Press Release
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
29 May 2010
Press Contacts:
David Gespass, National Lawyers Guild: +1-205-566-2530
Gena Berglund. International Humanitarian Law Institute of Minnesota: +1-651-208-7964
Emira Woods, Institute for Policy Studies: +1-301-523-2979
International Human Rights Advocates join Erlinder family to condemn Rwanda's arrest of U.S. Attorney Peter Erlinder and demand his immediate release.
Saturday, May 29, 2010 (Washington, DC) –Professor Peter Erlinder, a faculty member at William Mitchell College of Law in the United States and President of the Association des Avocats de la Defense (ADAD), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Defense Lawyers Association, was arrested by the government of Rwanda under President Paul Kagame. Mr. Erlinder has been arrested in the course of his representation of Rwandan opposition leader Victoire Ingabire.
Mr. Erlinder’s arrest was politically motivated and seeks only to punish him for fulfilling his responsibilities as a lawyer, to be a vigorous and conscientious advocate for his clients. The Rwandan government and President Kagame must allow fair and public trials. Mr. Erlinder’s advocacy is in the finest tradition of the legal profession and every individual and government committed to the rule of law, including the authorities in Rwanda, should applaud his dedication to human rights and international law.
As international human rights activists, we join the Erlinder family to call on the United States government, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals around the world to prevail upon Rwanda to release Mr. Erlinder immediately. The U.S. has had a longstanding special relationship with Rwanda, which remains one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in Africa. Given the U.S. government's often expressed commitment to promoting democracy and the rule of law, it is absolutely critical that the Obama Administration and the U.S. Congress uphold these values in Rwanda and demand the immediate release of Peter Erlinder, an advocate of justice and the rule of law.
"Professor Erlinder has been acting in the best tradition of the legal profession and has been a vigorous advocate in his representation of his clients. There can be no justice for anyone if the state can silence lawyers for representing defendants it dislikes. A government that seeks to prevent lawyers from being vigorous advocates for their clients cannot be trusted. The entire National Lawyers Guild is honored by Erlinder's membership, his leadership as past president and his courageous advocacy," said David Gespass, President of the National Lawyers Guild.
"The offense Peter is charged with is not based on facts, but on the suppression of free speech in his representation of clients, which undermines the rule of law. His family knows he stands with people who are oppressed by those in power and he encourages people to stand up for justice," said Masako Usui, wife of Peter Erlinder.
"The real issue here seems to be whether the U.S. and the world will stand by and allow my father to be detained and prosecuted for doing his job, as an attorney and advocate for his clients. After a career of defense of others, he needs our help now demanding his immediate release and dismissal of all charges." said Sarah Erlinder, daughter of Peter Erlinder.
"The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) is outraged at the arrest of Peter Erlinder in Rwanda. This arrest violates the rights and privileges of lawyers in discharging their professional responsibilities, constitutes a willful obstruction of the judicial process and is in gross violation of the rights of defense of an accused person," said Jeanne Mirer, President of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers.
29 May, 2010
RPF and Rwandan Police Urged to Stop Meddling in PS-Imberakuri Political Activities.
By Maitre NTAGANDA Bernard
PS-IMBERAKURI
Founder and Chairman
May 27, 2010
PRESS RELEASE No. 005/P.S. IMB/010
Following the surprised attack led by the Commander of the Police of the City of Kigali in the company with the Representative of the Police of the District of Nyarugenge;
Referring also to the press conference held by one of the leaders of the PS Power; RPF political wing in the person of Mrs. Christine MUKABUNANI on Thursday, May 27, 2010;
The Social Party IMBERAKURI would like to inform the Rwandan population and the international community in general and the IMBERAKURI in particular, the following:
ARTICLE 1:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI condemns the police command, which continues to meddle in political activities in order to undermine the Social Party IMBERAKURI since its inception. The Social Party IMBERAKURI especially condemns the police commander in the City of Kigali with the Representative of the Police of the District of Nyarugenge who, accompanied with a huge number of policemen tried to enter the permanence of our party on May 26, 2010 to conduct warrantless searches. This irresponsible act has caused unrest and confrontations with militants of the Social Party IMBERAKURI who have come to participate in a press conference on that day.
ARTICLE 2:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI leadership continues to urge the Kigali Government led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that the struggles it has itself initiated within the Social Party IMBERAKURI must be resolved peacefully according to the laws instead of using violent means like what happened February 21, 2010 when the Social Party IMBERAKURI was attacked by a gang of criminals with the connivance of the police. The PS IMBERAKURI leadership found that one of the leaders of the PS Power; RPF political wing, Mrs. Christine MUKABUNANI in her press conference on May 27, 2010, stated that she was taking the path of the courts to find a solution to the problems created by RPF in our party. This is a sign of desperation as she does no longer know who to turn to.
ARTICLE 3:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI is very concerned by the new methods adopted by the Kigali Government which consist in splitting the political parties opposed to the RPF into two rival factions to hide its real intentions which are to liquidate its opponents and finally turn and criminalize the rival side for the crime. The population of Rwanda and the international community must not forget so soon that the parties created by the MRND, labeled as POWER parties, have played a great role in liquidation of different politicians and have contributed significantly to the tragedy experienced by the country particularly in 1994.
ARTICLE 4:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI is deeply concerned by the diabolical plan hatched by the Government in Kigali led by the RPF to imprison Me NTAGANDA Bernard, Founder and Chairman of the Party PS- IMBERAKURI. Currently he is being hunted down on the pretext that he would have kidnapped journalists came to attend the press conference on May 26, 2010 as stated by the spokesman of the police, who knowingly omitted to mention that everyone was locked inside the meeting room for safety reasons. The Social Party IMBERAKURI would like to recall that no one has complained to the police for this incident.
Done in Kigali
May 27, 2010
Maitre NTAGANDA, Bernard (Se)
PS-IMBERAKURI
Founder and Chairman
PS-IMBERAKURI
Founder and Chairman
May 27, 2010
PRESS RELEASE No. 005/P.S. IMB/010
Following the surprised attack led by the Commander of the Police of the City of Kigali in the company with the Representative of the Police of the District of Nyarugenge;
Referring also to the press conference held by one of the leaders of the PS Power; RPF political wing in the person of Mrs. Christine MUKABUNANI on Thursday, May 27, 2010;
The Social Party IMBERAKURI would like to inform the Rwandan population and the international community in general and the IMBERAKURI in particular, the following:
ARTICLE 1:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI condemns the police command, which continues to meddle in political activities in order to undermine the Social Party IMBERAKURI since its inception. The Social Party IMBERAKURI especially condemns the police commander in the City of Kigali with the Representative of the Police of the District of Nyarugenge who, accompanied with a huge number of policemen tried to enter the permanence of our party on May 26, 2010 to conduct warrantless searches. This irresponsible act has caused unrest and confrontations with militants of the Social Party IMBERAKURI who have come to participate in a press conference on that day.
ARTICLE 2:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI leadership continues to urge the Kigali Government led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that the struggles it has itself initiated within the Social Party IMBERAKURI must be resolved peacefully according to the laws instead of using violent means like what happened February 21, 2010 when the Social Party IMBERAKURI was attacked by a gang of criminals with the connivance of the police. The PS IMBERAKURI leadership found that one of the leaders of the PS Power; RPF political wing, Mrs. Christine MUKABUNANI in her press conference on May 27, 2010, stated that she was taking the path of the courts to find a solution to the problems created by RPF in our party. This is a sign of desperation as she does no longer know who to turn to.
ARTICLE 3:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI is very concerned by the new methods adopted by the Kigali Government which consist in splitting the political parties opposed to the RPF into two rival factions to hide its real intentions which are to liquidate its opponents and finally turn and criminalize the rival side for the crime. The population of Rwanda and the international community must not forget so soon that the parties created by the MRND, labeled as POWER parties, have played a great role in liquidation of different politicians and have contributed significantly to the tragedy experienced by the country particularly in 1994.
ARTICLE 4:
The Social Party IMBERAKURI is deeply concerned by the diabolical plan hatched by the Government in Kigali led by the RPF to imprison Me NTAGANDA Bernard, Founder and Chairman of the Party PS- IMBERAKURI. Currently he is being hunted down on the pretext that he would have kidnapped journalists came to attend the press conference on May 26, 2010 as stated by the spokesman of the police, who knowingly omitted to mention that everyone was locked inside the meeting room for safety reasons. The Social Party IMBERAKURI would like to recall that no one has complained to the police for this incident.
Done in Kigali
May 27, 2010
Maitre NTAGANDA, Bernard (Se)
PS-IMBERAKURI
Founder and Chairman
Major Update on the Arrest of Peter Erlinder.
At 7:00 AM Kigali time, an attorney working with Mr. Erlinder talked with Mr. Scott Dargus at the US Embassy in Kigali. He identified Mr. Erlinder's police handler as Mr. Eric Karonga, whose phone number is +250-0788-1155 (If this doesn't work try dropping the lead zero in front of the 7). The lawyer called him and he said to call back in an hour as he was in a meeting. Mr. Erlinder has a legal right to see a lawyer and so the lawyer went to the CID HQ to meet Mr. Karonga. After waiting for over an hour, Mr. Karonga took the lawyer to meet Tony (Tomy?) Kuramba. He said he was to busy to meet and told the lawyer to go back to their hotel and call in an hour. Mr. Kuramba's number is +250-0788-311-164 (same recommendation as above). He said at that time, he would allow the lawyer to meet with Mr. Erlinder. After calling an hour later, the lawyer was told they would not be allowed to see Mr. Erlinder without a letter from the Chairman of the Rwandan Bar Association stating that this individual is Mr. Erlinder's lawyer. The name and number of the Chairman was not provided. After 2 hours the Chairman was tracked down and he spoke little English (or pretended he did). An interpreter was hired and a meeting is set with the Chairman to obtain the letter. Currently, Mr. Erlinder is being denied his right to legal counsel. More to come as WNJ recieves reports.....
Update 1 (8:06 PM Kigali Time) - Mr. Kurt Kerns, one of the lawyers who accompanied Mr. Erlinder to Rwanda, was able to see and meet with Mr. Erlinder at his jail cell today. Mr. Kerns reports that Mr. Erlinder is in good health and has not been tortured. WNJ will continue to update as we monitor the situation.
Update 2 (9:10 PM Kigali Time) - From the activist circuit: "We got Congressman Jackson's office to call the State Department and they found out that people from the US Embassy were with him when he was arrested and stayed with him. On Friday, he was safe and his human rights were not being violated but he was being questioned. State is on this and the Embassy is on it. Senator Dick Durbin was also supposed to be talking with Secretary Clinton about Peter yesterday afternoon."
In Congressional circles - U.S. Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Erlinder's home state) Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota said her office is working with the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda to make sure that Mr. Erlinder "is treated well and that the legal process works quickly and fairly so he can come home."
Senator Klobuchar said on Friday she spoke to U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda W. Stuart Symington, a longtime friend of hers, and he told her that embassy officials met with Mr. Erlinder soon after his arrest and reported that he is in good health.
"I know Professor Erlinder as a long-standing member of Minnesota's legal community. Our thoughts and prayers are with him and his family," Sen. Klobuchar said in a statement.
For his part, Mr. Erlinder is busy assembling a team of lawyers to represent him in court. The ICCDA hired one attorney to help his case, but the attorney was not allowed to see Mr. Erlinder on Saturday.
Update 1 (8:06 PM Kigali Time) - Mr. Kurt Kerns, one of the lawyers who accompanied Mr. Erlinder to Rwanda, was able to see and meet with Mr. Erlinder at his jail cell today. Mr. Kerns reports that Mr. Erlinder is in good health and has not been tortured. WNJ will continue to update as we monitor the situation.
Update 2 (9:10 PM Kigali Time) - From the activist circuit: "We got Congressman Jackson's office to call the State Department and they found out that people from the US Embassy were with him when he was arrested and stayed with him. On Friday, he was safe and his human rights were not being violated but he was being questioned. State is on this and the Embassy is on it. Senator Dick Durbin was also supposed to be talking with Secretary Clinton about Peter yesterday afternoon."
In Congressional circles - U.S. Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Erlinder's home state) Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota said her office is working with the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda to make sure that Mr. Erlinder "is treated well and that the legal process works quickly and fairly so he can come home."
Senator Klobuchar said on Friday she spoke to U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda W. Stuart Symington, a longtime friend of hers, and he told her that embassy officials met with Mr. Erlinder soon after his arrest and reported that he is in good health.
"I know Professor Erlinder as a long-standing member of Minnesota's legal community. Our thoughts and prayers are with him and his family," Sen. Klobuchar said in a statement.
For his part, Mr. Erlinder is busy assembling a team of lawyers to represent him in court. The ICCDA hired one attorney to help his case, but the attorney was not allowed to see Mr. Erlinder on Saturday.
Cracks in the Mirror as Rwanda Prepares for Presidential Elections.
By Kris Berwouts,
Director of EurAc
Post-field visit report
March 2010
I visited Rwanda during the second week of March 2010. In recent years I have often passed through this country which I have been visiting since 1997, usually in transit to Goma, Bukavu or Bujumbura. Each time I have taken advantage and met some personal or professional contacts, but since 2007 I have never stayed more than 24 hours.I have, of course, always kept up to date with what was happening in Rwanda and, together with my colleagues at EurAc, I have made a continuing effort to provide information to understand the issues better and to discuss them objectively. Such a « leitmotiv » is relevant everywhere but it is especially important in the case of Rwanda: here very often the arguments between “believers” and “non- believers” are like the deaf listening to the dumb.In the weeks just before my arrival it was possible to feel considerable tension building up in the country. Of course we all expected the space for political dialogue to be reduced in the months leading to the election. The demonization of Victoire Ingabire when she returned to the country to lead a campaign for president as the candidate of the opposition party, FDU-Inkingi, led to increasing aggression against the other opposition parties present inside the country. On 19 February, a Friday evening, various well frequented places in the capital were the subject of three grenade attacks at the height of the rush hour resulting in two deaths and several people wounded. The Rwanda media first accused the FDLR, then Victoire Ingabire for these attacks. On Thursday 4 March 2010 in two further, almost simultaneous, bomb attacks in Kigali 16 more people were wounded. These acts of violence were followed by a wave of accusations and arrests.
In the time between the two attacks, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa left the country and went to South Africa. After his departure this former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army was accused of being behind the grenade attacks of 19 February and of being associated with the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, who has been in South Africa since 2007.
On Saturday 6 March, the Rwanda authorities announced the arrest in Burundi of an opposition activist, Déo Mushayidi, accused by Kigali of being one of the authors of the recent grenade attacks. Gradually the bomb throwers started to outnumber the bombs.
You can understand that I did not know very well what to expect. As the days went by I had a problem knowing exactly why the situation seemed to me to be different from what it was the other times I had visited the country. I noticed that the people felt fear, but that had long been the case. I saw a closing up of the political space but this had often been experienced before. I had not remembered grenade attacks in the recent past (but a little research after my return told me that there had been in April and December 2008 and in April and July 2009), but at the same time I had the impression that the grenades were a symptom rather than a cause of events. It was my wish and my duty to bring together all these bits of information in one solid piece of analysis.
Finally what was really new dawned on me: I was watching a régime which was primarily not fighting its enemies; it was struggling to prevent its own disintegration. For ten years we had speculated about divisions within the inner circle of power. We always realized that there were disagreements but no-one could help me precisely define these divisions. Today when the régime looks at itself in the mirror it can see the cracks that belie the united and serene image which it wants to show to the public in Rwanda and internationally. The régime has come face to face with its own fragility; it is nervous and is reacting out of all proportion.
You will read in the following pages my findings, my impressions and my analysis. This does not reflect EurAc’s official position. It is based on the reflections of a single person and only he is committed by it – a person who, as usual, returns from a visit with more questions than answers.
Kris Berwouts
Director, EurAc
21 March 2010
1) Open debate in a closed political context?
Rwanda is not accustomed to open debate. Over the years the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the party which has been in power since 1994 has built up a control over public life (including the political and judicial organs) on the lines of a one party system despite the existence of a number of other satellite political parties which operate on the fringes of power thanks to their basic loyalty to that power.
The electoral cycle (2001 – 2003) which marked the end of the transition period was organised with no open debate: the only opposition party, ADEP-Mizero, was never registered, and the main independent candidates for the presidential elections were disqualified just before the vote. President Kagame won his elections with a stalinist 95% of votes following a campaign marred by the disappearances, arrests and intimidation of voters, candidates and observers. The European Union found irregularities and serious fraud in both the legislative and presidential elections of 2003. The EU observation mission had similar findings during the legislative elections of September 2008. Although the wording of the report and in the declarations made at the time of its publication was very diplomatic and tried to avoid confrontation with the Rwandan régime, several of those who took part in this mission reported voting irregularities, in the handling of ballot boxes and in counting votes.
It is now four and a half months until the presidential elections due on 9 August 2010. The ruling party is taking them very seriously and making preparations, putting the party machine in order at local and national level and using all available means including its monopoly of the media.
At the same time other political groupings are preparing themselves too. They are trying to obtain registration as political parties and demanding a fair chance to make themselves known and heard by the electorate. The principal opposition parties are:
• The Parti Social Imberakuri, (PSI) with Bernard Ntaganda as President, formed by ex-members of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) which they left because they were frustrated that the PSD remained tied to the FPR.
• The Democratic Green Party, with a leadership drawn mainly from the Anglophones, is seen by many as an expression of discontent from within the FPR. Its President is Frank Habineza and its Secretary General Charles Kabanda, one of the founders of the FPR in the 80’s in Uganda.
