Cyprien Ntaryamira, et l’ensemble de l’équipage français avaient trouvé la mort. Déo Mushayidi avait accepté de collaborer à cette enquête malgré les risques très importants qu’il encourait à Kigali. Au cours d’un dîner aux Etats-Unis, il m’a longuement parlé des crimes commis par les rebelles tutsi lors de la prise de Kigali et les multiples assassinats des Hutu en 1995, 1996 et 1997. Il m’avait également fait état du projet d’assassinat de l’ancien président du parlement rwandais, Joseph Sebarenzi, un Tutsi qui luttait contre le régime de l’arbitraire au sein du parlement rwandais. « Kagame, m’avait-il dit, voulait assassiner Sebarenzi. Car, il craignait que le président du parlement, très respecté, lui fasse de l’ombre ». Joseph Sebarenzi a fui le Rwanda et s’est exilé aux Etats-Unis.
Deo Mushayidi m’avait parlé d’autres projets d’assassinats visant aussi d’autres personnalités tutsi comme le journaliste Jean Pierre Mugabe, réfugié lui aussi aux Etats-Unis, avec qui j’avais beaucoup échangé sur le dossier de l’attentat et sur les méthodes violentes de Paul Kagame. Déo Mushayidi m’avait également entretenu des menaces d’assassinat qui pesaient sur lui. Il était calme mais préoccupé. Nous étions restés en contact et j’avais essayé de l’encourager comme je le pouvais. Le climat dans ce pays était exécrable et il l’est resté.
L’année suivante, au mois de mars 2000, mon téléphone sonne. C’est Déo Mushayidi qui m’appelle de l’ambassade de France à Kigali. D’une voix calme mais anxieuse, il me dit qu’il est en danger de mort. « Ne t’inquiète pas, ajoute-t-il, un ami français a pris des dispositions pour m’évacuer en Europe. Je lui ai donné ton numéro de téléphone au cas où j’aurais besoin de quelque chose. Dès que j’arrive en Europe, je t’appelle, conclut-il ». J’étais en effet rassuré de savoir que mon ami se trouvait dans les locaux de l’ambassade de France. C’était, à ce moment-là, l’endroit le plus fiable pour sa sécurité. Les jours suivants ont été difficiles car je ne savais pas si Déo Mushayidi allait réussir à quitter Kigali sans entrave. Mais, une semaine plus tard, je reçus un autre coup de téléphone. C’était à nouveau lui au bout du fil. Il était enfin arrivé en Europe et se trouvait loin des sbires de Paul Kagame. J’étais ravi de savoir que mon ami était hors de danger.
Si je raconte cet épisode aujourd’hui, c’est parce que j’ai l’impression que mon ami a été livré à ceux qui ont voulu l’assassiner en 2000. Tous ces efforts pour le sortir de Kigali ont- ils été vains ? Ce fonctionnaire français qui a sauvé Déo du gang de la mort peut-il être entendu par Monsieur Bernard Kouchner, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, et Monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy qui apprécient tant Paul Kagame? Pour ma part, je remercie ce Français d’avoir prolongé la vie de Déo Mushayidi et de lui avoir permis de lutter pendant dix ans pour la vérité et la justice dans son pays. Lors du procès que Paul Kagame avait intenté contre moi à Paris en 2002 à la sortie de notre livre sur l’attentat du 6 avril 1994, Déo Mushayidi était venu me soutenir. Il m’a toujours soutenu face aux multiples attaques dont j’ai été l’objet pour avoir osé mettre en lumière les crimes de Kagame contre les Hutu, les Tutsi et les Congolais. Quand il s’est réfugié en 2000 en Belgique, il a quitté le journalisme pour continuer son combat en politique. Il a continué à prôner l’équité et la justice pour toutes les victimes rwandaises de 1994 (Hutu et Tutsi confondus). Il a publié en 2008, avec l’ancien ministre de la Défense rwandais, le général Emmanuel Habyarimana, ancien collaborateur de Paul Kagame en exil en Suisse, un mémorandum adressé aux Conseil de Sécurité. Ce document très bien informé met en cause Paul Kagame, dans le pillage des ressources en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), dans l’attentat contre le président Juvenal Habyarimana ainsi dans de nombreux autres crimes. Déo Mushayidi a toujours milité pour la paix et la réconciliation entre Rwandais. Une démarche que désapprouve totalement l’actuel gouvernement du Rwanda.
Hier, les Hutu étaient accusés par Paul Kagame d’avoir « planifié un génocide » contre les Tutsi. Aujourd’hui, mon ami Tutsi est accusé par le même régime de Paul Kagame de terrorisme et de négationnisme du « génocide tutsi ». Pourtant, Déo Mushayidi n’a jamais tenu de Kalachnikov comme Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais fait abattre un avion de présidents comme l’a fait Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais tué ses collaborateurs comme l’a fait Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais fait tuer ni Hutu ni Tutsi comme l’a fait Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais prôné le séparatisme entre Rwandais comme le fait Paul Kagame. Il n’a jamais envahi la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) et massacré des millions de Congolais comme l’a fait et continue de le faire l’armée de Paul Kagame. Il n’a jamais pillé la RDC comme Paul Kagame le fait depuis bientôt treize ans. C’est pourtant Déo Mushayidi qui est désormais sur le banc des accusés, que dis-je, dans le couloir de la mort à Kigali. Et j’observe avec curiosité mais espoir, l’enthousiasme pondéré des médias internationaux à parler du sort réservé à Déo Mushayidi. Je suis étonné du silence pesant de la Belgique, pays qui avait accueilli mon ami et qui lui avait accordé l’asile politique. Je regarde, pensif, les gestes étriqués des organisations des droits de l’Homme promptes à harceler, sur ordre de Paul Kagame, de prétendus « génocidaires hutu ». Prennent-ils peut-être mon ami Tutsi pour un pauvre Hutu qui mérite, comme l’ancien président hutu du FPR, Pasteur Bizimungu, de disparaître en prison, pour préserver cette bande de criminels au pouvoir à Kigali ? Voient-ils aussi en Mushayidi un « génocidaire » ou un « divisionniste » et un « révisionniste » ? Puisque le régime dit qu’il est « terroriste » et tout cela à la fois, peut-être qu’il existe encore quelques écervelés pour le croire. En réalité, mon ami paye pour sa collaboration à mon enquête sur l’attentat du 6 avril 1994, pour son implication dans le travail d’investigation qui a abouti au mémorandum de 2008 et pour ses prises de positions publiques, en tant que victime tutsi et ancien membre du FPR, contre le régime de Kagame. Les charges de la dictature militaire rwandaise contre Déo Mushayidi relèvent de la construction et de l’arbitraire.
Devant le consensus mou de l’Union Européenne, principal pourvoyeur de fonds publics au régime autocratique et répressif de Kigali, je voudrais encore croire, pour ma part, que mon ami ne restera pas très longtemps ou pour toujours entre les mains du gang de la mort qui règne désormais sur le Rwanda et sur la RDCongo.
par Charles Onana
Auteur de:
- Les Secrets du génocide rwandais publié en 2002 aux éditions Duboiris avec la collaboration de Déo Mushayidi.
- Les secrets de la justice internationale, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2005
- Ces tueurs tutsi au cœur de la tragédie congolaise, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2009
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Who will stop the criminal cartel that is currently running wild in
Kigali? Who will bring an end to the grisly martyrdom of the Tutsi,
Hutu and Congolese? Who will find justice for the French, Spanish and
Canadians felled by the bullets and missiles of the assassins who
seized state power in Rwanda by force of arms in 1994?
For the moment, all is silence. Maybe an uncomfortable silence—but
silence nonetheless! Faced with the growing murderousness of the
Rwandan authorities, faced with the torrent of Rwandan soldiers and
diplomats fleeing into other countries, faced with ever more
persecutions of political opponents, faced with arbitrary arrests of
Rwandan citizens at home and abroad: the Western powers that support
the Kigali regime are keeping their heads down. Yet the lives of many
Rwandans, inside and outside the country, are now being threatened
more than ever—regardless of whether they are Tutsi or Hutu. Not since
the days of the one-party states has Africa experienced such a savage
and ruthless dictatorship as the one in Kigali today. This
unsustainable situation is unbearable for the victims of the Rwandan
tragedy of 1994.
My friend and colleague Déo Mushayidi is one such victim. In the past,
he was a member of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Today, he is the
RPF’s prey. Before, it was the ‘Extremist Hutu’ who slaughtered his
family; today, it is the ruling Tutsi Extremists who are plotting his
death. Given the gravity of the situation, I cannot just sit on my
hands. By writing this now, I mean to support my friend, who has been
kidnapped and is about to face a firing squad.
Two weeks ago Déo Mushayidi was arrested in Burundi and transported
to Kigali, Africa’s new capital of state-sanctioned crime. I did not
react right away. I wanted to know exactly what he had done and what
he was being accused of. After several days, the Kagame regime spat
out its venom, accusing Déo Mushayidi of “endangering state security.”
This was the charge made against him at his first appearance before a
Kigali judge. Then, the indictment metastasized with other charges:
“disturbing the peace, forgery, associating with a terrorist group,
genocide revisionism and divisionism.” Déo Mushayidi, a Tutsi victim,
should not have expected less from these self-appointed spokespeople
for the Tutsi. The Rwandan hills are alive with such mountebanks.
What were the circumstances of Déo Mushayidi’s arrest? Who handed down
the order to send him to Kigali? Under what international convention
was he handed over to Rwandan authorities, or—more exactly—to Paul
Kagame?
The minimum that can be said is that nothing is clear in this case.
But the highly political decision to send Déo Mushayidi to Rwanda is
very much a call by the current Kigali regime for the murder of exiled
Rwandan political opponents. This initiative placed in particular
jeopardy all those Tutsi who refuse to submit to the bloody
authoritarianism of President Paul Kagame.
After actively campaigning for the RPF in Switzerland during the
1990s, my friend Mushayidi indeed became an opponent of the Kagame
regime. Until 1994, before Kagame and the RPF had seized state power,
Mushayidi was the Front’s representative in Geneva. Upon his arrival
in Kigali, he was one of the first Tutsi to understand the reality of
this new Rwandan government.
I first met Déo Mushayidi in Washington, DC, in 1999. Careful,
measured and critical, he is a professional journalist and an open-
minded individual. At the time, he was running a newspaper in Kigali
and chairing the Rwandan Journalists Association.
One evening in my Washington hotel room, Déo Mushayidi warned me
against the image of Paul Kagame and his regime being presented in the
Western media. He knew a lot about this since he had worked with
Kagame and seen just what he was capable of. I was in the midst of my
investigation of Kagame’s role in the terrorist attack of 6 April 1994
against the plane of the sitting Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana
—an international crime against the peace in which the Burundian
President, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and the entire French (civilian) flight
crew were also killed. Déo Mushayidi had agreed to cooperate in my
investigation despite the great risks he’d be running in Kigali. In
the course of a dinner in the US he told me at length about the crimes
committed by the Tutsi ‘rebels’ during their taking of Kigali and the
mass killings of Hutu in 1995, 1996, and 1997. He had also reported on
a plan to murder the former president of the Rwandan parliament,
Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tutsi, who fought against the arbitrariness of the
Rwandan legislature. “Kagame told me he wanted Sebarenzi dead. Because
he feared that the speaker of the parliament, widely respected, would
overshadow him.” Joseph Sebarenzi fled Rwanda and is now in exile in
the United States.
Déo Mushayidi told me of other schemes to murder members of the
opposition, like the Tutsi journalist Jean Pierre Mugabe, another
refugee in the US today, with whom I had discussed a great deal
concerning the history of the terrorist attack of 6 April and the
violent methods favored by Paul Kagame. Déo also spoke to me of
assassination threats against him. He was calm but concerned. We have
stayed in touch, and I have tried to encourage him as much as I can.
The atmosphere in this country was ghastly and remains so.
One day the following year, in March 2000, my phone rang. It was Déo
calling from the French Embassy in Kigali. With a steady but anxious
voice, he said he was in danger. “Do not worry,” he assured. “A French
friend has made arrangements to get me to Europe. I gave him your
number in case I need something. As soon as I arrive in Europe, I’ll
call you,” he concluded. I was indeed reassured to know my friend was
in the French Embassy. It was, at that time, the safest place for him.
The following days were difficult because I did not know if Déo
Mushayidi would be able to get out of Kigali unmolested. But a week
later I received another call. It was Déo again. He had finally
arrived in Europe and was far from Kagame’s henchmen. I was delighted
that my friend was out of danger.
I tell this story today because I think my friend has been delivered
into the hands of those who tried to murder him in 2000. Were all
these efforts to get him out of Kigali in vain? Could the French
official who saved Déo from his executioners get the ear of French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, or President Nicolas Sarkozy, both
of whom are well known to be very fond of Paul Kagame? For my part, I
thank the French for prolonging Déo Mushayidi’s life and allowing him
to fight for Truth and Justice in his country for another ten years.
During my 2002 trial in Paris on charges brought against me by Paul
Kagame for our book on the terrorist attack of 6 April 1994, Déo
Mushayidi came out to support me. He has always supported me against
the many attacks of which I was the object for having dared to shine a
light on the crimes Kagame committed against the Hutu, Tutsi and
Congolese. When he became a refugee in Belgium in 2000, he got out of
journalism to be able to continue his political struggles. He still
advocates for fairness and justice to all victims of the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide (Hutu and Tutsi, alike). In 2008 he joined with former
Rwandan Defense Minister, General Emmanuel Habyarimana, once a
collaborator of Paul Kagame’s now living in exile in Switzerland, to
publish a memorandum that was sent to the UN Security Council. That
memo was extensively documented (including many highly classified
documents) and explained Paul Kagame’s involvement in the plundering
of resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in the
terrorist assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana, and many
other crimes. Déo Mushayidi has always advocated for peace and
reconciliation among Rwandans—an approach the current government of
Rwanda completely rejects.
In the past, Paul Kagame accused the Hutu of having “planned a
genocide” against the Tutsi. Now, the same Kagame regime accuses my
Tutsi friend of terrorism and denial of the “Tutsi genocide.” However,
Déo Mushayidi has never carried a Kalashnikov as has Paul Kagame, he’s
never shot down a president’s plane as has Paul Kagame, he’s never
killed his own staff as has Paul Kagame, he’s never killed either Hutu
or Tutsi as has Paul Kagame, he’s never advocated discrimination
against Rwandan citizens as does Paul Kagame. He’s never invaded the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and butchered millions of Congolese
as Paul Kagame’s military continues to do. He’s never plundered the
DRC as Paul Kagame has for the last nearly thirteen years. Yet, it is
Déo Mushayidi who is now in the dock—or should I say, on death row—in
Kigali.
And I was struck with a curious hopefulness by the singular lack of
enthusiasm shown by the international media in reporting the case of
Déo Mushayidi. I’m especially surprised by the pall of silence hanging
over Belgium, the country that welcomed my friend and gave him
political asylum. And it was thought-provoking to see how little was
made of his case by the Human Rights community, which is usually very
quick to execute the orders of the Kagame regime by going after so-
called ‘Hutu Genocidaires.’ Are they, perhaps, confusing my Tutsi
friend with some poor Hutu who deserves to disappear behind jailhouse
walls, as did former Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, in order to
protect the criminal syndicate currently in power in Kigali? Do they
also see Déo Mushayidi as a ‘genocidaire’ or a ‘divisionist’ and a
‘revisionist’? Since the regime said he was all those things and a
‘terrorist’ to boot, maybe there are still some brain-donors out there
who believe it. The reality is that my friend is paying for his
involvement in my investigation of the terrorist attack on 6 April
1994, for his investigative work that led to the memorandum of 2008,
and for his public positions as a Tutsi victim and a former member of
the RPF working against the Kagame regime. The charges by the Rwandan
military dictatorship against Déo Mushayidi are simply arbitrary and
capricious fabrications.
Given the weak consensus within the European Union, the principal
contributor of public funds to the repressive autocracy in Kigali, I
would like to think that my friend will not remain for long in the
hands of Africa’s Murder Inc., which is currently ravaging Rwanda and
the DRC.
Charles Onana
Author of:
- The Secrets of the Rwandan Genocide, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2002
(in collaboration with Déo Mushayidi)
- The Secrets of International Justice, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2005
- The Tutsi Killers at the Heart of the Congolese Tragedy, Paris,
Editions Duboiris, 2009
Pour l’instant, le silence règne. Peut-être aussi un certain malaise ! Face à l’escalade meurtrière du pouvoir rwandais, face aux fuites en cascade de militaires et de diplomates rwandais à l’étranger, face aux multiples persécutions d’opposants politiques, face aux arrestations arbitraires de citoyens rwandais dans leurs pays comme à l’étranger, les puissances occidentales qui soutiennent le régime de Kigali font profil bas. Pourtant, la vie de nombreux Rwandais est, à l’intérieur comme l’extérieur, plus que jamais menacée. Peu importe qu’ils soient Hutu ou Tutsi. Depuis l’époque des partis uniques, l’Afrique n’a pas connu une dictature aussi féroce et un pouvoir aussi cruel. Une situation intenable et forcément insupportable pour toutes les victimes de la tragédie de 1994 au Rwanda.
Mon ami et confrère Déo Mushayidi est une de ces victimes. Hier, il était membre du Front Patriotique rwandais (FPR). Aujourd’hui, il est victime du régime-FPR. Hier c’était des extrémistes hutu qui exécutaient les membres de sa famille, aujourd’hui ce sont les extrémistes tutsi au pouvoir qui s’apprêtent à l’assassiner. Devant la gravité de la situation, je ne pouvais pas rester les bras croisés. Si je réagis à travers ce texte, c’est pour soutenir mon ami kidnappé et envoyé au peloton d’exécution.