• The FDU-Inkingi whose President, Victoire Ingabire, returned in mid-January to stand as a presidential candidate after an absence of 17 years.
The regime does not consider that these parties enrich Rwanda’s political life.
In 2009, the Parti Social Imberakuri tried to organise four congresses. Three of them were stopped by the regime for procedural reasons but one was held in June.The PS Imberakuri was recognised as a party in July 2009. Throughout this period the party president, Bernard Ntaganda, made very critical speeches on a number of social, political and judicial issues of concern to the people. For many Rwandans the fact that the regime was apparently allowing Ntaganda to speak so openly was an indication that there could be positive change and a new political openness.
In the end an offensive against Bernard Ntaganda was launched from within his own party. The Secretary General of the PSI, Noel Hakizimfura, accused his president of « divisionism and genocidal ideology ». In February Hakizimfura and another party member were expelled from the party for having accepted money from the FPR in order to destabilize the PSI. On Tuesday evening 16 March 2010, some leading members of the PS-Imberakuri were taken to the headquarters of the FPR where they were ordered to organise a party convention the following day, 17 March, to remove Ntaganda from his post. The convention was held and the party vice-president, Christine Mukabunani, declared afterwards that Bernard Ntaganda was no longer president of the party. As a result the institutional framework of the PSI has become very unclear.
In her case, Victoire Ingabire had for a long time been preparing her bid for the presidency of Rwanda from Holland where she had been living for 17 years. Ingabire arrived on Saturday 16 January in Rwanda: "I am ready to canvass for my candidature for head of state and victory is certain", she declared soon after stepping on to the tarmac at Kigali international airport. Her candidature and her direct way of speaking immediately caused tension within the regime which responded with immediate verbal aggression including in the media. Almost immediately she went to place flowers at the Gisozi Memorial. In part of her speech she said: "The road to reconciliation is still long. This memorial only commemorates the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsis, whereas there were also massacres of Hutus », clearly alluding to the crimes committed in 1994 by members of the former Tutsi rebellion by the Rwanda Popular Front (FPR), now in power. “The Hutus who killed Tutsis must understand that they have to be punished. It is the same for the Tutsis who have killed Hutus." This declaration caused fury on the part of genocide victims, the media and the authorities who accused her of propagating “negativism”.
Since 10 February she has regularly been summoned by the police for investigation which has been very time consuming and has hindered her other activities and in which she has been accused of spreading « genocidal ideology, divisionism and contact with the FDLR”. Up to now no formal charges have been brought but a legal framework has been created which can lead to charges simply by transferring the police file to the courts.
At the same time the FDU-Inkingi was trying to organise its constituent assembly. This had not been formally forbidden by anyone but Ingabire faced “Kafkaesque” behaviour on the part of the authorities. The commune was willing to authorize the assembly on condition that the police would confirm that they would be present to ensure security. The police would be happy to ensure security provided that the commune gives its written authorisation, and so...
On 13 March, she received a letter from the communal authorities which forbade her to organise political meetings since she was subject to police investigation i.e. the February police interrogation was being used to prevent her exercising political rights today. She wanted to react by holding a press conference but all the hotels where she had booked a meeting room were threatened and cancelled the booking at the last minute.
The newest opposition party is the Green Democratic Party, launched in August 2009 in Kigali, with the aim of creating a genuine and broad-based opposition with a progressive and ecological vision. This party has also been stopped several times in its efforts to organise its meetings. Faced with this situation, the three parties mentioned have set up a common structure (Conseil de Concertation Permanent des Partis de l’Opposition) in the hope that this coordination will enable them to widen the democratic “space” by having a common position on certain subjects and joint lobbying nationally and internationally.
However, these groups, acting alone or together, are very fragile faced with a regime which has no desire for real debate during the elections and which is restricting democratic space through :
• Its monopoly of the media, which continually demonize the opposition parties and their leaders
• Verbal and physical intimidation of opposition parties, their leaders, members and activists
• The creation of a legal framework in which proceedings can be brought very rapidly and where the opposition finds it hard to defend itself (since accusations of spreading genocidal ideology and divisionism are very broad and not clearly defined in law. This terminology is applied to all those who have a different understanding than the official one of the recent history of Rwanda. This means it can be used to paralyse the leaders of the opposition and to prevent them carrying out their daily duties and exercising their political rights.)
• An administrative policy which aims to prevent opposition groups being registered, setting themselves up, organising meetings or making themselves known to the general public. In this way two of the parties mentioned above have not yet been registered, while the third has not been given the right to organise activities on the ground.
• Infiltration of opposition parties in order to destabilise them from within.
These strategies do not necessarily imply that the regime wants completely to ban the opposition. It could easily have done that before. Perhaps it wants first to slow down the opposition, to stop it getting through to the people with a message different from its own and to stop it gaining credibility. The opposition leaders I have met fear that the government will prevent them getting registration in March. The process cannot go forward in April, the month when the country is loaded with emotions, with ceremonies and activities commemorating the genocide. This would mean starting again in May. If the authorities use the same delaying tactics it is not unlikely that opposition political parties would only be recognised several weeks before the elections. In this case they would take part in the elections without any normal preparation for the campaign or for the vote and without a chance of getting through to the electorate.
2) Hawks on the run
On Wednesday 3 March, President Kagame accused two high ranking Rwandan officers of attempting to destabilise Rwanda: the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, and General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army and Ambassador to India who had also fled to South Africa, according to the Rwandan judiciary. "Nobody, not a single person, not even Kayumba, can make a coup d'etat here. Think about it and you will conclude that no-one can make a coup d'etat in Rwanda”, President Kagame insisted. Around the same time the state prosecutor, Martin Ngoga, accused General Kayumba Nyamwasa of the grenade attacks of 19 February. For a long time these two soldiers originating from the Ugandan Anglophone diaspora had been among the regime’s key personalities.
Patrick Karegeya was not only the former intelligence chief, he was also the main man running the Congo Desk, a bureau run by the External Security Department which was created in order to manage the exploitation of the wealth of eastern DRC, the income from which did not appear in official government accounts. This system enabled the army and political leaders to conceal huge sums of money. In all the discussions and documents relating to the official withdrawal of the Rwandan army from the Congo in September 2002 it has been very hard to distinguish precisely between the role of the Rwandan state and that of the non-state political and military lobbies as regards the illicit exploitation of Congolese resources and the support given to military groups such as the CNDP. In the shadowy zone between the state and the Rwandan lobbies, Patrick Karegeya and the Congo Desk occupied a central position.
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa grew up in the south of Uganda and he became one of the most powerful people in the Rwanda army. He led the military campaigns in the north east of the country in the years following the genocide. In 2001 he was replaced as head of the army by General Emmanuel Habyarimana, who was himself later replaced by James Kaberebe. Kayumba was sent for training to the United Kingdom. In 2004, he was appointed ambassador to India. Political insiders in Rwanda have always believed that this appointment (and even sending him earlier to England) was a step taken by President Kagame to remove Kayumba from the centre of politico-military affairs in Rwanda as he was starting to build his own base within the core group of power in Rwanda.
In November 2006, the French judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, issued an international arrest warrant against Kayumba and eight other high ranking military men close to Kagame in connexion with the enquiry into the attack on President Juvénal Habyarimana’s airplane on 6 April 1994 which triggered the genocide. In February 2008, the Spanish magistrate, Fernando Andreu Merelles, issued fourty arrest warrants against senior officers in the Rwanda army (including Kayumba) for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism committed in Rwanda and in the DRC between 1 October 1990 and 2002. The cases had been submitted to the Spanish courts in 2000 by relatives of Spanish victims killed in Rwanda, religious and humanitarian workers and by exiled Rwandan organisations.
In an interview after his arrival in South Africa General Kayumba spoke of the transformation of Kagame’s regime into a dictatorship and of his own commitment to a democratic Rwanda. One must, however, make a distinction between hawks and doves inside Rwanda’s power structure – but Kayumba is most certainly no dove…
3) Déo Mushayidi
On Saturday 6 March 2010, the Rwandan authorities confirmed the arrest of the opposition leader, Déo Mushayidi. Mushayidi, had been living in recent months in Tanzania, was arrested by Tanzanian police in the town of Bukoba. On 4 March, he was taken to the Burundi frontier and transferred by the Burundian police to Bujumbura. On Friday 5 March he was extradited to Rwanda, despite the absence of an international arrest warrant or even any kind of legal procedure, and transferred to Kicukiro police station, Kigali.
Born in 1961 in the south east of Rwanda, Mushayidi was a genocide survivor who in 1995 resigned his post as assistant to the Secretary-General of the FPR, Major Théogène Rudasingwa. He became a journalist on several papers e.g. l’Ere de Liberté, Imboni where he began to denounce human rights violations and corruption. In 1996, he was elected president of the Association of Journalists of Rwanda (AJIR). He also became Executive Secretary of the Centre for the Promotion of Freedom of Expression and Tolerance in the Great Lakes Region. In 2000, persecuted and slandered by the government media, he requested and was granted asylum in Belgium.
There he involved himself in a number of political movements including the monarchist Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation (ADRN), Igihango and the Intwari Partnership in order to create in 2008 the Pact for the Defence of the People (PDP) of which he remains president until today. He left Belgium in order to continue his political activities closer to Rwanda.
After his arrest, Déo Mushayidi was accused of being implicated in the grenade attacks and of working with Kayumba et Karegeya. Amnesty International has organised an emergency action to support him.
4) The cracks in the mirror
The traditional opposition is not the main concern of the Rwandan regime at the present moment. When you have almost complete control over the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, when an independent press has almost completely disappeared, when that section of opinion which has not openly sided with you has attained an extraordinary level of sophistication in the noble art of self-censorship, when for a large part of national and international opinion you represent the ending of genocide and the return to stability, you are not going to lose the elections. Not against Victoire Ingabire who has not played any role in Rwandan public life and is therefore not known by the electorate in Rwanda. Not against Bernard Ntaganda either – his team is unstable and easily manipulated. And not against Frank Habineza, even though he has worked with people close to you including the first president (i.e. one of the first dissidents) of your country. They have a party which was still not in existence a year ago and which is not certain to be recognised in time to take part in the elections.
The Democratic Green Party is not going to defeat the FPR in the elections but it is making the regime nervous. This is because it shows how the Rwandan elite, the inner circle of power is losing its cohesion. This is not the only indication and it is not new, but Kayumba’s departure, the arrest of Mushayidi and the emergence of the Democratic Green Party prove that what the government sees when it looks in the mirror can be seen by everybody, not just by the government itself.
Nothing grows underneath a baobab
Part of the problem of tension inside the regime has nothing to do with the specific context of Rwanda. After the death of Fred Rwigema on the second day of the FPR armed struggle in October 1990, Paul Kagame took over the command of the rebellion and he still commands it today. He was the strong man during the war and after the victory, even though he reserved for himself the role of Minister of Defense, leaving Pasteur Bizimungu to head the institutions of state. This did not prevent anybody, inside Rwanda or not, being aware that it was he who was really running the country. Many in the international community had a high opinion of him: after the fall of the Mobutu generation, Kagame was for some people the incarnation of a new type of African leadership with an inspiring vision, an ability to mobilise and effective enough to achieve palpable and, in some areas, even spectacular results.
However, he is following the same track as other African heads of state (e.g. Museveni and Mugabe). His self-confidence is turning to arrogance and reading carefully the list of key people (high ranking military personnel, ministers, ambassadors) who have left the country shows that his rule has developed a self-destructive tendency, sawing off the branch on which he is sitting. Like Museveni, Mugabe and so many others, Kagame is turning himself into the “Roi Soleil” with no heir, a baobab tree beneath which nothing can grow.
Part of the discontent within the party and the associated community results from a build up of frustration among those who hang on to the coat tails of power without having access to it, people who thought that the FPR could be the motive force to drag them out of poverty. They can see people they grew up with in the refugee camps in Uganda who are now billionaires but they see no way in to that closed circle.
A generational aspect to their exclusion from power is also developing. The generation which took up arms won the war and took over the running of the country invested a lot in the education of their sons and daughters who are now returning home. Their intellectual and technical level far exceeds that of their fathers’ generation and they want to play a leading role in running the country.
International justice: the sword of Damocles
The legal procedures initiated by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière in France and Fernando Andreu Merelles in Spain have badly shaken the inner circle of power. The Rwanda government can rely on the loyalty of a number of countries and international institutions, and this is at least partly based on feelings of guilt on the part of the international community for not having been able to prevent the genocide (and, frankly, not having tried too much to prevent it).
To preserve international support it is vital for the Rwandan regime to be sure of the interpretation the world makes of Rwanda’s recent history. Since 1994, the country has been managed in a psychological climate of winners of the war versus its losers, the victims of the crimes against their executioners, in which, for example, a whole system has been put in place through the gacaca courts to deal with crimes of genocide against Tutsis while at the same time there is a complete taboo regarding crimes committed by the FPR since the start of the war. This taboo reduces the positive effect that gacaca should have been able to have: instead of being the means of taking on board its traumatic past, gacaca has become a strategy for consolidating the winners/victims versus losers/ criminals scenario.
It is true that the initiatives of de Bruguière and Andreu are very irritating. They disrupt the picture and spoil the image. And they lead to worry on the part of those who feel concerned. Even though it is highly improbable that the current leaders of Rwanda would be brought to trial in France or Spain, perhaps the image the country wishes to present is not tenable in the medium term. It cannot be ruled out, even if this does not happen tomorrow, that the question will become: « What are we going to admit ? Who shall we sacrifice?». Such questions do not greatly help to create cohesion. The immediate future of Kayumba is a major concern of the regime. What will he say and before what audience? What if he is extradited to Spain? Hence the pressure on the South African government to send him back to Rwanda.
Rwanda’s involvement in the Congo
Since 1996 the Congo has taken a lot of space in Rwanda’s foreign policy, and on several occasions what happened in the Congo has been a bone of contention which has haunted the regime. For example Kayumba was opposed to the confrontation with Uganda in 2000 and 2002.
A recent example is the arrest of Laurent Nkunda at the start of the joint operation, Umoja Wetu. The operation was led by John Numbi (for the Congo) and James Kabarebe (for Rwanda) and one of the first actions was to arrest Laurent Nkunda who was the subject of a plan by Bosco Ntaganda to replace him at the head of the CNDP. This arrest provoked much animosity in Rwanda, not only in Congolese Rwandophone refugee circles and camps in Rwanda, but also in the army. After all, Nkunda had served in the FPR and elements of the FPR had served in Nkunda forces. This collaboration created strong links and common interests.
Clearly a great part of the Congo’s importance for Rwanda is the illegal trafficking of the Congo’s resources through Rwanda. This traffic is evidently not controlled by the Congo government but a good part is also outside the control of the Rwanda government even though it serves the interests of key people in the Rwandan politico-military establishment. Such business interests can be very various and do not always contribute to the cohesion of the regime either. It is partly for this reason that one can understand the nervousness about the current obligation that the Rwandan rulers must report their wealth and their income transparently.
Directly linked to the Rwandan involvement in the Congo is the problem of demobilised soldiers. Now that a direct presence in the Congo is no longer an option, Rwanda finds itself with much too large an army. Part of the surplus can be deployed by the African Union but that is a limited option. The remainder has to be demobilised, and many of these ex-soldiers feel basically abandoned by the regime which they have fought for, often in very tough circumstances.
The language issue
We all know about the linguistic tension in Rwanda: the FPR introduced English since the rebellion was led by those who had grown up in Uganda. The fact that they had taken power gave English a much more important status in the public life of the country than could be imagined from the numbers that actually spoke it. Over the years the balance has gradually shifted in favour of English and this was accompanied by a feeling of discrimination among many Francophones.
A decisive moment was in 2008 when English was recognised as the official language in education. For some this was a visionary decision to open up the country to the regional, continental and global reality; for others it was a decision to set in stone the ambition of a minority regime to monopolize communication and the country’s intellectual life, to dominate the country’s youth, to rewrite history and in the end to take control of the country’s collective memory.
Quite independently of the point of view from which this question is viewed, it is obvious that the decision has strengthened some and marginalised others. It deepens the already existing gulf between those who came out of Uganda and formed the nucleus of the regime and the others, where genocide survivors found themselves in an even more uncomfortable situation than that found by those who returned from Burundi or the Congo in 1994.
Power and the clan structure
The clan structure around the Rwanda royal family, even though it has not reigned for over half a century, is still seen by many as a factor. The monarchist movement around King Kigeli V (currently in the United States) continues to play a political role and it wants to participate in running the country. Some Rwandan analysts point out that membership of these clans is an important aspect of the identity of a number of those currently active on the political stage. In particular the ancestral tension between Banyiginya and Bega is one of the cracks which enable us better to understand the goings on side the power structure: Kagame is a Mwega, whereas Kayumba, Karegeya, Nyetera, Kazura, Sebarenzi and many others are Banyiginya.
I am not at all an expert in this subject to understand to what degree clans play a serious role in the present situation but I thought I should at least mention it.
Conclusion: more questions than answers
Is the Rwandan regime in crisis? It is possible, certainly. Given the over-reaction of the authorities when confronted by new situations on the ground, we get the impression that the regime believes so, even while the authorities keep declaring that everything is under control. Is the reign of the FPR approaching its end? I meet many people who hope so, but that remains to be seen. Even though I believe that the Rwanda government is not working towards a lasting solution to its problems, it seems clear that the control which it has established remains solid based as it is on a culture of silence and a tradition of obedience to authority. Is the country about to implode again? We definitely hope it isn’t. It is very hard to imagine that Rwanda and its people have anything to gain from that, and any such event would have serious consequences for the whole region – for the essential but fragile peace process in Burundi for example; or for the people in eastern Congo who have seen many changes since the Umoja Wetu operation without any resulting sign of future lasting peace.