Voici deux semaines que Déo Mushayidi a été arrêté en Burundi avant d’être déporté à Kigali, la nouvelle capitale africaine du crime autorisé. Je n’ai pas voulu réagir dans la précipitation. Je voulais savoir ce qu’il avait fait et ce qu’on lui reprochait exactement. Après quelques jours d’attente, le régime du chef de l’Etat rwandais, Paul Kagame, a craché son venin en accusant Déo Mushayidi d’avoir porté ‘‘atteinte à la sûreté de l'Etat". Cette accusation lui a été signifiée lors de sa première comparution devant un juge à Kigali. Puis, l’accusation a enflé avec d’autres chefs d'inculpation : "trouble à l’ordre public, usage de faux, association avec un groupe terroriste, révisionnisme du génocide (contre les Tutsis) et divisionnisme". Une victime tutsi comme Déo Mushayidi ne pouvait attendre moins des porte-paroles autoproclamés des Tutsi. Ce sont ces imposteurs qui gouvernement désormais les collines du Rwanda.
Dans quelles circonstances Déo Mushayidi a-t-il été arrêté ? Qui a pris la décision de l’envoyer à Kigali ? En vertu de quelle convention internationale a-t-il été remis aux autorités rwandaises ou plus exactement à Paul Kagame ?
Le moins qu’on puisse dire est que rien n’est clair dans cette affaire. Mais, la décision très politique d’envoyer Déo Mushayidi au Rwanda est une incitation au meurtre d’opposants rwandais en exil. Cette initiative met particulièrement en danger tous les Tutsi qui refusent de se soumettre à l’autoritarisme sanglant de Paul Kagame.
Mon ami Mushayidi est en effet devenu un opposant au régime de Paul Kagame après avoir milité dans son parti au début des années 90 en Suisse. Jusqu’en 1994, avant la prise de pouvoir de Paul Kagame, il représentait le FPR à Genève. Dès son arrivée à Kigali, il fut parmi les premiers et rares Tutsi à comprendre ce qu’était réellement le nouveau régime de Paul Kagame.
C’est en 1999 à Washington que j’ai rencontré pour la première fois Déo Mushayidi. Prudent, mesuré et critique, Déo est un journaliste professionnel et un esprit ouvert. Il dirigeait un journal à Kigali et présidait l’association des journalistes rwandais.
Un soir, dans ma chambre d’hôtel à Washington, Déo Mushayidi me mit en garde contre l’image que les médias occidentaux donnaient de Paul Kagame et de son régime. Il le connaissait bien pour avoir travaillé avec lui et pour l’avoir vu agir. J’étais déjà en train d’enquêter sur le rôle de Paul Kagame dans l’attentat du 6 avril 1994 contre l’avion de l’ancien président rwandais, Juvenal Habyarimana. Attentat dans lequel le président burundais, Cyprien Ntaryamira, et l’ensemble de l’équipage français avaient trouvé la mort. Déo Mushayidi avait accepté de collaborer à cette enquête malgré les risques très importants qu’il encourait à Kigali. Au cours d’un dîner aux Etats-Unis, il m’a longuement parlé des crimes commis par les rebelles tutsi lors de la prise de Kigali et les multiples assassinats des Hutu en 1995, 1996 et 1997. Il m’avait également fait état du projet d’assassinat de l’ancien président du parlement rwandais, Joseph Sebarenzi, un Tutsi qui luttait contre le régime de l’arbitraire au sein du parlement rwandais. « Kagame, m’avait-il dit, voulait assassiner Sebarenzi. Car, il craignait que le président du parlement, très respecté, lui fasse de l’ombre ». Joseph Sebarenzi a fui le Rwanda et s’est exilé aux Etats-Unis.
Deo Mushayidi m’avait parlé d’autres projets d’assassinats visant aussi d’autres personnalités tutsi comme le journaliste Jean Pierre Mugabe, réfugié lui aussi aux Etats-Unis, avec qui j’avais beaucoup échangé sur le dossier de l’attentat et sur les méthodes violentes de Paul Kagame. Déo Mushayidi m’avait également entretenu des menaces d’assassinat qui pesaient sur lui. Il était calme mais préoccupé. Nous étions restés en contact et j’avais essayé de l’encourager comme je le pouvais. Le climat dans ce pays était exécrable et il l’est resté.
L’année suivante, au mois de mars 2000, mon téléphone sonne. C’est Déo Mushayidi qui m’appelle de l’ambassade de France à Kigali. D’une voix calme mais anxieuse, il me dit qu’il est en danger de mort. « Ne t’inquiète pas, ajoute-t-il, un ami français a pris des dispositions pour m’évacuer en Europe. Je lui ai donné ton numéro de téléphone au cas où j’aurais besoin de quelque chose. Dès que j’arrive en Europe, je t’appelle, conclut-il ». J’étais en effet rassuré de savoir que mon ami se trouvait dans les locaux de l’ambassade de France. C’était, à ce moment-là, l’endroit le plus fiable pour sa sécurité. Les jours suivants ont été difficiles car je ne savais pas si Déo Mushayidi allait réussir à quitter Kigali sans entrave. Mais, une semaine plus tard, je reçus un autre coup de téléphone. C’était à nouveau lui au bout du fil. Il était enfin arrivé en Europe et se trouvait loin des sbires de Paul Kagame. J’étais ravi de savoir que mon ami était hors de danger.
Si je raconte cet épisode aujourd’hui, c’est parce que j’ai l’impression que mon ami a été livré à ceux qui ont voulu l’assassiner en 2000. Tous ces efforts pour le sortir de Kigali ont- ils été vains ? Ce fonctionnaire français qui a sauvé Déo du gang de la mort peut-il être entendu par Monsieur Bernard Kouchner, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, et Monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy qui apprécient tant Paul Kagame? Pour ma part, je remercie ce Français d’avoir prolongé la vie de Déo Mushayidi et de lui avoir permis de lutter pendant dix ans pour la vérité et la justice dans son pays. Lors du procès que Paul Kagame avait intenté contre moi à Paris en 2002 à la sortie de notre livre sur l’attentat du 6 avril 1994, Déo Mushayidi était venu me soutenir. Il m’a toujours soutenu face aux multiples attaques dont j’ai été l’objet pour avoir osé mettre en lumière les crimes de Kagame contre les Hutu, les Tutsi et les Congolais. Quand il s’est réfugié en 2000 en Belgique, il a quitté le journalisme pour continuer son combat en politique. Il a continué à prôner l’équité et la justice pour toutes les victimes rwandaises de 1994 (Hutu et Tutsi confondus). Il a publié en 2008, avec l’ancien ministre de la Défense rwandais, le général Emmanuel Habyarimana, ancien collaborateur de Paul Kagame en exil en Suisse, un mémorandum adressé aux Conseil de Sécurité. Ce document très bien informé met en cause Paul Kagame, dans le pillage des ressources en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), dans l’attentat contre le président Juvenal Habyarimana ainsi dans de nombreux autres crimes. Déo Mushayidi a toujours milité pour la paix et la réconciliation entre Rwandais. Une démarche que désapprouve totalement l’actuel gouvernement du Rwanda.
Hier, les Hutu étaient accusés par Paul Kagame d’avoir « planifié un génocide » contre les Tutsi. Aujourd’hui, mon ami Tutsi est accusé par le même régime de Paul Kagame de terrorisme et de négationnisme du « génocide tutsi ». Pourtant, Déo Mushayidi n’a jamais tenu de Kalachnikov comme Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais fait abattre un avion de présidents comme l’a fait Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais tué ses collaborateurs comme l’a fait Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais fait tuer ni Hutu ni Tutsi comme l’a fait Paul Kagame, il n’a jamais prôné le séparatisme entre Rwandais comme le fait Paul Kagame. Il n’a jamais envahi la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) et massacré des millions de Congolais comme l’a fait et continue de le faire l’armée de Paul Kagame. Il n’a jamais pillé la RDC comme Paul Kagame le fait depuis bientôt treize ans. C’est pourtant Déo Mushayidi qui est désormais sur le banc des accusés, que dis-je, dans le couloir de la mort à Kigali. Et j’observe avec curiosité mais espoir, l’enthousiasme pondéré des médias internationaux à parler du sort réservé à Déo Mushayidi. Je suis étonné du silence pesant de la Belgique, pays qui avait accueilli mon ami et qui lui avait accordé l’asile politique. Je regarde, pensif, les gestes étriqués des organisations des droits de l’Homme promptes à harceler, sur ordre de Paul Kagame, de prétendus « génocidaires hutu ». Prennent-ils peut-être mon ami Tutsi pour un pauvre Hutu qui mérite, comme l’ancien président hutu du FPR, Pasteur Bizimungu, de disparaître en prison, pour préserver cette bande de criminels au pouvoir à Kigali ? Voient-ils aussi en Mushayidi un « génocidaire » ou un « divisionniste » et un « révisionniste » ? Puisque le régime dit qu’il est « terroriste » et tout cela à la fois, peut-être qu’il existe encore quelques écervelés pour le croire. En réalité, mon ami paye pour sa collaboration à mon enquête sur l’attentat du 6 avril 1994, pour son implication dans le travail d’investigation qui a abouti au mémorandum de 2008 et pour ses prises de positions publiques, en tant que victime tutsi et ancien membre du FPR, contre le régime de Kagame. Les charges de la dictature militaire rwandaise contre Déo Mushayidi relèvent de la construction et de l’arbitraire.
Devant le consensus mou de l’Union Européenne, principal pourvoyeur de fonds publics au régime autocratique et répressif de Kigali, je voudrais encore croire, pour ma part, que mon ami ne restera pas très longtemps ou pour toujours entre les mains du gang de la mort qui règne désormais sur le Rwanda et sur la RDCongo.
par Charles Onana
Auteur de:
- Les Secrets du génocide rwandais publié en 2002 aux éditions Duboiris avec la collaboration de Déo Mushayidi.
- Les secrets de la justice internationale, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2005
- Ces tueurs tutsi au cœur de la tragédie congolaise, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2009
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Who will stop the criminal cartel that is currently running wild in
Kigali? Who will bring an end to the grisly martyrdom of the Tutsi,
Hutu and Congolese? Who will find justice for the French, Spanish and
Canadians felled by the bullets and missiles of the assassins who
seized state power in Rwanda by force of arms in 1994?
For the moment, all is silence. Maybe an uncomfortable silence—but
silence nonetheless! Faced with the growing murderousness of the
Rwandan authorities, faced with the torrent of Rwandan soldiers and
diplomats fleeing into other countries, faced with ever more
persecutions of political opponents, faced with arbitrary arrests of
Rwandan citizens at home and abroad: the Western powers that support
the Kigali regime are keeping their heads down. Yet the lives of many
Rwandans, inside and outside the country, are now being threatened
more than ever—regardless of whether they are Tutsi or Hutu. Not since
the days of the one-party states has Africa experienced such a savage
and ruthless dictatorship as the one in Kigali today. This
unsustainable situation is unbearable for the victims of the Rwandan
tragedy of 1994.
My friend and colleague Déo Mushayidi is one such victim. In the past,
he was a member of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Today, he is the
RPF’s prey. Before, it was the ‘Extremist Hutu’ who slaughtered his
family; today, it is the ruling Tutsi Extremists who are plotting his
death. Given the gravity of the situation, I cannot just sit on my
hands. By writing this now, I mean to support my friend, who has been
kidnapped and is about to face a firing squad.
Two weeks ago Déo Mushayidi was arrested in Burundi and transported
to Kigali, Africa’s new capital of state-sanctioned crime. I did not
react right away. I wanted to know exactly what he had done and what
he was being accused of. After several days, the Kagame regime spat
out its venom, accusing Déo Mushayidi of “endangering state security.”
This was the charge made against him at his first appearance before a
Kigali judge. Then, the indictment metastasized with other charges:
“disturbing the peace, forgery, associating with a terrorist group,
genocide revisionism and divisionism.” Déo Mushayidi, a Tutsi victim,
should not have expected less from these self-appointed spokespeople
for the Tutsi. The Rwandan hills are alive with such mountebanks.
What were the circumstances of Déo Mushayidi’s arrest? Who handed down
the order to send him to Kigali? Under what international convention
was he handed over to Rwandan authorities, or—more exactly—to Paul
Kagame?
The minimum that can be said is that nothing is clear in this case.
But the highly political decision to send Déo Mushayidi to Rwanda is
very much a call by the current Kigali regime for the murder of exiled
Rwandan political opponents. This initiative placed in particular
jeopardy all those Tutsi who refuse to submit to the bloody
authoritarianism of President Paul Kagame.
After actively campaigning for the RPF in Switzerland during the
1990s, my friend Mushayidi indeed became an opponent of the Kagame
regime. Until 1994, before Kagame and the RPF had seized state power,
Mushayidi was the Front’s representative in Geneva. Upon his arrival
in Kigali, he was one of the first Tutsi to understand the reality of
this new Rwandan government.
I first met Déo Mushayidi in Washington, DC, in 1999. Careful,
measured and critical, he is a professional journalist and an open-
minded individual. At the time, he was running a newspaper in Kigali
and chairing the Rwandan Journalists Association.
One evening in my Washington hotel room, Déo Mushayidi warned me
against the image of Paul Kagame and his regime being presented in the
Western media. He knew a lot about this since he had worked with
Kagame and seen just what he was capable of. I was in the midst of my
investigation of Kagame’s role in the terrorist attack of 6 April 1994
against the plane of the sitting Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana
—an international crime against the peace in which the Burundian
President, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and the entire French (civilian) flight
crew were also killed. Déo Mushayidi had agreed to cooperate in my
investigation despite the great risks he’d be running in Kigali. In
the course of a dinner in the US he told me at length about the crimes
committed by the Tutsi ‘rebels’ during their taking of Kigali and the
mass killings of Hutu in 1995, 1996, and 1997. He had also reported on
a plan to murder the former president of the Rwandan parliament,
Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tutsi, who fought against the arbitrariness of the
Rwandan legislature. “Kagame told me he wanted Sebarenzi dead. Because
he feared that the speaker of the parliament, widely respected, would
overshadow him.” Joseph Sebarenzi fled Rwanda and is now in exile in
the United States.
Déo Mushayidi told me of other schemes to murder members of the
opposition, like the Tutsi journalist Jean Pierre Mugabe, another
refugee in the US today, with whom I had discussed a great deal
concerning the history of the terrorist attack of 6 April and the
violent methods favored by Paul Kagame. Déo also spoke to me of
assassination threats against him. He was calm but concerned. We have
stayed in touch, and I have tried to encourage him as much as I can.
The atmosphere in this country was ghastly and remains so.
One day the following year, in March 2000, my phone rang. It was Déo
calling from the French Embassy in Kigali. With a steady but anxious
voice, he said he was in danger. “Do not worry,” he assured. “A French
friend has made arrangements to get me to Europe. I gave him your
number in case I need something. As soon as I arrive in Europe, I’ll
call you,” he concluded. I was indeed reassured to know my friend was
in the French Embassy. It was, at that time, the safest place for him.
The following days were difficult because I did not know if Déo
Mushayidi would be able to get out of Kigali unmolested. But a week
later I received another call. It was Déo again. He had finally
arrived in Europe and was far from Kagame’s henchmen. I was delighted
that my friend was out of danger.
I tell this story today because I think my friend has been delivered
into the hands of those who tried to murder him in 2000. Were all
these efforts to get him out of Kigali in vain? Could the French
official who saved Déo from his executioners get the ear of French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, or President Nicolas Sarkozy, both
of whom are well known to be very fond of Paul Kagame? For my part, I
thank the French for prolonging Déo Mushayidi’s life and allowing him
to fight for Truth and Justice in his country for another ten years.
During my 2002 trial in Paris on charges brought against me by Paul
Kagame for our book on the terrorist attack of 6 April 1994, Déo
Mushayidi came out to support me. He has always supported me against
the many attacks of which I was the object for having dared to shine a
light on the crimes Kagame committed against the Hutu, Tutsi and
Congolese. When he became a refugee in Belgium in 2000, he got out of
journalism to be able to continue his political struggles. He still
advocates for fairness and justice to all victims of the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide (Hutu and Tutsi, alike). In 2008 he joined with former
Rwandan Defense Minister, General Emmanuel Habyarimana, once a
collaborator of Paul Kagame’s now living in exile in Switzerland, to
publish a memorandum that was sent to the UN Security Council. That
memo was extensively documented (including many highly classified
documents) and explained Paul Kagame’s involvement in the plundering
of resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in the
terrorist assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana, and many
other crimes. Déo Mushayidi has always advocated for peace and
reconciliation among Rwandans—an approach the current government of
Rwanda completely rejects.
In the past, Paul Kagame accused the Hutu of having “planned a
genocide” against the Tutsi. Now, the same Kagame regime accuses my
Tutsi friend of terrorism and denial of the “Tutsi genocide.” However,
Déo Mushayidi has never carried a Kalashnikov as has Paul Kagame, he’s
never shot down a president’s plane as has Paul Kagame, he’s never
killed his own staff as has Paul Kagame, he’s never killed either Hutu
or Tutsi as has Paul Kagame, he’s never advocated discrimination
against Rwandan citizens as does Paul Kagame. He’s never invaded the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and butchered millions of Congolese
as Paul Kagame’s military continues to do. He’s never plundered the
DRC as Paul Kagame has for the last nearly thirteen years. Yet, it is
Déo Mushayidi who is now in the dock—or should I say, on death row—in
Kigali.
And I was struck with a curious hopefulness by the singular lack of
enthusiasm shown by the international media in reporting the case of
Déo Mushayidi. I’m especially surprised by the pall of silence hanging
over Belgium, the country that welcomed my friend and gave him
political asylum. And it was thought-provoking to see how little was
made of his case by the Human Rights community, which is usually very
quick to execute the orders of the Kagame regime by going after so-
called ‘Hutu Genocidaires.’ Are they, perhaps, confusing my Tutsi
friend with some poor Hutu who deserves to disappear behind jailhouse
walls, as did former Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, in order to
protect the criminal syndicate currently in power in Kigali? Do they
also see Déo Mushayidi as a ‘genocidaire’ or a ‘divisionist’ and a
‘revisionist’? Since the regime said he was all those things and a
‘terrorist’ to boot, maybe there are still some brain-donors out there
who believe it. The reality is that my friend is paying for his
involvement in my investigation of the terrorist attack on 6 April
1994, for his investigative work that led to the memorandum of 2008,
and for his public positions as a Tutsi victim and a former member of
the RPF working against the Kagame regime. The charges by the Rwandan
military dictatorship against Déo Mushayidi are simply arbitrary and
capricious fabrications.
Given the weak consensus within the European Union, the principal
contributor of public funds to the repressive autocracy in Kigali, I
would like to think that my friend will not remain for long in the
hands of Africa’s Murder Inc., which is currently ravaging Rwanda and
the DRC.
Charles Onana
Author of:
- The Secrets of the Rwandan Genocide, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2002
(in collaboration with Déo Mushayidi)
- The Secrets of International Justice, Paris, Editions Duboiris, 2005
- The Tutsi Killers at the Heart of the Congolese Tragedy, Paris,
Editions Duboiris, 2009
U.S. Military Contractors Swarm into Africa.
AllGov
24 March 2010
By Noel Brinkerhoff
With the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, the U.S. government decided to make security a key foreign policy objective for a continent that has long been plagued by civil war and other conflicts. But AFRICOM has no U.S. Army divisions or Marine Corps battalions supporting it. Instead, the U.S. is relying on private military contractors (PMCs) to provide logistical help and military training to African armies.
The State Department is reportedly spending nearly $100 million a year on PMCs to train local forces through its African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. One of the companies hired is DynCorp International, which has performed work for the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. DynCorp could be paid as much as $20 million over two years for work in Liberia alone, providing operations and maintenance support at Edward B. Kesselly Barracks and Camp Ware.
A previous contract awarded to DynCorp was for recruiting and training Liberia’s infantry. Other companies hired to work in the country include PAE Government Services (a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin) and Protection Strategies Inc., with each receiving contracts valued at $375 million.
Former Halliburton subsidiary KBR Inc. was contracted to support three military bases in Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia used by the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
Northrop Grumman was awarded a $75 million deal to train 40,000 African peacekeepers over five years.
And MPRI, a division of L-3 Communications, has been paid by the State Department to train militaries in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal. The company also provided assistance to South Africa’s military.
24 March 2010
By Noel Brinkerhoff
With the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, the U.S. government decided to make security a key foreign policy objective for a continent that has long been plagued by civil war and other conflicts. But AFRICOM has no U.S. Army divisions or Marine Corps battalions supporting it. Instead, the U.S. is relying on private military contractors (PMCs) to provide logistical help and military training to African armies.
The State Department is reportedly spending nearly $100 million a year on PMCs to train local forces through its African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. One of the companies hired is DynCorp International, which has performed work for the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. DynCorp could be paid as much as $20 million over two years for work in Liberia alone, providing operations and maintenance support at Edward B. Kesselly Barracks and Camp Ware.
A previous contract awarded to DynCorp was for recruiting and training Liberia’s infantry. Other companies hired to work in the country include PAE Government Services (a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin) and Protection Strategies Inc., with each receiving contracts valued at $375 million.
Former Halliburton subsidiary KBR Inc. was contracted to support three military bases in Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia used by the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
Northrop Grumman was awarded a $75 million deal to train 40,000 African peacekeepers over five years.
And MPRI, a division of L-3 Communications, has been paid by the State Department to train militaries in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal. The company also provided assistance to South Africa’s military.
NATO wants “one state entity” from Bosnia.
RNP
23 March 2010
The head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussenm, Tuesday urged all parties in Bosnia to curb nationalist rhetoric and ensure the deeply divided country functions as one state if they want to join the military alliance.
“We urge all parties to stop nationalistic rhetoric and make sure that Bosnia-Herzegovina is kept as a state,” the NATO secretary-general told journalists during a visit to Bosnia.
“NATO attaches strong importance to having a functioning state, one state entity, that acts decisively,” he added.
Rasmussen said NATO’s door was open to Sarajevo and “a membership action plan would be a very important step for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s future membership of NATO”.
The visiting NATO delegation discussed with Bosnian authorities the importance of political reforms including “a review of the electoral law so that it respects minority rights,” he said.
Other issues were “a resolution of the problems as regards defense property, destruction of surplus ammunition and the decision on the deployment of an extra ISAF [International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan] contingent.”
“NATO stands ready to help Bosnia-Herzegovina along the road to NATO but you must do the walk,” he said.
Since the 1992-1995 war, Bosnia consists of two semi-independent entities–the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbs’ Republika Srpska. Conflict among the different ethnic groups often blocks decision making in the country.
The prospect of membership of NATO and the European Union has been a powerful force for reform in the volatile Balkans, where conflict raged for much of the 1990s.
Albania and Croatia became NATO members in April 2009, while Montenegro joined the membership action plan in December.
23 March 2010
The head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussenm, Tuesday urged all parties in Bosnia to curb nationalist rhetoric and ensure the deeply divided country functions as one state if they want to join the military alliance.
“We urge all parties to stop nationalistic rhetoric and make sure that Bosnia-Herzegovina is kept as a state,” the NATO secretary-general told journalists during a visit to Bosnia.
“NATO attaches strong importance to having a functioning state, one state entity, that acts decisively,” he added.
Rasmussen said NATO’s door was open to Sarajevo and “a membership action plan would be a very important step for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s future membership of NATO”.
The visiting NATO delegation discussed with Bosnian authorities the importance of political reforms including “a review of the electoral law so that it respects minority rights,” he said.
Other issues were “a resolution of the problems as regards defense property, destruction of surplus ammunition and the decision on the deployment of an extra ISAF [International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan] contingent.”
“NATO stands ready to help Bosnia-Herzegovina along the road to NATO but you must do the walk,” he said.
Since the 1992-1995 war, Bosnia consists of two semi-independent entities–the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbs’ Republika Srpska. Conflict among the different ethnic groups often blocks decision making in the country.
The prospect of membership of NATO and the European Union has been a powerful force for reform in the volatile Balkans, where conflict raged for much of the 1990s.
Albania and Croatia became NATO members in April 2009, while Montenegro joined the membership action plan in December.
L’ITRI poursuit le projet de traçabilité de la cassitérite provenant de la RDC.
Media Congo
24 March 2010
L'organisation des principaux producteurs et fonderies de l'étain (ITRI), s'est dit prêt à débuter la seconde phase d'essai pilote au sujet de la traçabilité de l'étain provenant des mines de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC).
La plus haute autorité mondiale dans le domaine de l'étain " va commencer à établir une traçabilité du minerai et va fournir des informations vérifiables concernant leur provenance depuis le site d'exploitation par des creuseurs dans l'Est de la RDC, ce qui n'était pas possible jusqu'à présent ", a- t- elle déclaré.
L'année dernière, Traxys SA et Amalgamated Metals Plc, les deux plus grands clients d'étain de la RDC (plus communément appelé cassitérite), avaient cessé d'en acquérir suite aux rapports des Nations Unies et de l'ONG britannique de défense des droit de l'Homme " Global Witness ", qui démontraient comment ce commerce participaient au financement des groupes armés. Ces ventes illicites d'étain et d'autres minerais ont contribué aux conflits dans l'Est de la RD Congo faisant des millions de morts depuis le milieu des années 1990.
Le Projet de traçabilité d'ITRI est à sa deuxième des trois phases visant à certifier l'origine de provenance de la cassitérite extraite des mines de la RDC qui consiste à développer une meilleure connaissance de la chaine de distribution.
Selon Mme Kay Nimmo, directrice du développement durable et des questions réglementaires d'ITRI , le programme pilote coûtera environ $ 600.000, dont la moitié proviendra des utilisateurs finaux de la " Coalition Industrielle Citoyenne de l'Electronique (EICC en sigle) ", qui est code de conduite international adopté par les plus grandes marques d'électronique du monde (Motorola Inc., Intel Corp. et Apple Inc., Konica Minolta), avec leurs fournisseurs et ayant comme objectif d'améliorer les conditions dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement des produits électroniques.
D'autres fonds proviendront des firmes comme Traxys et Corus (unité européenne du groupe " Tata Steel Ltd."), et un prélèvement sur deux fonderies d'étain : la " Malaysia Smelting Corp. Bhd " et la " Thailand Smelting & Refining Ltd."
Le Congo est le plus grand pays producteur d'étain de l'Afrique. Rien que pour l'année 2008, l'ITRI a estimé la production d'étain en provenance de cette région à 15.500 T, ce qui représente environ 6 % de la production minière mondiale.
Source originale: Bloomberg
Par Michael J. Kavanagh
Plus d'infos:
http://www.itri.co.uk/SITE/UPLOAD/Document/Sustainability/Ref%2009-09%20%20iTSCi%20kinshasa%20-FINAL-fr.pdf
http://www.itri.co.uk/POOLED/ARTICLES/BF_PARTART/VIEW.ASP?Q=BF_PARTART_310250
24 March 2010
L'organisation des principaux producteurs et fonderies de l'étain (ITRI), s'est dit prêt à débuter la seconde phase d'essai pilote au sujet de la traçabilité de l'étain provenant des mines de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC).
La plus haute autorité mondiale dans le domaine de l'étain " va commencer à établir une traçabilité du minerai et va fournir des informations vérifiables concernant leur provenance depuis le site d'exploitation par des creuseurs dans l'Est de la RDC, ce qui n'était pas possible jusqu'à présent ", a- t- elle déclaré.
L'année dernière, Traxys SA et Amalgamated Metals Plc, les deux plus grands clients d'étain de la RDC (plus communément appelé cassitérite), avaient cessé d'en acquérir suite aux rapports des Nations Unies et de l'ONG britannique de défense des droit de l'Homme " Global Witness ", qui démontraient comment ce commerce participaient au financement des groupes armés. Ces ventes illicites d'étain et d'autres minerais ont contribué aux conflits dans l'Est de la RD Congo faisant des millions de morts depuis le milieu des années 1990.
Le Projet de traçabilité d'ITRI est à sa deuxième des trois phases visant à certifier l'origine de provenance de la cassitérite extraite des mines de la RDC qui consiste à développer une meilleure connaissance de la chaine de distribution.
Selon Mme Kay Nimmo, directrice du développement durable et des questions réglementaires d'ITRI , le programme pilote coûtera environ $ 600.000, dont la moitié proviendra des utilisateurs finaux de la " Coalition Industrielle Citoyenne de l'Electronique (EICC en sigle) ", qui est code de conduite international adopté par les plus grandes marques d'électronique du monde (Motorola Inc., Intel Corp. et Apple Inc., Konica Minolta), avec leurs fournisseurs et ayant comme objectif d'améliorer les conditions dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement des produits électroniques.
D'autres fonds proviendront des firmes comme Traxys et Corus (unité européenne du groupe " Tata Steel Ltd."), et un prélèvement sur deux fonderies d'étain : la " Malaysia Smelting Corp. Bhd " et la " Thailand Smelting & Refining Ltd."
Le Congo est le plus grand pays producteur d'étain de l'Afrique. Rien que pour l'année 2008, l'ITRI a estimé la production d'étain en provenance de cette région à 15.500 T, ce qui représente environ 6 % de la production minière mondiale.
Source originale: Bloomberg
Par Michael J. Kavanagh
Plus d'infos:
http://www.itri.co.uk/SITE/UPLOAD/Document/Sustainability/Ref%2009-09%20%20iTSCi%20kinshasa%20-FINAL-fr.pdf
http://www.itri.co.uk/POOLED/ARTICLES/BF_PARTART/VIEW.ASP?Q=BF_PARTART_310250
Burundi's army in crisis - Defense Minister.
SAPA
24 March 2010
Burundi's army is in a state of crisis that could "plunge the country into the abyss" two months ahead of a marathon round of elections, the country's defence minister has warned.
"Something unusual is happening. Since I started my career in the army 34 years ago we have never had a crisis that lasted as long as this one, even as the country is going through a crucially-important period," General Germain Niyoyankana said late on Tuesday.
"If this crisis lasts it could plunge the country into the abyss," Niyoyankana told journalists.
The minister was speaking on the day of the start of the court martial in Bujumbura of 18 soldiers arrested in January and charged with "military plotting" and "destabilising the country's institutions".
The trial comes in a context of persistent unease in the ranks of the army and the police.
Since December 2009, at least six junior officers have been arrested and eight other soldiers dismissed from the army, suspected of being behind tracts calling on soldiers to revolt.
In February a soldier was killed in a shoot-out in a military camp in Bujumbura.
In late November tracts distributed in several provinces by junior officers, soldiers and policemen accused their superiors of favouritism towards the officer class, syphoning off part of their salary and of expelling soldiers' widows from military camps.
The defence minister called on "all Burundi's political parties, the ruling party and those who support the opposition to show a sense of responsibility".
"For the past several months we've been seeing clashes between youth groups affiliated to these parties. It should stop," the general said.
"Burundi has crucial elections coming up ... I'm sounding the alarm bell because ... this youth group agitation can be a source of insecurity that can have long-term consequences no one can control," he warned.
24 March 2010
Burundi's army is in a state of crisis that could "plunge the country into the abyss" two months ahead of a marathon round of elections, the country's defence minister has warned.
"Something unusual is happening. Since I started my career in the army 34 years ago we have never had a crisis that lasted as long as this one, even as the country is going through a crucially-important period," General Germain Niyoyankana said late on Tuesday.
"If this crisis lasts it could plunge the country into the abyss," Niyoyankana told journalists.
The minister was speaking on the day of the start of the court martial in Bujumbura of 18 soldiers arrested in January and charged with "military plotting" and "destabilising the country's institutions".
The trial comes in a context of persistent unease in the ranks of the army and the police.
Since December 2009, at least six junior officers have been arrested and eight other soldiers dismissed from the army, suspected of being behind tracts calling on soldiers to revolt.
In February a soldier was killed in a shoot-out in a military camp in Bujumbura.
In late November tracts distributed in several provinces by junior officers, soldiers and policemen accused their superiors of favouritism towards the officer class, syphoning off part of their salary and of expelling soldiers' widows from military camps.
The defence minister called on "all Burundi's political parties, the ruling party and those who support the opposition to show a sense of responsibility".
"For the past several months we've been seeing clashes between youth groups affiliated to these parties. It should stop," the general said.
"Burundi has crucial elections coming up ... I'm sounding the alarm bell because ... this youth group agitation can be a source of insecurity that can have long-term consequences no one can control," he warned.
Rwandan Green Party meets with the Ministry of Local Government officials.
The Democratic Green Party of Rwanda
Press Release
On the 24th March 2010, the interim leaders of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda held a meeting with the representatives of the Ministry of Local Government(MINALOC) to discuss issues related to the official registration of the Green Party.
At the meeting, the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda was represented by Mr.Frank Habineza, Founder and Interim President, and Mr. Charles Kabanda, the Interim Secretary General. The Ministry of Local Government was represented by Mr.Fred Mufuruki, the Director of Good Governance in charge of political parties and Mr. Oswald Burasanzwe, the Director of Legal Affairs.
During the meeting that lasted nearly two hours, representatives of both sides brainstormed on how the obstacles hindering the registration process of The Green Party could be resolved so that the Party can be registered.
Several issues were discussed, including: the problems that erupted during the Green Party Congress of 30th October 2009; the issue of needing a police clearance that was requested of the District of Gasabo; and the response given by the National Police, which ensured the police’s commitment to protect people and their property.
It was agreed that during the next consultative meeting both parties will lay down their strategies which will ensure an organized and peaceful party Congress.
The interim leadership of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda would like to extend its sincere appreciation to the leadership of MINALOC for having organized such a wonderful meeting.
We would like to further emphasize that this approach of seeking solutions to problems through peaceful means such as open dialogue should always characterize our relationship so that together, we can all work to build a stronger and better Rwanda.
Done in Kigali,
24th March 2010
Frank Habineza
Interim President, Democratic Green Party of Rwanda
Founding member and President of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda,
President, African Greens Movement (AfGM),
Co-Africa Representative to Global Greens Coordination (GGC)
Mob: + 250 78 85 630 39
Email: fhabineza@africangreens.org
http://www.rwandagreendemocrats.org
http://www.africangreens.org
http://www.globalgreens.org
Press Release
On the 24th March 2010, the interim leaders of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda held a meeting with the representatives of the Ministry of Local Government(MINALOC) to discuss issues related to the official registration of the Green Party.
At the meeting, the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda was represented by Mr.Frank Habineza, Founder and Interim President, and Mr. Charles Kabanda, the Interim Secretary General. The Ministry of Local Government was represented by Mr.Fred Mufuruki, the Director of Good Governance in charge of political parties and Mr. Oswald Burasanzwe, the Director of Legal Affairs.
During the meeting that lasted nearly two hours, representatives of both sides brainstormed on how the obstacles hindering the registration process of The Green Party could be resolved so that the Party can be registered.