What is certain is that things are not going well. People are not comparing the situation with the pre-electoral atmosphere in 2003 but with that of 1993. The grenade attacks have provoked fear. The question: « Who threw them? » remains unanswered. Victoire Ingabire and the presidents of the other opposition parties simply want a really free and transparent electoral process. For them the present climate is counter productive. Kayumba ? There are plenty of precedents in the history of post-colonial Africa of generals trying to take power but I do not remember any case where they began their campaign by throwing grenades at a bus stop. The FDLR? I have just been in eastern Congo and I had a strong impression that the FDLR had other things on their mind. Déo Mushayidi? Frustrated demobilised soldiers? People who were angry because they found that Sarkozy was not forced to make a proper apology (that was one of the suggestions I heard)? Not very likely. In fact there are no probable explanations but one of the least improbable ones is that the regime itself organised the attacks so as to create a climate where citizens could be arrested and intimidated. I met many people who were frightened and there were others I was not able to meet as they were so frightened that they did not dare meet me.
The pre-electoral situation remains volatile. It is hard to foresee what Rwanda will be like during and after the elections if the opposition remains muzzled, harassed or crushed. It is important for the Rwandan regime to receive signals from the international community that it must stop this intimidation. At the present time this community gives the impression that it is not at all concerned. It seems to believe that the pre-election tension was predictable, that the situation is under control, that the nervousness might increase a little before the election but that in the end Kagame will win with a comfortable, even crushing, majority. Then the international community will continue business as usual. This is a rather weak analysis. It underestimates the destabilising potential of the present situation and it serves very badly the chances for democracy in Rwanda in the medium and longer term.
From our point of view we must recommend that the international community put pressure on the regime to take measures that will help create political stability in Rwanda and the holding of truly free and transparent elections. Such pressures should principally consist of:
• urging the regime not to refuse to register opposition parties, not to prevent them from working on the ground and not destroying them;
• stopping political and police harassment of the leaders and members of the opposition ;
• asking the government not to use the public media to demonise its opponents;
• demand that a new electoral law be published and an independent electoral commission be set up;
• rapidly deploy an international electoral observer mission.
Beyond the immediate question of the election, it is really important for the FPR to reverse trend to restriction and exclusion and to put its effort into solving the antagonisms which exist, but this falls outside the Terms of Reference of my March visit. EurAc will come back to this matter in a future document.
For further details:
Kris Berwouts
Rue des Tanneurs, 165 B - 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2 213 04 000
@: kris.berwouts@eurac-network.org
http://www.eurac-network.org/
Director of EurAc
Post-field visit report
March 2010
I visited Rwanda during the second week of March 2010. In recent years I have often passed through this country which I have been visiting since 1997, usually in transit to Goma, Bukavu or Bujumbura. Each time I have taken advantage and met some personal or professional contacts, but since 2007 I have never stayed more than 24 hours.I have, of course, always kept up to date with what was happening in Rwanda and, together with my colleagues at EurAc, I have made a continuing effort to provide information to understand the issues better and to discuss them objectively. Such a « leitmotiv » is relevant everywhere but it is especially important in the case of Rwanda: here very often the arguments between “believers” and “non- believers” are like the deaf listening to the dumb.In the weeks just before my arrival it was possible to feel considerable tension building up in the country. Of course we all expected the space for political dialogue to be reduced in the months leading to the election. The demonization of Victoire Ingabire when she returned to the country to lead a campaign for president as the candidate of the opposition party, FDU-Inkingi, led to increasing aggression against the other opposition parties present inside the country. On 19 February, a Friday evening, various well frequented places in the capital were the subject of three grenade attacks at the height of the rush hour resulting in two deaths and several people wounded. The Rwanda media first accused the FDLR, then Victoire Ingabire for these attacks. On Thursday 4 March 2010 in two further, almost simultaneous, bomb attacks in Kigali 16 more people were wounded. These acts of violence were followed by a wave of accusations and arrests.
In the time between the two attacks, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa left the country and went to South Africa. After his departure this former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army was accused of being behind the grenade attacks of 19 February and of being associated with the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, who has been in South Africa since 2007.
On Saturday 6 March, the Rwanda authorities announced the arrest in Burundi of an opposition activist, Déo Mushayidi, accused by Kigali of being one of the authors of the recent grenade attacks. Gradually the bomb throwers started to outnumber the bombs.
You can understand that I did not know very well what to expect. As the days went by I had a problem knowing exactly why the situation seemed to me to be different from what it was the other times I had visited the country. I noticed that the people felt fear, but that had long been the case. I saw a closing up of the political space but this had often been experienced before. I had not remembered grenade attacks in the recent past (but a little research after my return told me that there had been in April and December 2008 and in April and July 2009), but at the same time I had the impression that the grenades were a symptom rather than a cause of events. It was my wish and my duty to bring together all these bits of information in one solid piece of analysis.
Finally what was really new dawned on me: I was watching a régime which was primarily not fighting its enemies; it was struggling to prevent its own disintegration. For ten years we had speculated about divisions within the inner circle of power. We always realized that there were disagreements but no-one could help me precisely define these divisions. Today when the régime looks at itself in the mirror it can see the cracks that belie the united and serene image which it wants to show to the public in Rwanda and internationally. The régime has come face to face with its own fragility; it is nervous and is reacting out of all proportion.
You will read in the following pages my findings, my impressions and my analysis. This does not reflect EurAc’s official position. It is based on the reflections of a single person and only he is committed by it – a person who, as usual, returns from a visit with more questions than answers.
Kris Berwouts
Director, EurAc
21 March 2010
1) Open debate in a closed political context?
Rwanda is not accustomed to open debate. Over the years the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the party which has been in power since 1994 has built up a control over public life (including the political and judicial organs) on the lines of a one party system despite the existence of a number of other satellite political parties which operate on the fringes of power thanks to their basic loyalty to that power.
The electoral cycle (2001 – 2003) which marked the end of the transition period was organised with no open debate: the only opposition party, ADEP-Mizero, was never registered, and the main independent candidates for the presidential elections were disqualified just before the vote. President Kagame won his elections with a stalinist 95% of votes following a campaign marred by the disappearances, arrests and intimidation of voters, candidates and observers. The European Union found irregularities and serious fraud in both the legislative and presidential elections of 2003. The EU observation mission had similar findings during the legislative elections of September 2008. Although the wording of the report and in the declarations made at the time of its publication was very diplomatic and tried to avoid confrontation with the Rwandan régime, several of those who took part in this mission reported voting irregularities, in the handling of ballot boxes and in counting votes.
It is now four and a half months until the presidential elections due on 9 August 2010. The ruling party is taking them very seriously and making preparations, putting the party machine in order at local and national level and using all available means including its monopoly of the media.
At the same time other political groupings are preparing themselves too. They are trying to obtain registration as political parties and demanding a fair chance to make themselves known and heard by the electorate. The principal opposition parties are:
• The Parti Social Imberakuri, (PSI) with Bernard Ntaganda as President, formed by ex-members of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) which they left because they were frustrated that the PSD remained tied to the FPR.
• The Democratic Green Party, with a leadership drawn mainly from the Anglophones, is seen by many as an expression of discontent from within the FPR. Its President is Frank Habineza and its Secretary General Charles Kabanda, one of the founders of the FPR in the 80’s in Uganda.
• The FDU-Inkingi whose President, Victoire Ingabire, returned in mid-January to stand as a presidential candidate after an absence of 17 years.
The regime does not consider that these parties enrich Rwanda’s political life.
In 2009, the Parti Social Imberakuri tried to organise four congresses. Three of them were stopped by the regime for procedural reasons but one was held in June.The PS Imberakuri was recognised as a party in July 2009. Throughout this period the party president, Bernard Ntaganda, made very critical speeches on a number of social, political and judicial issues of concern to the people. For many Rwandans the fact that the regime was apparently allowing Ntaganda to speak so openly was an indication that there could be positive change and a new political openness.
In the end an offensive against Bernard Ntaganda was launched from within his own party. The Secretary General of the PSI, Noel Hakizimfura, accused his president of « divisionism and genocidal ideology ». In February Hakizimfura and another party member were expelled from the party for having accepted money from the FPR in order to destabilize the PSI. On Tuesday evening 16 March 2010, some leading members of the PS-Imberakuri were taken to the headquarters of the FPR where they were ordered to organise a party convention the following day, 17 March, to remove Ntaganda from his post. The convention was held and the party vice-president, Christine Mukabunani, declared afterwards that Bernard Ntaganda was no longer president of the party. As a result the institutional framework of the PSI has become very unclear.
In her case, Victoire Ingabire had for a long time been preparing her bid for the presidency of Rwanda from Holland where she had been living for 17 years. Ingabire arrived on Saturday 16 January in Rwanda: "I am ready to canvass for my candidature for head of state and victory is certain", she declared soon after stepping on to the tarmac at Kigali international airport. Her candidature and her direct way of speaking immediately caused tension within the regime which responded with immediate verbal aggression including in the media. Almost immediately she went to place flowers at the Gisozi Memorial. In part of her speech she said: "The road to reconciliation is still long. This memorial only commemorates the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsis, whereas there were also massacres of Hutus », clearly alluding to the crimes committed in 1994 by members of the former Tutsi rebellion by the Rwanda Popular Front (FPR), now in power. “The Hutus who killed Tutsis must understand that they have to be punished. It is the same for the Tutsis who have killed Hutus." This declaration caused fury on the part of genocide victims, the media and the authorities who accused her of propagating “negativism”.
Since 10 February she has regularly been summoned by the police for investigation which has been very time consuming and has hindered her other activities and in which she has been accused of spreading « genocidal ideology, divisionism and contact with the FDLR”. Up to now no formal charges have been brought but a legal framework has been created which can lead to charges simply by transferring the police file to the courts.
At the same time the FDU-Inkingi was trying to organise its constituent assembly. This had not been formally forbidden by anyone but Ingabire faced “Kafkaesque” behaviour on the part of the authorities. The commune was willing to authorize the assembly on condition that the police would confirm that they would be present to ensure security. The police would be happy to ensure security provided that the commune gives its written authorisation, and so...
On 13 March, she received a letter from the communal authorities which forbade her to organise political meetings since she was subject to police investigation i.e. the February police interrogation was being used to prevent her exercising political rights today. She wanted to react by holding a press conference but all the hotels where she had booked a meeting room were threatened and cancelled the booking at the last minute.
The newest opposition party is the Green Democratic Party, launched in August 2009 in Kigali, with the aim of creating a genuine and broad-based opposition with a progressive and ecological vision. This party has also been stopped several times in its efforts to organise its meetings. Faced with this situation, the three parties mentioned have set up a common structure (Conseil de Concertation Permanent des Partis de l’Opposition) in the hope that this coordination will enable them to widen the democratic “space” by having a common position on certain subjects and joint lobbying nationally and internationally.
However, these groups, acting alone or together, are very fragile faced with a regime which has no desire for real debate during the elections and which is restricting democratic space through :
• Its monopoly of the media, which continually demonize the opposition parties and their leaders
• Verbal and physical intimidation of opposition parties, their leaders, members and activists
• The creation of a legal framework in which proceedings can be brought very rapidly and where the opposition finds it hard to defend itself (since accusations of spreading genocidal ideology and divisionism are very broad and not clearly defined in law. This terminology is applied to all those who have a different understanding than the official one of the recent history of Rwanda. This means it can be used to paralyse the leaders of the opposition and to prevent them carrying out their daily duties and exercising their political rights.)
• An administrative policy which aims to prevent opposition groups being registered, setting themselves up, organising meetings or making themselves known to the general public. In this way two of the parties mentioned above have not yet been registered, while the third has not been given the right to organise activities on the ground.
• Infiltration of opposition parties in order to destabilise them from within.
These strategies do not necessarily imply that the regime wants completely to ban the opposition. It could easily have done that before. Perhaps it wants first to slow down the opposition, to stop it getting through to the people with a message different from its own and to stop it gaining credibility. The opposition leaders I have met fear that the government will prevent them getting registration in March. The process cannot go forward in April, the month when the country is loaded with emotions, with ceremonies and activities commemorating the genocide. This would mean starting again in May. If the authorities use the same delaying tactics it is not unlikely that opposition political parties would only be recognised several weeks before the elections. In this case they would take part in the elections without any normal preparation for the campaign or for the vote and without a chance of getting through to the electorate.
2) Hawks on the run
On Wednesday 3 March, President Kagame accused two high ranking Rwandan officers of attempting to destabilise Rwanda: the former chief of foreign intelligence, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, and General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan army and Ambassador to India who had also fled to South Africa, according to the Rwandan judiciary. "Nobody, not a single person, not even Kayumba, can make a coup d'etat here. Think about it and you will conclude that no-one can make a coup d'etat in Rwanda”, President Kagame insisted. Around the same time the state prosecutor, Martin Ngoga, accused General Kayumba Nyamwasa of the grenade attacks of 19 February. For a long time these two soldiers originating from the Ugandan Anglophone diaspora had been among the regime’s key personalities.
Patrick Karegeya was not only the former intelligence chief, he was also the main man running the Congo Desk, a bureau run by the External Security Department which was created in order to manage the exploitation of the wealth of eastern DRC, the income from which did not appear in official government accounts. This system enabled the army and political leaders to conceal huge sums of money. In all the discussions and documents relating to the official withdrawal of the Rwandan army from the Congo in September 2002 it has been very hard to distinguish precisely between the role of the Rwandan state and that of the non-state political and military lobbies as regards the illicit exploitation of Congolese resources and the support given to military groups such as the CNDP. In the shadowy zone between the state and the Rwandan lobbies, Patrick Karegeya and the Congo Desk occupied a central position.
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa grew up in the south of Uganda and he became one of the most powerful people in the Rwanda army. He led the military campaigns in the north east of the country in the years following the genocide. In 2001 he was replaced as head of the army by General Emmanuel Habyarimana, who was himself later replaced by James Kaberebe. Kayumba was sent for training to the United Kingdom. In 2004, he was appointed ambassador to India. Political insiders in Rwanda have always believed that this appointment (and even sending him earlier to England) was a step taken by President Kagame to remove Kayumba from the centre of politico-military affairs in Rwanda as he was starting to build his own base within the core group of power in Rwanda.
In November 2006, the French judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, issued an international arrest warrant against Kayumba and eight other high ranking military men close to Kagame in connexion with the enquiry into the attack on President Juvénal Habyarimana’s airplane on 6 April 1994 which triggered the genocide. In February 2008, the Spanish magistrate, Fernando Andreu Merelles, issued fourty arrest warrants against senior officers in the Rwanda army (including Kayumba) for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism committed in Rwanda and in the DRC between 1 October 1990 and 2002. The cases had been submitted to the Spanish courts in 2000 by relatives of Spanish victims killed in Rwanda, religious and humanitarian workers and by exiled Rwandan organisations.
In an interview after his arrival in South Africa General Kayumba spoke of the transformation of Kagame’s regime into a dictatorship and of his own commitment to a democratic Rwanda. One must, however, make a distinction between hawks and doves inside Rwanda’s power structure – but Kayumba is most certainly no dove…
3) Déo Mushayidi
On Saturday 6 March 2010, the Rwandan authorities confirmed the arrest of the opposition leader, Déo Mushayidi. Mushayidi, had been living in recent months in Tanzania, was arrested by Tanzanian police in the town of Bukoba. On 4 March, he was taken to the Burundi frontier and transferred by the Burundian police to Bujumbura. On Friday 5 March he was extradited to Rwanda, despite the absence of an international arrest warrant or even any kind of legal procedure, and transferred to Kicukiro police station, Kigali.
Born in 1961 in the south east of Rwanda, Mushayidi was a genocide survivor who in 1995 resigned his post as assistant to the Secretary-General of the FPR, Major Théogène Rudasingwa. He became a journalist on several papers e.g. l’Ere de Liberté, Imboni where he began to denounce human rights violations and corruption. In 1996, he was elected president of the Association of Journalists of Rwanda (AJIR). He also became Executive Secretary of the Centre for the Promotion of Freedom of Expression and Tolerance in the Great Lakes Region. In 2000, persecuted and slandered by the government media, he requested and was granted asylum in Belgium.
There he involved himself in a number of political movements including the monarchist Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation (ADRN), Igihango and the Intwari Partnership in order to create in 2008 the Pact for the Defence of the People (PDP) of which he remains president until today. He left Belgium in order to continue his political activities closer to Rwanda.
After his arrest, Déo Mushayidi was accused of being implicated in the grenade attacks and of working with Kayumba et Karegeya. Amnesty International has organised an emergency action to support him.
4) The cracks in the mirror
The traditional opposition is not the main concern of the Rwandan regime at the present moment. When you have almost complete control over the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, when an independent press has almost completely disappeared, when that section of opinion which has not openly sided with you has attained an extraordinary level of sophistication in the noble art of self-censorship, when for a large part of national and international opinion you represent the ending of genocide and the return to stability, you are not going to lose the elections. Not against Victoire Ingabire who has not played any role in Rwandan public life and is therefore not known by the electorate in Rwanda. Not against Bernard Ntaganda either – his team is unstable and easily manipulated. And not against Frank Habineza, even though he has worked with people close to you including the first president (i.e. one of the first dissidents) of your country. They have a party which was still not in existence a year ago and which is not certain to be recognised in time to take part in the elections.
The Democratic Green Party is not going to defeat the FPR in the elections but it is making the regime nervous. This is because it shows how the Rwandan elite, the inner circle of power is losing its cohesion. This is not the only indication and it is not new, but Kayumba’s departure, the arrest of Mushayidi and the emergence of the Democratic Green Party prove that what the government sees when it looks in the mirror can be seen by everybody, not just by the government itself.