Several issues were discussed, including: the problems that erupted during the Green Party Congress of 30th October 2009; the issue of needing a police clearance that was requested of the District of Gasabo; and the response given by the National Police, which ensured the police’s commitment to protect people and their property.
It was agreed that during the next consultative meeting both parties will lay down their strategies which will ensure an organized and peaceful party Congress.
The interim leadership of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda would like to extend its sincere appreciation to the leadership of MINALOC for having organized such a wonderful meeting.
We would like to further emphasize that this approach of seeking solutions to problems through peaceful means such as open dialogue should always characterize our relationship so that together, we can all work to build a stronger and better Rwanda.
Done in Kigali,
24th March 2010
Frank Habineza
Interim President, Democratic Green Party of Rwanda
Founding member and President of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda,
President, African Greens Movement (AfGM),
Co-Africa Representative to Global Greens Coordination (GGC)
Mob: + 250 78 85 630 39
Email: fhabineza@africangreens.org
http://www.rwandagreendemocrats.org
http://www.africangreens.org
http://www.globalgreens.org
Rwanda: Cracks in the Mirror.
By Kris Berwouts
23 March 2010
Editor's Note: WNJ's Rwandan sources allege the Rwandan Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. James Kabarebe, was placed under house arrest last week on the order of President Kagame and his Executive Secretary of National Security Services, Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro. Gen. Kabarebe is allegedly accused of helping Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa escape Rwanda to Uganda. It is unknown to WNJ if he is still under house arrest or not, but he recently appeared at an official government function. Rwanda's Prosecutor General has officially issued international arrest warrants to Interpol for Gen. Nyamwasa and Patrick Karegyeya.
1)Débat contradictoire dans un espace politique verrouillé?
Le Rwanda n’est pas habitué à un débat politique contradictoire. Au courant des années, le parti au pouvoir depuis 1994, le Front Patriotique Rwandais, a établi un contrôle sur la vie publique (y compris sur les organes politiques et judiciaires) selon la logique de parti unique, malgré l’existence d’une série d’autres partis politiques satellites qui jouent un rôle en marge du pouvoir grâce à leur loyauté fondamentale à celui-ci.
Le cycle électoral (2001 – 2003) qui a clôturé la transition a été organisé sans débat contradictoire : le seul parti d’opposition, l’Alliance pour la Démocratie, l’Equité et le Progrès (ADEP-Mizero) n’a jamais obtenu son agrément, et les candidats indépendants principaux pour les élections présidentielles ont été disqualifiés à la veille du scrutin. Le Président Kagame a gagné ses élections avec un résultat staliniste de 95% après une campagne accompagnée de disparitions, d’arrestations et d’intimidation des candidats, de l’électorat et des observateurs. Aussi bien dans les élections législatives que présidentielles en 2003, la mission d’observation de l’Union européenne a constaté des irrégularités et des fraudes importantes. Les mêmes constats ont été faits par la mission d’observation de l’UE aux élections législatives de septembre 2008. Même si le langage dans le rapport et dans les déclarations lors de sa publication était très diplomatique et cherchait à ne pas affronter le régime rwandais, plusieurs participants à cette mission ont fait part des irrégularités dans le vote, dans le traitement des urnes et dans le comptage:
Aujourd’hui, nous sommes à quatre mois et demi des élections présidentielles du 9 août 2010. Le parti au pouvoir les prend très au sérieux et s’y prépare en mettant en route sa machinerie du niveau local au niveau national, et en utilisant tous les moyens disponibles, y compris son monopole sur les médias.
Entre-temps, d’autres formations politiques s’y préparent aussi. Ils essayent d’obtenir leurs enregistrements comme partis politiques et ils réclament l’espace pour se faire connaître et entendre par l’électorat. Les principaux partis d’opposition sont :
•le Parti Social Imberakuri, (PSI) présidé par Bernard Ntaganda et créé par des ex-membres du Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) qui l’avaient quitté par frustration que le PSD restait dans le giron du FPR.
•Le Green Democratic Party, (GDP) avec un leadership qui vient principalement du milieu anglophone. Le parti est considéré par beaucoup de gens comme une émanation du mécontentement au sein du FPR. Le président s’appelle Frank Habineza et le Secrétaire-général, Charles Kabanda, co-fondateur du FPR dans les années ’80 en Ouganda
•Les Forces Démocratiques Unifiées (FDU-Inkingi), dont la présidente Victoire Ingabire est rentrée à la mi janvier 2010 pour poser sa candidature pour la présidence, après une absence de 17 ans.
Ces partis ne sont pas considérés par le régime comme un enrichissement à la vie politique rwandaise, tel qu’il le souhaite.
En 2009, le Parti Social Imberakuri a essayé d’organiser quatre congrès. Trois en ont été empêchés par le régime pour des raisons de procédures, mais un congrès a été tenu en juin. Le PS Imberakuri a été reconnu comme parti en juillet 2009. Pendant toute cette période, leur président Bernard Ntaganda s’est exprimé dans des termes très sévères contre le régime sur une série de thèmes sociaux, politiques et judiciaires qui préoccupent la population. Le fait que le régime apparemment laissait parler Ntaganda aussi ouvertement était pour beaucoup de Rwandais une indication qu’il y pourrait y avoir réellement un changement positif et une nouvelle ouverture politique.
Finalement, l’offensive contre Bernard Ntaganda a été lancée de l’intérieur de son parti même. Le secrétaire-général du PSI, Noel Hakizimfura, a accusé son président de divisionnisme et de l’idéologie génocidaire.En février 2010, Hakizimfura et un autre membre du parti ont été licenciés du parti pour avoir accepté de l’argent du FPR pour déstabiliser le PS-I. Le mardi soir 16 mars 2010, des membres dirigeants du PS-Imberakuri ont été amené aux Head Quarters du FPR où ils ont reçu l’ordre d’organisé une convention du parti pour le lendemain 17 mars, afin de destituer Ntaganda de ses fonctions. La convention a été tenue, et la vice-présidente, Christine Mukabunani a fait une déclaration dans laquelle elle a affirmé que Bernard Ntaganda n’est plus président du parti. Depuis lors, le cadre institutionnel du PSI est très flou.
De son côté, Victoire Ingabire a longtemps préparé sa candidature pour la présidence rwandaise à partir de la Hollande, où elle habitait depuis 17 ans. Ingabire est arrivée au Rwanda le samedi 16 janvier: “Je suis prête à briguer ma candidature pour la magistrature suprême et la victoire est certaine", a déclaré Mme Victoire Ingabire à peine descendue sur le tarmac de l'aéroport international de Kigali. Sa candidature et son style direct ont tout suite suscité des tensions au sein du régime qui a répondu par une agression verbale immédiate, y compris dans les médias. Mme Ingabire s’est rendue presque immédiatement au Mémorial de Gisozi pour y déposer une gerbe de fleurs. Dans son discours, elle a dit entre autre : "Le chemin de la réconciliation est encore long. Ce Mémorial ne rappelle que le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi mais reste muet sur d’autres crimes contre l’humanité ciblant des membres d’ethnie Hutu ». Elle lançait ainsi une claire allusion aux crimes commis en 1994 par des membres de l'ex-rébellion tutsi, le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR), aujourd'hui au pouvoir. Les Hutu qui ont tué les Tutsi doivent comprendre qu'ils doivent être punis. Il en va de même des Tutsi qui ont tué les Hutu." Cette déclaration a déclenché la fureur des victimes du génocide, des médias pro-gouvernementaux et des autorités, qui l’ont accusé de propager le négationnisme.
Depuis le 10 février, Mme Ingabire a été régulièrement convoquée par la police, pour des interrogatoires qui prennent beaucoup de temps, l’empêchent d’entreprendre d’autres activités, et l’accusent de diffusion de l’idéologie génocidaire, du divisionnisme et de contacts avec les FDLR. Jusque maintenant, il n’y a pas de procédure juridique formelle, mais le cadre légal a été créé pour en entamer une, par le simple transfert du dossier de la police au parquet.
Entretemps, le FDU-Inkingi a essayé d’organiser son congrès constituant. Personne ne l’a formellement défendu, mais le parti se trouve devant un comportement kafkaïen de la part des autorités : la Commune veut bien donner son autorisation pour le congrès, à condition que la police confirme qu’elle sera sur place pour assurer la sécurité. La police affirme aimablement qu’elle est prête à assurer la sécurité du congrès à condition que la Commune donne son autorisation par écrit…
Le 12 mars, Mme Ingabire a reçu une lettre des autorités communales pour lui interdire d’organiser des réunions politiques parce qu’elle est poursuivie par les instances judiciaires: Les interrogatoires policiers de février sont donc utilisés aujourd’hui pour l’empêcher d’exercer ses droits politiques. Le même jour, le Ministre de l’administration territoriale confirme dans des interviews avec des médias nationaux et internationaux que les constituantes du FDU-INKINGi ne seront jamais autorisées au Rwanda aussi longtemps que Mme Victoire Ingabire est poursuivie par la police et que des enquêtes sur le lien entre son organisation politique et le FDLR restent ouvertes Mme Ingabire a voulu réagir à ces accusations dans une conférence de presse, mais tous les hôtels qu’elle a contacté pour louer une salle ont été menacés et ont donc refusé de louer. Certains ont annulé la réservation à la dernière minute.
Le plus jeune parti d’opposition est le Green Democratic Party, lancé en août 2009 à Kigali, avec l’objectif de créer une opposition réelle et large autour d’une vision progressiste et écologiste. Lui aussi, il a été bloqué plusieurs fois dans ses efforts d’organiser ses réunions. Face à cette situation, les trois partis mentionnés ont mis en place une structure commune (Conseil de Concertation Permanent des Partis de l’Opposition) dans l’espoir que cette concertation leur permettra d’élargir l’espace démocratique à travers des positions communes et un plaidoyer conjoint national et international.
Mais tous ensemble ou chacun de son côté, ces formations sont très fragiles devant un pouvoir qui n’a aucune envie d’avoir un débat contradictoire réelle autour des élections, et qui verrouille l’espace politique par :
•son monopole sur les médias, qui diabolisent de façon permanente les partis d’opposition et leurs leaders
•une intimidation verbale et physique des partis d’opposition, leurs leaders, les cadres et les militants
•la création d’un cadre légal qui permet au régime d’entamer à très court terme une démarche juridique contre laquelle l’opposition peut difficilement se défendre (puisque les notions de diffusion de l’idéologie génocidaire et du divisionnisme sont très larges et mal définis dans la loi. Ces termes s’appliquent à tous ceux qui ont une lecture différente de la lecture officielle de l’histoire récente du Rwanda. Ce cadre paralyse les leaders de l’opposition dans leurs activités quotidiennes et est utilisé pour les empêcher d’exercer leurs droits politiques
•une politique administrative qui vise à empêcher l’opposition de se faire enregistrer, de s’implanter, d’organiser des réunions ou de se faire connaître auprès du grand public. Ainsi, deux des partis que nous avons mentionnés ci-dessus n’ont pas encore été enregistrés, alors que le troisième n’a pas le droit d’organiser des activités à la base.
•par l’infiltration des partis de l’opposition pour leur déstabiliser de l’intérieur
Ces stratégies n’impliquent pas que le régime veut absolument interdire l’opposition. Il aurait pu le faire. Peut-être cherche-t-il tout d’abord à ralentir l’opposition, l’empêcher d’atteindre la base avec un message différent du sien, éviter qu’elle gagne de la crédibilité. Les leaders de l’opposition que j’ai rencontrés craignent que le gouvernement ne les empêche de finaliser l’enregistrement en mars. En effet, il est exclu que le dossier avancera en avril, vu la lourdeur émotionnelle pour le pays entier pendant ce mois, avec ses cérémonies et ses activités de commémoration du génocide. Ceci veut dire que l’administration recommencera de travailler sur leurs dossiers en mai Si les autorités utilisent les mêmes mécanismes de ralentissement, il n’est pas exclu que l’opposition soit reconnue comme partis politiques quelques semaines avant les élections. Dans ce cas, elle ne pourra pas remplir les conditions légales de participation aux élections ou participera sans aucune préparation normale à la campagne et au scrutin et sans aucune chance d’avoir atteint l’électorat.
2)Faucons en fuite
Mercredi 3 mars, le Président Kagame a accusé deux officiers rwandais de haut rang, de tenter de déstabiliser le Rwanda. Il s’agit de l'ex-patron des renseignements extérieurs, le colonel Patrick Karegeya, réfugié en Afrique du Sud depuis 2007 , et le général Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, ancien chef d'état-major de l'armée rwandaise et ancien ambassadeur du Rwanda en Inde, qui a fui également en Afrique du Sud fin février, selon la justice rwandaise. "Personne, pas une seule personne, ni même Kayumba, ne peut faire un coup d'Etat ici. Réfléchissez-y, vous en viendrez à la conclusion que personne ne peut faire un coup d'Etat" au Rwanda, a assuré le président Kagame. Dans les mêmes jours, le procureur général Martin Ngoga, accusait le général Kayumba Nyamwasa d’être le commanditaire des attaques à la grenade du 19 février. Pendant longtemps, ces deux militaires issus de la diaspora anglophone ougandaise ont été des personnalités-clés du régime.
Patrick Karegeya n’est pas seulement l’ex-chef des renseignements, il a été aussi l’homme central dans le fonctionnement du Congo Desk, service du Département de la sécurité extérieure, créé pour gérer l’exploitation des richesses de l’est de la RDC, dont les recettes n’apparaissaient pas dans les comptes officiels de l’Etat. Ce système a permis à l’armée et aux dirigeants politiques de dissimuler des sommes d’argents énormes. Dans tous les dossiers et les discussions depuis le retrait officiel de l’armée rwandaise du Congo en septembre 2002, il a été très difficile de faire une distinction précise entre le rôle de l’Etat rwandais et le rôle des lobbies politiques et militaires rwandais en dehors de l’Etat dans l’exploitation illicite des ressources congolaises et dans l’appui aux groupes militaires comme le Congrès National de la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Dans la zone d’ombre entre Etats et lobbies rwandais, Patrick Karegeya et le Congo Desk ont occupé une place centrale.
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa a grandi au sud de l’Ouganda, et il est devenu une des personnes les plus puissantes dans l’armée rwandaise. Chef des renseignements militaires pendant toute la guerre, il est perçu comme l’homme fort après Kagame au moment de la victoire militaire de l’ancienne rébellion Il a mené des campagnes militaires au nord-est du pays dans les années après le génocide. En 2001, il a été remplacé à la tête de l’armée par le général Emmanuel Habyarimana, lui-même remplacé plus tard par James Kabarebe. Kayumba a été envoyé en formation au Royaume Uni. En 2004, il a été nommé ambassadeur en Inde. Des insiders de la politique rwandaise ont toujours cru que cette nomination (et même son départ en Angleterre avant) était une mesure du Président Kagame pour écarter Kayumba du centre des activités politico-militaires rwandaises, parce qu’il commençait à avoir une assise propre dans le noyau du pouvoir.
En novembre 2006, le juge français Jean-Louis Bruguière a émis un mandat d'arrêt international contre Kayumba et huit autres hauts cadres militaires proches de Kagame, dans le cadre de l'enquête sur l'attentat contre l'avion du Président Juvénal Habyarimana, le 6 avril 1994 – qui a entraîné le déclenchement du génocide. En février 2008, le juge d'instruction espagnol Fernando Andreu Merelles a émis quarante mandats d'arrêt à l'encontre d'officiers supérieurs de l'armée rwandaise (dont Kayumba) pour actes de génocide, crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre et terrorisme commis au Rwanda et en République démocratique du Congo (RDC) entre le 1er octobre 1990 et 2002. La justice espagnole avait été saisie, en 2000, par des proches de victimes espagnoles tuées au Rwanda - religieux et humanitaires - et par des organisations rwandaises en exil.
Dans une interview réalisée après son arrivée en Afrique du Sud, le général Kayumba s’est exprimé sur la transformation du régime de Kagame en dictature et sur son propre engagement pour un Rwanda démocratique. Mais s’il y a une distinction à faire entre les faucons et les colombes à l’intérieur du noyau du pouvoir de Kigali, ce n’est certainement pas lui la colombe…
3)Déo Mushayidi
Le samedi 6 mars 2010, les autorités rwandaises ont annoncé l’arrestation de l’opposant Déo Mushayidi. Mushayidi, qui vivait les derniers mois en Tanzanie, avait été arrêté par des policiers tanzaniens dans la ville de Bukoba. Le 4 mars, il a été conduit à la frontière burundaise et transféré par la police burundaise à Bujumbura. Vendredi 5 mars, il a été extradé au Rwanda, malgré l’absence d’un mandat d’arrêt international ou même d’une quelconque procédure judiciaire à son encontre, et transféré au Bureau de la police de Kicukiro, à Kigali.
Né en 1961au Sud-est du Rwanda, Mushayidi était un rescapé du génocide. Il quitte en 1995 son poste d’assistant du secrétaire-général du FPR, le major Théogène Rudasingwa. Il se lance comme journaliste dans plusieurs journaux (l’Ere de Liberté, Imboni,…) où il se met à dénoncer les violations des droits humains et la corruption. En 1996, il est élu président de l’Association des Journalistes du Rwanda (AJIR). Il devient également secrétaire-exécutif du Centre de promotion de la liberté d’expression et de la tolérance dans la région des Grands Lacs. En 2000, persécuté et diffamé par les médias gouvernementaux, il demande et obtient asile en Belgique.
Là, il s’engage dans une série de mouvements politiques, dont le courant monarchiste, l’Alliance pour la démocratie et la réconciliation nationale (ADRN Igihango) et le Partenariat Intwari, pour créer en 208 le Pacte de défense du peuple PDP qu’il préside jusqu’aujourd’hui. Il quitte la Belgique pour continuer ses activités politiques dans des pays plus proche au territoire rwandais…
Après son arrestation, Déo Mushayidi est accusé d’être impliqué dans les attaques aux grenades et de travailler avec Kayumba et Karegeya. Amnesty International a organisé une action d’urgence en sa faveur
4)Les fissures dans le miroir
Aujourd’hui, le premier souci du régime n’est pas l’opposition classique. Quand vous avez un contrôle quasi-total sur les institutions législatives, exécutives et judiciaires, quand la presse indépendante a presque entièrement disparu, quand la partie de la société qui n’a pas été explicitement récupérée par vous a atteint un raffinement extraordinaire dans l’art noble de l’autocensure, quand vous incarnez pour une partie importante de l’opinion publique nationale et internationale la fin du génocide et le retour à la stabilité, vous n’allez pas perdre les élections. Pas contre Victoire Ingabire, qui n’a jamais eu une vie publique au Rwanda et qui n’est donc pas connue par l’électorat rwandais. Pas contre Bernard Ntaganda non plus, qui a un entourage institutionnel instable et facile à manipuler. Et pas par Frank Habineza, même si il travaille avec des gens qui viennent de votre milieu, y compris le premier président (et d’ailleurs un des premiers dissidents) de votre pays. Ils ont un parti qui n’existait pas encore il y a un an, et dont c’est incertain qu’il sera reconnu à temps pour participer aux élections.
Le Democratic Green Party ne va pas battre le FPR dans les élections, mais il rend le régime nerveux. Parce que, parmi beaucoup d’autres signes, il montre la perte de la cohésion au sein de l’élite rwandaise, l’inner circle du pouvoir. Ceci n’est pas nouveau, mais le départ de Kayumba, l’arrestation de Mushayidi et l’émergence du Democratic Green Party font preuve que les fissures que le gouvernement voit quand il se regarde dans le miroir ne sont pas seulement visibles pour lui-même, mais pour tout le monde.
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I visited Rwanda during the second week of March 2010. In recent years I have often passed through this country which I have been visiting since 1997, usually in transit to Goma, Bukavu or Bujumbura. Each time I have taken advantage and met some personal or professional contacts, but since 2007 I have never stayed more than 24 hours.
I have, of course, always kept up to date with what was happening in Rwanda and, together with my colleagues at EurAc, I have made a continuing effort to provide information to understand the issues better and to discuss them objectively. Such a « leitmotiv » is relevant everywhere but it is especially important in the case of Rwanda: here very often the arguments between “believers” and “non- believers” are like the deaf listening to the dumb.
In the weeks just before my arrival it was possible to feel considerable tension building up in the country. Of course we all expected the space for political dialogue to be reduced in the months leading to the election. The demonization of Victoire Ingabire when she returned to the country to lead a campaign for president as the candidate of the opposition party, FDU-Inkingi, led to increasing aggression against the other opposition parties present inside the country. On 19 February, a Friday evening, various well frequented places in the capital were the subject of three grenade attacks at the height of the rush hour resulting in two deaths and several people wounded. The Rwanda media first accused the FDLR, then Victoire Ingabire for these attacks. On Thursday 4 March 2010 in two further, almost simultaneous, bomb attacks in Kigali 16 more people were wounded. These acts of violence were followed by a wave of accusations and arrests.
In the time between the two attacks, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa left the country and went to South Africa. After his departure this former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army was accused of being behind the grenade attacks of 19 February and of being associated with the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, who has been in South Africa since 2007.
On Saturday 6 March, the Rwanda authorities announced the arrest in Burundi of an opposition activist, Déo Mushayidi, accused by Kigali of being one of the authors of the recent grenade attacks. Gradually the bomb throwers started to outnumber the bombs.
You can understand that I did not know very well what to expect. As the days went by I had a problem knowing exactly why the situation seemed to me to be different from what it was the other times I had visited the country. I noticed that the people felt fear, but that had long been the case. I saw a closing up of the political space but this had often been experienced before. I had not remembered grenade attacks in the recent past (but a little research after my return told me that there had been in April and December 2008 and in April and July 2009), but at the same time I had the impression that the grenades were a symptom rather than a cause of events. It was my wish and my duty to bring together all these bits of information in one solid piece of analysis.
Finally what was really new dawned on me: I was watching a régime which was primarily not fighting its enemies; it was struggling to prevent its own disintegration. For ten years we had speculated about divisions within the inner circle of power. We always realized that there were disagreements but no-one could help me precisely define these divisions. Today when the régime looks at itself in the mirror it can see the cracks that belie the united and serene image which it wants to show to the public in Rwanda and internationally. The régime has come face to face with its own fragility; it is nervous and is reacting out of all proportion.
You will read in the following pages my findings, my impressions and my analysis. This does not reflect EurAc’s official position. It is based on the reflections of a single person and only he is committed by it – a person who, as usual, returns from a visit with more questions than answers.
Kris Berwouts
Director, EurAc
21 March 2010
1) Open debate in a closed political context?
Rwanda is not accustomed to open debate. Over the years the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the party which has been in power since 1994 has built up a control over public life (including the political and judicial organs) on the lines of a one party system despite the existence of a number of other satellite political parties which operate on the fringes of power thanks to their basic loyalty to that power.
The electoral cycle (2001 – 2003) which marked the end of the transition period was organised with no open debate: the only opposition party, ADEP-Mizero, was never registered, and the main independent candidates for the presidential elections were disqualified just before the vote. President Kagame won his elections with a stalinist 95% of votes following a campaign marred by the disappearances, arrests and intimidation of voters, candidates and observers. The European Union found irregularities and serious fraud in both the legislative and presidential elections of 2003. The EU observation mission had similar findings during the legislative elections of September 2008. Although the wording of the report and in the declarations made at the time of its publication was very diplomatic and tried to avoid confrontation with the Rwandan régime, several of those who took part in this mission reported voting irregularities, in the handling of ballot boxes and in counting votes.
It is now four and a half months until the presidential elections due on 9 August 2010. The ruling party is taking them very seriously and making preparations, putting the party machine in order at local and national level and using all available means including its monopoly of the media.
At the same time other political groupings are preparing themselves too. They are trying to obtain registration as political parties and demanding a fair chance to make themselves known and heard by the electorate. The principal opposition parties are:
• The Parti Social-Imberakuri, (PS) with Bernard Ntaganda as its original President, formed by ex-members of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) which they left because they were frustrated that the PSD remained tied to the FPR.
• The Democratic Green Party, with a leadership drawn mainly from the Anglophones, is seen by many as an expression of discontent from within the FPR. Its President is Frank Habineza and its Secretary General Charles Kabanda, one of the founders of the FPR in the 80’s in Uganda.
• The FDU-Inkingi whose President, Victoire Ingabire, returned in mid-January to stand as a presidential candidate after an absence of 17 years.
The regime does not consider that these parties enrich Rwanda’s political life.
In 2009, the Parti Social Imberakuri tried to organise four congresses. Three of them were stopped by the regime for procedural reasons but one was held in June.The PS Imberakuri was recognised as a party in July 2009. Throughout this period the party president, Bernard Ntaganda, made very critical speeches on a number of social, political and judicial issues of concern to the people. For many Rwandans the fact that the regime was apparently allowing Ntaganda to speak so openly was an indication that there could be positive change and a new political openness.
In the end an offensive against Bernard Ntaganda was launched from within his own party. The Secretary General of the PSI, Noel Hakizimfura, accused his president of « divisionism and genocidal ideology ». In February Hakizimfura and another party member were expelled from the party for having accepted money from the FPR in order to destabilize the PSI. On Tuesday evening 16 March 2010, some leading members of the PS-Imberakuri were taken to the headquarters of the FPR where they were ordered to organise a party convention the following day, 17 March, to remove Ntaganda from his post. The convention was held and the party vice-president, Christine Mukabunani, declared afterwards that Bernard Ntaganda was no longer president of the party. As a result the institutional framework of the PSI has become very unclear.
In her case, Victoire Ingabire had for a long time been preparing her bid for the presidency of Rwanda from Holland where she had been living for 17 years. Ingabire arrived on Saturday 16 January in Rwanda: "I am ready to canvass for my candidature for head of state and victory is certain", she declared soon after stepping on to the tarmac at Kigali international airport. Her candidature and her direct way of speaking immediately caused tension within the regime which responded with immediate verbal aggression including in the media. Almost immediately she went to place flowers at the Gisozi Memorial. In part of her speech she said: "The road to reconciliation is still long. This memorial only commemorates the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsis, whereas there were also massacres of Hutus », clearly alluding to the crimes committed in 1994 by members of the former Tutsi rebellion by the Rwanda Popular Front (FPR), now in power. “The Hutus who killed Tutsis must understand that they have to be punished. It is the same for the Tutsis who have killed Hutus." This declaration caused fury on the part of genocide victims, the media and the authorities who accused her of propagating “negativism”.
Since 10 February she has regularly been summoned by the police for investigation which has been very time consuming and has hindered her other activities and in which she has been accused of spreading « genocidal ideology, divisionism and contact with the FDLR”. Up to now no formal charges have been brought but a legal framework has been created which can lead to charges simply by transferring the police file to the courts.
At the same time the FDU-Inkingi was trying to organise its constituent assembly. This had not been formally forbidden by anyone but Ingabire faced “Kafkaesque” behaviour on the part of the authorities. The commune was willing to authorize the assembly on condition that the police would confirm that they would be present to ensure security. The police would be happy to ensure security provided that the commune gives its written authorisation, and so...
On 13 March, she received a letter from the communal authorities which forbade her to organise political meetings since she was subject to police investigation i.e. the February police interrogation was being used to prevent her exercising political rights today. She wanted to react by holding a press conference but all the hotels where she had booked a meeting room were threatened and cancelled the booking at the last minute.
The newest opposition party is the Green Democratic Party, launched in August 2009 in Kigali, with the aim of creating a genuine and broad-based opposition with a progressive and ecological vision. This party has also been stopped several times in its efforts to organise its meetings. Faced with this situation, the three parties mentioned have set up a common structure (Conseil de Concertation Permanent des Partis de l’Opposition) in the hope that this coordination will enable them to widen the democratic “space” by having a common position on certain subjects and joint lobbying nationally and internationally.
However, these groups, acting alone or together, are very fragile faced with a regime which has no desire for real debate during the elections and which is restricting democratic space through :
• Its monopoly of the media, which continually demonize the opposition parties and their leaders.
• Verbal and physical intimidation of opposition parties, their leaders, members and activists.
• The creation of a legal framework in which proceedings can be brought very rapidly and where the opposition finds it hard to defend itself (since accusations of spreading genocidal ideology and divisionism are very broad and not clearly defined in law. This terminology is applied to all those who have a different understanding than the official one of the recent history of Rwanda. This means it can be used to paralyse the leaders of the opposition and to prevent them carrying out their daily duties and exercising their political rights.)
• An administrative policy which aims to prevent opposition groups being registered, setting themselves up, organising meetings or making themselves known to the general public. In this way two of the parties mentioned above have not yet been registered, while the third has not been given the right to organise activities on the ground.
• Infiltration of opposition parties in order to destabilise them from within.
These strategies do not necessarily imply that the regime wants completely to ban the opposition. It could easily have done that before. Perhaps it wants first to slow down the opposition, to stop it getting through to the people with a message different from its own and to stop it gaining credibility. The opposition leaders I have met fear that the government will prevent them getting registration in March. The process cannot go forward in April, the month when the country is loaded with emotions, with ceremonies and activities commemorating the genocide. This would mean starting again in May. If the authorities use the same delaying tactics it is not unlikely that opposition political parties would only be recognised several weeks before the elections. In this case they would take part in the elections without any normal preparation for the campaign or for the vote and without a chance of getting through to the electorate.
2) Hawks on the run
On Wednesday 3 March, President Kagame accused two high ranking Rwandan officers of attempting to destabilise Rwanda: the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, and General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army and Ambassador to India who had also fled to South Africa, according to the Rwandan judiciary. "Nobody, not a single person, not even Kayumba, can make a coup d'etat here. Think about it and you will conclude that no-one can make a coup d'etat in Rwanda”, President Kagame insisted. Around the same time the state prosecutor, Martin Ngoga, accused General Kayumba Nyamwasa of the grenade attacks of 19 February. For a long time these two soldiers originating from the Ugandan Anglophone diaspora had been among the regime’s key personalities.
Patrick Karegeya was not only the former intelligence chief, he was also the main man running the Congo Desk, a bureau run by the External Security Department which was created in order to manage the exploitation of the wealth of eastern DRC, the income from which did not appear in official government accounts. This system enabled the army and political leaders to conceal huge sums of money. In all the discussions and documents relating to the official withdrawal of the Rwandan army from the Congo in September 2002 it has been very hard to distinguish precisely between the role of the Rwandan state and that of the non-state political and military lobbies as regards the illicit exploitation of Congolese resources and the support given to military groups such as the CNDP. In the shadowy zone between the state and the Rwandan lobbies, Patrick Karegeya and the Congo Desk occupied a central position.
Kayumba Nyamwasa grew up in the south of Uganda and he became one of the most powerful people in the Rwanda army. He led the military campaigns in the north east of the country in the years following the genocide. In 2001 he was replaced as head of the army by General Emmanuel Habyarimana, who was himself later replaced by James Kaberebe. Kayumba was sent for training to the United Kingdom. In 2004, he was appointed ambassador to India. Political insiders in Rwanda have always believed that this appointment (and even sending him earlier to England) was a step taken by President Kagame to remove Kayumba from the centre of politico-military affairs in Rwanda as he was starting to build his own base within the core group of power in Rwanda.
In November 2006, the French judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, issued an international arrest warrant against Kayumba and eight other high ranking military men close to Kagame in connexion with the enquiry into the attack on President Juvénal Habyarimana’s airplane on 6 April 1994 which triggered the genocide. In February 2008, the Spanish magistrate, Fernando Andreu Merelles, issued fourty arrest warrants against senior officers in the Rwanda army (including Kayumba) for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism committed in Rwanda and in the DRC between 1 October 1990 and 2002. The cases had been submitted to the Spanish courts in 2000 by relatives of Spanish victims killed in Rwanda, religious and humanitarian workers and by exiled Rwandan organisations.
In an interview after his arrival in South Africa General Kayumba spoke of the transformation of Kagame’s regime into a dictatorship and of his own commitment to a democratic Rwanda. One must, however, make a distinction between hawks and doves inside Rwanda’s power structure – but Kayumba is most certainly no dove…
3) Déo Mushayidi
On Saturday 6 March 2010, the Rwandan authorities confirmed the arrest of the opposition leader, Déo Mushayidi. Mushayidi, had been living in recent months in Tanzania, was arrested by Tanzanian police in the town of Bukoba. On 4 March, he was taken to the Burundi frontier and transferred by the Burundian police to Bujumbura. On Friday 5 March he was extradited to Rwanda, despite the absence of an international arrest warrant or even any kind of legal procedure, and transferred to Kicukiro police station, Kigali.
Born in 1961 in the south east of Rwanda, Mushayidi was a genocide survivor who in 1995 resigned his post as assistant to the Secretary-General of the FPR, Major Théogène Rudasingwa. He became a journalist on several papers e.g. l’Ere de Liberté, Imboni where he began to denounce human rights violations and corruption. In 1996, he was elected president of the Association of Journalists of Rwanda (AJIR). He also became Executive Secretary of the Centre for the Promotion of Freedom of Expression and Tolerance in the Great Lakes Region. In 2000, persecuted and slandered by the government media, he requested and was granted asylum in Belgium.
There he involved himself in a number of political movements including the monarchist Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation (ADRN), Igihango and the Intwari Partnership in order to create in 2008 the Pact for the Defence of the People (PDP) of which he remains president until today. He left Belgium in order to continue his political activities closer to Rwanda.
After his arrest, Déo Mushayidi was accused of being implicated in the grenade attacks and of working with Kayumba et Karegeya. Amnesty International has organised an emergency action to support him.
4) The cracks in the mirror
The traditional opposition is not the main concern of the Rwandan regime at the present moment. When you have almost complete control over the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, when an independent press has almost completely disappeared, when that section of opinion which has not openly sided with you has attained an extraordinary level of sophistication in the noble art of self-censorship, when for a large part of national and international opinion you represent the ending of genocide and the return to stability, you are not going to lose the elections. Not against Victoire Ingabire who has not played any role in Rwandan public life and is therefore not known by the electorate in Rwanda. Not against Bernard Ntaganda either – his team is unstable and easily manipulated. And not against Frank Habineza, even though he has worked with people close to you including the first president (i.e. one of the first dissidents) of your country. They have a party which was still not in existence a year ago and which is not certain to be recognised in time to take part in the elections.
The Democratic Green Party is not going to defeat the FPR in the elections but it is making the regime nervous. This is because it shows how the Rwandan elite, the inner circle of power is losing its cohesion. This is not the only indication and it is not new, but Kayumba’s departure, the arrest of Mushayidi and the emergence of the Democratic Green Party prove that what the government sees when it looks in the mirror can be seen by everybody, not just by the government itself.
Nothing grows underneath a baobab
Part of the problem of tension inside the regime has nothing to do with the specific context of Rwanda. After the death of Fred Rwigema on the second day of the FPR armed struggle in October 1990, Paul Kagame took over the command of the rebellion and he still commands it today. He was the strong man during the war and after the victory, even though he reserved for himself the role of Minister of Defense, leaving Pasteur Bizimungu to head the institutions of state. This did not prevent anybody, inside Rwanda or not, being aware that it was he who was really running the country. Many in the international community had a high opinion of him: after the fall of the Mobutu generation, Kagame was for some people the incarnation of a new type of African leadership with an inspiring vision, an ability to mobilise and effective enough to achieve palpable and, in some areas, even spectacular results.