Nothing grows underneath a baobab
Part of the problem of tension inside the regime has nothing to do with the specific context of Rwanda. After the death of Fred Rwigema on the second day of the FPR armed struggle in October 1990, Paul Kagame took over the command of the rebellion and he still commands it today. He was the strong man during the war and after the victory, even though he reserved for himself the role of Minister of Defense, leaving Pasteur Bizimungu to head the institutions of state. This did not prevent anybody, inside Rwanda or not, being aware that it was he who was really running the country. Many in the international community had a high opinion of him: after the fall of the Mobutu generation, Kagame was for some people the incarnation of a new type of African leadership with an inspiring vision, an ability to mobilise and effective enough to achieve palpable and, in some areas, even spectacular results.
However, he is following the same track as other African heads of state (e.g. Museveni and Mugabe). His self-confidence is turning to arrogance and reading carefully the list of key people (high ranking military personnel, ministers, ambassadors) who have left the country shows that his rule has developed a self-destructive tendency, sawing off the branch on which he is sitting. Like Museveni, Mugabe and so many others, Kagame is turning himself into the “Roi Soleil” with no heir, a baobab tree beneath which nothing can grow.
Part of the discontent within the party and the associated community results from a build up of frustration among those who hang on to the coat tails of power without having access to it, people who thought that the FPR could be the motive force to drag them out of poverty. They can see people they grew up with in the refugee camps in Uganda who are now billionaires but they see no way in to that closed circle.
A generational aspect to their exclusion from power is also developing. The generation which took up arms won the war and took over the running of the country invested a lot in the education of their sons and daughters who are now returning home. Their intellectual and technical level far exceeds that of their fathers’ generation and they want to play a leading role in running the country.
International justice: the sword of Damocles
The legal procedures initiated by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière in France and Fernando Andreu Merelles in Spain have badly shaken the inner circle of power. The Rwanda government can rely on the loyalty of a number of countries and international institutions, and this is at least partly based on feelings of guilt on the part of the international community for not having been able to prevent the genocide (and, frankly, not having tried too much to prevent it).
To preserve international support it is vital for the Rwandan regime to be sure of the interpretation the world makes of Rwanda’s recent history. Since 1994, the country has been managed in a psychological climate of winners of the war versus its losers, the victims of the crimes against their executioners, in which, for example, a whole system has been put in place through the gacaca courts to deal with crimes of genocide against Tutsis while at the same time there is a complete taboo regarding crimes committed by the FPR since the start of the war. This taboo reduces the positive effect that gacaca should have been able to have: instead of being the means of taking on board its traumatic past, gacaca has become a strategy for consolidating the winners/victims versus losers/ criminals scenario.
It is true that the initiatives of de Bruguière and Andreu are very irritating. They disrupt the picture and spoil the image. And they lead to worry on the part of those who feel concerned. Even though it is highly improbable that the current leaders of Rwanda would be brought to trial in France or Spain, perhaps the image the country wishes to present is not tenable in the medium term. It cannot be ruled out, even if this does not happen tomorrow, that the question will become: « What are we going to admit ? Who shall we sacrifice?». Such questions do not greatly help to create cohesion. The immediate future of Kayumba is a major concern of the regime. What will he say and before what audience? What if he is extradited to Spain? Hence the pressure on the South African government to send him back to Rwanda.
Rwanda’s involvement in the Congo
Since 1996 the Congo has taken a lot of space in Rwanda’s foreign policy, and on several occasions what happened in the Congo has been a bone of contention which has haunted the regime. For example Kayumba was opposed to the confrontation with Uganda in 2000 and 2002.
A recent example is the arrest of Laurent Nkunda at the start of the joint operation, Umoja Wetu. The operation was led by John Numbi (for the Congo) and James Kabarebe (for Rwanda) and one of the first actions was to arrest Laurent Nkunda who was the subject of a plan by Bosco Ntaganda to replace him at the head of the CNDP. This arrest provoked much animosity in Rwanda, not only in Congolese Rwandophone refugee circles and camps in Rwanda, but also in the army. After all, Nkunda had served in the FPR and elements of the FPR had served in Nkunda forces. This collaboration created strong links and common interests.
Clearly a great part of the Congo’s importance for Rwanda is the illegal trafficking of the Congo’s resources through Rwanda. This traffic is evidently not controlled by the Congo government but a good part is also outside the control of the Rwanda government even though it serves the interests of key people in the Rwandan politico-military establishment. Such business interests can be very various and do not always contribute to the cohesion of the regime either. It is partly for this reason that one can understand the nervousness about the current obligation that the Rwandan rulers must report their wealth and their income transparently.
Directly linked to the Rwandan involvement in the Congo is the problem of demobilised soldiers. Now that a direct presence in the Congo is no longer an option, Rwanda finds itself with much too large an army. Part of the surplus can be deployed by the African Union but that is a limited option. The remainder has to be demobilised, and many of these ex-soldiers feel basically abandoned by the regime which they have fought for, often in very tough circumstances.
The language issue
We all know about the linguistic tension in Rwanda: the FPR introduced English since the rebellion was led by those who had grown up in Uganda. The fact that they had taken power gave English a much more important status in the public life of the country than could be imagined from the numbers that actually spoke it. Over the years the balance has gradually shifted in favour of English and this was accompanied by a feeling of discrimination among many Francophones.
A decisive moment was in 2008 when English was recognised as the official language in education. For some this was a visionary decision to open up the country to the regional, continental and global reality; for others it was a decision to set in stone the ambition of a minority regime to monopolize communication and the country’s intellectual life, to dominate the country’s youth, to rewrite history and in the end to take control of the country’s collective memory.
Quite independently of the point of view from which this question is viewed, it is obvious that the decision has strengthened some and marginalised others. It deepens the already existing gulf between those who came out of Uganda and formed the nucleus of the regime and the others, where genocide survivors found themselves in an even more uncomfortable situation than that found by those who returned from Burundi or the Congo in 1994.
Power and the clan structure
The clan structure around the Rwanda royal family, even though it has not reigned for over half a century, is still seen by many as a factor. The monarchist movement around King Kigeli V (currently in the United States) continues to play a political role and it wants to participate in running the country. Some Rwandan analysts point out that membership of these clans is an important aspect of the identity of a number of those currently active on the political stage. In particular the ancestral tension between Banyiginya and Bega is one of the cracks which enable us better to understand the goings on side the power structure: Kagame is a Mwega, whereas Kayumba, Karegeya, Nyetera, Kazura, Sebarenzi and many others are Banyiginya.
I am not at all an expert in this subject to understand to what degree clans play a serious role in the present situation but I thought I should at least mention it.
Conclusion: more questions than answers
Is the Rwandan regime in crisis? It is possible, certainly. Given the over-reaction of the authorities when confronted by new situations on the ground, we get the impression that the regime believes so, even while the authorities keep declaring that everything is under control. Is the reign of the FPR approaching its end? I meet many people who hope so, but that remains to be seen. Even though I believe that the Rwanda government is not working towards a lasting solution to its problems, it seems clear that the control which it has established remains solid based as it is on a culture of silence and a tradition of obedience to authority. Is the country about to implode again? We definitely hope it isn’t. It is very hard to imagine that Rwanda and its people have anything to gain from that, and any such event would have serious consequences for the whole region – for the essential but fragile peace process in Burundi for example; or for the people in eastern Congo who have seen many changes since the Umoja Wetu operation without any resulting sign of future lasting peace.
What is certain is that things are not going well. People are not comparing the situation with the pre-electoral atmosphere in 2003 but with that of 1993. The grenade attacks have provoked fear. The question: « Who threw them? » remains unanswered. Victoire Ingabire and the presidents of the other opposition parties simply want a really free and transparent electoral process. For them the present climate is counter productive. Kayumba ? There are plenty of precedents in the history of post-colonial Africa of generals trying to take power but I do not remember any case where they began their campaign by throwing grenades at a bus stop. The FDLR? I have just been in eastern Congo and I had a strong impression that the FDLR had other things on their mind. Déo Mushayidi? Frustrated demobilised soldiers? People who were angry because they found that Sarkozy was not forced to make a proper apology (that was one of the suggestions I heard)? Not very likely. In fact there are no probable explanations but one of the least improbable ones is that the regime itself organised the attacks so as to create a climate where citizens could be arrested and intimidated. I met many people who were frightened and there were others I was not able to meet as they were so frightened that they did not dare meet me.
The pre-electoral situation remains volatile. It is hard to foresee what Rwanda will be like during and after the elections if the opposition remains muzzled, harassed or crushed. It is important for the Rwandan regime to receive signals from the international community that it must stop this intimidation. At the present time this community gives the impression that it is not at all concerned. It seems to believe that the pre-election tension was predictable, that the situation is under control, that the nervousness might increase a little before the election but that in the end Kagame will win with a comfortable, even crushing, majority. Then the international community will continue business as usual. This is a rather weak analysis. It underestimates the destabilising potential of the present situation and it serves very badly the chances for democracy in Rwanda in the medium and longer term.
From our point of view we must recommend that the international community put pressure on the regime to take measures that will help create political stability in Rwanda and the holding of truly free and transparent elections. Such pressures should principally consist of:
• urging the regime not to refuse to register opposition parties, not to prevent them from working on the ground and not destroying them;
• stopping political and police harassment of the leaders and members of the opposition ;
• asking the government not to use the public media to demonise its opponents;
• demand that a new electoral law be published and an independent electoral commission be set up;
• rapidly deploy an international electoral observer mission.
Beyond the immediate question of the election, it is really important for the FPR to reverse trend to restriction and exclusion and to put its effort into solving the antagonisms which exist, but this falls outside the Terms of Reference of my March visit. EurAc will come back to this matter in a future document.
For further details:
Kris Berwouts
Rue des Tanneurs, 165 B - 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2 213 04 000
@: kris.berwouts@eurac-network.org
http://www.eurac-network.org/
American Lawyer for Opposition Leader Is Arrested in Rwanda.
The New York Times
28 May 2010
By JOSH KRON and JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
Editor's Note: The reason for posting this article on WNJ is that the Rwandan police spokesman most clearly lays out the charges being leveled against Professor Erlinder and where the 'evidence' for these charges stem from.
Rwandan authorities on Friday arrested an American lawyer who is representing a leading Rwandan opposition figure, the latest sign of an increasingly repressive atmosphere there.
Peter Erlinder, a law professor at William Mitchell College of Law in Minnesota, is being charged with denying the Rwandan Tutsi genocide and was being interrogated Friday night at police headquarters in the capital, Kigali, Rwandan officials said.
The Rwandan government seems to be getting increasingly sensitive in the months before national elections in August and recently lashed out at the American government, one of its biggest donors, for complaining about restrictions on the media and human rights groups.
The Rwandan government has barred a Human Rights Watch researcher from working in the country and closed down several independent newspapers. Some opposition supporters have been attacked inside government offices; others have been jailed.
Mr. Erlinder previously defended accused genocide suspects at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania, and also recently helped file a civil lawsuit in Oklahoma against Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, which may have provoked the government’s ire.
“He is an advocate for unpopular causes,” which is “one of the great traditions of lawyers,” said Eric S. Janus, president and dean of William Mitchell college.
Mr. Erlinder arrived in Kigali on Sunday to take on the case of Victoire Ingabire, a leading opposition politician who has been trying to run for president but was recently charged with helping a rebel group and espousing genocide ideology. Human rights observers say the Rwandan government has vaguely defined the crime of genocide ideology and is using it to punish political opponents and people who challenge the government’s version of the genocide in 1994.
A police spokesman, Eric Kayingare, said that Mr. Erlinder was accused of “denying the genocide” and “negationism” from statements he had made at the tribunal in Arusha, as well as “in his books, in publications.”
Mr. Erlinder’s arrest comes days after Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, told Congress that the Rwandan government was restricting human rights ahead of presidential elections. A spokesperson for Rwanda dismissed that criticism, saying that American concerns “need to be contextualized.”
Ms. Ingabire was arrested in April after she claimed that crimes committed in 1994 against Hutus by the ruling party had gone unpunished. In a telephone interview on Friday, she said she was surprised the authorities were now going after her lawyer.
“He has the same problem as me,” Ms. Ingabire said. “There was a genocide against the Tutsi, but there were also crimes against humanity, and Kagame doesn’t like to talk about that.”
Josh Kron reported from Kampala, and Jeffrey Gettleman from Nairobi, Kenya.
28 May 2010
By JOSH KRON and JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
Editor's Note: The reason for posting this article on WNJ is that the Rwandan police spokesman most clearly lays out the charges being leveled against Professor Erlinder and where the 'evidence' for these charges stem from.
Rwandan authorities on Friday arrested an American lawyer who is representing a leading Rwandan opposition figure, the latest sign of an increasingly repressive atmosphere there.
Peter Erlinder, a law professor at William Mitchell College of Law in Minnesota, is being charged with denying the Rwandan Tutsi genocide and was being interrogated Friday night at police headquarters in the capital, Kigali, Rwandan officials said.
The Rwandan government seems to be getting increasingly sensitive in the months before national elections in August and recently lashed out at the American government, one of its biggest donors, for complaining about restrictions on the media and human rights groups.
The Rwandan government has barred a Human Rights Watch researcher from working in the country and closed down several independent newspapers. Some opposition supporters have been attacked inside government offices; others have been jailed.
Mr. Erlinder previously defended accused genocide suspects at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania, and also recently helped file a civil lawsuit in Oklahoma against Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, which may have provoked the government’s ire.
“He is an advocate for unpopular causes,” which is “one of the great traditions of lawyers,” said Eric S. Janus, president and dean of William Mitchell college.
Mr. Erlinder arrived in Kigali on Sunday to take on the case of Victoire Ingabire, a leading opposition politician who has been trying to run for president but was recently charged with helping a rebel group and espousing genocide ideology. Human rights observers say the Rwandan government has vaguely defined the crime of genocide ideology and is using it to punish political opponents and people who challenge the government’s version of the genocide in 1994.
A police spokesman, Eric Kayingare, said that Mr. Erlinder was accused of “denying the genocide” and “negationism” from statements he had made at the tribunal in Arusha, as well as “in his books, in publications.”
Mr. Erlinder’s arrest comes days after Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, told Congress that the Rwandan government was restricting human rights ahead of presidential elections. A spokesperson for Rwanda dismissed that criticism, saying that American concerns “need to be contextualized.”
Ms. Ingabire was arrested in April after she claimed that crimes committed in 1994 against Hutus by the ruling party had gone unpunished. In a telephone interview on Friday, she said she was surprised the authorities were now going after her lawyer.
“He has the same problem as me,” Ms. Ingabire said. “There was a genocide against the Tutsi, but there were also crimes against humanity, and Kagame doesn’t like to talk about that.”
Josh Kron reported from Kampala, and Jeffrey Gettleman from Nairobi, Kenya.
US Considers Unilateral Strike Against Pakistan in Same Vein as Bush Doctrine.
By Greg Miller
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, May 29, 2010; A01
The U.S. military is reviewing options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan in the event that a successful attack on American soil is traced to the country's tribal areas, according to senior military officials.
Ties between the alleged Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, and elements of the Pakistani Taliban have sharpened the Obama administration's need for retaliatory options, the officials said. They stressed that a U.S. reprisal would be contemplated only under extreme circumstances, such as a catastrophic attack that leaves President Obama convinced that the ongoing campaign of CIA drone strikes is insufficient.
"Planning has been reinvigorated in the wake of Times Square," one of the officials said.
At the same time, the administration is trying to deepen ties to Pakistan's intelligence officials in a bid to head off any attack by militant groups. The United States and Pakistan have recently established a joint military intelligence center on the outskirts of the northwestern city of Peshawar, and are in negotiations to set up another one near Quetta, the Pakistani city where the Afghan Taliban is based, according to the U.S. military officials. They and other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity surrounding U.S. military and intelligence activities in Pakistan.
The "fusion centers" are meant to bolster Pakistani military operations by providing direct access to U.S. intelligence, including real-time video surveillance from drones controlled by the U.S. Special Operations Command, the officials said. But in an acknowledgment of the continuing mistrust between the two governments, the officials added that both sides also see the centers as a way to keep a closer eye on one another, as well as to monitor military operations and intelligence activities in insurgent areas.
Obama said during his campaign for the presidency that he would be willing to order strikes in Pakistan, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a television interview after the Times Square attempt that "if, heaven forbid, an attack like this that we can trace back to Pakistan were to have been successful, there would be very severe consequences."
Obama dispatched his national security adviser, James L. Jones, and CIA Director Leon Panetta to Islamabad this month to deliver a similar message to Pakistani officials, including President Asif Ali Zardari and the military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani.
Jones and Panetta also presented evidence gathered by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies that Shahzad received significant support from the Pakistani Taliban.
The U.S. options for potential retaliatory action rely mainly on air and missile strikes, but could also employ small teams of U.S. Special Operations troops already positioned along the border with Afghanistan. One of the senior military officials said plans for military strikes in Pakistan have been revised significantly over the past several years, moving away from a "large, punitive response" to more measured plans meant to deliver retaliatory blows against specific militant groups.
The official added that there is a broad consensus in the U.S. military that airstrikes would at best erode the threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and risk an irreparable rupture in the U.S. relationship with Pakistan.
"The general feeling is that we need to be circumspect in how we respond so we don't destroy the relationships we've built" with the Pakistani military, the second official said.