However, he is following the same track as other African heads of state (e.g. Museveni and Mugabe). His self-confidence is turning to arrogance and reading carefully the list of key people (high ranking military personnel, ministers, ambassadors) who have left the country shows that his rule has developed a self-destructive tendency, sawing off the branch on which he is sitting. Like Museveni, Mugabe and so many others, Kagame is turning himself into the “Roi Soleil” with no heir, a baobab tree beneath which nothing can grow.
Part of the discontent within the party and the associated community results from a build up of frustration among those who hang on to the coat tails of power without having access to it, people who thought that the FPR could be the motive force to drag them out of poverty. They can see people they grew up with in the refugee camps in Uganda who are now billionaires but they see no way in to that closed circle.
A generational aspect to their exclusion from power is also developing. The generation which took up arms won the war and took over the running of the country invested a lot in the education of their sons and daughters who are now returning home. Their intellectual and technical level far exceeds that of their fathers’ generation and they want to play a leading role in running the country.
International justice: The sword of Damocles
The legal procedures initiated by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière in France and Fernando Andreu Merelles in Spain have badly shaken the inner circle of power. The Rwanda government can rely on the loyalty of a number of countries and international institutions, and this is at least partly based on feelings of guilt on the part of the international community for not having been able to prevent the genocide (and, frankly, not having tried too much to prevent it).
To preserve international support it is vital for the Rwandan regime to be sure of the interpretation the world makes of Rwanda’s recent history. Since 1994, the country has been managed in a psychological climate of winners of the war versus its losers, the victims of the crimes against their executioners, in which, for example, a whole system has been put in place through the gacaca courts to deal with crimes of genocide against Tutsis while at the same time there is a complete taboo regarding crimes committed by the FPR since the start of the war. This taboo reduces the positive effect that gacaca should have been able to have: instead of being the means of taking on board its traumatic past, gacaca has become a strategy for consolidating the winners/victims versus losers/ criminals scenario.
It is true that the initiatives of de Bruguière and Andreu are very irritating. They disrupt the picture and spoil the image. And they lead to worry on the part of those who feel concerned. Even though it is highly improbable that the current leaders of Rwanda would be brought to trial in France or Spain, perhaps the image the country wishes to present is not tenable in the medium term. It cannot be ruled out, even if this does not happen tomorrow, that the question will become: « What are we going to admit ? Who shall we sacrifice?». Such questions do not greatly help to create cohesion. The immediate future of Kayumba is a major concern of the regime. What will he say and before what audience? What if he is extradited to Spain? Hence the pressure on the South African government to send him back to Rwanda.
Rwanda’s involvement in the Congo
Since 1996 the Congo has taken a lot of space in Rwanda’s foreign policy, and on several occasions what happened in the Congo has been a bone of contention which has haunted the regime. For example Kayumba was opposed to the confrontation with Uganda in 2000 and 2002.
A recent example is the arrest of Laurent Nkunda at the start of the joint operation, Umoja Wetu. The operation was led by John Numbi (for the Congo) and James Kabarebe (for Rwanda) and one of the first actions was to arrest Laurent Nkunda who was the subject of a plan by Bosco Ntaganda to replace him at the head of the CNDP. This arrest provoked much animosity in Rwanda, not only in Congolese Rwandophone refugee circles and camps in Rwanda, but also in the army. After all, Nkunda had served in the FPR and elements of the FPR had served in Nkunda forces. This collaboration created strong links and common interests.
Clearly a great part of the Congo’s importance for Rwanda is the illegal trafficking of the Congo’s resources through Rwanda. This traffic is evidently not controlled by the Congo government but a good part is also outside the control of the Rwanda government even though it serves the interests of key people in the Rwandan politico-military establishment. Such business interests can be very various and do not always contribute to the cohesion of the regime either. It is partly for this reason that one can understand the nervousness about the current obligation that the Rwandan rulers must report their wealth and their income transparently.
Directly linked to the Rwandan involvement in the Congo is the problem of demobilised soldiers. Now that a direct presence in the Congo is no longer an option, Rwanda finds itself with much too large an army. Part of the surplus can be deployed by the African Union but that is a limited option. The remainder has to be demobilised, and many of these ex-soldiers feel basically abandoned by the regime which they have fought for, often in very tough circumstances.
The language issue
We all know about the linguistic tension in Rwanda: the FPR introduced English since the rebellion was led by those who had grown up in Uganda. The fact that they had taken power gave English a much more important status in the public life of the country than could be imagined from the numbers that actually spoke it. Over the years the balance has gradually shifted in favour of English and this was accompanied by a feeling of discrimination among many Francophones.
A decisive moment was in 2008 when English was recognised as the official language in education. For some this was a visionary decision to open up the country to the regional, continental and global reality; for others it was a decision to set in stone the ambition of a minority regime to monopolize communication and the country’s intellectual life, to dominate the country’s youth, to rewrite history and in the end to take control of the country’s collective memory.
Quite independently of the point of view from which this question is viewed, it is obvious that the decision has strengthened some and marginalised others. It deepens the already existing gulf between those who came out of Uganda and formed the nucleus of the regime and the others, where genocide survivors found themselves in an even more uncomfortable situation than that found by those who returned from Burundi or the Congo in 1994.
Power and the clan structure
The clan structure around the Rwanda royal family, even though it has not reigned for over half a century, is still seen by many as a factor. The monarchist movement around King Kigeli V (currently in the United States) continues to play a political role and it wants to participate in running the country. Some Rwandan analysts point out that membership of these clans is an important aspect of the identity of a number of those currently active on the political stage. In particular the ancestral tension between Banyiginya and Bega is one of the cracks which enable us better to understand the goings on side the power structure: Kagame is a Mwega, whereas Kayumba, Karegeya, Nyetera, Kazura, Sebarenzi and many others are Banyiginya.
I am not at all an expert in this subject to understand to what degree clans play a serious role in the present situation but I thought I should at least mention it.
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Conclusion: More questions than answers.
Is the Rwandan regime in crisis? It is possible, certainly. Given the over-reaction of the authorities when confronted by new situations on the ground, we get the impression that the regime believes so, even while the authorities keep declaring that everything is under control. Is the reign of the FPR approaching its end? I meet many people who hope so, but that remains to be seen. Even though I believe that the Rwanda government is not working towards a lasting solution to its problems, it seems clear that the control which it has established remains solid based as it is on a culture of silence and a tradition of obedience to authority. Is the country about to implode again? We definitely hope it isn’t. It is very hard to imagine that Rwanda and its people have anything to gain from that, and any such event would have serious consequences for the whole region – for the essential but fragile peace process in Burundi for example; or for the people in eastern Congo who have seen many changes since the Umoja Wetu operation without any resulting sign of future lasting peace.
What is certain is that things are not going well. People are not comparing the situation with the pre-electoral atmosphere in 2003 but with that of 1993. The grenade attacks have provoked fear. The question: « Who threw them? » remains unanswered. Victoire Ingabire and the presidents of the other opposition parties simply want a really free and transparent electoral process. For them the present climate is counter productive. Kayumba ? There are plenty of precedents in the history of post-colonial Africa of generals trying to take power but I do not remember any case where they began their campaign by throwing grenades at a bus stop. The FDLR? I have just been in eastern Congo and I had a strong impression that the FDLR had other things on their mind. Déo Mushayidi? Frustrated demobilised soldiers? People who were angry because they found that Sarkozy was not forced to make a proper apology (that was one of the suggestions I heard)? Not very likely. In fact there are no probable explanations but one of the least improbable ones is that the regime itself organised the attacks so as to create a climate where citizens could be arrested and intimidated. I met many people who were frightened and there were others I was not able to meet as they were so frightened that they did not dare meet me.
The pre-electoral situation remains volatile. It is hard to foresee what Rwanda will be like during and after the elections if the opposition remains muzzled, harassed or crushed. It is important for the Rwandan regime to receive signals from the international community that it must stop this intimidation. At the present time this community gives the impression that it is not at all concerned. It seems to believe that the pre-election tension was predictable, that the situation is under control, that the nervousness might increase a little before the election but that in the end Kagame will win with a comfortable, even crushing, majority. Then the international community will continue business as usual. This is a rather weak analysis. It underestimates the destabilising potential of the present situation and it serves very badly the chances for democracy in Rwanda in the medium and longer term.
From our point of view we must recommend that the international community put pressure on the regime to take measures that will help create political stability in Rwanda and the holding of truly free and transparent elections. Such pressures should principally consist of:
• Urging the regime not to refuse to register opposition parties, not to prevent them from working on the ground and not destroying them;
• Stopping political and police harassment of the leaders and members of the opposition;
• Asking the government not to use the public media to demonise its opponents;
• Demand that a new electoral law be published and an independent electoral commission be set up;
• Rapidly deploy an international electoral observer mission.
Beyond the immediate question of the election, it is really important for the FPR to reverse trend to restriction and exclusion and to put its effort into solving the antagonisms which exist, but this falls outside the Terms of Reference of my March visit. EurAc will come back to this matter in a future document.
For further details:
Kris Berwouts
Rue des Tanneurs, 165 B - 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2 213 04 000
E-mail: kris.berwouts@eurac-network.org
www.eurac-network.org
23 March 2010
Editor's Note: WNJ's Rwandan sources allege the Rwandan Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. James Kabarebe, was placed under house arrest last week on the order of President Kagame and his Executive Secretary of National Security Services, Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro. Gen. Kabarebe is allegedly accused of helping Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa escape Rwanda to Uganda. It is unknown to WNJ if he is still under house arrest or not, but he recently appeared at an official government function. Rwanda's Prosecutor General has officially issued international arrest warrants to Interpol for Gen. Nyamwasa and Patrick Karegyeya.
1)Débat contradictoire dans un espace politique verrouillé?
Le Rwanda n’est pas habitué à un débat politique contradictoire. Au courant des années, le parti au pouvoir depuis 1994, le Front Patriotique Rwandais, a établi un contrôle sur la vie publique (y compris sur les organes politiques et judiciaires) selon la logique de parti unique, malgré l’existence d’une série d’autres partis politiques satellites qui jouent un rôle en marge du pouvoir grâce à leur loyauté fondamentale à celui-ci.
Le cycle électoral (2001 – 2003) qui a clôturé la transition a été organisé sans débat contradictoire : le seul parti d’opposition, l’Alliance pour la Démocratie, l’Equité et le Progrès (ADEP-Mizero) n’a jamais obtenu son agrément, et les candidats indépendants principaux pour les élections présidentielles ont été disqualifiés à la veille du scrutin. Le Président Kagame a gagné ses élections avec un résultat staliniste de 95% après une campagne accompagnée de disparitions, d’arrestations et d’intimidation des candidats, de l’électorat et des observateurs. Aussi bien dans les élections législatives que présidentielles en 2003, la mission d’observation de l’Union européenne a constaté des irrégularités et des fraudes importantes. Les mêmes constats ont été faits par la mission d’observation de l’UE aux élections législatives de septembre 2008. Même si le langage dans le rapport et dans les déclarations lors de sa publication était très diplomatique et cherchait à ne pas affronter le régime rwandais, plusieurs participants à cette mission ont fait part des irrégularités dans le vote, dans le traitement des urnes et dans le comptage:
Aujourd’hui, nous sommes à quatre mois et demi des élections présidentielles du 9 août 2010. Le parti au pouvoir les prend très au sérieux et s’y prépare en mettant en route sa machinerie du niveau local au niveau national, et en utilisant tous les moyens disponibles, y compris son monopole sur les médias.
Entre-temps, d’autres formations politiques s’y préparent aussi. Ils essayent d’obtenir leurs enregistrements comme partis politiques et ils réclament l’espace pour se faire connaître et entendre par l’électorat. Les principaux partis d’opposition sont :
•le Parti Social Imberakuri, (PSI) présidé par Bernard Ntaganda et créé par des ex-membres du Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) qui l’avaient quitté par frustration que le PSD restait dans le giron du FPR.
•Le Green Democratic Party, (GDP) avec un leadership qui vient principalement du milieu anglophone. Le parti est considéré par beaucoup de gens comme une émanation du mécontentement au sein du FPR. Le président s’appelle Frank Habineza et le Secrétaire-général, Charles Kabanda, co-fondateur du FPR dans les années ’80 en Ouganda
•Les Forces Démocratiques Unifiées (FDU-Inkingi), dont la présidente Victoire Ingabire est rentrée à la mi janvier 2010 pour poser sa candidature pour la présidence, après une absence de 17 ans.
Ces partis ne sont pas considérés par le régime comme un enrichissement à la vie politique rwandaise, tel qu’il le souhaite.
En 2009, le Parti Social Imberakuri a essayé d’organiser quatre congrès. Trois en ont été empêchés par le régime pour des raisons de procédures, mais un congrès a été tenu en juin. Le PS Imberakuri a été reconnu comme parti en juillet 2009. Pendant toute cette période, leur président Bernard Ntaganda s’est exprimé dans des termes très sévères contre le régime sur une série de thèmes sociaux, politiques et judiciaires qui préoccupent la population. Le fait que le régime apparemment laissait parler Ntaganda aussi ouvertement était pour beaucoup de Rwandais une indication qu’il y pourrait y avoir réellement un changement positif et une nouvelle ouverture politique.
Finalement, l’offensive contre Bernard Ntaganda a été lancée de l’intérieur de son parti même. Le secrétaire-général du PSI, Noel Hakizimfura, a accusé son président de divisionnisme et de l’idéologie génocidaire.En février 2010, Hakizimfura et un autre membre du parti ont été licenciés du parti pour avoir accepté de l’argent du FPR pour déstabiliser le PS-I. Le mardi soir 16 mars 2010, des membres dirigeants du PS-Imberakuri ont été amené aux Head Quarters du FPR où ils ont reçu l’ordre d’organisé une convention du parti pour le lendemain 17 mars, afin de destituer Ntaganda de ses fonctions. La convention a été tenue, et la vice-présidente, Christine Mukabunani a fait une déclaration dans laquelle elle a affirmé que Bernard Ntaganda n’est plus président du parti. Depuis lors, le cadre institutionnel du PSI est très flou.
De son côté, Victoire Ingabire a longtemps préparé sa candidature pour la présidence rwandaise à partir de la Hollande, où elle habitait depuis 17 ans. Ingabire est arrivée au Rwanda le samedi 16 janvier: “Je suis prête à briguer ma candidature pour la magistrature suprême et la victoire est certaine", a déclaré Mme Victoire Ingabire à peine descendue sur le tarmac de l'aéroport international de Kigali. Sa candidature et son style direct ont tout suite suscité des tensions au sein du régime qui a répondu par une agression verbale immédiate, y compris dans les médias. Mme Ingabire s’est rendue presque immédiatement au Mémorial de Gisozi pour y déposer une gerbe de fleurs. Dans son discours, elle a dit entre autre : "Le chemin de la réconciliation est encore long. Ce Mémorial ne rappelle que le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi mais reste muet sur d’autres crimes contre l’humanité ciblant des membres d’ethnie Hutu ». Elle lançait ainsi une claire allusion aux crimes commis en 1994 par des membres de l'ex-rébellion tutsi, le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR), aujourd'hui au pouvoir. Les Hutu qui ont tué les Tutsi doivent comprendre qu'ils doivent être punis. Il en va de même des Tutsi qui ont tué les Hutu." Cette déclaration a déclenché la fureur des victimes du génocide, des médias pro-gouvernementaux et des autorités, qui l’ont accusé de propager le négationnisme.
Depuis le 10 février, Mme Ingabire a été régulièrement convoquée par la police, pour des interrogatoires qui prennent beaucoup de temps, l’empêchent d’entreprendre d’autres activités, et l’accusent de diffusion de l’idéologie génocidaire, du divisionnisme et de contacts avec les FDLR. Jusque maintenant, il n’y a pas de procédure juridique formelle, mais le cadre légal a été créé pour en entamer une, par le simple transfert du dossier de la police au parquet.
Entretemps, le FDU-Inkingi a essayé d’organiser son congrès constituant. Personne ne l’a formellement défendu, mais le parti se trouve devant un comportement kafkaïen de la part des autorités : la Commune veut bien donner son autorisation pour le congrès, à condition que la police confirme qu’elle sera sur place pour assurer la sécurité. La police affirme aimablement qu’elle est prête à assurer la sécurité du congrès à condition que la Commune donne son autorisation par écrit…
Le 12 mars, Mme Ingabire a reçu une lettre des autorités communales pour lui interdire d’organiser des réunions politiques parce qu’elle est poursuivie par les instances judiciaires: Les interrogatoires policiers de février sont donc utilisés aujourd’hui pour l’empêcher d’exercer ses droits politiques. Le même jour, le Ministre de l’administration territoriale confirme dans des interviews avec des médias nationaux et internationaux que les constituantes du FDU-INKINGi ne seront jamais autorisées au Rwanda aussi longtemps que Mme Victoire Ingabire est poursuivie par la police et que des enquêtes sur le lien entre son organisation politique et le FDLR restent ouvertes Mme Ingabire a voulu réagir à ces accusations dans une conférence de presse, mais tous les hôtels qu’elle a contacté pour louer une salle ont été menacés et ont donc refusé de louer. Certains ont annulé la réservation à la dernière minute.