U.S. Special Operations teams in Afghanistan have pushed for years to have wider latitude to carry out raids across the border, arguing that CIA drone strikes do not yield prisoners or other opportunities to gather intelligence. But a 2008 U.S. helicopter raid against a target in Pakistan prompted protests from officials in Islamabad who oppose allowing U.S. soldiers to operate within their country.
The CIA has the authority to designate and strike targets in Pakistan without case-by-case approval from the White House. U.S. military forces are currently authorized to carry out unilateral strikes in Pakistan only if solid intelligence were to surface on any of three high-value targets: al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Taliban chief Mohammad Omar. But even in those cases, the military would need higher-level approval.
"The bottom line is you have to have information about targets to do something [and] we have a process that remains cumbersome," said one of the senior military officials. "If something happens, we have to confirm who did it and where it came from. People want to be as precise as possible to be punitive."
U.S. spy agencies have engaged in a major buildup inside Pakistan over the past year. The CIA has increased the pace of drone strikes against al-Qaeda affiliates, a campaign supported by the arrival of new surveillance and eavesdropping technology deployed by the National Security Agency.
The fusion centers are part of a parallel U.S. military effort to intensify the pressure on the Taliban and other groups accused of directing insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. U.S. officials said that the sharing of intelligence goes both ways and that targets are monitored in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In the Peshawar fusion cell, which was set up within the last several months, Pakistanis have access to "full-motion video from different platforms," including unarmed surveillance drones, one official said.
The fusion centers also serve a broader U.S. aim: making the Pakistanis more dependent on U.S. intelligence, and less likely to curtail Predator drone patrols or other programs that draw significant public opposition.
To Pakistan, the fusion centers offer a glimpse of U.S. capabilities, as well as the ability to monitor U.S. military operations across the border. "They find out much more about what we know," one of the senior U.S. military officials said. "What we get is physical presence -- to see what they are actually doing versus what they say they're doing."
That delicate arrangement will be tested if the two sides reach agreement on the fusion center near Quetta. The city has served for nearly a decade as a sanctuary for Taliban leaders who fled Afghanistan in 2001 and have long-standing ties to Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.
U.S. officials said that the two sides have done preliminary work searching for a suitable site for the center but that the effort is proceeding at a pace that one official described as "typical Pakistani glacial speed." Despite the increased cooperation, U.S. officials say they continue to be frustrated over Pakistan's slow pace in issuing visas to American military and civilian officials.
One senior U.S. military official said the center would be used to track the Afghan Taliban leadership council, known as the Quetta shura. But other officials said the main mission would be to support the U.S. military effort across the border in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where a major U.S. military push is planned.
Staff writers Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung contributed to this report.
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, May 29, 2010; A01
The U.S. military is reviewing options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan in the event that a successful attack on American soil is traced to the country's tribal areas, according to senior military officials.
Ties between the alleged Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, and elements of the Pakistani Taliban have sharpened the Obama administration's need for retaliatory options, the officials said. They stressed that a U.S. reprisal would be contemplated only under extreme circumstances, such as a catastrophic attack that leaves President Obama convinced that the ongoing campaign of CIA drone strikes is insufficient.
"Planning has been reinvigorated in the wake of Times Square," one of the officials said.
At the same time, the administration is trying to deepen ties to Pakistan's intelligence officials in a bid to head off any attack by militant groups. The United States and Pakistan have recently established a joint military intelligence center on the outskirts of the northwestern city of Peshawar, and are in negotiations to set up another one near Quetta, the Pakistani city where the Afghan Taliban is based, according to the U.S. military officials. They and other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity surrounding U.S. military and intelligence activities in Pakistan.
The "fusion centers" are meant to bolster Pakistani military operations by providing direct access to U.S. intelligence, including real-time video surveillance from drones controlled by the U.S. Special Operations Command, the officials said. But in an acknowledgment of the continuing mistrust between the two governments, the officials added that both sides also see the centers as a way to keep a closer eye on one another, as well as to monitor military operations and intelligence activities in insurgent areas.
Obama said during his campaign for the presidency that he would be willing to order strikes in Pakistan, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a television interview after the Times Square attempt that "if, heaven forbid, an attack like this that we can trace back to Pakistan were to have been successful, there would be very severe consequences."
Obama dispatched his national security adviser, James L. Jones, and CIA Director Leon Panetta to Islamabad this month to deliver a similar message to Pakistani officials, including President Asif Ali Zardari and the military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani.
Jones and Panetta also presented evidence gathered by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies that Shahzad received significant support from the Pakistani Taliban.
The U.S. options for potential retaliatory action rely mainly on air and missile strikes, but could also employ small teams of U.S. Special Operations troops already positioned along the border with Afghanistan. One of the senior military officials said plans for military strikes in Pakistan have been revised significantly over the past several years, moving away from a "large, punitive response" to more measured plans meant to deliver retaliatory blows against specific militant groups.
The official added that there is a broad consensus in the U.S. military that airstrikes would at best erode the threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and risk an irreparable rupture in the U.S. relationship with Pakistan.
"The general feeling is that we need to be circumspect in how we respond so we don't destroy the relationships we've built" with the Pakistani military, the second official said.
U.S. Special Operations teams in Afghanistan have pushed for years to have wider latitude to carry out raids across the border, arguing that CIA drone strikes do not yield prisoners or other opportunities to gather intelligence. But a 2008 U.S. helicopter raid against a target in Pakistan prompted protests from officials in Islamabad who oppose allowing U.S. soldiers to operate within their country.
The CIA has the authority to designate and strike targets in Pakistan without case-by-case approval from the White House. U.S. military forces are currently authorized to carry out unilateral strikes in Pakistan only if solid intelligence were to surface on any of three high-value targets: al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Taliban chief Mohammad Omar. But even in those cases, the military would need higher-level approval.
"The bottom line is you have to have information about targets to do something [and] we have a process that remains cumbersome," said one of the senior military officials. "If something happens, we have to confirm who did it and where it came from. People want to be as precise as possible to be punitive."
U.S. spy agencies have engaged in a major buildup inside Pakistan over the past year. The CIA has increased the pace of drone strikes against al-Qaeda affiliates, a campaign supported by the arrival of new surveillance and eavesdropping technology deployed by the National Security Agency.
The fusion centers are part of a parallel U.S. military effort to intensify the pressure on the Taliban and other groups accused of directing insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. U.S. officials said that the sharing of intelligence goes both ways and that targets are monitored in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In the Peshawar fusion cell, which was set up within the last several months, Pakistanis have access to "full-motion video from different platforms," including unarmed surveillance drones, one official said.
The fusion centers also serve a broader U.S. aim: making the Pakistanis more dependent on U.S. intelligence, and less likely to curtail Predator drone patrols or other programs that draw significant public opposition.
To Pakistan, the fusion centers offer a glimpse of U.S. capabilities, as well as the ability to monitor U.S. military operations across the border. "They find out much more about what we know," one of the senior U.S. military officials said. "What we get is physical presence -- to see what they are actually doing versus what they say they're doing."
That delicate arrangement will be tested if the two sides reach agreement on the fusion center near Quetta. The city has served for nearly a decade as a sanctuary for Taliban leaders who fled Afghanistan in 2001 and have long-standing ties to Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.
U.S. officials said that the two sides have done preliminary work searching for a suitable site for the center but that the effort is proceeding at a pace that one official described as "typical Pakistani glacial speed." Despite the increased cooperation, U.S. officials say they continue to be frustrated over Pakistan's slow pace in issuing visas to American military and civilian officials.
One senior U.S. military official said the center would be used to track the Afghan Taliban leadership council, known as the Quetta shura. But other officials said the main mission would be to support the U.S. military effort across the border in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where a major U.S. military push is planned.
Staff writers Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung contributed to this report.
Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation Demands International Community Act on Peter Erlinder's Arrest in Rwanda.
Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation
Press Release
28 May 2010
Contact: Kitty Kurth
Phone: 312-617-7288
The Rwanda News Agency reported today that American law professor C. Peter Erlinder (William and Mitchell College of Law - Minnesota) was arrested over accusations related to negating the Rwandan genocide. The Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation deplores this clearly politically-motivated arrest, and implores the international community to act quickly and decisively to demand Professor Erlinder's immediate release from custody.
Professor Erlinder, an outspoken critic of the Kagame regime, is frequently criticized by the Rwandan government. His name recently appeared on a publicized list of foreigners who the Rwandan government allegedly wants silenced for their views. Professor Erlinder traveled to Rwanda last week to defend presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire on the charges brought against her by the Rwandan government. Mrs. Ingabire, a political opponent of current President Kagame, was jailed recently and is currently under house arrest for expressing her political views, which are in opposition to official government policies. Erlinder is also a defense lawyer and leader of the association of defense attorneys defending Rwandan genocide suspects at the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. His current trip to Rwanda was intended to provide defense counsel in a peaceful legal process, but with this arrest his human rights, liberty and possibly his person safety are in danger.
Professor Erlinder was reportedly arrested on charges of "genocide negationism," which means that he disagrees with the official version of the 1994 genocide perpetuated by the current Rwandan regime. This law is frequently applied to silence critics of the regime, including in the past Mrs. Ingabire, Human Rights Watch investigators, and even the BBC.
Immediate action is needed to free Professor Erlinder and guarantee his human rights and personal safety.
Press Release
28 May 2010
Contact: Kitty Kurth
Phone: 312-617-7288
The Rwanda News Agency reported today that American law professor C. Peter Erlinder (William and Mitchell College of Law - Minnesota) was arrested over accusations related to negating the Rwandan genocide. The Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation deplores this clearly politically-motivated arrest, and implores the international community to act quickly and decisively to demand Professor Erlinder's immediate release from custody.
Professor Erlinder, an outspoken critic of the Kagame regime, is frequently criticized by the Rwandan government. His name recently appeared on a publicized list of foreigners who the Rwandan government allegedly wants silenced for their views. Professor Erlinder traveled to Rwanda last week to defend presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire on the charges brought against her by the Rwandan government. Mrs. Ingabire, a political opponent of current President Kagame, was jailed recently and is currently under house arrest for expressing her political views, which are in opposition to official government policies. Erlinder is also a defense lawyer and leader of the association of defense attorneys defending Rwandan genocide suspects at the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. His current trip to Rwanda was intended to provide defense counsel in a peaceful legal process, but with this arrest his human rights, liberty and possibly his person safety are in danger.
Professor Erlinder was reportedly arrested on charges of "genocide negationism," which means that he disagrees with the official version of the 1994 genocide perpetuated by the current Rwandan regime. This law is frequently applied to silence critics of the regime, including in the past Mrs. Ingabire, Human Rights Watch investigators, and even the BBC.
Immediate action is needed to free Professor Erlinder and guarantee his human rights and personal safety.
Pakistan, Iran sign major gas pipeline pact.
Daily Times
29 May 2010
By Zeeshan Javaid
ISLAMABAD: The Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline sovereign guarantee agreement was signed on Friday.
The agreement was signed by National Iranian Oil Company Managing Director SR Kasaezadeh and Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Joint Secretary Irshad Kaleemi.
Talking to the media after the signing ceremony, Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Naveed Qamar said that the groundwork of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project would start soon, as the paper work had been completed today (Friday).
He said that the Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) between Pakistan and Iran was for the import of 750 million cubic feet daily (mmcfd) of natural gas with a provision to increase it to 1 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd).
“The imported gas volume was nearly 20 percent of Pakistan’s current gas production and the supply was for a contracted period of 25 years, renewable for another five years. All of the imported gas will be dedicated to the power sector,” the minister said.
Shah said the imported gas volume would support approximately 5,000 Megawatts (MW) of power generation and would result in significant annual savings compared to alternative fuels such as High Sulphur Furnace Oil (HSFO), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and Coal.
“As a part of the conditions precedent (CP) to be completed by parties to make the GSPA effective, the Pakistan government was providing a ‘performance guarantee’ on behalf of the Inter State Gas Company. While all other CPs of the GSPA had been completed, the project was now ready to enter into its implementation phase. As per the current project implementation schedule, the first gas flow was targeted by the end of 2014,” he added.
The project will be funded through public-private partnership and the capital cost for the Pakistan section is estimated at $1.65 billion.
The minister added that the construction of the pipeline would also create job opportunities, vocational training and health facilities in the backward areas of Balochistan and Sindh.
While talking to Daily Times, Petroleum Secretary Kamran Lashari said that the usage of this gas would change the fuel mixture composition, which would result in a more affordable power tariff for electric power consumers.
He added that under the second phase, the country would also import 250mmcft gas per day for Balochistan. Lashari said it was time the bankable feasibility study was made and the route survey and front end engineering was conducted for laying the pipeline.
While talking to the media, the National Iranian Oil Company Managing director said that this project would enhance the bilateral relations between both countries.
29 May 2010
By Zeeshan Javaid
ISLAMABAD: The Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline sovereign guarantee agreement was signed on Friday.
The agreement was signed by National Iranian Oil Company Managing Director SR Kasaezadeh and Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Joint Secretary Irshad Kaleemi.
Talking to the media after the signing ceremony, Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Naveed Qamar said that the groundwork of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project would start soon, as the paper work had been completed today (Friday).
He said that the Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) between Pakistan and Iran was for the import of 750 million cubic feet daily (mmcfd) of natural gas with a provision to increase it to 1 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd).
“The imported gas volume was nearly 20 percent of Pakistan’s current gas production and the supply was for a contracted period of 25 years, renewable for another five years. All of the imported gas will be dedicated to the power sector,” the minister said.
Shah said the imported gas volume would support approximately 5,000 Megawatts (MW) of power generation and would result in significant annual savings compared to alternative fuels such as High Sulphur Furnace Oil (HSFO), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and Coal.
“As a part of the conditions precedent (CP) to be completed by parties to make the GSPA effective, the Pakistan government was providing a ‘performance guarantee’ on behalf of the Inter State Gas Company. While all other CPs of the GSPA had been completed, the project was now ready to enter into its implementation phase. As per the current project implementation schedule, the first gas flow was targeted by the end of 2014,” he added.
The project will be funded through public-private partnership and the capital cost for the Pakistan section is estimated at $1.65 billion.
The minister added that the construction of the pipeline would also create job opportunities, vocational training and health facilities in the backward areas of Balochistan and Sindh.
While talking to Daily Times, Petroleum Secretary Kamran Lashari said that the usage of this gas would change the fuel mixture composition, which would result in a more affordable power tariff for electric power consumers.
He added that under the second phase, the country would also import 250mmcft gas per day for Balochistan. Lashari said it was time the bankable feasibility study was made and the route survey and front end engineering was conducted for laying the pipeline.
While talking to the media, the National Iranian Oil Company Managing director said that this project would enhance the bilateral relations between both countries.
Message from Mr. John Philpot, ICTR Lawyer and Vice President of the ADAD.
Last weekend at the ICTR defense conference in Brussels, Martin Ngoga, the Prosecutor General of Rwanda, told us, "we could not invite certain speakers." Two were there with us: Mr. Eugène Rwamucyo, a fine Rwandan doctor, and Professor Peter Erlinder among many other fine intellectuals and lawyers from all walks of life and all tendencies. Now, Eugène Rwamucyo is in prison in France on an apparent request by President Sarkozy for extradition to Rwanda and Peter Erlinder is in prison in Rwanda.
US embassy officials in Rwanda guided Professor Erlinder into prison this morning. What is his alleged crime: genocide negationism that was apparently committed outside Rwandan territory. Does Rwanda have jurisdiction over the entire world?
What is the US doing other than supporting their puppet dictator?
And our crimes: We said it in court at the ICTR and we are threatened for it. We cannot even defend our clients without being endangered.
Peter must be released along with Doctor Rwamucyo.
Mrs. Victoire Ingabire should be released on all charges and allowed to run for President.
John Philpot
Attorney at Law
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
28 May 2010
US embassy officials in Rwanda guided Professor Erlinder into prison this morning. What is his alleged crime: genocide negationism that was apparently committed outside Rwandan territory. Does Rwanda have jurisdiction over the entire world?
What is the US doing other than supporting their puppet dictator?
And our crimes: We said it in court at the ICTR and we are threatened for it. We cannot even defend our clients without being endangered.
Peter must be released along with Doctor Rwamucyo.
Mrs. Victoire Ingabire should be released on all charges and allowed to run for President.
John Philpot
Attorney at Law
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
28 May 2010
Article 19's Comment on the Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology of Rwanda.
Article 19
Press Release
September 2009
ARTICLE 19 is alarmed by the Genocide Ideology Law principally because the central concept of “genocide ideology” is extraordinarily broad and would catch a whole range of forms of expressions concerning genocide. Indeed, the definition of “genocide ideology” violates international law on genocide and “hate speech” in multiple ways. Furthermore, the system of penalties also breaches international human rights law, particularly with respect to children. We contend that law is so fundamentally inimical to international human rights law and humanitarian values that it is fatally flawed. We also consider that the Genocide Ideology Law is counterproductive to its apparent objectives. Its current application suggests that it presents a catalyst for, rather than a barrier against, future human rights atrocities in Rwanda. In our view, therefore, Rwanda’s state organs should simply repeal the law in its entirety, refrain from adopting a similar law in the future and fully implement Rwanda’s actual obligations under international human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR, but also the Genocide Convention and the CRC].
I. Introduction
1. In this Comment, ARTICLE 19 sets out its concerns about the Law No. 18/2008, the Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology (hereinafter the “Genocide Ideology Law” or “Law”) that was adopted on 23 July 2008 by the Rwandan Parliament.
2. ARTICLE 19’s Comment of the Genocide Ideology Law is informed by international human rights law, in particular the right to freedom of expression as encompassed by Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”), a core international human rights treaty to which Rwanda acceded on 16 April 1975. It is recalled that Article 19 of the ICCPR states:
1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
3. Article 20 of the ICCPR then states:
1) Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
4. As a result of ratifying the ICCPR, Rwanda is not only bound as a matter of international law by the provisions of the ICCPR, but is obliged to give effect to that treaty through national legislation. ARTICLE 19 also notes that Rwanda has ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 15 July 1983 which also guarantees freedom of expression.
5. Although ARTICLE 19 relies on international human rights provisions on the right to freedom of expression in particular, this Comment is based on a comprehensive and coherent understanding of international human rights law as contained in other provisions of the ICCPR, including its provisions on equality, as well as those contained in other key international human rights instruments, notably the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention”) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (hereinafter the “CRC”). Furthermore, ARTICLE 19 relies on relevant jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the crime of genocide. In addition to such international human rights authorities, ARTICLE 19 also relies in particular on The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality (hereinafter the “Camden Principles”), a progressive interpretation of international law and standards prepared by ARTICLE 19 in consultation with high-level inter-governmental officials, civil society representatives and academic experts.
6. ARTICLE 19 is alarmed by the Genocide Ideology Law principally because the central concept of “genocide ideology” is extraordinarily broad and would catch a whole range of forms of expressions concerning genocide. Indeed, the definition of “genocide ideology” violates international law on genocide and “hate speech” in multiple ways. Furthermore, the system of penalties also breaches international human rights law, particularly with respect to children. We contend that law is so fundamentally inimical to international human rights law and humanitarian values that it is fatally flawed. We also consider that the Genocide Ideology Law is counterproductive to its apparent objectives. Its current application suggests that it presents a catalyst for, rather than a barrier against, future human rights atrocities in Rwanda. In our view, therefore, Rwanda’s state organs should simply repeal the law in its entirety, refrain from adopting a similar law in the future and fully implement Rwanda’s actual obligations under international human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR, but also the Genocide Convention and the CRC.
II. Analysis of the Genocide Ideology Law
A. The context of the Genocide Ideology Law
7. At the outset of this Comment, ARTICLE 19 acknowledges the particular context within which this law emerged. That context obviously encompasses the historical legacy of the Rwandan genocide in the early months of 1994 in which over eight hundred thousand people, overwhelmingly Tutsis, were systemically and viciously killed, but also the role that certain media played in creating the conditions that gave rise to the genocide. That role was especially acknowledged in the landmark case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the use of hate propaganda to provoke the Rwandan genocide, that of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Boso Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, three media executives who were found guilty of genocide, as well as conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide, and the crimes of persecution and extermination. ARTICLE 19 notes that the Trial Chamber emphasised that “freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination are not incompatible principles of law” and in doing so reflected the fundamental premises of The Camden Principles. (The judgment of the Appeals Chamber is discussed further below.)
8. Yet to properly understand the context of the Genocide Ideology Law, it is also important to understand the significance of the so-called “campaign against genocide ideology” that has recently been launched in Rwanda. Reports of authoritative media and human rights non-governmental organisations indicate that the legacy of genocide is being manipulated by the Rwandan government to suppress political dissent and opposition in a range of ways, but most significantly through the cases involving the crime of genocide ideology. According to available information, about 1,300 such cases were initiated in the Rwandan courts in the 2007-2008 judicial year, even before it was defined by the Genocide Ideology Law itself. Rwandan authorities have used prosecution, or the threat of prosecution under the law to trample opposition, including calls for justice for war crimes committed by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A range of Rwandan and foreign individuals and media organisations have been caught as actual or potential violators of the Genocide Ideology Law. Most notoriously the BBC’s local language radio service was suspended in the country following the station’s feature of its weekly of a programme that was to include a debate on forgiveness among Rwandans after the genocide. Moreover, teachers and pupils at schools have been directly warned by prominent political figures that children “found guilty of harbouring the genocide ideology [can] be denied admission in any school in the country … [and] also be prosecuted in the courts of law when he or she turns the prescribed age”. Such reliance on the Genocide Ideology Law in itself has had a chilling effect on the spectrum of expression, from political to juvenile speech – but comes at a time of a more broader crackdown on media organisations who are targeted with suspension for such activities as comparing the current government to that which was in power in the run-up to the genocide in 1994, and on individual journalists being imprisoned without any legitimate cause. The situation of media in Rwanda was taken up within the recent Concluding Observations on Rwanda, the UN Human Rights Committee, which stated:
While taking note of the State party’s explanations with regard to the role of the press in the 1994 events, the Committee notes with concern reports that journalists who have criticized the Government are currently subjected to intimidation or to acts of aggression by authorities of the State party and that some have been charged with “divisionism”. International press agencies are reported to be under threat of losing their licences by employing certain journalists (art. 19 of the Covenant).
The State party should guarantee freedom of expression for the press and the media, as well as for all citizens. It should make sure that any restriction on the exercise of their activities is compatible with the provisions of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant and cease to punish so-called acts of “divisionism”. The State party should also undertake investigations into the above-mentioned acts of intimidation or aggression and punish their perpetrators.
9. The Human Rights Committee also more generally “expressed its concern about the instability of the current situation in regard to the reconciliation within Rwandan society”, notwithstanding the ongoing period of “reconstruction”. . The lack of political rights and freedoms has undoubtedly hindered the fight against poverty, including the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, and stunted economic growth. More seriously and with specific regard to the Genocide Ideology Law, although it is apparently directed at preventing genocide in Rwanda, the current climate of silencing and fear generated around the law only makes such a massive human rights violation more likely.
B. Legal Basis and Purpose
10. ARTICLE 19 notes that the Genocide Ideology finds its legal basis in a number of provisions of the Rwandan Constitution, including Article 9 which commits the state to the promotion and enforcement of “fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations”, whilst not defining the scope of that term. The Preamble also refers the law establishing the gacaca jurisdictions, the community-based courts which were created in 2001 to provide a speedy and informal way to resolve a backlog of cases involving many thousands of alleged genocidaires. ARTICLE 19 notes these gacaca jurisdictions as well as the convention courts, which together comprise a single judicial system, have come under increasing criticism recently from human rights organisations and also the UN Human Rights Committee for lacking independence and fair trial guarantees.
11. Article 1 states that the purpose of the Genocide Ideology Law is to both prevent and punish the crime of genocide ideology. The purposes of the law are further revealed through the assertion in the final preambular paragraph which makes a causal connection between the existence of the law and the elimination of any future threat of genocide. It states that “it is necessary to prevent and punish genocide ideology in order not for genocide to be committed again in the country”. Whilst this is presented as an underlying premise for the law, ARTICLE 19 submits that it is questionable as to whether such a belief actually exists or whether it is simply an excuse to explain why prosecutions under the law have been pursued with such vigour. Moreover, we also question whether the claim – that a law on genocide ideology must be adopted to ensure that there will never again be a genocide – can be really substantiated. We believe that if such really were the best method of prevention, surely the international community would have agreed to include a requirement on states to adopt such a law within the Genocide Convention itself. Consider also the vast majority of states which neither have legislation resembling the Genocide Ideology Law nor have suffered genocide as suffered by Rwanda in 1994. Whilst it is difficult to claim that the adoption of any legislation can serve as an absolute guarantee against genocide, it may be argued with considerable support that it is the adoption and implementation of human rights guarantees, including protections of freedom of expression, by a state are the best protection against genocide.
C. The definition of “genocide ideology”
12. The central provisions of the Genocide Ideology Law are Articles 2 and 3 that define the concept of “genocide ideology” and set out the characteristics of the crime respectively. Genocide ideology is considered to encompass the following: “an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war”. The characteristics of genocide include “any behaviour aimed at deshumanizing [sic] a person or a group of persons with the same characteristics” by (1) “threatening, intimidating, degrading through diffamatory [sic] speeches, documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred”; (2) “marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, degrading createing [sic] confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stiring [sic] up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred”; (3) “killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide ideology”.
13. Overall a very broad, imprecise and even confusing array of activities and expressions is covered by the notion of genocide ideology. Article 3 encompasses terms which are wide open for abusive interpretation – such as “marginalising”, “laughing”, “mocking”, “boasting”, and “creating confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred” and “stirring up ill feelings” – or which very obviously have no place in any law – such as “propounding wickedness”. Also certain behaviour covered by Article 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law, most obviously killing, should be covered by ordinary criminal law anyway notwithstanding the added dimension of genocide ideology.
14. ARTICLE 19 has a number of more specific comments about these provisions – first through the lens of the Genocide Convention and second through that of the ICCPR.
i. The relevance of the Genocide Convention
15. The fact that the Genocide Ideology Law seeks to combat genocide ideology rather than genocide suggests that this law suffers from any connection with international law on the crime of genocide. Whilst the law’s target of “genocide ideology” is not found in the Genocide Convention or any international human rights instruments, genocidal acts covered by the Genocide Convention – such as the assistance or facilitation of genocide, awareness of any planned or actual genocide – are absent from the law. Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law however mirror Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention in terms of setting out the definition and types of acts covered, though are far broader than the narrowly tailored prescriptions contained in the latter which state:
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
16. From this perspective, if the law is intended to target any genocide related form of expression, it should be directed at the “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” which Rwanda is required to prevent and punish as a state party to the Genocide Convention. ARTICLE 19 notes that the key provisions of the Genocide Convention are reproduced in the relevant context of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide through Articles 2(2) and (3) of the State of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda. The interpretations given to these provisions by the International Criminal Court for Rwanda are especially pertinent for they allow a probing into the reach of the Genocide Ideology Law.
17. In the leading judgment on issue of incitement to commit genocide, the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana considered that a person may be found guilty of the crime of direct and public incitement to genocide if he or she directly and publicly incited the commission of genocide and had the intent directly and publicly to incite others to commit genocide. It emphasised:
… there is a difference between hate speech in general (or inciting discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Direct incitement to commit genocide assumes that the speech is a direct appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2(2) of the Statute; it has to be more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion. In most cases, direct and public incitement to commit genocide can be preceded or accompanied by hate speech, but only direct and public incitement to commit genocide is prohibited under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute. This conclusion is corroborated by the travaux préparatoires to the Genocide Convention.
18. In this way, the Appeals Chamber decision in Nahimana judgment supports the contention that the scope of Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention does not apply to hate speech that does not directly call for the commission of genocide. At the same time, in upholding the view of the Trials Chamber, the Appeals Chamber held that the specific context is a factor to consider in deciding whether discourse constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide. It found that the appellate court also indicated that crime is an inchoate offence, punishable even if no act of genocide has actually resulted from it. Finally, the Appeals Court found that acts of direct and public incitement to commit genocide must be clearly identified. None of these standards on the direct and public incitement of genocide are met by Article 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law. The law’s definition of genocide ideology therefore cannot find any legal basis in international law on the crime of genocide, but in fact contravenes that law.
ii. The relevance of the ICCPR
19. Even if the Genocide Ideology Law is intended to catch a broader range of expressions than direct and public incitement to commit genocide, it should still meet the thresholds contained within Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR. It is recalled that Article 20 imposes an obligation on states to prohibit only the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. In terms of the meaning of this in practice, Principle 12 of The Camden Principles offers helpful guidance on the interpretation of Article 20. It states:
12.1. All States should adopt legislation prohibiting any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (hate speech). National legal systems should make it clear, either explicitly or through authoritative interpretation, that:
i. The terms ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’ refer to intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target group.
ii. The term ‘advocacy’ is to be understood as requiring an intention to promote hatred publicly towards the target group.
iii. The term ‘incitement’ refers to statements about national, racial or religious groups which create an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence against persons belonging to those groups.
iv. The promotion, by different communities, of a positive sense of group identity does not constitute hate speech.
12.2. States should prohibit the condoning or denying of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but only where such statements constitute hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1.
12.3. States should not prohibit criticism directed at, or debate about, particular ideas, beliefs or ideologies, or religions or religious institutions, unless such expression constitutes hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1.
12.4. States should ensure that persons who have suffered actual damages as a result of hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1 have a right to an effective remedy, including a civil remedy for damages.
12.5. States should review their legal framework to ensure that any hate speech regulations conform to the above.
20. The Genocide Ideology Law clearly fails to meet the standards in Article 20 of the ICCPR and Principle 12 of The Camden Principles: Article 3 does not spell out the requirement for an intention to promote hatred publicly or an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence. Also, the criminalisation of “confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence …” is clearly at odds with Principle 12.2 of The Camden Principles.
21. Finally, given that any law on hate speech is direct interference with the right to freedom of expression, it must also meet the conditions of the three part test contained in Article 19(3). The Genocide Ideology Law, however, fails to meet these standards for restrictions on freedom of expression that are reflected in Principle 11 of The Camden Principles which reads:
11.1. States should not impose any restrictions on freedom of expression that are not in accordance with the standards set out in Principle 2.2 and, in particular, restrictions should be provided by law, serve to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security or public order, or public health or morals, and be necessary in a democratic society to protect these interests. This implies, among other things, that restrictions:
i. Are clearly and narrowly defined and respond to a pressing social need.
ii. Are the least intrusive measure available, in the sense that there is no other measure which would be effective and yet less restrictive of freedom of expression.
iii. Are not overbroad, in the sense that they do not restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way, or go beyond the scope of harmful speech and rule out legitimate speech.
iv. Are proportionate in the sense that the benefit to the protected interest outweighs the harm to freedom of expression, including in respect to the sanctions they authorise.
11.2. States should review their legal framework to ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expression.
22. In summary, the Genocide Ideology Law’s central concept of “genocide ideology” violates international human rights law and standards, particularly those contained in Article III of the Genocide Convention and Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR, in a multiple ways. ARTICLE 19 therefore considers that the law is fatally flawed from the perspective of international human rights law. Nevertheless we continue to consider the remainder of the provisions to highlight its other problematic features.
D. Penalties
i. General penalties
23. As indicated earlier, the Genocide Ideology Law provides for very severe penalties for individuals convicted of genocide ideology. Pursuant to Article 4, anyone convicted of the genocide ideology as defined by Articles 2 and 3, shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of 10 to 25 years and a fine of 200,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €245 to €1,230). In the case of recidivism, that penalty is doubled. Article 5 requires that anyone found guilty of genocide ideology who was also convicted of genocide shall also be sentenced to life imprisonment. Under Article 6, current or former leaders in public or private administrative organs, political organisations or non-governmental organisations, or religious leaders convicted of the crime of genocide ideology shall be sentenced to harsher sentences than ordinary people, 15-25 years and a fine of 2,000,000 to 5,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €2,460 to €6,145). Under Article 8, those who are convicted of disseminating genocide ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures and other media shall be sentenced to 20-25 years imprisonment and a fine of 2,000,000 to 5,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €2,460 to €6,145). The level of fines is extremely high for the vast majority of individuals to pay in Rwanda, a country whose GDP per capita estimated at only €687 or US$1,000 for 2008.
24. Article 11 also provides anyone who kills another, conspires or who attempts to kill basing on the ideology of genocide shall be sentenced to a life imprisonment. For this crime there are no mitigating circumstances. This is extremely harsh for a “crime” that is so poorly defined and itself illegal under international law.
25. ARTICLE 19 is seriously concerned about the severity of these penalties because they are likely to have the effect of silencing individuals in relation to forms of expression which fall within the scope of “genocide ideology”. It should be noted that in cases involving any form of expression, the imposition of a penalty – whatever the character of that sanction – engages the right to freedom of expression. This restricts the type of penalties or sanctions that may be imposed, their amount in the case of fines or length in the case of custodial sentences. Under international law, it is well established that an excessive sanction, even for otherwise legitimate restrictions, represent a breach of the right to freedom of expression. The European Court on Human Rights, for example, has noted that excessive sanctions exert an unacceptable chilling effect on freedom of expression. In view of this, ARTICLE 19 considers that the system of penalties is not in compliance with international standards concerning the protection of the right to freedom of expression.
26. Under Article 13, anyone found guilty of making false accusations of genocide ideology is liable to punishment under the Penal Code. Presumably this provision had been added to allay concerns that the law would be abusively applied. Yet, the provision has not prevented the high number of cases on genocide ideology, as noted earlier.
ii. Associations and organisations
27. The law also imposes harsh penalties for associations and organisations, which nevertheless should be and are liable under international criminal law for acts of genocide. Article 7 provides that any association, political organisation or non-profit making organisation convicted of the ideology of genocide shall be punished through its dissolution or a fine of 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €6,145 to €12,290) without prejudice to individual liability of any participant in the commission of the crime. Many such associations and organisations, including non-governmental organisations in Rwanda, would be bankrupted if they were levied such a fine for overstepping the low threshold for “genocide ideology”.
28. ARTICLE 19 considers that the system of penalties as it applies to associations and organisations, as the system of penalties in relation to individuals, is not in compliance with international standards concerning the protection of the right to freedom of expression.
iii. Children
29. The Genocide Ideology Law contains several provisions that relate to children found guilty of genocide ideology and their parents, guardians and teachers. Article 9 provides that a child found guilty of genocide ideology shall be taken to a rehabilitation centre for up to 12 months, if he or she is under 12. If he or she is between 12 and 18 years, he or she shall receive half the sentences referred to in Article 4 of the law. Part or whole of the sentence may be served in the rehabilitation centre. The follow-up procedures for children sent to such rehabilitation centres would be governed by a government minister for the centres.