Le plus jeune parti d’opposition est le Green Democratic Party, lancé en août 2009 à Kigali, avec l’objectif de créer une opposition réelle et large autour d’une vision progressiste et écologiste. Lui aussi, il a été bloqué plusieurs fois dans ses efforts d’organiser ses réunions. Face à cette situation, les trois partis mentionnés ont mis en place une structure commune (Conseil de Concertation Permanent des Partis de l’Opposition) dans l’espoir que cette concertation leur permettra d’élargir l’espace démocratique à travers des positions communes et un plaidoyer conjoint national et international.
Mais tous ensemble ou chacun de son côté, ces formations sont très fragiles devant un pouvoir qui n’a aucune envie d’avoir un débat contradictoire réelle autour des élections, et qui verrouille l’espace politique par :
•son monopole sur les médias, qui diabolisent de façon permanente les partis d’opposition et leurs leaders
•une intimidation verbale et physique des partis d’opposition, leurs leaders, les cadres et les militants
•la création d’un cadre légal qui permet au régime d’entamer à très court terme une démarche juridique contre laquelle l’opposition peut difficilement se défendre (puisque les notions de diffusion de l’idéologie génocidaire et du divisionnisme sont très larges et mal définis dans la loi. Ces termes s’appliquent à tous ceux qui ont une lecture différente de la lecture officielle de l’histoire récente du Rwanda. Ce cadre paralyse les leaders de l’opposition dans leurs activités quotidiennes et est utilisé pour les empêcher d’exercer leurs droits politiques
•une politique administrative qui vise à empêcher l’opposition de se faire enregistrer, de s’implanter, d’organiser des réunions ou de se faire connaître auprès du grand public. Ainsi, deux des partis que nous avons mentionnés ci-dessus n’ont pas encore été enregistrés, alors que le troisième n’a pas le droit d’organiser des activités à la base.
•par l’infiltration des partis de l’opposition pour leur déstabiliser de l’intérieur
Ces stratégies n’impliquent pas que le régime veut absolument interdire l’opposition. Il aurait pu le faire. Peut-être cherche-t-il tout d’abord à ralentir l’opposition, l’empêcher d’atteindre la base avec un message différent du sien, éviter qu’elle gagne de la crédibilité. Les leaders de l’opposition que j’ai rencontrés craignent que le gouvernement ne les empêche de finaliser l’enregistrement en mars. En effet, il est exclu que le dossier avancera en avril, vu la lourdeur émotionnelle pour le pays entier pendant ce mois, avec ses cérémonies et ses activités de commémoration du génocide. Ceci veut dire que l’administration recommencera de travailler sur leurs dossiers en mai Si les autorités utilisent les mêmes mécanismes de ralentissement, il n’est pas exclu que l’opposition soit reconnue comme partis politiques quelques semaines avant les élections. Dans ce cas, elle ne pourra pas remplir les conditions légales de participation aux élections ou participera sans aucune préparation normale à la campagne et au scrutin et sans aucune chance d’avoir atteint l’électorat.
2)Faucons en fuite
Mercredi 3 mars, le Président Kagame a accusé deux officiers rwandais de haut rang, de tenter de déstabiliser le Rwanda. Il s’agit de l'ex-patron des renseignements extérieurs, le colonel Patrick Karegeya, réfugié en Afrique du Sud depuis 2007 , et le général Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, ancien chef d'état-major de l'armée rwandaise et ancien ambassadeur du Rwanda en Inde, qui a fui également en Afrique du Sud fin février, selon la justice rwandaise. "Personne, pas une seule personne, ni même Kayumba, ne peut faire un coup d'Etat ici. Réfléchissez-y, vous en viendrez à la conclusion que personne ne peut faire un coup d'Etat" au Rwanda, a assuré le président Kagame. Dans les mêmes jours, le procureur général Martin Ngoga, accusait le général Kayumba Nyamwasa d’être le commanditaire des attaques à la grenade du 19 février. Pendant longtemps, ces deux militaires issus de la diaspora anglophone ougandaise ont été des personnalités-clés du régime.
Patrick Karegeya n’est pas seulement l’ex-chef des renseignements, il a été aussi l’homme central dans le fonctionnement du Congo Desk, service du Département de la sécurité extérieure, créé pour gérer l’exploitation des richesses de l’est de la RDC, dont les recettes n’apparaissaient pas dans les comptes officiels de l’Etat. Ce système a permis à l’armée et aux dirigeants politiques de dissimuler des sommes d’argents énormes. Dans tous les dossiers et les discussions depuis le retrait officiel de l’armée rwandaise du Congo en septembre 2002, il a été très difficile de faire une distinction précise entre le rôle de l’Etat rwandais et le rôle des lobbies politiques et militaires rwandais en dehors de l’Etat dans l’exploitation illicite des ressources congolaises et dans l’appui aux groupes militaires comme le Congrès National de la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Dans la zone d’ombre entre Etats et lobbies rwandais, Patrick Karegeya et le Congo Desk ont occupé une place centrale.
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa a grandi au sud de l’Ouganda, et il est devenu une des personnes les plus puissantes dans l’armée rwandaise. Chef des renseignements militaires pendant toute la guerre, il est perçu comme l’homme fort après Kagame au moment de la victoire militaire de l’ancienne rébellion Il a mené des campagnes militaires au nord-est du pays dans les années après le génocide. En 2001, il a été remplacé à la tête de l’armée par le général Emmanuel Habyarimana, lui-même remplacé plus tard par James Kabarebe. Kayumba a été envoyé en formation au Royaume Uni. En 2004, il a été nommé ambassadeur en Inde. Des insiders de la politique rwandaise ont toujours cru que cette nomination (et même son départ en Angleterre avant) était une mesure du Président Kagame pour écarter Kayumba du centre des activités politico-militaires rwandaises, parce qu’il commençait à avoir une assise propre dans le noyau du pouvoir.
En novembre 2006, le juge français Jean-Louis Bruguière a émis un mandat d'arrêt international contre Kayumba et huit autres hauts cadres militaires proches de Kagame, dans le cadre de l'enquête sur l'attentat contre l'avion du Président Juvénal Habyarimana, le 6 avril 1994 – qui a entraîné le déclenchement du génocide. En février 2008, le juge d'instruction espagnol Fernando Andreu Merelles a émis quarante mandats d'arrêt à l'encontre d'officiers supérieurs de l'armée rwandaise (dont Kayumba) pour actes de génocide, crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre et terrorisme commis au Rwanda et en République démocratique du Congo (RDC) entre le 1er octobre 1990 et 2002. La justice espagnole avait été saisie, en 2000, par des proches de victimes espagnoles tuées au Rwanda - religieux et humanitaires - et par des organisations rwandaises en exil.
Dans une interview réalisée après son arrivée en Afrique du Sud, le général Kayumba s’est exprimé sur la transformation du régime de Kagame en dictature et sur son propre engagement pour un Rwanda démocratique. Mais s’il y a une distinction à faire entre les faucons et les colombes à l’intérieur du noyau du pouvoir de Kigali, ce n’est certainement pas lui la colombe…
3)Déo Mushayidi
Le samedi 6 mars 2010, les autorités rwandaises ont annoncé l’arrestation de l’opposant Déo Mushayidi. Mushayidi, qui vivait les derniers mois en Tanzanie, avait été arrêté par des policiers tanzaniens dans la ville de Bukoba. Le 4 mars, il a été conduit à la frontière burundaise et transféré par la police burundaise à Bujumbura. Vendredi 5 mars, il a été extradé au Rwanda, malgré l’absence d’un mandat d’arrêt international ou même d’une quelconque procédure judiciaire à son encontre, et transféré au Bureau de la police de Kicukiro, à Kigali.
Né en 1961au Sud-est du Rwanda, Mushayidi était un rescapé du génocide. Il quitte en 1995 son poste d’assistant du secrétaire-général du FPR, le major Théogène Rudasingwa. Il se lance comme journaliste dans plusieurs journaux (l’Ere de Liberté, Imboni,…) où il se met à dénoncer les violations des droits humains et la corruption. En 1996, il est élu président de l’Association des Journalistes du Rwanda (AJIR). Il devient également secrétaire-exécutif du Centre de promotion de la liberté d’expression et de la tolérance dans la région des Grands Lacs. En 2000, persécuté et diffamé par les médias gouvernementaux, il demande et obtient asile en Belgique.
Là, il s’engage dans une série de mouvements politiques, dont le courant monarchiste, l’Alliance pour la démocratie et la réconciliation nationale (ADRN Igihango) et le Partenariat Intwari, pour créer en 208 le Pacte de défense du peuple PDP qu’il préside jusqu’aujourd’hui. Il quitte la Belgique pour continuer ses activités politiques dans des pays plus proche au territoire rwandais…
Après son arrestation, Déo Mushayidi est accusé d’être impliqué dans les attaques aux grenades et de travailler avec Kayumba et Karegeya. Amnesty International a organisé une action d’urgence en sa faveur
4)Les fissures dans le miroir
Aujourd’hui, le premier souci du régime n’est pas l’opposition classique. Quand vous avez un contrôle quasi-total sur les institutions législatives, exécutives et judiciaires, quand la presse indépendante a presque entièrement disparu, quand la partie de la société qui n’a pas été explicitement récupérée par vous a atteint un raffinement extraordinaire dans l’art noble de l’autocensure, quand vous incarnez pour une partie importante de l’opinion publique nationale et internationale la fin du génocide et le retour à la stabilité, vous n’allez pas perdre les élections. Pas contre Victoire Ingabire, qui n’a jamais eu une vie publique au Rwanda et qui n’est donc pas connue par l’électorat rwandais. Pas contre Bernard Ntaganda non plus, qui a un entourage institutionnel instable et facile à manipuler. Et pas par Frank Habineza, même si il travaille avec des gens qui viennent de votre milieu, y compris le premier président (et d’ailleurs un des premiers dissidents) de votre pays. Ils ont un parti qui n’existait pas encore il y a un an, et dont c’est incertain qu’il sera reconnu à temps pour participer aux élections.
Le Democratic Green Party ne va pas battre le FPR dans les élections, mais il rend le régime nerveux. Parce que, parmi beaucoup d’autres signes, il montre la perte de la cohésion au sein de l’élite rwandaise, l’inner circle du pouvoir. Ceci n’est pas nouveau, mais le départ de Kayumba, l’arrestation de Mushayidi et l’émergence du Democratic Green Party font preuve que les fissures que le gouvernement voit quand il se regarde dans le miroir ne sont pas seulement visibles pour lui-même, mais pour tout le monde.
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I visited Rwanda during the second week of March 2010. In recent years I have often passed through this country which I have been visiting since 1997, usually in transit to Goma, Bukavu or Bujumbura. Each time I have taken advantage and met some personal or professional contacts, but since 2007 I have never stayed more than 24 hours.
I have, of course, always kept up to date with what was happening in Rwanda and, together with my colleagues at EurAc, I have made a continuing effort to provide information to understand the issues better and to discuss them objectively. Such a « leitmotiv » is relevant everywhere but it is especially important in the case of Rwanda: here very often the arguments between “believers” and “non- believers” are like the deaf listening to the dumb.
In the weeks just before my arrival it was possible to feel considerable tension building up in the country. Of course we all expected the space for political dialogue to be reduced in the months leading to the election. The demonization of Victoire Ingabire when she returned to the country to lead a campaign for president as the candidate of the opposition party, FDU-Inkingi, led to increasing aggression against the other opposition parties present inside the country. On 19 February, a Friday evening, various well frequented places in the capital were the subject of three grenade attacks at the height of the rush hour resulting in two deaths and several people wounded. The Rwanda media first accused the FDLR, then Victoire Ingabire for these attacks. On Thursday 4 March 2010 in two further, almost simultaneous, bomb attacks in Kigali 16 more people were wounded. These acts of violence were followed by a wave of accusations and arrests.
In the time between the two attacks, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa left the country and went to South Africa. After his departure this former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army was accused of being behind the grenade attacks of 19 February and of being associated with the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, who has been in South Africa since 2007.
On Saturday 6 March, the Rwanda authorities announced the arrest in Burundi of an opposition activist, Déo Mushayidi, accused by Kigali of being one of the authors of the recent grenade attacks. Gradually the bomb throwers started to outnumber the bombs.
You can understand that I did not know very well what to expect. As the days went by I had a problem knowing exactly why the situation seemed to me to be different from what it was the other times I had visited the country. I noticed that the people felt fear, but that had long been the case. I saw a closing up of the political space but this had often been experienced before. I had not remembered grenade attacks in the recent past (but a little research after my return told me that there had been in April and December 2008 and in April and July 2009), but at the same time I had the impression that the grenades were a symptom rather than a cause of events. It was my wish and my duty to bring together all these bits of information in one solid piece of analysis.
Finally what was really new dawned on me: I was watching a régime which was primarily not fighting its enemies; it was struggling to prevent its own disintegration. For ten years we had speculated about divisions within the inner circle of power. We always realized that there were disagreements but no-one could help me precisely define these divisions. Today when the régime looks at itself in the mirror it can see the cracks that belie the united and serene image which it wants to show to the public in Rwanda and internationally. The régime has come face to face with its own fragility; it is nervous and is reacting out of all proportion.
You will read in the following pages my findings, my impressions and my analysis. This does not reflect EurAc’s official position. It is based on the reflections of a single person and only he is committed by it – a person who, as usual, returns from a visit with more questions than answers.
Kris Berwouts
Director, EurAc
21 March 2010
1) Open debate in a closed political context?
Rwanda is not accustomed to open debate. Over the years the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the party which has been in power since 1994 has built up a control over public life (including the political and judicial organs) on the lines of a one party system despite the existence of a number of other satellite political parties which operate on the fringes of power thanks to their basic loyalty to that power.
The electoral cycle (2001 – 2003) which marked the end of the transition period was organised with no open debate: the only opposition party, ADEP-Mizero, was never registered, and the main independent candidates for the presidential elections were disqualified just before the vote. President Kagame won his elections with a stalinist 95% of votes following a campaign marred by the disappearances, arrests and intimidation of voters, candidates and observers. The European Union found irregularities and serious fraud in both the legislative and presidential elections of 2003. The EU observation mission had similar findings during the legislative elections of September 2008. Although the wording of the report and in the declarations made at the time of its publication was very diplomatic and tried to avoid confrontation with the Rwandan régime, several of those who took part in this mission reported voting irregularities, in the handling of ballot boxes and in counting votes.
It is now four and a half months until the presidential elections due on 9 August 2010. The ruling party is taking them very seriously and making preparations, putting the party machine in order at local and national level and using all available means including its monopoly of the media.
At the same time other political groupings are preparing themselves too. They are trying to obtain registration as political parties and demanding a fair chance to make themselves known and heard by the electorate. The principal opposition parties are:
• The Parti Social-Imberakuri, (PS) with Bernard Ntaganda as its original President, formed by ex-members of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) which they left because they were frustrated that the PSD remained tied to the FPR.
• The Democratic Green Party, with a leadership drawn mainly from the Anglophones, is seen by many as an expression of discontent from within the FPR. Its President is Frank Habineza and its Secretary General Charles Kabanda, one of the founders of the FPR in the 80’s in Uganda.
• The FDU-Inkingi whose President, Victoire Ingabire, returned in mid-January to stand as a presidential candidate after an absence of 17 years.
The regime does not consider that these parties enrich Rwanda’s political life.
In 2009, the Parti Social Imberakuri tried to organise four congresses. Three of them were stopped by the regime for procedural reasons but one was held in June.The PS Imberakuri was recognised as a party in July 2009. Throughout this period the party president, Bernard Ntaganda, made very critical speeches on a number of social, political and judicial issues of concern to the people. For many Rwandans the fact that the regime was apparently allowing Ntaganda to speak so openly was an indication that there could be positive change and a new political openness.
In the end an offensive against Bernard Ntaganda was launched from within his own party. The Secretary General of the PSI, Noel Hakizimfura, accused his president of « divisionism and genocidal ideology ». In February Hakizimfura and another party member were expelled from the party for having accepted money from the FPR in order to destabilize the PSI. On Tuesday evening 16 March 2010, some leading members of the PS-Imberakuri were taken to the headquarters of the FPR where they were ordered to organise a party convention the following day, 17 March, to remove Ntaganda from his post. The convention was held and the party vice-president, Christine Mukabunani, declared afterwards that Bernard Ntaganda was no longer president of the party. As a result the institutional framework of the PSI has become very unclear.
In her case, Victoire Ingabire had for a long time been preparing her bid for the presidency of Rwanda from Holland where she had been living for 17 years. Ingabire arrived on Saturday 16 January in Rwanda: "I am ready to canvass for my candidature for head of state and victory is certain", she declared soon after stepping on to the tarmac at Kigali international airport. Her candidature and her direct way of speaking immediately caused tension within the regime which responded with immediate verbal aggression including in the media. Almost immediately she went to place flowers at the Gisozi Memorial. In part of her speech she said: "The road to reconciliation is still long. This memorial only commemorates the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsis, whereas there were also massacres of Hutus », clearly alluding to the crimes committed in 1994 by members of the former Tutsi rebellion by the Rwanda Popular Front (FPR), now in power. “The Hutus who killed Tutsis must understand that they have to be punished. It is the same for the Tutsis who have killed Hutus." This declaration caused fury on the part of genocide victims, the media and the authorities who accused her of propagating “negativism”.
Since 10 February she has regularly been summoned by the police for investigation which has been very time consuming and has hindered her other activities and in which she has been accused of spreading « genocidal ideology, divisionism and contact with the FDLR”. Up to now no formal charges have been brought but a legal framework has been created which can lead to charges simply by transferring the police file to the courts.
At the same time the FDU-Inkingi was trying to organise its constituent assembly. This had not been formally forbidden by anyone but Ingabire faced “Kafkaesque” behaviour on the part of the authorities. The commune was willing to authorize the assembly on condition that the police would confirm that they would be present to ensure security. The police would be happy to ensure security provided that the commune gives its written authorisation, and so...