30. ARTICLE 19 is deeply considered about these provisions which impose harsh sentences on children upon conviction for genocide ideology. It is especially troublesome that Article 9 suggests criminal responsibility can be attributed to someone below the age of 12. Also, those between 12 and 18 only have the possibility of serving their sentence at a rehabilitation centre; they may go to an adult prison for a conviction under the law. Although the provisions take some account of the age of children, under the CRC all those under the age of 18 are entitled to be treated within the criminal justice system in a manner that due account of their age. This entails, among other things: the right to be detained separately from adults, except where this is not in the child’s best interests; the right to privacy at all stages of the criminal proceedings; and the right to be detained or sentenced to imprisonment as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate time. The regime of penalties vis-à-vis children, therefore, depends on a proper functioning system of juvenile justice system, including special laws, procedures and institutions for determining the criminal liability of children. Furthermore, children have to basic guarantees against arbitrary detention and procedural protections ensuring fair trial. This is especially important as special juvenile justice laws, procedures and practices can result in reduced protection as compared to adult criminal justice.
31. Beyond these concerns, ARTICLE 19 also emphasises the especially harmful impact that the Genocide Ideology Law has had and will continue to have upon classroom discussions and debates on historical events and personal experiences in Rwanda and beyond – and the right of every child to express themselves freely about them. In this regard, the Genocide Ideology Law contravenes the child’s right to freedom of expression as contained in Article 13 of the CRC, but also the child’s right to education as contained in Article 28 and 29 of the CRC.
32. Article 11 concerns penalties awarded to parents and to other guardians of children found guilty of genocide ideology. The provision states that “[i]n case it is evident that the parent of the child referred to in Article 9 of this Law, the guardian, the tutor, the teacher or the school headmaster of the child participated in inoculating the genocide ideology”, these individuals shall be sentenced to 15 to 20 years imprisonment. Furthermore, a teacher or a director referred in the preceding paragraph cannot be reintegrated into his teaching career.
33. This provision raises a number of concerns, besides the excessive sentences for parents, guardians and teachers of children found guilty of genocide ideology. First, the words “in case it is evident” suggest a very low standard for determining whether such an individual has “inoculated” a child with genocide ideology, which would not meet the standard of proof in criminal trials (such as “beyond reasonable doubt”) or even civil cases (such as “on a balance of probabilities”). Second, this provision criminalises parents, guardians and teachers for actions including encouraging children to think for themselves in the exercise of their freedom of thought, arguably one of the features of a “good education”. In doing so, it goes against Article 14(2) of the CRC which states:
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents, and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.
III. Recommendations
• The Rwandan Legislature should immediately repeal the Genocide Ideology Law in its entirety.
• To facilitate the ongoing process of reconstruction following the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government should implement fully its international human rights obligations, under the ICCPR, the Genocide Convention and the CRC.
• The Rwandan government should protect and promote the right to freedom of expression as defined in international human rights law and The Camden Principles.
IV. Text of Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology
LAW N°18/2008 OF 23/07/2008
RELATING TO THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IDEOLOGY
We, KAGAME Paul,
President of the Republic;
THE PARLIAMENT HAS ADOPTED AND WE SANCTION, PROMULGATE THE FOLLOWING LAW AND ORDER IT BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA.
THE PARLIAMENT:
The Chamber of Deputies, in its session of May 20, 2008;
The Senate, in its session of April 25, 2008;
Pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 4 June 2003 as amended to date, especially in its articles 9, 62, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 108, 118, 152 and 201;
Pursuant to Organic Law n° 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 establishing the organisation, competence and functioning of Gacaca Courts charged with prosecuting and trying perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity, committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 as modified and complemented to date, especially in Article 14;
Pursuant to the Law n° 33 bis/2003 of 06/09/2003 punishing the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
Pursuant to Decree-Law n° 21/77 of 18/8/1977 instituting the Penal code; Considering the fact that after the genocide of 1994, the crime of genocide ideology is still persisting in the country;
After considering the fact that it is necessary to prevent and punish genocide ideology in order not for genocide to be committed again in the country;
ADOPTS:
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article One: Purpose of this law
This Law aims at preventing and punishing the crime of genocide ideology.
Article 2: Definition of “genocide ideology”
The genocide ideology is an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.
Article 3: Characteristics of the crime of genocide ideology
The crime of genocide ideology is characterized in any behaviour manifested by facts aimed at deshumanizing a person or a group of persons with the same characteristics in the following manner:
1° threatening, intimidating, degrading through diffamatory speeches, documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred;
2° marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, degrading createing confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stiring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred;
3° killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide ideology.
CHAPTER II: PENALTIES
Article 4: Sentencing the crime of genocide ideology
Any person convicted of the crime of genocide ideology as mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of this Law shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of ten (10) years to twenty five (25) years and a fine of two hundred thousand (200.000) to one million (1.000. 000) Rwandan francs
In case of recidivism, the penalty provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be doubled.
Article 5: Penalty awarded to a genocide ideology convict found guilty of the crime of genocide
Any person found guilty of the ideology of genocide who was convicted of the crime of genocide, shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Article 6: Penalties awarded to current and former leaders
In case the perpetrator of the crime of genocide ideology is a leader in public administrative organs, political organisation, private administrative organs, or a non governmental organs, a religious leader, or a former leader in such organs, he/she shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to twenty five (25) years and a fine of two million (2,000,000) to five million (5,000, 000) Rwandan francs.
Article 7: Penalties awarded to associations, a political organization and non profit making organization
Any association, political organization or non profit making organisation convicted of the crime of the ideology of genocide shall be subject to a punishment of its dissolution in accordance with legal provisions relating to dissolution of associations, political organisations and non profit making associations and a fine of five million (5.000.000) to ten million (10.000.000) Rwandan francs without prejudice to individual liability of any participant in the commission of the crime.
Article 8: Penalties for disseminating genocide ideology
Any person who disseminates genocide ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures, media or any other means shall be sentenced to an imprisonment from twenty (20) years to twenty-five (25) years and a fine of two million (2. 000. 000) to five million (5.000.000) Rwandan francs
Article 9: Penalties awarded to children guilty of the crime of genocide ideology
In case a child under twelve years (12) of age is found guilty of a crime of genocide ideology, he or she shall be taken to a rehabilitation centre for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months
In case a child who is found guilty of the crime of genocide ideology is between twelve (12) and eighteen (18) years, he or she shall be sentenced to a half of the penalty referred to in Article 4 of this Law, without prejudice to the possibility that a part or whole of the sentence may be served in the rehabilitation centre.
Article 10: Follow up of a child who is in or was in a rehabilitation centre
An Order of the Minister in charge of rehabilitation centres shall determine procedures through which children referred to in Article 9 of this Law are followed up while in rehabilitation centres and during their social reintegration.
Article 11: Penalties awarded to parents and to other guardians of the child
In case it is evident that the parent of the child referred to in Article 9 of this Law, the guardian, the tutor, the teacher or the school headmaster of the child participated in inoculating the genocide ideology, they shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to twenty five (25) years.
A teacher or a director referred to in the preceeding paragraph cannot be reintegrated into his teaching career.
Article 12: Penalty awarded to a murderer, a conspirator or attempted murderer
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 of this Law, any person who kills another, one who conspires or who attempts to kill basing on the ideology of genocide shall be sentenced to a life imprisonment. There shall be no mitigating circumstance regarding this crime.
Article 13: Penalties against false accusers
Any person found guilty of false accusations of the crime of genocide ideology referred to in Article 4 of this Law shall be liable to the punishment provided for by the penal Code.
Article 14: Damages
Damages awarded to victims of the crime of the ideology of genocide shall be determined in accordance with provisions of civil procedure.
CHAPTER III: FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 15: Abrogating provisions
All prior legal provisions contrary to this Law are hereby repealed.
Article 16: Commencement
This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda.
Kigali, on 23/07/2008
The President of the Republic
KAGAME Paul
(sé)
The Prime Minister
MAKUZA Bernard
(sé)
Seen and sealed with the Seal of the Republic:
The Minister of Justice/Attorney
General
KARUGARAMA Tharcisse
(sé)
FURTHER INFORMATION:
• For more information please contact:
Dr Sejal Parmar, Senior Legal Officer, sejal@article19.org, +44 20 7324 2500
• ARTICLE 19 is an independent human rights organisation that works around the world to protect and promote the right to freedom of expression. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees free speech.
Copyrights ©ARTICLE 19, September 2009.
Free Word Centre, 60 Farringdon Road,
London EC1R 3GA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7324 2500. Fax: +44 20 7490 0566.
Press Release
September 2009
ARTICLE 19 is alarmed by the Genocide Ideology Law principally because the central concept of “genocide ideology” is extraordinarily broad and would catch a whole range of forms of expressions concerning genocide. Indeed, the definition of “genocide ideology” violates international law on genocide and “hate speech” in multiple ways. Furthermore, the system of penalties also breaches international human rights law, particularly with respect to children. We contend that law is so fundamentally inimical to international human rights law and humanitarian values that it is fatally flawed. We also consider that the Genocide Ideology Law is counterproductive to its apparent objectives. Its current application suggests that it presents a catalyst for, rather than a barrier against, future human rights atrocities in Rwanda. In our view, therefore, Rwanda’s state organs should simply repeal the law in its entirety, refrain from adopting a similar law in the future and fully implement Rwanda’s actual obligations under international human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR, but also the Genocide Convention and the CRC].
I. Introduction
1. In this Comment, ARTICLE 19 sets out its concerns about the Law No. 18/2008, the Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology (hereinafter the “Genocide Ideology Law” or “Law”) that was adopted on 23 July 2008 by the Rwandan Parliament.
2. ARTICLE 19’s Comment of the Genocide Ideology Law is informed by international human rights law, in particular the right to freedom of expression as encompassed by Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”), a core international human rights treaty to which Rwanda acceded on 16 April 1975. It is recalled that Article 19 of the ICCPR states:
1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
3. Article 20 of the ICCPR then states:
1) Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
4. As a result of ratifying the ICCPR, Rwanda is not only bound as a matter of international law by the provisions of the ICCPR, but is obliged to give effect to that treaty through national legislation. ARTICLE 19 also notes that Rwanda has ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 15 July 1983 which also guarantees freedom of expression.
5. Although ARTICLE 19 relies on international human rights provisions on the right to freedom of expression in particular, this Comment is based on a comprehensive and coherent understanding of international human rights law as contained in other provisions of the ICCPR, including its provisions on equality, as well as those contained in other key international human rights instruments, notably the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention”) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (hereinafter the “CRC”). Furthermore, ARTICLE 19 relies on relevant jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the crime of genocide. In addition to such international human rights authorities, ARTICLE 19 also relies in particular on The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality (hereinafter the “Camden Principles”), a progressive interpretation of international law and standards prepared by ARTICLE 19 in consultation with high-level inter-governmental officials, civil society representatives and academic experts.
6. ARTICLE 19 is alarmed by the Genocide Ideology Law principally because the central concept of “genocide ideology” is extraordinarily broad and would catch a whole range of forms of expressions concerning genocide. Indeed, the definition of “genocide ideology” violates international law on genocide and “hate speech” in multiple ways. Furthermore, the system of penalties also breaches international human rights law, particularly with respect to children. We contend that law is so fundamentally inimical to international human rights law and humanitarian values that it is fatally flawed. We also consider that the Genocide Ideology Law is counterproductive to its apparent objectives. Its current application suggests that it presents a catalyst for, rather than a barrier against, future human rights atrocities in Rwanda. In our view, therefore, Rwanda’s state organs should simply repeal the law in its entirety, refrain from adopting a similar law in the future and fully implement Rwanda’s actual obligations under international human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR, but also the Genocide Convention and the CRC.
II. Analysis of the Genocide Ideology Law
A. The context of the Genocide Ideology Law
7. At the outset of this Comment, ARTICLE 19 acknowledges the particular context within which this law emerged. That context obviously encompasses the historical legacy of the Rwandan genocide in the early months of 1994 in which over eight hundred thousand people, overwhelmingly Tutsis, were systemically and viciously killed, but also the role that certain media played in creating the conditions that gave rise to the genocide. That role was especially acknowledged in the landmark case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the use of hate propaganda to provoke the Rwandan genocide, that of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Boso Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, three media executives who were found guilty of genocide, as well as conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide, and the crimes of persecution and extermination. ARTICLE 19 notes that the Trial Chamber emphasised that “freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination are not incompatible principles of law” and in doing so reflected the fundamental premises of The Camden Principles. (The judgment of the Appeals Chamber is discussed further below.)
8. Yet to properly understand the context of the Genocide Ideology Law, it is also important to understand the significance of the so-called “campaign against genocide ideology” that has recently been launched in Rwanda. Reports of authoritative media and human rights non-governmental organisations indicate that the legacy of genocide is being manipulated by the Rwandan government to suppress political dissent and opposition in a range of ways, but most significantly through the cases involving the crime of genocide ideology. According to available information, about 1,300 such cases were initiated in the Rwandan courts in the 2007-2008 judicial year, even before it was defined by the Genocide Ideology Law itself. Rwandan authorities have used prosecution, or the threat of prosecution under the law to trample opposition, including calls for justice for war crimes committed by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A range of Rwandan and foreign individuals and media organisations have been caught as actual or potential violators of the Genocide Ideology Law. Most notoriously the BBC’s local language radio service was suspended in the country following the station’s feature of its weekly of a programme that was to include a debate on forgiveness among Rwandans after the genocide. Moreover, teachers and pupils at schools have been directly warned by prominent political figures that children “found guilty of harbouring the genocide ideology [can] be denied admission in any school in the country … [and] also be prosecuted in the courts of law when he or she turns the prescribed age”. Such reliance on the Genocide Ideology Law in itself has had a chilling effect on the spectrum of expression, from political to juvenile speech – but comes at a time of a more broader crackdown on media organisations who are targeted with suspension for such activities as comparing the current government to that which was in power in the run-up to the genocide in 1994, and on individual journalists being imprisoned without any legitimate cause. The situation of media in Rwanda was taken up within the recent Concluding Observations on Rwanda, the UN Human Rights Committee, which stated:
While taking note of the State party’s explanations with regard to the role of the press in the 1994 events, the Committee notes with concern reports that journalists who have criticized the Government are currently subjected to intimidation or to acts of aggression by authorities of the State party and that some have been charged with “divisionism”. International press agencies are reported to be under threat of losing their licences by employing certain journalists (art. 19 of the Covenant).
The State party should guarantee freedom of expression for the press and the media, as well as for all citizens. It should make sure that any restriction on the exercise of their activities is compatible with the provisions of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant and cease to punish so-called acts of “divisionism”. The State party should also undertake investigations into the above-mentioned acts of intimidation or aggression and punish their perpetrators.
9. The Human Rights Committee also more generally “expressed its concern about the instability of the current situation in regard to the reconciliation within Rwandan society”, notwithstanding the ongoing period of “reconstruction”. . The lack of political rights and freedoms has undoubtedly hindered the fight against poverty, including the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, and stunted economic growth. More seriously and with specific regard to the Genocide Ideology Law, although it is apparently directed at preventing genocide in Rwanda, the current climate of silencing and fear generated around the law only makes such a massive human rights violation more likely.
B. Legal Basis and Purpose
10. ARTICLE 19 notes that the Genocide Ideology finds its legal basis in a number of provisions of the Rwandan Constitution, including Article 9 which commits the state to the promotion and enforcement of “fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations”, whilst not defining the scope of that term. The Preamble also refers the law establishing the gacaca jurisdictions, the community-based courts which were created in 2001 to provide a speedy and informal way to resolve a backlog of cases involving many thousands of alleged genocidaires. ARTICLE 19 notes these gacaca jurisdictions as well as the convention courts, which together comprise a single judicial system, have come under increasing criticism recently from human rights organisations and also the UN Human Rights Committee for lacking independence and fair trial guarantees.
11. Article 1 states that the purpose of the Genocide Ideology Law is to both prevent and punish the crime of genocide ideology. The purposes of the law are further revealed through the assertion in the final preambular paragraph which makes a causal connection between the existence of the law and the elimination of any future threat of genocide. It states that “it is necessary to prevent and punish genocide ideology in order not for genocide to be committed again in the country”. Whilst this is presented as an underlying premise for the law, ARTICLE 19 submits that it is questionable as to whether such a belief actually exists or whether it is simply an excuse to explain why prosecutions under the law have been pursued with such vigour. Moreover, we also question whether the claim – that a law on genocide ideology must be adopted to ensure that there will never again be a genocide – can be really substantiated. We believe that if such really were the best method of prevention, surely the international community would have agreed to include a requirement on states to adopt such a law within the Genocide Convention itself. Consider also the vast majority of states which neither have legislation resembling the Genocide Ideology Law nor have suffered genocide as suffered by Rwanda in 1994. Whilst it is difficult to claim that the adoption of any legislation can serve as an absolute guarantee against genocide, it may be argued with considerable support that it is the adoption and implementation of human rights guarantees, including protections of freedom of expression, by a state are the best protection against genocide.
C. The definition of “genocide ideology”
12. The central provisions of the Genocide Ideology Law are Articles 2 and 3 that define the concept of “genocide ideology” and set out the characteristics of the crime respectively. Genocide ideology is considered to encompass the following: “an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war”. The characteristics of genocide include “any behaviour aimed at deshumanizing [sic] a person or a group of persons with the same characteristics” by (1) “threatening, intimidating, degrading through diffamatory [sic] speeches, documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred”; (2) “marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, degrading createing [sic] confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stiring [sic] up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred”; (3) “killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide ideology”.
13. Overall a very broad, imprecise and even confusing array of activities and expressions is covered by the notion of genocide ideology. Article 3 encompasses terms which are wide open for abusive interpretation – such as “marginalising”, “laughing”, “mocking”, “boasting”, and “creating confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred” and “stirring up ill feelings” – or which very obviously have no place in any law – such as “propounding wickedness”. Also certain behaviour covered by Article 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law, most obviously killing, should be covered by ordinary criminal law anyway notwithstanding the added dimension of genocide ideology.
14. ARTICLE 19 has a number of more specific comments about these provisions – first through the lens of the Genocide Convention and second through that of the ICCPR.
i. The relevance of the Genocide Convention
15. The fact that the Genocide Ideology Law seeks to combat genocide ideology rather than genocide suggests that this law suffers from any connection with international law on the crime of genocide. Whilst the law’s target of “genocide ideology” is not found in the Genocide Convention or any international human rights instruments, genocidal acts covered by the Genocide Convention – such as the assistance or facilitation of genocide, awareness of any planned or actual genocide – are absent from the law. Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law however mirror Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention in terms of setting out the definition and types of acts covered, though are far broader than the narrowly tailored prescriptions contained in the latter which state:
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
16. From this perspective, if the law is intended to target any genocide related form of expression, it should be directed at the “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” which Rwanda is required to prevent and punish as a state party to the Genocide Convention. ARTICLE 19 notes that the key provisions of the Genocide Convention are reproduced in the relevant context of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide through Articles 2(2) and (3) of the State of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda. The interpretations given to these provisions by the International Criminal Court for Rwanda are especially pertinent for they allow a probing into the reach of the Genocide Ideology Law.
17. In the leading judgment on issue of incitement to commit genocide, the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana considered that a person may be found guilty of the crime of direct and public incitement to genocide if he or she directly and publicly incited the commission of genocide and had the intent directly and publicly to incite others to commit genocide. It emphasised:
… there is a difference between hate speech in general (or inciting discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Direct incitement to commit genocide assumes that the speech is a direct appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2(2) of the Statute; it has to be more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion. In most cases, direct and public incitement to commit genocide can be preceded or accompanied by hate speech, but only direct and public incitement to commit genocide is prohibited under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute. This conclusion is corroborated by the travaux préparatoires to the Genocide Convention.
18. In this way, the Appeals Chamber decision in Nahimana judgment supports the contention that the scope of Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention does not apply to hate speech that does not directly call for the commission of genocide. At the same time, in upholding the view of the Trials Chamber, the Appeals Chamber held that the specific context is a factor to consider in deciding whether discourse constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide. It found that the appellate court also indicated that crime is an inchoate offence, punishable even if no act of genocide has actually resulted from it. Finally, the Appeals Court found that acts of direct and public incitement to commit genocide must be clearly identified. None of these standards on the direct and public incitement of genocide are met by Article 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law. The law’s definition of genocide ideology therefore cannot find any legal basis in international law on the crime of genocide, but in fact contravenes that law.
ii. The relevance of the ICCPR
19. Even if the Genocide Ideology Law is intended to catch a broader range of expressions than direct and public incitement to commit genocide, it should still meet the thresholds contained within Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR. It is recalled that Article 20 imposes an obligation on states to prohibit only the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. In terms of the meaning of this in practice, Principle 12 of The Camden Principles offers helpful guidance on the interpretation of Article 20. It states:
12.1. All States should adopt legislation prohibiting any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (hate speech). National legal systems should make it clear, either explicitly or through authoritative interpretation, that:
i. The terms ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’ refer to intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target group.
ii. The term ‘advocacy’ is to be understood as requiring an intention to promote hatred publicly towards the target group.
iii. The term ‘incitement’ refers to statements about national, racial or religious groups which create an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence against persons belonging to those groups.
iv. The promotion, by different communities, of a positive sense of group identity does not constitute hate speech.
12.2. States should prohibit the condoning or denying of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but only where such statements constitute hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1.
12.3. States should not prohibit criticism directed at, or debate about, particular ideas, beliefs or ideologies, or religions or religious institutions, unless such expression constitutes hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1.
12.4. States should ensure that persons who have suffered actual damages as a result of hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1 have a right to an effective remedy, including a civil remedy for damages.
12.5. States should review their legal framework to ensure that any hate speech regulations conform to the above.
20. The Genocide Ideology Law clearly fails to meet the standards in Article 20 of the ICCPR and Principle 12 of The Camden Principles: Article 3 does not spell out the requirement for an intention to promote hatred publicly or an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence. Also, the criminalisation of “confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence …” is clearly at odds with Principle 12.2 of The Camden Principles.
21. Finally, given that any law on hate speech is direct interference with the right to freedom of expression, it must also meet the conditions of the three part test contained in Article 19(3). The Genocide Ideology Law, however, fails to meet these standards for restrictions on freedom of expression that are reflected in Principle 11 of The Camden Principles which reads:
11.1. States should not impose any restrictions on freedom of expression that are not in accordance with the standards set out in Principle 2.2 and, in particular, restrictions should be provided by law, serve to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security or public order, or public health or morals, and be necessary in a democratic society to protect these interests. This implies, among other things, that restrictions:
i. Are clearly and narrowly defined and respond to a pressing social need.
ii. Are the least intrusive measure available, in the sense that there is no other measure which would be effective and yet less restrictive of freedom of expression.
iii. Are not overbroad, in the sense that they do not restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way, or go beyond the scope of harmful speech and rule out legitimate speech.
iv. Are proportionate in the sense that the benefit to the protected interest outweighs the harm to freedom of expression, including in respect to the sanctions they authorise.
11.2. States should review their legal framework to ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expression.
22. In summary, the Genocide Ideology Law’s central concept of “genocide ideology” violates international human rights law and standards, particularly those contained in Article III of the Genocide Convention and Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR, in a multiple ways. ARTICLE 19 therefore considers that the law is fatally flawed from the perspective of international human rights law. Nevertheless we continue to consider the remainder of the provisions to highlight its other problematic features.
D. Penalties
i. General penalties
23. As indicated earlier, the Genocide Ideology Law provides for very severe penalties for individuals convicted of genocide ideology. Pursuant to Article 4, anyone convicted of the genocide ideology as defined by Articles 2 and 3, shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of 10 to 25 years and a fine of 200,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €245 to €1,230). In the case of recidivism, that penalty is doubled. Article 5 requires that anyone found guilty of genocide ideology who was also convicted of genocide shall also be sentenced to life imprisonment. Under Article 6, current or former leaders in public or private administrative organs, political organisations or non-governmental organisations, or religious leaders convicted of the crime of genocide ideology shall be sentenced to harsher sentences than ordinary people, 15-25 years and a fine of 2,000,000 to 5,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €2,460 to €6,145). Under Article 8, those who are convicted of disseminating genocide ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures and other media shall be sentenced to 20-25 years imprisonment and a fine of 2,000,000 to 5,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €2,460 to €6,145). The level of fines is extremely high for the vast majority of individuals to pay in Rwanda, a country whose GDP per capita estimated at only €687 or US$1,000 for 2008.
24. Article 11 also provides anyone who kills another, conspires or who attempts to kill basing on the ideology of genocide shall be sentenced to a life imprisonment. For this crime there are no mitigating circumstances. This is extremely harsh for a “crime” that is so poorly defined and itself illegal under international law.
25. ARTICLE 19 is seriously concerned about the severity of these penalties because they are likely to have the effect of silencing individuals in relation to forms of expression which fall within the scope of “genocide ideology”. It should be noted that in cases involving any form of expression, the imposition of a penalty – whatever the character of that sanction – engages the right to freedom of expression. This restricts the type of penalties or sanctions that may be imposed, their amount in the case of fines or length in the case of custodial sentences. Under international law, it is well established that an excessive sanction, even for otherwise legitimate restrictions, represent a breach of the right to freedom of expression. The European Court on Human Rights, for example, has noted that excessive sanctions exert an unacceptable chilling effect on freedom of expression. In view of this, ARTICLE 19 considers that the system of penalties is not in compliance with international standards concerning the protection of the right to freedom of expression.
26. Under Article 13, anyone found guilty of making false accusations of genocide ideology is liable to punishment under the Penal Code. Presumably this provision had been added to allay concerns that the law would be abusively applied. Yet, the provision has not prevented the high number of cases on genocide ideology, as noted earlier.
ii. Associations and organisations
27. The law also imposes harsh penalties for associations and organisations, which nevertheless should be and are liable under international criminal law for acts of genocide. Article 7 provides that any association, political organisation or non-profit making organisation convicted of the ideology of genocide shall be punished through its dissolution or a fine of 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €6,145 to €12,290) without prejudice to individual liability of any participant in the commission of the crime. Many such associations and organisations, including non-governmental organisations in Rwanda, would be bankrupted if they were levied such a fine for overstepping the low threshold for “genocide ideology”.
28. ARTICLE 19 considers that the system of penalties as it applies to associations and organisations, as the system of penalties in relation to individuals, is not in compliance with international standards concerning the protection of the right to freedom of expression.
iii. Children
29. The Genocide Ideology Law contains several provisions that relate to children found guilty of genocide ideology and their parents, guardians and teachers. Article 9 provides that a child found guilty of genocide ideology shall be taken to a rehabilitation centre for up to 12 months, if he or she is under 12. If he or she is between 12 and 18 years, he or she shall receive half the sentences referred to in Article 4 of the law. Part or whole of the sentence may be served in the rehabilitation centre. The follow-up procedures for children sent to such rehabilitation centres would be governed by a government minister for the centres.
30. ARTICLE 19 is deeply considered about these provisions which impose harsh sentences on children upon conviction for genocide ideology. It is especially troublesome that Article 9 suggests criminal responsibility can be attributed to someone below the age of 12. Also, those between 12 and 18 only have the possibility of serving their sentence at a rehabilitation centre; they may go to an adult prison for a conviction under the law. Although the provisions take some account of the age of children, under the CRC all those under the age of 18 are entitled to be treated within the criminal justice system in a manner that due account of their age. This entails, among other things: the right to be detained separately from adults, except where this is not in the child’s best interests; the right to privacy at all stages of the criminal proceedings; and the right to be detained or sentenced to imprisonment as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate time. The regime of penalties vis-à-vis children, therefore, depends on a proper functioning system of juvenile justice system, including special laws, procedures and institutions for determining the criminal liability of children. Furthermore, children have to basic guarantees against arbitrary detention and procedural protections ensuring fair trial. This is especially important as special juvenile justice laws, procedures and practices can result in reduced protection as compared to adult criminal justice.
31. Beyond these concerns, ARTICLE 19 also emphasises the especially harmful impact that the Genocide Ideology Law has had and will continue to have upon classroom discussions and debates on historical events and personal experiences in Rwanda and beyond – and the right of every child to express themselves freely about them. In this regard, the Genocide Ideology Law contravenes the child’s right to freedom of expression as contained in Article 13 of the CRC, but also the child’s right to education as contained in Article 28 and 29 of the CRC.
32. Article 11 concerns penalties awarded to parents and to other guardians of children found guilty of genocide ideology. The provision states that “[i]n case it is evident that the parent of the child referred to in Article 9 of this Law, the guardian, the tutor, the teacher or the school headmaster of the child participated in inoculating the genocide ideology”, these individuals shall be sentenced to 15 to 20 years imprisonment. Furthermore, a teacher or a director referred in the preceding paragraph cannot be reintegrated into his teaching career.
33. This provision raises a number of concerns, besides the excessive sentences for parents, guardians and teachers of children found guilty of genocide ideology. First, the words “in case it is evident” suggest a very low standard for determining whether such an individual has “inoculated” a child with genocide ideology, which would not meet the standard of proof in criminal trials (such as “beyond reasonable doubt”) or even civil cases (such as “on a balance of probabilities”). Second, this provision criminalises parents, guardians and teachers for actions including encouraging children to think for themselves in the exercise of their freedom of thought, arguably one of the features of a “good education”. In doing so, it goes against Article 14(2) of the CRC which states:
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents, and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.
III. Recommendations
• The Rwandan Legislature should immediately repeal the Genocide Ideology Law in its entirety.
• To facilitate the ongoing process of reconstruction following the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government should implement fully its international human rights obligations, under the ICCPR, the Genocide Convention and the CRC.
• The Rwandan government should protect and promote the right to freedom of expression as defined in international human rights law and The Camden Principles.
IV. Text of Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology
LAW N°18/2008 OF 23/07/2008
RELATING TO THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IDEOLOGY
We, KAGAME Paul,
President of the Republic;
THE PARLIAMENT HAS ADOPTED AND WE SANCTION, PROMULGATE THE FOLLOWING LAW AND ORDER IT BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA.
THE PARLIAMENT:
The Chamber of Deputies, in its session of May 20, 2008;
The Senate, in its session of April 25, 2008;
Pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 4 June 2003 as amended to date, especially in its articles 9, 62, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 108, 118, 152 and 201;
Pursuant to Organic Law n° 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 establishing the organisation, competence and functioning of Gacaca Courts charged with prosecuting and trying perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity, committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 as modified and complemented to date, especially in Article 14;
Pursuant to the Law n° 33 bis/2003 of 06/09/2003 punishing the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
Pursuant to Decree-Law n° 21/77 of 18/8/1977 instituting the Penal code; Considering the fact that after the genocide of 1994, the crime of genocide ideology is still persisting in the country;
After considering the fact that it is necessary to prevent and punish genocide ideology in order not for genocide to be committed again in the country;
ADOPTS:
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article One: Purpose of this law
This Law aims at preventing and punishing the crime of genocide ideology.
Article 2: Definition of “genocide ideology”
The genocide ideology is an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.
Article 3: Characteristics of the crime of genocide ideology
The crime of genocide ideology is characterized in any behaviour manifested by facts aimed at deshumanizing a person or a group of persons with the same characteristics in the following manner:
1° threatening, intimidating, degrading through diffamatory speeches, documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred;
2° marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, degrading createing confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stiring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred;
3° killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide ideology.
CHAPTER II: PENALTIES
Article 4: Sentencing the crime of genocide ideology
Any person convicted of the crime of genocide ideology as mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of this Law shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of ten (10) years to twenty five (25) years and a fine of two hundred thousand (200.000) to one million (1.000. 000) Rwandan francs
In case of recidivism, the penalty provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be doubled.
Article 5: Penalty awarded to a genocide ideology convict found guilty of the crime of genocide
Any person found guilty of the ideology of genocide who was convicted of the crime of genocide, shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Article 6: Penalties awarded to current and former leaders
In case the perpetrator of the crime of genocide ideology is a leader in public administrative organs, political organisation, private administrative organs, or a non governmental organs, a religious leader, or a former leader in such organs, he/she shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to twenty five (25) years and a fine of two million (2,000,000) to five million (5,000, 000) Rwandan francs.
Article 7: Penalties awarded to associations, a political organization and non profit making organization
Any association, political organization or non profit making organisation convicted of the crime of the ideology of genocide shall be subject to a punishment of its dissolution in accordance with legal provisions relating to dissolution of associations, political organisations and non profit making associations and a fine of five million (5.000.000) to ten million (10.000.000) Rwandan francs without prejudice to individual liability of any participant in the commission of the crime.
Article 8: Penalties for disseminating genocide ideology
Any person who disseminates genocide ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures, media or any other means shall be sentenced to an imprisonment from twenty (20) years to twenty-five (25) years and a fine of two million (2. 000. 000) to five million (5.000.000) Rwandan francs
Article 9: Penalties awarded to children guilty of the crime of genocide ideology
In case a child under twelve years (12) of age is found guilty of a crime of genocide ideology, he or she shall be taken to a rehabilitation centre for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months
In case a child who is found guilty of the crime of genocide ideology is between twelve (12) and eighteen (18) years, he or she shall be sentenced to a half of the penalty referred to in Article 4 of this Law, without prejudice to the possibility that a part or whole of the sentence may be served in the rehabilitation centre.
Article 10: Follow up of a child who is in or was in a rehabilitation centre
An Order of the Minister in charge of rehabilitation centres shall determine procedures through which children referred to in Article 9 of this Law are followed up while in rehabilitation centres and during their social reintegration.
Article 11: Penalties awarded to parents and to other guardians of the child
In case it is evident that the parent of the child referred to in Article 9 of this Law, the guardian, the tutor, the teacher or the school headmaster of the child participated in inoculating the genocide ideology, they shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to twenty five (25) years.
A teacher or a director referred to in the preceeding paragraph cannot be reintegrated into his teaching career.
Article 12: Penalty awarded to a murderer, a conspirator or attempted murderer
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 of this Law, any person who kills another, one who conspires or who attempts to kill basing on the ideology of genocide shall be sentenced to a life imprisonment. There shall be no mitigating circumstance regarding this crime.
Article 13: Penalties against false accusers
Any person found guilty of false accusations of the crime of genocide ideology referred to in Article 4 of this Law shall be liable to the punishment provided for by the penal Code.
Article 14: Damages
Damages awarded to victims of the crime of the ideology of genocide shall be determined in accordance with provisions of civil procedure.
CHAPTER III: FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 15: Abrogating provisions
All prior legal provisions contrary to this Law are hereby repealed.
Article 16: Commencement
This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda.
Kigali, on 23/07/2008
The President of the Republic
KAGAME Paul
(sé)
The Prime Minister
MAKUZA Bernard
(sé)
Seen and sealed with the Seal of the Republic:
The Minister of Justice/Attorney
General
KARUGARAMA Tharcisse
(sé)
FURTHER INFORMATION:
• For more information please contact:
Dr Sejal Parmar, Senior Legal Officer, sejal@article19.org, +44 20 7324 2500
• ARTICLE 19 is an independent human rights organisation that works around the world to protect and promote the right to freedom of expression. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees free speech.
Copyrights ©ARTICLE 19, September 2009.
Free Word Centre, 60 Farringdon Road,
London EC1R 3GA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7324 2500. Fax: +44 20 7490 0566.
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