On 13 March, she received a letter from the communal authorities which forbade her to organise political meetings since she was subject to police investigation i.e. the February police interrogation was being used to prevent her exercising political rights today. She wanted to react by holding a press conference but all the hotels where she had booked a meeting room were threatened and cancelled the booking at the last minute.
The newest opposition party is the Green Democratic Party, launched in August 2009 in Kigali, with the aim of creating a genuine and broad-based opposition with a progressive and ecological vision. This party has also been stopped several times in its efforts to organise its meetings. Faced with this situation, the three parties mentioned have set up a common structure (Conseil de Concertation Permanent des Partis de l’Opposition) in the hope that this coordination will enable them to widen the democratic “space” by having a common position on certain subjects and joint lobbying nationally and internationally.
However, these groups, acting alone or together, are very fragile faced with a regime which has no desire for real debate during the elections and which is restricting democratic space through :
• Its monopoly of the media, which continually demonize the opposition parties and their leaders.
• Verbal and physical intimidation of opposition parties, their leaders, members and activists.
• The creation of a legal framework in which proceedings can be brought very rapidly and where the opposition finds it hard to defend itself (since accusations of spreading genocidal ideology and divisionism are very broad and not clearly defined in law. This terminology is applied to all those who have a different understanding than the official one of the recent history of Rwanda. This means it can be used to paralyse the leaders of the opposition and to prevent them carrying out their daily duties and exercising their political rights.)
• An administrative policy which aims to prevent opposition groups being registered, setting themselves up, organising meetings or making themselves known to the general public. In this way two of the parties mentioned above have not yet been registered, while the third has not been given the right to organise activities on the ground.
• Infiltration of opposition parties in order to destabilise them from within.
These strategies do not necessarily imply that the regime wants completely to ban the opposition. It could easily have done that before. Perhaps it wants first to slow down the opposition, to stop it getting through to the people with a message different from its own and to stop it gaining credibility. The opposition leaders I have met fear that the government will prevent them getting registration in March. The process cannot go forward in April, the month when the country is loaded with emotions, with ceremonies and activities commemorating the genocide. This would mean starting again in May. If the authorities use the same delaying tactics it is not unlikely that opposition political parties would only be recognised several weeks before the elections. In this case they would take part in the elections without any normal preparation for the campaign or for the vote and without a chance of getting through to the electorate.
2) Hawks on the run
On Wednesday 3 March, President Kagame accused two high ranking Rwandan officers of attempting to destabilise Rwanda: the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, and General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army and Ambassador to India who had also fled to South Africa, according to the Rwandan judiciary. "Nobody, not a single person, not even Kayumba, can make a coup d'etat here. Think about it and you will conclude that no-one can make a coup d'etat in Rwanda”, President Kagame insisted. Around the same time the state prosecutor, Martin Ngoga, accused General Kayumba Nyamwasa of the grenade attacks of 19 February. For a long time these two soldiers originating from the Ugandan Anglophone diaspora had been among the regime’s key personalities.
Patrick Karegeya was not only the former intelligence chief, he was also the main man running the Congo Desk, a bureau run by the External Security Department which was created in order to manage the exploitation of the wealth of eastern DRC, the income from which did not appear in official government accounts. This system enabled the army and political leaders to conceal huge sums of money. In all the discussions and documents relating to the official withdrawal of the Rwandan army from the Congo in September 2002 it has been very hard to distinguish precisely between the role of the Rwandan state and that of the non-state political and military lobbies as regards the illicit exploitation of Congolese resources and the support given to military groups such as the CNDP. In the shadowy zone between the state and the Rwandan lobbies, Patrick Karegeya and the Congo Desk occupied a central position.
Kayumba Nyamwasa grew up in the south of Uganda and he became one of the most powerful people in the Rwanda army. He led the military campaigns in the north east of the country in the years following the genocide. In 2001 he was replaced as head of the army by General Emmanuel Habyarimana, who was himself later replaced by James Kaberebe. Kayumba was sent for training to the United Kingdom. In 2004, he was appointed ambassador to India. Political insiders in Rwanda have always believed that this appointment (and even sending him earlier to England) was a step taken by President Kagame to remove Kayumba from the centre of politico-military affairs in Rwanda as he was starting to build his own base within the core group of power in Rwanda.
In November 2006, the French judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, issued an international arrest warrant against Kayumba and eight other high ranking military men close to Kagame in connexion with the enquiry into the attack on President Juvénal Habyarimana’s airplane on 6 April 1994 which triggered the genocide. In February 2008, the Spanish magistrate, Fernando Andreu Merelles, issued fourty arrest warrants against senior officers in the Rwanda army (including Kayumba) for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism committed in Rwanda and in the DRC between 1 October 1990 and 2002. The cases had been submitted to the Spanish courts in 2000 by relatives of Spanish victims killed in Rwanda, religious and humanitarian workers and by exiled Rwandan organisations.
In an interview after his arrival in South Africa General Kayumba spoke of the transformation of Kagame’s regime into a dictatorship and of his own commitment to a democratic Rwanda. One must, however, make a distinction between hawks and doves inside Rwanda’s power structure – but Kayumba is most certainly no dove…
3) Déo Mushayidi
On Saturday 6 March 2010, the Rwandan authorities confirmed the arrest of the opposition leader, Déo Mushayidi. Mushayidi, had been living in recent months in Tanzania, was arrested by Tanzanian police in the town of Bukoba. On 4 March, he was taken to the Burundi frontier and transferred by the Burundian police to Bujumbura. On Friday 5 March he was extradited to Rwanda, despite the absence of an international arrest warrant or even any kind of legal procedure, and transferred to Kicukiro police station, Kigali.
Born in 1961 in the south east of Rwanda, Mushayidi was a genocide survivor who in 1995 resigned his post as assistant to the Secretary-General of the FPR, Major Théogène Rudasingwa. He became a journalist on several papers e.g. l’Ere de Liberté, Imboni where he began to denounce human rights violations and corruption. In 1996, he was elected president of the Association of Journalists of Rwanda (AJIR). He also became Executive Secretary of the Centre for the Promotion of Freedom of Expression and Tolerance in the Great Lakes Region. In 2000, persecuted and slandered by the government media, he requested and was granted asylum in Belgium.
There he involved himself in a number of political movements including the monarchist Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation (ADRN), Igihango and the Intwari Partnership in order to create in 2008 the Pact for the Defence of the People (PDP) of which he remains president until today. He left Belgium in order to continue his political activities closer to Rwanda.
After his arrest, Déo Mushayidi was accused of being implicated in the grenade attacks and of working with Kayumba et Karegeya. Amnesty International has organised an emergency action to support him.
4) The cracks in the mirror
The traditional opposition is not the main concern of the Rwandan regime at the present moment. When you have almost complete control over the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, when an independent press has almost completely disappeared, when that section of opinion which has not openly sided with you has attained an extraordinary level of sophistication in the noble art of self-censorship, when for a large part of national and international opinion you represent the ending of genocide and the return to stability, you are not going to lose the elections. Not against Victoire Ingabire who has not played any role in Rwandan public life and is therefore not known by the electorate in Rwanda. Not against Bernard Ntaganda either – his team is unstable and easily manipulated. And not against Frank Habineza, even though he has worked with people close to you including the first president (i.e. one of the first dissidents) of your country. They have a party which was still not in existence a year ago and which is not certain to be recognised in time to take part in the elections.
The Democratic Green Party is not going to defeat the FPR in the elections but it is making the regime nervous. This is because it shows how the Rwandan elite, the inner circle of power is losing its cohesion. This is not the only indication and it is not new, but Kayumba’s departure, the arrest of Mushayidi and the emergence of the Democratic Green Party prove that what the government sees when it looks in the mirror can be seen by everybody, not just by the government itself.
Nothing grows underneath a baobab
Part of the problem of tension inside the regime has nothing to do with the specific context of Rwanda. After the death of Fred Rwigema on the second day of the FPR armed struggle in October 1990, Paul Kagame took over the command of the rebellion and he still commands it today. He was the strong man during the war and after the victory, even though he reserved for himself the role of Minister of Defense, leaving Pasteur Bizimungu to head the institutions of state. This did not prevent anybody, inside Rwanda or not, being aware that it was he who was really running the country. Many in the international community had a high opinion of him: after the fall of the Mobutu generation, Kagame was for some people the incarnation of a new type of African leadership with an inspiring vision, an ability to mobilise and effective enough to achieve palpable and, in some areas, even spectacular results.
However, he is following the same track as other African heads of state (e.g. Museveni and Mugabe). His self-confidence is turning to arrogance and reading carefully the list of key people (high ranking military personnel, ministers, ambassadors) who have left the country shows that his rule has developed a self-destructive tendency, sawing off the branch on which he is sitting. Like Museveni, Mugabe and so many others, Kagame is turning himself into the “Roi Soleil” with no heir, a baobab tree beneath which nothing can grow.
Part of the discontent within the party and the associated community results from a build up of frustration among those who hang on to the coat tails of power without having access to it, people who thought that the FPR could be the motive force to drag them out of poverty. They can see people they grew up with in the refugee camps in Uganda who are now billionaires but they see no way in to that closed circle.
A generational aspect to their exclusion from power is also developing. The generation which took up arms won the war and took over the running of the country invested a lot in the education of their sons and daughters who are now returning home. Their intellectual and technical level far exceeds that of their fathers’ generation and they want to play a leading role in running the country.
International justice: The sword of Damocles
The legal procedures initiated by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière in France and Fernando Andreu Merelles in Spain have badly shaken the inner circle of power. The Rwanda government can rely on the loyalty of a number of countries and international institutions, and this is at least partly based on feelings of guilt on the part of the international community for not having been able to prevent the genocide (and, frankly, not having tried too much to prevent it).
To preserve international support it is vital for the Rwandan regime to be sure of the interpretation the world makes of Rwanda’s recent history. Since 1994, the country has been managed in a psychological climate of winners of the war versus its losers, the victims of the crimes against their executioners, in which, for example, a whole system has been put in place through the gacaca courts to deal with crimes of genocide against Tutsis while at the same time there is a complete taboo regarding crimes committed by the FPR since the start of the war. This taboo reduces the positive effect that gacaca should have been able to have: instead of being the means of taking on board its traumatic past, gacaca has become a strategy for consolidating the winners/victims versus losers/ criminals scenario.
It is true that the initiatives of de Bruguière and Andreu are very irritating. They disrupt the picture and spoil the image. And they lead to worry on the part of those who feel concerned. Even though it is highly improbable that the current leaders of Rwanda would be brought to trial in France or Spain, perhaps the image the country wishes to present is not tenable in the medium term. It cannot be ruled out, even if this does not happen tomorrow, that the question will become: « What are we going to admit ? Who shall we sacrifice?». Such questions do not greatly help to create cohesion. The immediate future of Kayumba is a major concern of the regime. What will he say and before what audience? What if he is extradited to Spain? Hence the pressure on the South African government to send him back to Rwanda.
Rwanda’s involvement in the Congo
Since 1996 the Congo has taken a lot of space in Rwanda’s foreign policy, and on several occasions what happened in the Congo has been a bone of contention which has haunted the regime. For example Kayumba was opposed to the confrontation with Uganda in 2000 and 2002.
A recent example is the arrest of Laurent Nkunda at the start of the joint operation, Umoja Wetu. The operation was led by John Numbi (for the Congo) and James Kabarebe (for Rwanda) and one of the first actions was to arrest Laurent Nkunda who was the subject of a plan by Bosco Ntaganda to replace him at the head of the CNDP. This arrest provoked much animosity in Rwanda, not only in Congolese Rwandophone refugee circles and camps in Rwanda, but also in the army. After all, Nkunda had served in the FPR and elements of the FPR had served in Nkunda forces. This collaboration created strong links and common interests.
Clearly a great part of the Congo’s importance for Rwanda is the illegal trafficking of the Congo’s resources through Rwanda. This traffic is evidently not controlled by the Congo government but a good part is also outside the control of the Rwanda government even though it serves the interests of key people in the Rwandan politico-military establishment. Such business interests can be very various and do not always contribute to the cohesion of the regime either. It is partly for this reason that one can understand the nervousness about the current obligation that the Rwandan rulers must report their wealth and their income transparently.
Directly linked to the Rwandan involvement in the Congo is the problem of demobilised soldiers. Now that a direct presence in the Congo is no longer an option, Rwanda finds itself with much too large an army. Part of the surplus can be deployed by the African Union but that is a limited option. The remainder has to be demobilised, and many of these ex-soldiers feel basically abandoned by the regime which they have fought for, often in very tough circumstances.
The language issue
We all know about the linguistic tension in Rwanda: the FPR introduced English since the rebellion was led by those who had grown up in Uganda. The fact that they had taken power gave English a much more important status in the public life of the country than could be imagined from the numbers that actually spoke it. Over the years the balance has gradually shifted in favour of English and this was accompanied by a feeling of discrimination among many Francophones.
A decisive moment was in 2008 when English was recognised as the official language in education. For some this was a visionary decision to open up the country to the regional, continental and global reality; for others it was a decision to set in stone the ambition of a minority regime to monopolize communication and the country’s intellectual life, to dominate the country’s youth, to rewrite history and in the end to take control of the country’s collective memory.
Quite independently of the point of view from which this question is viewed, it is obvious that the decision has strengthened some and marginalised others. It deepens the already existing gulf between those who came out of Uganda and formed the nucleus of the regime and the others, where genocide survivors found themselves in an even more uncomfortable situation than that found by those who returned from Burundi or the Congo in 1994.
Power and the clan structure
The clan structure around the Rwanda royal family, even though it has not reigned for over half a century, is still seen by many as a factor. The monarchist movement around King Kigeli V (currently in the United States) continues to play a political role and it wants to participate in running the country. Some Rwandan analysts point out that membership of these clans is an important aspect of the identity of a number of those currently active on the political stage. In particular the ancestral tension between Banyiginya and Bega is one of the cracks which enable us better to understand the goings on side the power structure: Kagame is a Mwega, whereas Kayumba, Karegeya, Nyetera, Kazura, Sebarenzi and many others are Banyiginya.
I am not at all an expert in this subject to understand to what degree clans play a serious role in the present situation but I thought I should at least mention it.
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Conclusion: More questions than answers.
Is the Rwandan regime in crisis? It is possible, certainly. Given the over-reaction of the authorities when confronted by new situations on the ground, we get the impression that the regime believes so, even while the authorities keep declaring that everything is under control. Is the reign of the FPR approaching its end? I meet many people who hope so, but that remains to be seen. Even though I believe that the Rwanda government is not working towards a lasting solution to its problems, it seems clear that the control which it has established remains solid based as it is on a culture of silence and a tradition of obedience to authority. Is the country about to implode again? We definitely hope it isn’t. It is very hard to imagine that Rwanda and its people have anything to gain from that, and any such event would have serious consequences for the whole region – for the essential but fragile peace process in Burundi for example; or for the people in eastern Congo who have seen many changes since the Umoja Wetu operation without any resulting sign of future lasting peace.
What is certain is that things are not going well. People are not comparing the situation with the pre-electoral atmosphere in 2003 but with that of 1993. The grenade attacks have provoked fear. The question: « Who threw them? » remains unanswered. Victoire Ingabire and the presidents of the other opposition parties simply want a really free and transparent electoral process. For them the present climate is counter productive. Kayumba ? There are plenty of precedents in the history of post-colonial Africa of generals trying to take power but I do not remember any case where they began their campaign by throwing grenades at a bus stop. The FDLR? I have just been in eastern Congo and I had a strong impression that the FDLR had other things on their mind. Déo Mushayidi? Frustrated demobilised soldiers? People who were angry because they found that Sarkozy was not forced to make a proper apology (that was one of the suggestions I heard)? Not very likely. In fact there are no probable explanations but one of the least improbable ones is that the regime itself organised the attacks so as to create a climate where citizens could be arrested and intimidated. I met many people who were frightened and there were others I was not able to meet as they were so frightened that they did not dare meet me.
The pre-electoral situation remains volatile. It is hard to foresee what Rwanda will be like during and after the elections if the opposition remains muzzled, harassed or crushed. It is important for the Rwandan regime to receive signals from the international community that it must stop this intimidation. At the present time this community gives the impression that it is not at all concerned. It seems to believe that the pre-election tension was predictable, that the situation is under control, that the nervousness might increase a little before the election but that in the end Kagame will win with a comfortable, even crushing, majority. Then the international community will continue business as usual. This is a rather weak analysis. It underestimates the destabilising potential of the present situation and it serves very badly the chances for democracy in Rwanda in the medium and longer term.
From our point of view we must recommend that the international community put pressure on the regime to take measures that will help create political stability in Rwanda and the holding of truly free and transparent elections. Such pressures should principally consist of:
• Urging the regime not to refuse to register opposition parties, not to prevent them from working on the ground and not destroying them;
• Stopping political and police harassment of the leaders and members of the opposition;
• Asking the government not to use the public media to demonise its opponents;
• Demand that a new electoral law be published and an independent electoral commission be set up;
• Rapidly deploy an international electoral observer mission.
Beyond the immediate question of the election, it is really important for the FPR to reverse trend to restriction and exclusion and to put its effort into solving the antagonisms which exist, but this falls outside the Terms of Reference of my March visit. EurAc will come back to this matter in a future document.
For further details:
Kris Berwouts
Rue des Tanneurs, 165 B - 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2 213 04 000
E-mail: kris.berwouts@eurac-network.org
www.eurac-network.org
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